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Abstract 
The thesis attempts to put in place- a conceptual framework that provides an 
alternative explanation on the nature of relatiorish1p-%efeweeo diversification and 
performance. Despite over four decadfes of extensive researghf in this domain, findings 
remain inconclusive. There are differences in findings-over time periods, as well as 
over contexts. Most importantly, extant research does not substantiate these cross-
findings with sufficient theoretical or logical justification; leaving sufficient scope to 
strike new directions. A more plausible explanation for the inconsistencies among 
existing research findings may be the failure of most studies to explicitly control for 
factors that may have a bearing on the relationship between diversification and 
performance. Our case studies across three largest business groups in India reveal that 
it not diversity/jer .ye, but the composition of the businesses that ultimately influences 
performance. We subsequently build on the concept of dominant logic to bridge the 
existing gap. Strategic fit was by and large found to be a superior indicator of 
performance compared to diversity. The conclusion is that performance effects of 
increased diversity need not be declining provided the top management of business 
groups makes a conscious effort to enter businesses which are consistent with its 
dominant logic and divest businesses where the fit is deviating. 
One of the key aspects of a firm's development from an evolutionary perspective is 
the choice of diversification strategies (Chandler, 1962; Kay, 1997). The strategic 
management literature therefore suggests diversification as a major strategy (Berry, 
1975; Muller, 1987; Fligstein, 1991). In pursuing diversification strategies, the 
strategic choices that govern it at various points include its: direction - extent - pace -
timing - route. A review of extant literature reveals that there is a great deal of 
variation in the way diversification is conceptualised, defined and measured. 
Ansoff s (1957) notion of diversification emphasises the entry of firms into new 
markets with new products. Gort (1962) defined diversification in terms of the 
concept of heterogeneity of output based on the number of markets served by that 
output. To Berry (1975) diversification represents an increase in the number of 
industries in which a firm is active. Diversification has also been perceived as 
increasing the geographical base of the country. 
The literature on diversification not only represents a great variety of perspectives and 
disciplinary paradigms, but also covers a wide range of research questions and issues. 
Research on diversification was the result of pioneering work of Ansoff (1957). Since 
then, research on diversification has been replete with numerous studies. The various 
research areas on diversification can be broadly categorised into, (a) firms decision to 
diversify - for understanding research on diversification the logically obvious place to 
start is the antecedents and influences on a firms' decisions to diversify, (b) choice of 
direction of diversification - a firm choosing to diversify can be viewed as basically 
seeking ways to modify its business definition, (c) choice of mode of diversification -
it is basically an indication of the extent a firm relies on organic growth vis-^-vis 
externally driven growth, (d) diversity status - after a firm has engaged in 
diversification over time it attains a certain status or profile, (e) management of 
diversification - the problem of managing diversified businesses increase 
dramatically as the firm's scope of diversification increases. 
While a set of studies has been contained within the individual frameworks as defined 
above, there has been another set of studies that has attempted to explore the various 
simple and complex linkages within the above individual frameworks. Such studies 
have explored simple bivariate as well as contingency type relationships involving 
more than a pair of variables, factors, or concepts. Some of the major researched 
linkages are (a) the effect of general environment, industry environment, and firm 
characteristics on a firms' decision to diversify, choice of direction of diversification, 
choice of mode of diversification, diversity status, and (b) the effect of firms decision 
to diversify, choice of direction of diversification, choice of mode of diversification, 
diversification on performance. However, the most researched linkage in this area 
involves diversification and performance (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991). 
Research findings on the nature of relationship between diversification and 
performance can be classified under four distinct streams of thought. The earliest 
streams of work follow exhaustive study of Gort (1962), which spawned decades of 
future research. The basic premise of this stream is that diversification and 
performance is linearly and positively related. This position rests upon several 
assumptions, including those derived from market power theory and internal market 
efficiency among others (Scherer, 1980; Grant, 1998; McCutcheon, 1991). The early 
literature on diversification asserts that diversified firms can employ a number of 
mechanisms to create and exploit market power advantages, tools that are largely 
unavailable to their more focused counterparts (Sobel, 1984; Caves, 1991). Further, a 
low diversified firm has no access to investment from cross-subsidisation. So its basic 
sources of capital are external - which are more costly than internally generated 
funds, when efficiently managed (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994; Lang, Poulsen 
and Stuiz, 1995). In contrast, highly diversified firms' have much greater flexibility in 
capital formation since it can access external as well internally generated resources 
(StuIz, 1990; Lang and StuIz, 1994). Thus, diversification can generate efficiencies 
that are primarily unavailable to a single-business firm (Gertner, Scharfstein and 
Stein, 1994). 
In the second stream of thought, researchers lend credence to the fact the 
diversification and performance is linearly and negatively related. Though many 
studies have concluded that highly diversified firms gain significant financial benefits 
from using internal markets for capital and other critical resources (Rumelt, 1982; 
Williamson, 1986; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Taylor and Lowe, 1995; Grant, 
1998); support for this contention is not universal (McCutcheon, 1991). Jensen (1996) 
has argued that top management of diversified firms may be inclined to invest surplus 
cash flows (i.e. cash flow exceeding that is required to fund all positive net present 
value investments in its present operations) in ways that may support organisational 
inefficiencies. In other words, managers may be drawn to over-invest in undeserving 
projects (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Stulz, 1990; Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
Furthermore, Bhide (1990), and among others (Markides, 1992; Matsusaka, 1993; 
Comment and Jarrell, 1995) mounts the case that internal market advantages from 
diversification were prevalent in the 60's, but the information asymmetries that 
produced this edge slowly diminished since the 70's due to wide spread economic, 
technological and regulatory changes. And by the SO's this distinct advantage was 
almost nullified. 
In the third stream of thought, researchers posit a curvi-linear relationship between 
diversification and performance. According to this view, moderately diversified firms 
perform better than its low diversified business counterparts. However, they differ in 
their predictions of the performance trend as firms move from moderate to high levels 
of diversification. Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) observe that single-business firms 
do not have the opportunity to exploit between-unit synergies or the portfolio effects 
that are available only to diversified firms. Hence, single-business firms do not enjoy 
scale and scope economies. In contrast moderately diversified firms are involved in 
multiple businesses that are able to tap a common pool of resources (Lubatkin and 
O'Neill, 1987; Nayyar, 1992), thus yielding advantages over a single-business firm. 
Theoretical rationales, which suggest superiority of moderate diversification, have 
their focuses on advantages derived from economies of scope (Seth, 1990; Markides 
and Williamson, 1994). Specifically, moderately diversified firms generate 
operational synergies by designing a portfolio of businesses that are mutually 
reinforcing. 
Porter (1985) provides numerous examples from case studies how moderate 
diversifiers can share activities across businesses in order to boost financial 
performance. While benefits accrue to moderately diversified firms, at some point 
these efforts are also associated with additional costs. Grant, Jammine and Thomas 
(1998) recognise the growing strain on top management as it tries to manage an 
increasingly disparate (and therefore, less familiar) portfolio of businesses. Markides 
(1992) delineates other costs, such as control and effort losses (due to increased 
shirking), coordination costs and other diseconomies related to organisation, 
inefficiencies from conflicting dominant logics between businesses, internal capital 
market inefficiencies and due to cross-subsidisation. Given these dynamics, one could 
argue that the marginal costs of diversification increase rapidly as diversification hits 
high levels. Markides and Williamson (1994) refer to this as exaggerated relatedmss 
suggesting a mirage effect when assessing apparent similarities between business 
units. They argue that moderate diversifiers will outperform their extensive 
diversified counterparts only to the degree that they are able to exploit synergies to 
create and accumulate strategic assets more quickly and cheaply than its competitors. 
Simply amortising existing assets via economies of scope - the popular mouthpiece of 
the relatedness theory - will yield only short-term benefits at best. In addition to this 
concern Nayyar (1992) points out that activity that is necessary to exploit relatedness 
lead to costs that partially blunt the benefits of that strategy. Thus, one can easily 
conclude that firms' experience an optimal level of diversification (likely to vary from 
case to case), with performance decrements beyond this point of maximisation (i.e. 
from moderate to high levels diversification). 
A fourth stream of thought, which is basically an extension of the earlier stream, 
advocates that effects of moderate and high levels of diversifications are somewhat 
equal in their impact on performance. In the earlier stream of work, few researchers 
have questioned the superiority of moderate over low or limited diversification. 
However, the performance contribution of moderate versus high levels of 
diversification is often debated. Considering the arguments that follow, it may be that 
the effects of moderate and high levels of diversifications are somewhat equal in their 
impact on performance. The primary issue in this controversy arises from concerns 
that highly diversified firms may not be able to fully exploit the synergies designed 
into the portfolio of businesses. Put another way, synergy initiatives often fall short of 
management expectations (Goold and Campbell, 1998). Going further, high 
diversifications may present some unique advantages of their own derived primarily 
from financial synergies (Kim, Hwang and Burgers, 1989). Highly diversified firms 
can also do more to reduce industry specific risks and probabilities of bankruptcy 
(also referred to as coinsurance effect) and also lead to enhanced debt carrying 
capacity (Barney, 1997; Seth, 1990). Thus, one can easily conclude that firms' do 
experience an optimal level of diversification. 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) argues that Western companies take for granted a range of 
institutions that support their business activities, but many of these institutions are 
absent in most emerging markets. These are also referred to as market failures or 
institutional voids. It is this difference in institutional context that explains the success 
of high levels of diversifications undertaken by business groups and its association 
with positive performance effects. Existing literature argues that groups can fill some 
subset of the institutional voids in such imperfect markets. Indeed, the descriptive 
literature on business groups across several markets emphasises panoply of benefits 
that arise out of the intermediation function played by groups in capital maricets (Leff, 
1976; Pan, 1991) and labour markets (Leff, 1978). The earliest econometric evidences 
came from the studies of Japanese keiretsus (Caves and Uekusa, 1976; Nakatani, 
1984). More recently, Lincoln et al., (1996) described a variety of coordinating 
mechanisms and their role in reducing the variability of returns of affiliates. Chang 
and Hong (1999) suggested that value creation in the case of Korean chaebols might 
occur primarily through product and capital market intermediation. 
Several studies have demonstrated that on the whole business groups add value 
through a combination of product, labour and capital market intermediation (Fisman 
and Khanna, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 1999). However, the benefits of 
diversification in emerging markets may not always be sufficient to offset the costs. 
Some studies suggest that such investments are characterised by fixed costs (Khanna 
and Palepu, 1997; Khanna, Palepu and Wu, 1998). Each business group needs to 
invest in creating coordinating mechanisms (Gerlach, 1992; Lincoln et al., 1996), 
which facilitate the sharing of information and the enforcement of explicit and 
implicit intra-group contracts. Therefore, in the initial stages the fixed costs outweighs 
the benefits of diversification, but once a threshold level is breached, the benefits 
outweigh the costs. It follows that groups that exceed the threshold diversification 
levels will undertake such investments and achieve superior performance. 
Such a threshold effect of diversification can also be generated by explanations 
grounded in political economy, emphasising a rent-seeking view of groups (Olson, 
1982; Granovetter. 1994). Studies by Encarnation (1989), White (1974), Amsden 
(1989) and Robison (1986) in different economic contexts lend credence to this view. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) proposed a formal model having its roots in politico-
economy, which provides an alternative foundation for understanding the mechanism 
for generating the threshold effect. Business groups possess various forms of non-
tradable assets, which are scarce and inimitable. Highly diversified groups have 
greater opportunities to use these assets than single business firms (Teece, 1980, 
1982). Khanna and Palepu (2000) which studied diversification patterns across a 
number of emerging markets, including India concluded that net performance effects 
of unrelated diversification will initially decline till it reaches a threshold. Beyond this 
threshold, marginal increases in group diversification will yield marginal increases in 
performance. They further observed that the threshold level will itself rise as market 
institutions evolve over time and hence performance effects of such high 
diversification will gradually become difficult to achieve. 
In contrast, evidences presented by certain researchers (Kakani, 2000; Mohanty 2000) 
either negate or contradict the above findings. They observed that moderately 
diversified groups outperformed highly diversified ones in India, a giant emerging 
market. They further contended that the value of a business group can be enhanced if 
they are split into individual and independent business units. One way to explain the 
dichotomous findings is that, as markets mature in emerging economies, the ability of 
business groups to circumvent market failure will gradually atrophy over time. This 
argument also finds support in the works of Chang and Hong (2002) who argue that 
the value business groups add may be contingent on the time period under study, as 
different stages of economic liberalisation may affect the optimal diversification level 
a business group should engage in. However, Khanna and Palepu (2000) have 
observed that group effects still persists in most emerging markets, even in markets 
which have a longer duration of economic liberalisation compared to India. Therefore, 
more robust theoretical justifications are needed to counter the same. In the absence of 
the same there is sufficient scope for fresh enquiry and striking out new directions. 
These factors suggest that further conceptual development could perhaps enhance our 
understanding of the linkage between diversification and performance. Also there is a 
dire need to address the indirect influences of diversification on performance 
outcomes (Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997). Therefore, unless such factors are controlled 
for, the relationship between diversification and performance may be spurious. While 
effects external forces on strategic choice are humbly contended; there is a rich 
tradition in strategy literature that suggests that managers have sufficient scope to 
override the industry context and shape the future of a business group (Child, 1972). 
Though the importance of managerial attributes such as distinctive skills, experiences, 
perceptions, biases, etc. have been recognized; the literature on diversification have 
stayed clear of such issues. However, one such notable exception is the concept of 
dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). Despite being a major milestone in 
strategic management research, the concept is lying dormant with very little 
subsequent improvement. The major reason is its cognitive nature, which has 
rendered its measurement and implementation difficult. We build on this concept to 
throw additional light on this research domain. 
Taking cognizance of the recommendations of Prahalad and Bettis (1995) we agree 
that research in strategic management is getting skewed towards offering explanations 
grounded purely in I/O Economics, almost ignoring the top management point of 
view. While analysing some of the diversification projects pursued by the three 
largest business groups in India, we found that top management played a critical role 
in the success of the diversification. In contrast, most of existing researches have 
ignored this view point, possibly due to conscious choice rather than ignorance. 
Considering the magnitude of the problem, we feel that the need of the day is to marry 
theories, rather than look at the problem from a single theoretical lens. Taking a cue 
from Ramanujam and Varadarajan (1989) we move away from empiricals to clinical 
process oriented studies, focusing on conceptual development, rather than end means. 
While taking discourse to some of the diversifications pursued by business groups, we 
find that while some business groups have added value through diversification, others 
have destroyed value. Unrelated diversification even beyond the threshold level has 
not always resulted in improved performance. Perhaps, empirical studies failed to 
highlight this lacuna, because of the strong initial resource position of most business 
groups. It could be also the result of watershed performance in one business, being 
suppressed by a staggering loss at the other end. But strategic failure was clear and 
apparent in some of the diversifications. Therefore, the implications are that the 
relationship between diversification and performance is not so straight-forward as it is 
put out to be. Therefore, that the empirical findings regarding diversification and 
performance are fraught with contradictions, and has raised more questions than 
providing answers. 
There is a school of thought that ascribes the success of some highly diversified 
business groups to the superior skills of the top management (Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986). The particular skill, which the authors identify, is the ability of the top 
management to conceptualise the top management task. They held that different 
businesses have different dominant logics, i.e. different patterns to conceptualise. 
According to their view it talces a highly skilled top management to conceptualise 
highly variegated businesses and hence is the reason for the success of some highly 
diversified groups. A dominant logic can be defined as the way in which the top 
management conceptualises its various business patterns and make critical resource 
allocation decisions. To put it more simply, it can be perceived as a set of working 
rules (similar to thumb rules) that enables the top management to decide what to do 
and more importantly what not to do (i.e. make trade-offs). 
This linkage consists of mental maps developed by the top management through its 
experiences in the core business and sometimes applied inappropriately in other 
businesses. Hence considered more broadly, it can be considered as both a knowledge 
structure and a set of elicited management processes. The top management of a 
diversified group has a significant influence on the ways its member firms are 
managed. It influences to a large extent the style and process of management. This 
research follows up on the notion that there is no unique diversification strategy. 
Sacrosanct, any diversification can be economically or strategically justified, 
depending upon certain ex-ante and ex-post factors. These factors are specific to 
business groups and are also contingent upon the stage of nation's economic transition 
(Lu, et al., 2002). We argue that dominant logic is one such critical factor that can 
generate powerful insights on the relationship between diversification and 
performance. 
At this stage the central contention of this research is that as long as diversification 
strategies of business groups are consistent with its dominant logic, performance will 
be enhanced. Further, greater the fit between the dominant logic of the business group 
and the business characteristics, greater is the likelihood of superior performance. We 
refer to this alignment as strategic fit as it attempts to measure strategic relatedness, 
which is by far superior compared to fit measured in terms of products, markets or 
technologies. Logic behind this inference can be had from multiple theoretical lenses 
having its origin in Organisation Theory, I/O Economics, and Strategic Management. 
Hence, we believe this contention has major implications for top management 
decision-making and will perhaps lead to a much more consistent and interpretable 
findings surrounding diversification and performance. 
One of the major implications of this contention is that the top management is less 
likely to respond appropriately to diversification strategies, where the dominant logic 
is different. As well as respond quickly enough, as they may be unable to interpret the 
information surrounding unfamiliar environment (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). All this 
implies hidden costs, which indirectly has a negative bearing on performance. Second, 
diversification strategies consistent with group dominant logic facilitates 
implementation of strategies as it provides strategic as well as operational control of 
the top management over its diversified businesses (Ghemawat, 1991). Third, a 
consistent dominant logic ensures unlearning and learning of new skills and practices 
required in a fast changing business environment, evident in most emerging markets 
(Das, 1981). Fourth, it implies commitment of the top management, which offers a 
generalized form of explanation for sustained differences in performance across 
business groups (Ghemawat, 1991). Fifth, it facilitates the systematic development 
certain idiosyncratic resources, termed capabilities and distinctive competencies, 
which are the primary sources of competitive advantage across different markets 
(Selznick, 1957; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). It comprises of delivering unimaginable 
value to customers, far ahead of its competitors and at a substantial lower cost. These 
complex resources are not easily replicable, imitable or substitutable by even its 
closest competitors because of a high degree of causal ambiguity involved in it (King 
and Zeithaml, 2001). Sixth, it also results in the reinforcement of fit among its entire 
system of activities. This fit leads to a sustainable competitive advantage and is far 
more superior to fit based on resources (Porter, 1986). 
We undertook in-depth case studies across three largest business groups in India (i.e. 
Tata group, Aditya Biria group, and Reliance group); which led us to develop the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The choice of portfolio of businesses of a diversified 
business group is shaped by the dominant logic of the top management. 
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Hypothesis 2: It is not diversity per se, but the composition of the 
groups' business portfolio contributing to diversity that influences 
performance. 
Hypothesis 3A: The greater the extent of fit of an individual business, 
within the portfolio of businesses, with the dominant logic of the top 
management, higher is the likelihood of better firm performance. 
Hypothesis 3B: The greater the number of individual business, within 
the portfolio of businesses, which fit with the dominant logic of the top 
management, higher is the likelihood of better group performance. 
Hypothesis 4: Dominant logic of the top management is shaped by 
characteristics of its core business, industry characteristics, together 
with the extent of market imperfection in an economy. 
Hypothesis 5: Economic liberalisation leads to a significant decline in 
the extent of market imperfection in an economy. 
Hypothesis 6A: Economic liberalisation necessitates business groups 
to change its dominant logic. 
Hypothesis 6B: Inertia constrains business groups from changing its 
dominant logic. 
Hypothesis 7A: Extent of fit between dominant logic of the top 
management and individual businesses within the portfolio of 
businesses enables a business group to develop distinctive capabilities. 
Hypothesis 7B: Extent of fit between dominant logic of the top 
management and individual businesses within the portfolio of 
businesses enables a business group to implement strategies better. 
This was followed by selective univariate, bi-variate, and multi-variate statistical 
analyses across the sample over a fourteen year time-frame (i.e. 1990-2003) which 
confirmed our hypotheses with high degrees of significance. 
Emerging markets provide business groups with an array of growth opportunities 
through diversification, which were earlier, restricted. As new sectors are opened up 
11 
and existing ones are liberalised, economic liberalisation poses big challenges before 
the top management. Whether to pursue diversifications, which presented new 
opportunities, or restrict businesses in current ones? Our research provides some 
interesting clues to this crucial question. With the onset of the 80's core competence 
and focus became the new dictum for the Western conglomerates. Its cascading effect 
spread even in the emerging markets. Most business groups operating in emerging 
markets were influenced and started curtailing their businesses as a result. This was 
followed by large-scale mergers and acquisitions. Subsequently, the market 
imperfection theory provided some relief to business groups, and once again the 90's 
witnessed business groups following a fresh wave of diversifications, which 
continued unabated for more than a decade. However, very recent results indicate that 
the threshold level above which such diversification benefits arise may have reached a 
crescendo. Thus the benefits of unrelated diversifications may no longer be available 
to business groups in markets where the history of economic liberalisation is 
sufficiently long (eg. China, Korea, and Chile). This is likely because the institutional 
gaps and voids that supported these unrelated business may no longer be present; and 
India being at a crucial stage. At this juncture, our research provides some indications 
that this may only be partially true. Business groups can still pursue high levels of 
diversifications, provided they are consistent with their dominant logic and not to the 
contrary. Such diversification are likely to enhance overall group performance. Here it 
needs to be mentioned that businesses groups, which operate with a set of large and 
broad dominant logic's, are likely to stand advantageous. This would enable them to 
cater to a wider range of businesses than its counterparts, which operate on, a limited 
set and focused dominant logic's. Here again the crucial question is: how do business 
groups manage their portfolio of dominant logic's? The answer is, as the economic 
context in emerging markets becomes increasingly market driven, business groups 
should learn how to adopt dominant logic(s) which are consistent with emerging 
economic environment, and discard old ones which are no longer relevant. Easier said 
than done, how do business groups implement this? They must avoid active inertia 
through changes in the top management. Learning and unlearning of dominant 
logic(s) by the top management in a fast changing economic environment, will hold 
the key to success or failure in the future. 
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DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES IN EMERGING MARKETS 
With Special Reference to Indian Business Groups 
Abstract 
The study attempts to evolve a theoretical framework that provides a holistic view on the 
nature of relationship between diversification and performance across business groups in 
emerging markets. Specifically, the study aims to (a) explore and identify factor(s) that 
influence the relationship between diversification and performance, (b) undertake in-depth 
case studies to analyse the nature of inter-relationship among the moderating and control 
factor(s) and propose a unified theoretical fi-amework, and (c) undertake statistical analyses 
to examine the nature and extent of influence of these factor(s) on diversification and 
performance. 
We build on the concept of "dominant logic" to provide insights and throw new light on the 
relationship between diversification and performance. Simply put, dominant logic represents 
the ways and thinking of the top management, how they view the internal and external 
environment and decide on resource allocations. We imdertook in-depth case studies across 
three largest business groups in India comprising the Tata group, Reliance group, and Aditya 
Birla group. We explored their history and background, trying to assess how their dominant 
logic evolved and changed over time. We moved fi"om overall measures of diversification, to 
individual diversification projects. At each and every stage, we found that the dominant logic 
of the business group was a crucial factor that shaped the resource allocation decision 
surrounding its various businesses. We observed that businesses, which were consistent with 
the dominant logic of the business group, significantly outperformed others in terms of its 
diversifications. Further, group affiliation seemed to be profitable, if firm's businesses were 
consistent with the dominant logic of the business group. 
To test our fi-amework, we assessed the dominant logic(s) of business groups through 
elaborate case studies. Then we compared the dominant logic(s) of the three groups in our 
sample frame with their diversified businesses. Based on a relative degree of consistency, we 
segregated the various businesses of a group of into high, medium, and low fit categories; 
and assigned ordinal values to it. A fit index was composed for each group, based on two 
parameters: sales and capital employed; according to the categories already determined 
earlier. The fit index helped measure the overall consistency of the various businesses within 
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the group as whole. The higher the index value, the higher was the consistency of the various 
businesses with the groups' dominant logic and vice-versa. We refer to this consistency as 
"strategic fit". The fit is referred to as strategic because it attempts to measure the strategic 
relatedness of the various businesses with the dominant logic of the top management. We 
measured the control variables according to detailed methodologies available in existing 
literature. 
Empirical analysis revealed that "strategic fit" had a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between diversification and performance. Even when other factors were 
controlled for, the moderating effect remained significant. However, it was also observed that 
the direct effect of "strategic fit" on overall group performance was negative. Perhaps the 
resource allocation decisions benefited the firms more than the group as whole. The 
following observations were also made (a) size had a negative effect (b) industry 
characteristics had a positive effect, (c) resources and capabilifies had a positive effect, (d) 
internal transactions had a negative effect, (e) inertia had a negative effect on overall group 
performance. It was also observed that market imperfection had a positive effect on 
performance measured by returns, and a negative effect on performance measured by 
margins. Further, businesses, which were consistent with the dominant logic, were found to 
significantly outperform others. 
The major implication of the study is that it is not diversity per se that ultimately influences 
performance. Composition of businesses around a business group's dominant logic (i.e. 
strategic fit) has a significant and decisive bearing on performance. The performance effect 
of diversification was also a function of the business groups' ability to restructure its 
portfolio of dominant logic(s) in the wake of economic liberalisation. This would enable 
them to add emerging businesses to its existing portfolio of businesses and divest low 
performing businesses, thereby enhancing overall group performance. Therefore, the 
conclusion is, market failure alone does not completely explain the evolution, existence and 
sustenance of business groups. In fact business groups may actually be the result of a wide 
range of cultural, political and socio-economic factors that has little to do with economic 
efficiency. 
The study contributes to the growing literature on diversification and performance and more 
specifically on business groups in more ways than one. It helps us understand the patterns of 
diversification strategies pursued by business groups in emerging markets. It attempts to 
provide an explanation, which is not purely based on economic forces. This was a major 
diverging trend. Lastly, but not least we have made an attempt to integrate multiple 
theoretical lenses, which was earlier lacking. We hope that this trend will pave the way to 
look at current research problems from a multi-dimensional and multilateral perspective. As 
a result we have been, by and large successful in increasing the explanatory power of 
diversification on performance by controlling various extraneous factors. 
Preface 
Socio-economic, cultural, and political forces operating in the economy largely shape the 
institution of business groups. Since these forces are likely to be unique in different contexts, 
the nature of diversification strategies pursued by them is also likely to be distinct. 
Historically, the origins of entrepreneurship started in India in the 1860"s - when the first 
cotton mills came up in Mumbai. Till date, Indian business groups, as an institution, have 
survived colonialism, partition and liberalisation. They have remained at the forefront of 
economic activity, al-through. It represents India's largest institution, symbolizing size, scale, 
scope and opportunities. 
Indian business groups are perhaps India's most engendered institution as well. And after 
surviving many a trials and tribulations, it is now faced with one of the toughest challenges 
from global competition. For, however glorious it's past, Indian business groups are 
confronted by a disturbingly uncertain future. Will it be able to face the challenges of 
economic liberalisation? Will it reign over the economy, or be perpetuated? After all, only 
seven of the first fifty business groups in 1947 were even in business by the turn of this 
century, and that the thirty two of the country's largest business groups in 1969 are no longer 
among the top fifty today (Business Today, January 1997). Globally, less than 10% of the 
Fortune 500 companies as first published in 1955, still exist as on 2005 (Govindarajan and 
Trimble, 2006). The lesson is clear: top companies and business groups have high mortality 
rates as well. 
In the wake of economic liberalisation, the one of the critical challenges encountered by 
business groups involves pursuing an appropriate diversification strategy. Accustomed to 
competing in protected environment, the notion of competing for the customer's attention 
and patronage represents a different paradigm altogether. As a result, transition can be truly 
traumatic. Business groups unable to transform have to watch their business disintegrate. The 
challenge to survival is to adapt and become competitive globally, if not at least locally. The 
more demanding decision, which a handful of groups are beginning to take, is to stay and 
compete on equal terms with global competition, penetrating into the market place. That, in 
turn, is forcing genres of sfrategic choices that Indian business groups have not pursued 
extensively in the protected past. It involves forging alliances and joint ventures with global 
competitors; developing distinctive competencies; upgrading quality and cost 
competitiveness to transcend national boundaries. 
The result, but inevitably, is a complete transformation. It demands a process of rigorous and 
analytical exploration of the environment, opportunities, and internal capabilities, which 
played a relatively negligible role in guiding the choice of diversification strategy in the past. 
In an open economy, every emerging field represents an opporttmity for growth to business 
groups. But earlier access to the protected environment was a significant criterion for 
success. Today an entire portfolio of skills and capabilities are essential for survival. To 
conduct a self audit; to take a conscious decision of investing in harvesting those skills; and 
to accept that diversification strategies are all about trade-offs, requires a level of strategic 
thinking that business groups are just beginning to attain. And the background caused by the 
trade-off of these compulsions coupled with the social ethos surrounding the exit of 
unprofitable businesses is revolving business groups through an enormous change of mind-
set and attitudes. 
Despite such intrinsic differences, business groups have been able to cohabit with the 
dynamics of the competitive and dynamic environment. The critical issue earlier was to stay 
together, which offered the route to controlling various individual firms and creating wealth. 
Through this motivation, business groups used bloodlines to build structures and perpetuate 
dynastic leadership. Only when family unity was threatened was the business also threatened 
as a result. Much the stronger force, however, was the family tradition of building, and 
passing on wealth to the heirs, which was almost a compulsion. Coupled with this vector was 
the other, materialistic, convention of seeking a safety net for the heir, which provided an 
additional impetus for creating a subsidiary business. 
The outcome of these forces: the interests of the family became indistinguishable from those 
of its businesses. Today, however, the disintegration of these bonds is one of the noticeable 
change inducing forces impacting a business group. Part of the impetus came from new 
societal structures such as growth of the nuclear family, triumph of individualism, and the 
need for instant gratification. The divergent ambitions of succeeding generations, as well as 
personality clashes, are throwing strong challenges to stability. Some equally critical 
compulsions are being imposed from outside; all of them threatening the age-old benefits and 
rationale that drove the group. Under the combined effect of these internal and external 
forces, a radically different future is emerging for business groups. 
As the families consolidated their business, it created partnerships between its members 
involving financial stakes. This enabled the group to retain strategic control over its 
diversified businesses. This structure did not disturb the patriarch's line of authority; it also 
left enough room for other members to air their personal ambitions. Importantly, the pursuit 
of these goals did not lead to the creation of completely new firms. Instead, it only led to 
complex networks with cross-holdings meant to ensure financial participation of its different 
members. Most family members were directors in almost every variety of business without 
hardly any technical background. As a result, the switch to the board managed structure, from 
the erstwhile managing agency structure in 1969, saw only superficial changes. The boards of 
family businesses thus comprised promoter-directors drawn from the family; a few managers 
with long and deep relationships with the family; fi-iends of the family portraying as 
professionals, non-executive directors; and institutional directors. However, the maze of 
multi-layered firms, with substantial cross-holdings and intermediate investment companies 
persisted, so did the centrally controlled structure of the group. 
However, since liberalisation, the rationale for these forms has almost disappeared. Equally 
important are the new considerations that are dictating the structure of business groups. They 
are beginning to consolidate their fractured holdings in order to keep off takeover attempts in 
the emerging market for corporate control. Moreover, as the new strategic imperatives, 
business groups are being compelled to take on new structures in response: substituting 
centralization with a confederate configuration; flattening hierarchical pyramids; and 
replacing family management wdth professional management. That the Indian business 
groups must follow these paths of transformation is by now an accepted fact. It is the path, 
and not the end result that is important in today's emerging context. Unfortimately, merely 
embarking on these changes may not alone lead to performance. The extent of progress 
already made is a crucial indicator of the chances of a group surviving and creating value in 
the new liberalised era. 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In this chapter we introduce the reader to the background of the research area and its 
development in the past few decades. We also attempt to present the different paradigms in 
explaining diversification strategies not only in the developed markets, but also in the case of 
emerging markets. The centrality of the research problem surrounds our basic observation 
that despite offering a plethora of views and approaches, the findings are fraught with 
contradictions. We intend to combine muhiple theoretical lenses; cutting across disciplines, 
to put in place a unified theoretical framework that attempts explains these dichotomies. 
1.1 Research Context 
The history of the U.S. economy has witnessed major shifts in the pattern of diversification. 
There was an increase in incidence of conglomerate form of diversification during 1960's. It 
was observed that two-thirds of the Fortune 500 firms in the U.S. were highly diversified and 
similar patterns of diversification were found to exist in Western Europe and Japan (Rumelt, 
1974). As a consequence, interest in diversification has grown among practitioners, 
academics, and public-policy makers. Studies of diversification have long been a mainstay of 
Strategic Management research. They constitute a unique core of growing literature in this 
discipline. It began with the pioneering work of Ansoff (1957). The most researched 
phenomenon in this extensive body of literature is that involving diversification and 
performance (Chatterjee and Wemerfelt, 1991). Beginning with the seminal work of Gort 
(1962), Industrial-Organisation (I/O) Economics spawned decades of research based on the 
premise that diversification and performance are positively related. This position rests upon 
several assumptions, including those derived fi-om market power theory and internal market 
efficiency arguments, among others (Scherer, 1980; Grant, 1998). 
Another major shift in the patterns of diversification was witnessed with the onset of the 
1980's in the U.S. economy. Core competencies and focus became the new guidelines of 
conglomerates in most Western economies. Subsequently, there was a spurt in research 
activity to explain this new phenomenon. In a tacit rejection of the earlier linear model, 
Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) concluded that recent empirical evidence suggested that the 
costs of high levels of diversification outweigh the benefits, that focused firms outperform 
their more diversified counterparts. Palich, Cardinal and Miller (2000) in turn proposed a 
curvilinear model, based on their findings that moderate levels of diversification yield higher 
levels of performance than either limited or extensive diversification. 
While U.S. conglomerates started focusing on their diversification strategies, it was also 
observed that there was an increasing trend to dismantle the large conglomerates formed in 
the 1960's into individual firms. Corporate managers argued that the unwieldy conglomerate 
form of structure was no longer responsive to environmental change, which was fast 
becoming the order of the day. Also the cost of maintaining a diversified conglomerate 
structure was slowly outperforming the benefits. To explain these phenomenon researchers 
tried to estimate the relative importance of firm, industry and group differences in the 
determination of performance of a business unit. In support Schmalensee (1985) observed 
that over a time, effects related to industry structure and group slowly gave way to firm 
effects. 
But while managers in the West have dismantled many conglomerates assembled in the 
1960's, diversified business group remains a dominant form of enterprise throughout most 
emerging markets. Some groups operate as holding companies with fiall ownership in many 
enterprises, others are collections of public traded companies, but all have some degree of 
central control and coordination. In the midst of such controversy Khanna and Palepu (1997) 
advocated that Western companies take for granted a range of institutions that support their 
business activities, but many of these institutions are absent in most emerging markets. 
Therefore, focus may be good advice for firms in the West, but groups operating in emerging 
markets can add value by imitating the fijnctions of several institutions that are present only 
in advanced economies. In support, it was observed that firm performance would initially 
decline with increases in a business group's diversification, until group diversification 
reaches a threshold. Beyond this threshold, marginal increases in group's diversification will 
yield marginal increases in firm performance. Further, the threshold above which marginal 
increases in unrelated group diversification result in marginal increases in firm performance 
will rise as market institutions evolve over time (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Therefore, it 
will be become increasingly difficult for business groups to retain the positive effects of 
diversification. Hence, in the long run the pattern of performance of business groups in 
emerging markets will match with those of its Western counterparts. But the pace at which 
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group effects are likely to atrophy is dependent on the pace of economic liberalization 
pursued by the local government. 
The authors also observed that after group diversification was controlled for, group affiliation 
was associated with positive performance effects. The study by Khanna and Rivkin (2001) 
that spanned across fourteen emerging markets concluded that group affiliation appears to 
have as profound an effect on profitability as industry membership. Also the performance 
effects of group membership will decrease as market institutions evolve over time. In support 
Chang and Hong (2002) had also observed that group effects decrease over time. However, 
the pace at which group effects will sublime is likely to depend on the particular institutional 
setting. While the outcome of this research phenomenon was uniformly observed across 
developed markets, they have evoked mixed reactions, particularly in the Indian context. 
While economic liberalisation has opened up a plethora of business opportunities, relatively 
newer business groups have continued to diversify during the last fifteen years of economic 
liberalisation; older business groups have by and large consolidated their business portfolio 
with some minor diversifications, while focused business groups still continue to perform 
unabated. Empirical findings in the same context remain equally confusing (Kakani, 2000; 
Mohanty, 2000). We intend to put in place a theoretical framework that integrates across 
these cross-findings. 
1.2 Research Problem 
Research on diversification and performance has long ignored managerial explanations in 
favour of explanations based on purely economic forces. Starting with the pioneering work of 
Gort (1962), followed by works of Leff (1976, 1978) and subsequent works of Khanna and 
Palepu (1997, 2000) all have based their work, which has its foundations in I/O Economics. 
While not opposed to the economic approach, it was felt that the balance between economic 
and managerial explanations was becoming dramatically skewed (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). 
This did not square with their personal observations or theoretical biases. An earlier paper 
(Bettis, Hall and Prahalad, 1978) began to address this issue. They continued to observe 
problems that the top management had in coping with major diversification moves. Our own 
case studies revealed how several business groups found it increasingly difficult thinking 
about strategically unrelated businesses, or about businesses with different characteristics 
firom their core businesses or when industry structures changed radically. 
The problem becomes even more complicated on account of economic liberalisation, as the 
rules of business changed significantly. Business groups, which were used to perform in a 
protected environment, now faced challenges against international competition. While 
researchers were focusing exclusively on diversification - performance relationship, they 
were at the same time ignoring the extraneous influences of diversification on performance 
outcomes. This has been facilitated because most of existing research has looked into the 
relationship from the point of view of single theoretical lens. Prahalad and Bettis (1995) felt 
that research on diversification and performance was setting into a pattern of regressing a set 
of economic and/or accounting variables and a measure of diversification on a performance 
measure. This research trend was built on earlier research studies of Wrigley (1970), Rumelt 
(1974) and continues till recent times (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). 
While new insights were found, it was felt that the marginal value of such studies was 
declining. There was also a need to shift focus from macro to micro level of analysis; from 
overall profiles of diversification to individual diversification projects and cumulative 
diversification experiences (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989; Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). 
Following this research tradition we made an attempt to study the diversifications patterns of 
Indian business groups and its outcome on performance from the point of view of a multiple 
theoretical lens by adopting a micro point of view. We also take a cue from the comments of 
Prahalad and Bettis (1995:6) "strategic management often ignored managerial explanations 
in favour of explanations based on purely economic forces and untenured faculty should not 
hesitate to strike out new directions, if it is firmly believed that the views are justified". This 
study combines perspectives from Strategic Management, Organisation Theory, and I/O 
Economics to explain the above dichotomies. This would help us achieve three major 
objectives. First, it would enable us to idenfify factors that moderate the relationship between 
diversification and performance. Second, it would help us in assessing the nature and extent 
of moderating effect of these factors on the diversification - performance relationship. Third, 
it would enable us to increase the significance and explanatory power of diversification on 
performance. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
The first chapter of the thesis introduces the research context and also provides an overview 
of the research problem. A crifical review of major relevant literature on the subject is 
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presented in the second chapter. This chapter serves two purposes - one, giving a critical 
exposition of the extant literattire and two, identify major research gaps. An elaborate 
discussion on the variables used in the course of the research is made in the third chapter. 
The fourth chapter presents a detailed accoimt of research design and methodology adopted 
in the study. The fifth chapter analyses the cases relevant to the framework, the details of 
which are provided in the armexure. In the sixth chapter we build on the various hypotheses 
developed from existing literature and case studies; this forms the backbone of our 
conceptual framework. The seventh chapter integrates across the various hypotheses and 
proposes a unified theoretical framework on antecedents of diversification and its outcomes 
on performance. The eighth chapter reports the results and findings of various statistical 
analyses. The discussion and interpretation of results is presented in the ninth chapter. Finally 
in chapter ten, the final chapter of the thesis, we have summarised the major findings, discuss 
their implication for practicing managers and delineates the contribution of the study to 
Strategic Management and Organisational Theory, presents the limitations of the study, and 
raises some major issues for fiiture research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
In this chapter we attempt to present the major discourses in diversification strategies, from 
the point of view of relevant literature. Within this framework we segregate research under 
two broad categories. In the first category, studies concerned with describing the relevant 
phenomenons and delineating or developing concepts are presented. In the second category, 
we have explored literature concerning simple bivariate or contingency type relationships 
involving more than a pair of variables, factors, or concepts. We move from simple unitary 
motives behind diversification, to complex array of relationships surrounding diversification 
and performance. The strength and direction of the relationship has been assessed from the 
point of view of conglomerates in the developed markets to business groups in emerging 
markets. Finally, we outline the limitations of earlier research followed up by identifying the 
prominent research gaps. 
2.1 Introduction 
The strategy field's core issues - the concept of strategy, causal models relating strategy to 
other constructs, and models of strategic management and choice (including diversification 
and perfonnance) has been addressed by two key progressions. The mechanistic perspective 
is based on disciplinary based theories, the design model and a view of strategy as a planned 
posture, has provided a unified view, but a narrow and increasingly pertinent one. The advent 
of organic developments that includes strategy process research, evolutionary and process 
models, and interactive and integrative views, has provided richness and pertinence, but not a 
unified perspective. These two progressions have marked an epistemological shift from 
mechanistic to organic assumptions: from discrete to incessant time, from directional to 
interactive flow, and from differentiated to integrated constructs and models (Farjoun, 2002). 
In the mechanistic perspective, strategy is mainly viewed as a posture - a relatively stable 
configuration - a fit or alignment - between mutually supporting organisational elements, 
such as activities and organizational structure, and environmental elements, such as a 
customer group. Two main types of strategy postures are "position" (i.e. differentiation 
strategy) and "scope" (i.e. vertical integrafion) (Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974, 1984; Porter, 
1980, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Strategy postures have been the tradifional focus of research 
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on customer groups (Cool and Schendel, 1988), diversification (Montgomery, 1982), and 
structure (White, 1986). In addition, early treatments of strategy, rooted in strategic planning 
models, have viewed it primarily as a rational plan. According to this view, which still guides 
much of the thought in strategy field, action is purposive and prospective, and strategies are 
realised and planned (Mintzberg et al., 1998). 
Two primary concerns of mechanistic views of strategy research are to explain what 
determines firm performance, and to identify what affects firm strategy. Three research 
programs have been particularly influential in addressing these questions. The structure -
conduct - performance (SCP) paradigm (Bain 1956) and its derivative, the industry -
structure model (Porter, 1980) and the strategy - structure - performance (SSP) paradigm. 
The industry - structure model views the external environment as a key determinant of 
strategy and performance. According to their view fit between strategy and its environment 
leads to better performance. The strategy - structure - performance (SSP) paradigm 
highlights the significance of factors complementary to strategy, such as organisational 
structure to firm performance (Chandler, 1962). The model proposes that different growth 
strategies are driven by the accumulation and deployment of internal resources, and are 
matched by different internal structural arrangements. It particularly implies that the match 
between strategy and structure results in better performance. A relatively and more recently 
embraced model is the resource-based view (RBV). Early work on RBV delineated a process 
theory of the role of resources in firm growth (Penrose, 1959). It sees certain resource 
attributes, such as inimitability, uniqueness, and flexibility, as enabling certain strategies (i.e. 
cost leadership), and contributing to sustained competitive advantage (Wemerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997). 
The mechanistic perspective remains a vital element in the development of strategy research. 
It has established the centrality of key constructs, questions, and theoretical relationships, and 
its prescriptive orientation reflects the fields commitment to help firms improve their 
functioning and performance, and to address key managerial concerns. Yet, despite its many 
contributions and achievements, the tenets of the mechanistic perspective have been 
increasingly questioned. Its simple assumptions are better suited to a relatively stable and 
predictable environment and to the early stages of the field's development. This seems to be 
at odds with the more complex and constantly changing observed behaviour of organisations 
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and markets (Farjoun, 2002). This is perhaps what is referred to as complex adaptive systems 
(Waldrop, 1992; Gleick, 1987; Cambel, 1993, Gulick, 1992). Furthermore, critics have 
described such views as static (Pettigrew, 1992), linear (Henderson and Mitchell, 1997), and 
fragmented (Schendel, 1994). Prompted by the limitations of the mechanistic perspective, 
and inspired by the advent of new ideas in the social and natural sciences, the strategy fields' 
second broad progression saw the emergence and spread of organic developments. Key 
developments included research on strategy formulation and implementation (Quinn, 1980; 
Minzberg and Waters, 1985), evolutionary ideas and process models (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Van de Ven, Bamett and Burgelman, 1996), the recognition of reciprocal and 
interaction relationships between strategy and other constructs (Tirole, 1989; Henderson and 
Mitchell, 1997), and interactive research (Baden - Fuller and Stopford, 1994). 
These research streams have collectively introduced more dynamic and eclectic views of key 
constructs, offered new views of strategy formulation, highlighted the importance of strategy 
processes, especially against rational unitary actor models, and portrayed a more complex 
view of causality. Moreover, they have shifted the focus from strategic choice to strategic 
change, and given much more recognition to 'soft' variables (Farjoun, 2002). Collectively, 
the organic perspective represents a paradigm shift in the underlying epistemological 
assumptions of the mechanistic perspective concerning time, flow, and coupling within and 
across models. First, the organic view adopts an incessant and diachronic concept of time. 
Here concepts and relationships are treated as a part of continuous processes and iterated 
sequences, and entities are created rather than given; compared with the discrete concept of 
the mechanistic view. Second, the mechanistic view contrasts with the organic ideas in its 
directional view of flow. It often presents a linear and sequential view of events and causality, 
and highlights deterministic causes of behaviour (Bourgeois, 1984). In contrast the organic 
view pays relatively more attention to interaction, feedback and to multiple, reciprocal, 
exogenous and endogenous influences. Lastly, although early concepts of strategy 
emphasised its integrative nature (Andrews, 1971), the mechanistic view is characterised by 
internal differentiation: the constructs in both explanatory and prescriptive models are more 
developed and better specified than the relationships that hold them together. In contrast 
organic views emphasises ideas, which are truly integrated in terms of phenomena and 
concepts. In our research context we incorporate some of the 'soft' constructs pertaining to 
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organic views, while also retaining the 'hard' constructs of the mechanistic views, which 
remain the backbone of strategy research. 
2.2 Diversification issues 
One of the key aspects of a firms' development from an evolutionary perspective is the 
choice of diversification strategies (Chandler, 1962; Kay, 1997). The strategic management 
literature therefore suggests diversification as a major strategy (Berry, 1975; MuUer, 1987; 
Fligstein, 1991). In pursuing diversification strategies, the strategic choices that govern it at 
various points of time includes its - direction - extent - pace - timing - route. A review of 
the literature reveals that there is a great deal of variation in the way diversification is 
conceptualised, defined and measured. Ansoff's (1957) notion of diversification emphasises 
the entry of firms into new markets with new products. Gort (1962) defined diversification in 
terms of the concept of 'heterogeneity of output' based on the number of markets served by 
that output. To Berry (1975) diversification represents an increase in the number of industries 
in which a firm is active. 
The literature on diversification not only represents a great variety of perspectives and 
disciplinary paradigms, but also covers a wide range of research questions and issues. We 
recognise that level and type of diversification are conceptually distinct, but we do not 
differentiate them here. For the time being we assume that single, related, and unrelated 
diversifications are equivalent to low, moderate, and high diversification. Research on 
diversification was the outcome of the pioneering work of Ansoflf (1957). Since the.., 
research on diversification has been replete with numerous studies. The various research 
areas on diversification can be broadly categorised into, (a) firms decision to diversify - for 
understanding research on diversification the logically obvious place to start is the 
antecedents and influences on a firms' decisions to diversify, (b) choice of direction of 
diversification - a firm choosing to diversify can be viewed as basically seeking ways to 
modify its business definition, (c) choice of mode of diversification - it is basically an 
indication of the extent a firm relies on organic growth vis-a-vis externally driven growth, (d) 
diversity status - after a firm has engaged in diversification over time it attains a certain 
status or profile, (e) management of diversification - the problem of managing diversified 
businesses increase dramatically as the firm's scope of diversification increases. 
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While a set of studies has been contained within the individual frameworks as defined above, 
there has been another set of studies that has attempted to explore the various simple and 
complex linkages among the various individual frameworks. Such studies have explored 
simple bivariate relationships as well as contingency type relationships involving more than a 
pair of variables, factors, or concepts. Some of the major researched linkages are (a) the 
effect of general envirormient, industry environment, and firm characteristics on a firms' 
decision to diversify, choice of direction of diversification, choice of mode of diversification, 
diversity status, and (b) the effect of firms decision to diversify, choice of direction of 
diversification, choice of mode of diversification, diversificafion on performance. However, 
the most researched linkage in this area involves diversification and performance (Chatterjee 
and Wemerfelt, 1991). 
2.3 Diversification and performance 
Research findings on the nature of relationship between diversification and performance can 
be classified under four distinct streams of thought. The earliest streams of work having its 
origin in I/O Economics follow exhaustive work of Gort (1962) that spawned decades of 
future research. The basic premise of this stream is that diversification and performance is 
linearly and positively related. This position rests upon several assumptions, including those 
derived fi-om market power theory and internal market efficiency among others (Scherer, 
1980; Grant, 1998; McCutcheon, 1991). The early literature on diversification asserts that 
diversified firms can employ a number of mechanisms to create and exploit market power 
advantages, tools that are largely unavailable to their more focused counterparts (Sobel. 
1984; Caves, 1991). Further, a low diversified firm has no access to investment from cross-
subsidisation. So its basic sources of capital are external - which are more costly than 
internally generated fiands, when efficiently managed (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994; 
Lang, Poulsen and Stulz, 1995). In contrast highly diversified firms' have much greater 
flexibility in capital formation since it can access external as well internally generated 
resources (Stulz, 1990; Lang and Stulz, 1994). Thus, diversification can generate efficiencies 
that are primarily unavailable to a single - business firm (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 
1994). 
In the second stream of thought, researchers lend credence to the fact the diversification and 
performance is linearly and negatively related. Though many studies have concluded that 
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highly diversified firms gain significant financial benefits fi-om using internal markets for 
capital and other critical resources (Rumelt, 1982; Williamson, 1986; Ravenscraft and 
Scherer, 1987; Taylor and Lowe, 1995; Grant, 1998), support for this contention is not 
universal (McCutcheon, 1991). Jensen (1996) has argued that top management of diversified 
firms may be inclined to invest surplus cash flows (i.e. cash flow exceeding that is required 
to fiind all positive net present value investments in its present operations) in ways that 
support organisational inefficiencies. In other words, managers may be drawn to over-invest 
in undeserving projects (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Stulz, 1990; Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
Furthermore, Bhide (1990), and among others (Markides, 1992; Matsusaka, 1993; Comment 
and Jarrell, 1995) mounts the case that internal market advantages from diversification were 
prevalent in the 1960's, but the information asymmetries that produced this edge slowly 
diminished since the 1970's due to wide spread economic, technological and regulatory 
changes. And by the 1980's this distinct advantage was almost nullified. 
In the third stream of thought, researchers have proposed a curvi-linear relationship between 
diversification and performance. According to this view, moderately diversified firms 
perform better than its low diversified business counterparts. However, they differ in their 
predictions of the performance trend as firms move from moderate to high levels of 
diversificafion. Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) observe that single-business firms do not 
have the opportunity to exploit between-unit synergies or the portfolio effects that are 
available only to diversified firms. That is single-business firms do not enjoy scope 
economies. In contrast moderately diversified firms are involved in multiple businesses are 
able to tap a common pool of resources (Lubatkin and O'Neill, 1987; Nayyar, 1992), thus 
yielding advantages over a single-business firm. Theoretical rationales, which suggest 
superiority of moderate diversification, have their focuses on advantages derived from 
economies of scale and scope (Seth, 1990; Markides and Williamson, 1994). Specifically, 
moderately diversified firms generate operational synergies by designing a portfolio of 
businesses that are mutually reinforcing. 
Porter (1985) provides numerous examples from case studies how moderate diversifiers can 
share activities across businesses in order to boost its financial perfoi-mance. While benefits 
accrue to moderately diversified firms, at some point these efforts are also associated with 
addhional costs. Grant, Jammine and Thomas (1998) recognise the growing strain on top 
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management as it tries to manage an increasingly disparate (and therefore, less familiar) 
portfolio of businesses. Markides (1992) delineates other costs, such as control and effort 
losses (due to increased shirking), coordination costs and other diseconomies related to 
organisation, inefficiencies from conflicting dominant logics between businesses, internal 
capital market inefficiencies and due to cross-subsidisation. Given these dynamics, 
researchers argue that the marginal costs of diversification increase rapidly as diversification 
hits high levels. 
Markides and Williamson (1994) refer to this as "exaggerated relatedness" suggesting a 
mirage effect when assessing apparent similarities between business units. They argue that 
moderate diversifiers will outperform their extensive diversified counterparts only to the 
degree that they are able to exploit synergies to create, and accumulate strategic assets more 
quickly and cheaply than its competitors. Simply amortising existing assets via economies of 
scope - the popular mouthpiece of the relatedness theory - will yield only short-term benefits 
at best. In addition to this concern, Nayyar (1992) points out that activity that is necessary to 
exploit relatedness lead to costs that partially blunt the benefits of that strategy. Thus, one can 
easily conclude that firms' experience an optimal level of diversification (likely to vary from 
case to case), with performance decrements beyond this point of maximisation (i.e. from 
moderate to high levels diversification). 
A fourth stream of thought, which is basically an extension of the earlier stream, advocates 
that effects of moderate and high levels of diversifications are somewhat equal in their 
impact on performance. In the earlier stream of work, few researchers have questioned the 
superiority of moderate over low or limited diversification. However, the performance 
contribution of moderate versus high levels of diversification is often debated. Considering 
the arguments that follow, it may be that the effects of moderate and high levels of 
diversifications are somewhat equal in their impact on performance. The primary issue in this 
controversy arises from concerns that moderate diversified firms may not be able to fully 
exploit the synergies designed into the portfolio of businesses. Put another way, synergy 
initiatives often fall short of management expectations (Goold and Campbell, 1998). Going 
further, high diversifications may present some unique advantages of their own derived 
primarily from financial synergies (Kim, Hwang and Burgers, 1989). Highly diversified 
firms can also do more to reduce industry specific risks and probabilities of bankruptcy (also 
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referred to as coinsurance effect) and also lead to enhanced debt carrying capacity (Barney, 
1997; Seth, 1990). Thus, one can easily conclude that firms' do experience an optimal level 
of diversification; however, performance effects will become constant beyond the point of 
maximisation. 
2.4 Emerging markets and business groups 
A vast majority of the studies on the nature of relationship between diversification and 
performance is based on the developed market context. In this regard, Khanna and Rivkin 
(2001: 45) have pointed out that: "conclusions drawn in one context may well not apply to 
another". Emerging markets characterised by low-income, rapid growth using economic 
liberalisation as their primary engines of growth depict an altogether different context 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). Therefore there is strong justification for a need to focus specifically 
on the nature of diversification - performance relationship across emerging markets. A 
review of existing literature on emerging markets provides a glimpse of three distinct 
perspectives of diversification in emerging markets. 
The institutional theory emphasises the influence of the systems surrounding organisations 
that shape social and organisational behaviour (Scott, 1995). Institutional forces affect 
organisations processes and decision-making. Perspectives derived to examine these 
institutional forces have both an economic orientation (Clague, 1997; Coase, 1998; North, 
1990) and a social orientation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1993; Scott, 1995). New institutional 
economics focuses on the interaction of institutions and firms resulting from market 
imperfections (Harriss, Hunter and Lewis, 1995). Peng and Heath (1996) argue that the 
internal growth of firms in emerging markets is limited by institutional constraints; as a 
result, a network-based growth strategy is expected to be more viable in emerging markets. 
Institutions can also facilitate diversification, allowing firms' to react to and play a more 
active role in an institutional environment if firms have an adaptive ability that allows them 
to move beyond institutional constraints (Oliver, 1991). 
A second perspective that can be applied to patterns of diversification in emerging markets is 
transaction cost economics. Transaction cost economics studies the firm - environment 
interface through a contractual or exchange based approach (Williamson, 1975). Where the 
transaction costs of markets are high, hierarchical governance modes will enhance efficiency, 
although hierarchical modes can have their own bureaucratic costs. High transaction costs 
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therefore suggest preference for hierarchical governance structures over the private market. It 
may also explain the higher incidence of unrelated diversification and counter - trade among 
business groups in emerging markets. Peng and Heath (1996) argued that it is difficult for 
firms' in emerging markets to grow internally or through mergers and acquisitions owing to 
various sorts of institutional failure. They suggest networks as a hybrid strategy. Within this 
perspective, we also consider agency theory as an important lens because of its focus on 
principal - agent problems under uncertainty. Agency theory suggests that a firm is a 'nexus 
of contracts' (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The third perspective, the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm is by far the most 
significant of the three approaches. The central quesfion addressed by the RBV concern why 
firms differ and how they achieve and sustain competitive advantage. Penrose (1959) 
provides some of the earliest insights on this view. He advocates that heterogeneous 
capabilities give each firm its unique character and the very essence of competitive 
advantage. Wemerfelt (1984) suggest that evaluating firms in terms of their resources could 
lead to insights different from the traditional I/O perspective (Porter, 1980). Barney (1986) 
suggested that strategic resource factors differ in their 'tradability' and that these factors can 
be specifically identified and their monetary value determined via a 'strategic factor market'. 
Barney (1991) later established four criteria to more fiilly explicate the idea of strategic 
tradability. He suggested that firm resources could be differentiated on the basis of value, 
rareness, inimitability and substitutability. 
A striking feature of most emerging markets is the prominent role played by business groups. 
Most business groups' span a diverse set of industries, and are generally associated with a 
single extended family. While these confederations of firm's go by different names in 
different countries (groupos in Latin America, guenxiqiye in China, keiretsus in Japan, 
chaebols in Korea, business houses in India), they share certain broad patterns of similarities. 
Though member firms' (i.e. group affiliates) remain legally independent, a maze of economic 
and social ties typically unites each group. The sheer ubiquity of business groups suggests 
that they may affect, in important ways, the broad patterns of economic performance in 
emerging markets (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). However, the task of defining a 'business 
group' is potentially vexing (Strachan, 1976; Leff, 1978; Encarnation, 1989; Granovetter, 
1994). Synthesising from earlier studies, Khanna and Rivkin (2001) has proposed the 
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following definition, "^ business group is a set of firms which, though legally independent, 
are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and are accustomed to 
taking centralised and coordinated action.'" This definition captures two important aspects of 
business groups: the ties that bind the firms together and the coordinated actions those ties 
enable. The aspects of the ties that bind groups together can be captured from earlier field 
research. First, the ties are numerous and overlapping. Second, they span the economic and 
the social, formal and the informal. The multiple ties among group affiliates enable them to 
take centralised coordinated actions. 
To interpret these coordinated actions, we follow a small but growing literature that has its 
origin in I/O Economics. It conceives of business groups as responses to market failures and 
associated transaction costs (Leff, 1976, 1978; Caves, 1989). A market failure arises when an 
economically beneficial transaction - one that would benefit both the buyer and seller - fails 
to be consummated because the indirect costs of the transaction outweigh the net benefit 
(Williamson, 1975). Transactions may be particularly costly in emerging markets because 
institutions of trade, contract enforcement, communication, and information disclosure are 
weak (Kharma and Palepu, 1997), exposing them to a trade to opportunistic behaviour. The 
work of Aoki (1984, 1990) has framed groups as response mainly to inefficient capital 
markets. However, labour, product, technology and other markets are also prone to failure in 
most emerging markets. While conglomerates in the West evolved out of their need for 
product - market penetration post World War II. The reasons behind the evolution of business 
groups in emerging markets are distinctly different. Recent researchers perceive business 
groups as responses to all of these failures (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 
2001). 
Another important stream of work, emerging from sociology (Granovetter, 1994), 
emphasises solidarity norms and codes of behaviour among business groups. This rich body 
of research consists largely of descriptive as well as statistical works (Gerlach, 1992; Lincoln 
et al., 1996; Keister, 1998). In an extension to this line of work, Peng and Luo (2000) offer 
the explanation that personal ties possessed by a firm's top managers with top managers at 
other firms and governmental officials are positively associated with performance. In both 
the transaction costs and sociological streams of work, business groups are viewed as value -
enhancing organisational forms. A third important stream, grounded in political economy, 
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emphasises a view of groups as socially counterproductive rent seekers, in which groups are 
primary devices through which rents in an economy accrue disproportionally to a handful of 
families that control major groups, to the detriment of the majority of the population 
(Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). Much of the work in this body is descriptive in nature, 
detailing the pattern of relationships between groups and political power structures 
(Encamation, 1989; Schwartz, 1992; Gill, 1999). 
In a recent study Guillen (2000) has proposed a fourth line of thought that justifies the 
existence of business groups. It justifies the importance of business groups in emerging 
markets from the existence from the asymmetries in foreign trade and investments that exists 
in the economy. This encourages entrepreneurs to create business groups as it allows them to 
develop and maintain an inimitable capability to combine foreign and domestic resources that 
enables them to enter muhiple industries. However, when such asymmetries fall, the scope 
and size of business groups becomes a liability rather than strength, because in such 
situations groups face intense competitive pressures from other organisational forms. 
2.5 Diversification and business groups 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) argue that Western companies take for granted a range of 
institutions that support their business activities, but many of these institutions are absent or 
underdeveloped in most emerging markets. These are also referred to as market failures or 
institutional voids. It is this difference in institutional context that explains the success of 
high levels of diversifications undertaken by business groups and its association with positive 
performance effects. Existing literature argues that groups can fill some subset of the 
institutional voids in imperfect markets. Indeed, the descriptive literature on groups across 
several markets emphasises an impressive array of benefits that arise out of the 
intermediation function played by groups in capital markets (Leff, 1976; Pan, 1991) and 
labour markets (Leff, 1978). The earliest econometric evidences came from the studies of 
Japanese keiretsus (Caves and Uekusa, 1976; Nakatani, 1984). More recently, Lincoln et al., 
(1996) described a variety of coordinating mechanisms and their role in reducing the 
variability of returns of affiliates. Chang and Hong (1999) suggested that value creation in 
the case of Korean chaebols might occur primarily through product and capital market 
intermediation. 
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Several studies have demonstrated that on the whole business groups add value through a 
combination of product, labour and capital market intermediation (Fisman and Khanna, 
1998; Khaima and Palepu, 1999). However, the benefits of diversification in emerging 
markets may not be sufficient to offset the costs. Some recent studies suggest that such 
investments are characterised by fixed costs (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Khanna, Palepu and 
Wu, 1998). Each business group needs to invest in creating a coordinating mechanism 
(Gerlach, 1992; Lincoln et al., 1996) that facilitates the sharing of information and the 
enforcement of explicit and implicit intra-group contracts. Therefore, in the initial stages the 
fixed costs outweighs the benefits of diversification, but once a threshold level is reached, the 
benefits outweigh the costs. It follows that groups that exceed the threshold diversification 
levels will undertake such investments. 
Such a threshold effect of diversification can also be generated by explanations grounded in 
political economy, emphasising a rent - seeking view of groups (Olson, 1982; Granovetter, 
1994). Studies by Encamation (1989), White (1974), Amsden (1989) and Robison (1986) in 
different economic scenarios lend credence to this view. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) proposed 
a formal model having its roots in politico - economy, which provides a supplementary basis 
for understanding an alternate mechanism for generating the threshold effect. Business 
groups possess various forms of non - tradable assets, which are scarce and inimitable. 
Highly diversified groups have greater opportunities to use these assets than single business 
firms (Teece, 1980, 1982). Khanna and Palepu (2000) conclude that net performance effects 
of unrelated diversification will initially decline, till it reaches a threshold. Beyond this 
threshold, marginal increases in-group diversification will yield marginal increases in 
performance. They further observe that the threshold level will itself rise as market 
institutions evolve over time and hence performance effects of such high diversification will 
gradually become difficult to achieve. 
However, research on business groups in the Indian context has evoked mixed responses. 
Kharma and Palepu (1999) observed that though the Government of India initiated reforms in 
1991, restrictions on the operation of markets continued to exist. This helped business groups 
to capitalise on the inefficiencies to create value. Further, Khaima and Rivkin (2001) 
observed that there was little evidence of 'diversification discount' in most emerging 
markets, and in a number of cases the authors observed the presence of 'diversification 
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premium'. In contrast, Kakani (2000) studying business groups in the Indian context found 
that group diversification was negatively related to performance during the entire 90's, a 
period when economic liberalisation had taken effect. The study also highlighted that net 
benefits of unrelated diversification (if any) will decline over time. The authors have further 
contended that the market imperfection theory has been blown out of proportion, and 
business groups are value destroyers in emerging markets too. The observations of Mohanty 
(2000) are also on similar lines. They concluded that business groups in India have by far 
destroyed value and that the institution of business groups will perform better if they arc 
dismantled into individual business units. Their findings suggest that business groups which 
flourished during the times of high regulations do not add value any more in a competitive 
era. They concluded that focused and related diversifiers outperformed unrelated ones. 
2.6 Group afflliation and performance 
Another area of interest among strategy researchers concerns the ramification of group 
affiliation for enhancing firm performance (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Several prominent 
economists and sociologists have emphasised that institutions affect economic outcomes 
(Granovetter, 1984; Williamson, 1985; Aoki, 1990; North, 1990). In the developed markets, 
which is characterised by efficient intermediation, it is less likely that a firm will benefit by 
being associated with a conglomerate that is highly diversified across a number of industries 
than with the case of a firm with such an association in an economy with severe market 
imperfections (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). Khaima and Palepu (2000) mentioned that after 
group diversification was controlled for, group affiliation would be associated with positive 
firm performance. Further, performance effects of group affiliation were found to decrease 
over time as market institutions evolve over time. In emerging markets context Chang and 
Hong (2002) found that corporate effects, reflected in - group membership do matter along 
with industry and firm effects, though group effects declined over time. This is in significant 
deviation to the study by Rumelt (1991), which found that firm effects dominate profitability, 
followed by industry effects, and that corporate effects on profit variance are nearly zero. 
Several subsequent studies in the developed markets either confirmed or disconfirmed the 
above findings (Roquebert, Phillips and Westfall, 1996; McGahan and Porter, 1997). 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) observed that as fi-ee markets emerge, the ability of business 
groups to enhance performance by circumventing market failure would gradually subside. 
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Thus group effects in general would decrease over time (Chang and Hong, 2002). Guillen 
(2000) findings were also on similar lines, the higher the market imperfections; greater will 
be the importance of business groups in an economy and vice - versa. However, the shocks 
to profitability fade at substantially different rates in different markets (Khanna and Rivkin, 
2001). The possible conjecture is that, the rate at which group effects atrophy possibly 
depends on the pace at which market institutions evolve over time. Therefore, it need not be 
necessarily concluded that with market evolvement groups' ability to create market value by 
circumventing market efficiencies would gradually subside (Chang and Hong, 2002). 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) clearly demonstrated that there were group benefits that were 
unrelated to diversification. Though there is mild evidence that benefits of high 
diversification pursued by business groups become progressively harder to obtain as market 
evolves (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Chang and Hong (2002) also observed that group effects 
are rather small among the largest segment of business groups than the erstwhile smaller 
ones. They provide the explanation that, these groups, most of which grew during the early 
phases of industrialisation were more or less homogeneous in terms of their strategies. 
structure and culture. On the other hand, smaller groups are more heterogeneous. Also most 
of the firms affiliated to large groups are more mature, and have their own set of resources. 
As a consequence, their own resources may also largely determine the profitability of 
affiliates firms. Hence, profit rates of group affiliates were observed to be closer to one 
another than they are to non - affiliates. Therefore in such situations firm effects might be 
stronger than group effects. Hence most results offer few universal truths valid across all 
emerging markets. 
Guillen (2000) put forward another view, which has its base in resource-based view (RBV) 
of the firm. His main contention was entrepreneurs in emerging markets create business 
groups if politico - economic conditions allow them to acquire and maintain the capability of 
combining foreign and domestic resources - inputs, processes, and market access - to 
repeatedly enter new industries. This contention is based on the logic that, diversification is 
to access both domestic and foreign resources rather than to reap scope economies and 
minimise transaction costs. Entrepreneurs who learn to combine these resources quickly and 
effectively will be best able to create business group by repeatedly entering a variety of 
industries. This capability is generic in nature and not precisely industry - specific. 
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Diversifying entrepreneurs will rarely bother to build integrated organisation structures to 
capture cross - industry synergies (Hoskisson, 1987; Chandler 1990). They will rather rely 
on the looser arrangement of the business group. However, in the Indian context Chacar and 
Visa (2005) have not found any significant difference between affiliated and non-affiliated 
firms. The distinct possibility may be that groups are really results of a wider range of 
cultural and sociological factors that has little to do with economic efficiency (Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001). 
2.7 Limitations of earlier research 
Although the topic of diversification has stimulated a stream of research studies exploring 
various themes and linkages across the developed markets, a substantial body of work (i.e. 
research on diversification and performance) across developed markets appears to be just 
incremental in nature. The rationale tor many of the studies - within the strategic 
management field in particular - appears to be nothing more ambitious than the opportunity 
to experiment with a different measure of diversification or performance, or a different 
approach to conceptualising and measuring its effectiveness. These observations leads Palich, 
Cardinal and Miller (2000) to conclude that this research domain - while large - has not yet 
reached maturity. According to the authors a research stream is best characterised as mature 
when (a) a substantial number of empirical studies have been conducted, (b) these studies 
have generated reasonably consistent and interpretable findings, and (c) the research has led 
to general consensus concerning the nature of key relationships. 
For instance, we still do not know why synergy in diversification is so elusive to obtain, or 
why diversification efforts are sometimes successful and sometimes not. Research examining 
diversification and performance has been ongoing for more than four decades, but a unified 
theoretical framework is still lacking which attempts to explain the antecedents of 
diversification and the relationship between diversification and firm outcomes such as 
performance (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). This leads Markides and Williamson (1994) to 
conclude that there is still considerable disagreement about precisely how and when 
diversification can be used to build long-run competitive advantage. Many researchers in this 
field share this view (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; 
Hoskisson et al., 1993; Hill, 1994; Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997). Therefore, much room 
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remains for breakthroughs in this seemingly oversaturated area of inquiry (Ramanujam and 
Varadarajan, 1989). 
2.7.1 Diversification and performance 
Beattie (1980) provides an overview of various theories of conglomerate diversification. 
Most empirical studies proceed on the assumption that only one of model is operating, and 
accordingly propose unitary motives for diversification (Lubatkin, 1983). Therefore, the 
explanatory power has been limited because of their neglect of other equally potent motives. 
As a resuh Rumelt (1974) was only able to explain less than 20%, while Montgomery (1979) 
could only explain about 38% of the variations in performance. A more plausible explanation 
for the inconsistencies among research findings may be the failure of empirical studies to 
explicitly address the indirect influences of diversification on performance outcomes 
(Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997). In contrast to the inadequate attention given to direct 
examination of the motives underlying the diversification decision, the extent of energy 
devoted in developing measures of diversification is quite impressive. In many studies 
diversification is treated as a continuous variable (Gort, 1962; Berry, 1975; Caves, Porter and 
Spence, 1980; Palepu, 1985). While in others, particularly within the strategic management 
discipline, categories were developed using somewhat arbitrary cut-off points (Wrigley, 
1970; Rumelt, 1974, 1982; Bettis, 1981; Montgomery, 1974, 1982). The use of various 
alternative approaches for measuring diversificafion has not led to any greater insights into 
the impact of diversification on performance and has been rather incremental in nature. 
Markides and Williamson (1994) conclude that disagreement exists because traditional 
methods of measuring relatedness in terms of products - markets - technologies are 
incomplete because it ignores 'strategic relatedness'. Pitts and Hopkins (1982) stressed, that 
the choice of measure should be guided by the research question in hand. 
Regarding the measurement of performance, there are clear differences again within three 
disciplinary streams. Earlier studies in I/O Economics were concerned with the possible anti-
competitive effects of diversification, and focused their attention on market structure 
variables. Using a public policy perspective, studies have examined the effects of 
diversification on such variables as concentration, industry growth and iimovation. The effect 
of diversification on a firm's growth rate and vice-versa has also been of significant interest 
(Berry, 1971; Hassid, 1977). The finance literature has been concerned with testing the extent 
27 
of portfolio risk reduction achieved by diversification from an investor's as opposed to a 
managerial point of view. Their dependent variables have been various market measures of 
return and risk, although some studies have also used accounting based measures of risk as 
well as return. 
A review of the literature reveals that accounting based measures have been the primary 
focus of much of the strategic management research on diversification. However, there is at 
present a lively interest within the strategic management field in adopting market-based 
performance measures (Montgomery, Thomas and Kamath, 1984; Hitt and Ireland, 1987; 
Amit and Livnat, 1988). Though this trend is welcome, but it is interesting to note that 
several years ago, Holzman, Copeland and Hayya (1975) deplored the exclusive focus of on 
market based measures of performance in studies of diversification in the finance area. They 
argued that decisions regarding diversification are made using profitability data derived from 
financial statements and, hence it would be more appropriate to use accounting based 
measures to assess the efficacy of diversification efforts. The availability of alternative 
measures advocates strongly for the use of an integrative point of view and reliance on 
multiple measures of effectiveness so that the cumulation of knowledge across disciplines 
can proceed smoothly (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). 
Research having its origin in financial economics and more specifically portfolio theory, 
proposes that under conditions of perfect capital markets, diversification provides no 
benefits. Still if firms diversify it follows that they are acting in markets that are less than 
perfectly competitive. Further, diversification provides no benefits to investors because 
alternately they can diversify their equity portfolio at a lesser cost. Thus, the possibility that, 
under conditions of efficient capital markets, the rationale for expecting differences in 
performance (risk - adjusted) between high and low diversified firms is seldom admitted 
explicitly (Montgomery and Singh, 1984; Bettis and Mahajan, 1985; Hoskisson, 1987). 
Most explorations of the diversificafion - performance relationships are cross-sectional in 
nature. Whether the relationship observed in a particular study is generalisable over time 
remain an interesfing, but less researched issue. Some studies that specifically tested for the 
temporal stability of the diversification - performance relationship over business cycles have 
found that the relationship does vary over cycles. Hill (1983) reported that the performance 
of conglomerates improved significantly more than that of non-conglomerates during the 
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upturn, but deteriorated more rapidly during the downturn. A study by Ciscel and Evans 
(1984) found that returns to diversification are sensitive to the business cycle but their results 
do not strictly correspond to those of Hill (1983). They found that moderate levels of 
diversification show improved relative performance in the expansionary periods, while high 
levels of diversification generally hurt performance in recessionary periods. 
Most strategy studies that spawned the 1970's have made no allowance for business cycle 
effects, but for the exception of Michel and Shaked (1984). The authors characterise the time 
frame of Rumelt's (1974) study (the 1949 - 69 period) as a stable, low inflation and low 
interest rate environment. In contrast, the time frame for the above study (1975 - 81) is stated 
to be one of considerable uncertainty largely precipitated by the oil crisis of the early 1970's. 
Not surprisingly the two studies reach different conclusions regarding the performance 
consequences of unrelated diversification. The implication of the above studies is that the 
diversification - performance relationship is time variant. Obviously as this may seem, broad 
generalisations regarding the value of diversification are by no means uncommon (Porter, 
1987). In addition to the apparent temporal instability of the diversity-performance relation, 
the findings of various studies using short time spans (4-5) years to examine cross-sectional 
differences across diversification categories seem to be of questionable validity. Another 
timing related criticism of the diversification - performance research is the fact that most of 
the early results may be outdated and of limited managerial and economic significance today 
(Davis, 1985). ' 
There is an increasing awareness among strategic management researchers that there is an 
acute need to devote more attention to process issues in diversification research (Burgleman, 
1983; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1987; Porter, 1985, 1987; Prahalad, 1986, 1995). In this 
connection it is frequently asserted that strategy implementation, in general, has received less 
attention than strategy formulation in strategic management literature. Certainly, this 
criticism takes on added piquancy in the research on diversification. Only a handful of 
studies have directly examined the issue of 'how' firms implement their diversification 
strategies, and fewer still are studies that explore the performance consequences of different 
approaches to implementation. Some notable exceptions are Dundas and Richardson (1982), 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1984), Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986), and Leontiades (1986). As 
such no study is yet to develop a framework or model that describes the relationships among 
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diversification strategy, intervening variables, and performance (Stimpert and Duhaime, 
1997). 
2.7.2 Group affiliation and performance 
The sheer ubiquity of business groups suggests that they may affect, in important ways, the 
broad patterns of economic performance in emerging economies. Yet virtually little 
systematic evidence exists concerning the ramifications of group affiliation in enhancing 
firm. We lack answers to even certain basic questions. We do not know whether group 
affiliation earn higher or lower rates of profit than unaffiliated firms, while theory offers 
prediction both ways. Likewise, we do not know how important knowledge of group 
affiliation is in improving our understanding of firm profitability, even after other observable 
characteristics of the firm, such as the industry in which it competes, are known. While most 
of existing research have measured effects of group affiliation on firm performance, its 
impact on overall group performance is relatively unknown. There are indications that the 
impact of the above on overall group performance may be exactly the opposite. 
The performance effects of group affiliation studied by Khanna and Rivkin (2001) across 
fourteen emerging markets (which include India among others) suggest that affiliates perform 
better than non - affiliates in six countries, and worse than non-affiliates in three, with no 
difference in profitability level in the remaining five countries. The effects of group 
membership on profitability differ substantially from one country to another. The authors 
attempted to account for these differences by taking into account differences in institutional 
context. Earlier research has clearly pointed out that there is no priori theoretical reason to 
focus on capital market imperfections in searching for a reason for the existence of business 
groups; groups might also alleviate failures in product markets, labour markets, and in cross-
border markets for technology (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). In contrast, Khanna and Rivkin 
(2001) finds no evidence that group importance is related to proxies for inefficiency in 
markets other than capital markets. It has been fiirther contended that the performance effects 
of group affiliation are likely to be difficult to obtain as markets evolve (Chang and Hong, 
2002). The contention of Kakani (2000) that the Markets in India are as developed as the 
West does not seem much convincing. This is considering the short history of economic 
liberalisation in India, compared to China, Korea, or even Chile where business groups still 
add value through unrelated diversification. Besides, the pace of economic liberalisation in 
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India has also been slower compared to most SE Asian or Latin American countries 
(Alluhalia, 2002). 
2.8 Research gaps 
Economic liberalisation of a number of emerging markets around the world in the recent 
decades has drawn attention on the functioning of business groups. An alternative school of 
thought has challenged the most dominant belief of the modem era that conglomerates fail to 
perform and questioned the wisdom that all firms need to restructure their businesses around 
their core competencies (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; 
Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). These authors have argued that for emerging markets, focused 
strategies around core competencies may not be an appropriate strategy, and unrelated 
diversification may not necessarily retard performance. In fact unrelated diversification may 
still be profitable for business groups where the institutional context is characterised by 
market failure and high transaction costs. Several studies further reported that group 
affiliation had a positive effect on firm performance; and affiliated firms outperformed 
unaffiliated firms in emerging markets. 
Interestingly, studies dedicated in the Indian context have either negated or contradicted the 
above assertions (Kakani, 2000; Mohanty, 2000). They have observed that focused business 
groups and related diversifiers have outperformed unrelated ones and group affiliation failed 
to add value in India, a giant emerging market. They have even gone ahead to assert that the 
value of business groups can be enhanced, provided they are split into individual and 
independent business units devoid of group control. Since the theory of market imperfection 
is quite comprehensive and tested, existing justifications do not seem to be tenable. More 
stronger and robust theory is needed to counter the same. 
One way of explaining the above dichotomy is that as emerging markets mature the ability by 
business groups to enhance performance by circumventing market failure will gradually 
sublime (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). This possibility has also been argued by Chang and 
Hong (2000) who argue that the value business groups add may be contingent on the time 
period under study. They assert that different stages of economic liberalisation may alter the 
optimal mix of business portfolio in which a group should engage. In contrast, Khanna and 
Rivkin (2001) have observed that positive group effects are still associated with emerging 
markets which have been subjected to a longer tenure of economic liberalisation compared to 
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India. It is interesting to note that most of the above studies have common databases as well 
as overlapping time-frames. Hence it is not quite clear why research in the Indian context 
reveals a diverging trend. 
Insights have revealed that not all diversifications by business groups have yielded similar 
resuhs. While certain unrelated diversifications have been successful; some related 
diversifications have failed dramatically. Neither affiliation to a business group has always 
added value for an individual business. Therefore, the above empirical findings are fraught 
with contradictions and have raised more doubts than providing clear answers. These 
observations also refuel the long standing inconclusive debate surrounding diversification 
and performance. In the absence of reasonably consistent and interpretable findings there is 
sufficient scope for fresh enquiry in the area. 
Most of earlier studies have taken recourse to the logic of market imperfection having its 
roots in I/O Economics to explain the diversification - performance linkage across emerging 
markets. The use of alternate or multiple theoretical lenses to explore variables whether there 
are other moderating variables affecting this linkage has been lacking. We argue that certain 
extraneous variables have not been controlled for; incorporation of such critical variables 
may throw new light on the subject. At the theoretical level, researchers often tend to ignore 
to incorporate the effect of certain intervening variables either knowingly or unknowingly. 
We believe that the inherent bias of researchers in focusing primarily on analytical methods 
has often led them to overlook certain critical variables. Though some studies have tried to 
introduce a series of intervening variables; a holistic and integrated view has been lacking. 
We argue one such crucial concept is - "dominant logic" as originally proposed by Prahalad 
and Bettis (1986). Though being considered a milestone in Strategic Management research, 
subsequent use of the concept has been lying dormant. Researchers have tended to ignore the 
above variable because it cannot be easily measured or amenable to statistical manipulation. 
We feel perhaps dominant logic will enable us to integrate across a number of hitherto 
unrelated intervening variables. The summary of the limitations of earlier research and 
research gaps in three broad areas, viz., context, content and methodology is presented in 
Table 2.1. 
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It may be observed that: 
• Little research has been reported on diversification and business groups using an 
ahemate or multiple theoretical lenses. 
• There is a need to control for intervening variables having its origin in multiple 
disciplines to explain the linkage between diversification and performance in a more 
effective manner. 
• The "top management" needs to be incorporated in a way to account for above 
differences in findings. 
" There is also a need to move away from empirical studies and focus on case studies, 
especially on process issues related to diversification. 
• While measuring degree of diversification one needs to focus on dynamic measures 
of relatedness (i.e. strategic relatedness), instead of approaching the problem through 
static measures such as products, markets and technologies. 
• Lastly, it is being felt that there is an urge to experiment with new ideas and 
approaches if new directions are to be struck. 
Thus there was a clear need: 
• To study the nature of relationship between diversification and performance across 
business groups in the Indian context by controlling various extraneous variables. 
• To study the changes in the performance effects of group affiliation in the context of 
economic liberalisation using alternate theoretical lenses. 
• To incorporate the skills of the "top management" as a major construct in managing 
highly diversified businesses and focus on process issues related to diversification. 
• Develop on concepts like "dominant logic", which is lying dormant. Adopt a simpler 
and working definition of "dominant logic" and move from a purely conceptual stage 
to measurement of the construct and it's testing, to generate powerfiil insights. 
• To adopt a holistic theoretical framework to explain performance effects of 
diversification and group affiliation, which might be generalisable across emerging 
markets and also over time? 
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Table 2.1: Critique of research on business groups 
Areas 
Context 
Content 
Methodology 
Limitations of Earlier Research 
• Studies in the emerging market context 
have received scant attention and are of 
very recent origin. In the absence of 
substantial number of empirical studies, 
this research domain cannot be ascribed as 
mature. 
• Contrasting research findings across 
number of emerging markets. Even within 
the same context with overlapping time 
frames and samples, research findings 
differ significantly. 
" Little importance has been placed on 
existing theoretical frameworks to explain 
such difference in findings. 
• Researchers have drawn their conclusions 
from a single theoretical lens involving 
macro-level empirical analysis. 
• Majority of earlier studies have 
concentrated on firm level of analysis. 
Group level analysis has been largely 
ignored. 
• Existing studies have failed to explicitly 
address the indirect influences of 
diversification on performance outcomes. 
• Business groups have been traditionally 
viewed as responses to market failure and 
high transaction costs. Alternative app-
roaches have been neglected. 
• Focus was primarily on empirical studies 
across large data samples; stress is on 
statistical association among variables. 
Case studies largely ignored. 
• Trends have been on construct 
measurement, through the use of 
sophisticated statistical tools and 
techniques. 
Research Gaps 
• Little research on the 
nature of relationship 
between diversification 
and performance in the 
emerging market con-
text. The performance 
effect of group affiliation 
is also relatively fuzzy. 
" Differences in external 
and internal environ-
mental factors not cont-
rolled for, especially 
their moderating effects. 
• Researchers have esch-
ewwed a multidiscip-
linary and micro level 
approach. 
• Need for shift in level of 
analysis. This will lead 
to better insights. 
• The 'top management' 
has been ignored as a 
major factor to be 
reckoned with. 
Especially since 
diversification decisions 
and its successful 
implementation are 
largely dependent on it. 
• There is a need for thrust 
on micro level case 
analysis. 
• Development of simple 
propositions through his-
torical analysis involving 
policy-capturing metho-
dology. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Discussion on Variables 
In this chapter we discuss the technicalities and issues surrounding the variables which form 
the structure of our theoretical framework. Ten such variables identified during the course of 
the literature review, have been examined in minute detail. Though in the case of most of the 
variables the literature was immensely rich and objective, in some cases it was found to be 
quite nascent and cognitive. In such cases, we draw heavily from our case studies, which 
would enhance our understanding of the variables. This chapter would lead to better 
assessment and appreciation of the methodologies discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
3.1 Diversification 
After a firm has engaged in diversification over time and has pursued several diversification 
projects, by which mode it chooses to grow, it attains a certain status or profile. Researchers 
have coined a term "diversity" to capture the nature and extent of diversification of a firm or 
a group. The various approaches to measuring diversity can be broadly classified into two 
groups - categorical measures, and continuous measures. Categorical measures are based on 
qualitative evaluation of the firms' product market scope and diversification rationale. A 
pioneering classification appeared on the basis of the firms' specialisation ratio (proportion 
of a firm's revenue attributable to its largest discrete product - market activity) and its 
direction of diversification in terms of relatedness to the firms' collective skills and strengths 
(Wrigley, 1970). Further conceptualisation of a multivariate measure of a firms' diversity 
was based on these ratios - specialisation ratio, related ratio and the vertical ratio (Rumelt, 
1974). On the basis of these ratios, firms were further assigned into nine diversification sub 
categories, within these three broad based categories. In a more recent study a fourth ratio 
was proposed - the related core ratio and further classification of firms were made in seven 
sub categories (Rumelt, 1982). 
A review of the literature reveals wide use of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) by I/O 
Economics for the above categorisation. They assume that if the businesses share the same 
SIC code, they must have some common input requirement and similar production or 
technology functions. Despite the high degree of objectivity and simplicity afforded by SIC 
diversification categorisafion, researchers seem to view these measures as two simplistic to 
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facilitate meaningful analysis and tend to favour complex and semi-subjective categorical 
measures of firms' diversity (Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Palepu, 1985). However, because 
of the subjectivity involved in categorical measures, off late certain refined SIC based 
measures have gained immense popularity amongst researchers. Most of recent studies have 
relied on SIC based categorisation with little or no modification, and their conclusion reveals 
that above categorisation is quite robust and comprehensive (Bettis, 1981; Bettis and Hall, 
1982; Bettis and Mahajan, 1985; Bettis, Hall and Prahalad, 1978; Montomery, 1982). 
Continuous measures of firm diversity, measures firm diversity quantitatively, on a year to 
year basis, instead of two points in time as used by categorical measures, which is a 
qualitative measure. Most continuous measures are variants of the general equation -
D = 1-1 (Pi WO (1) 
where -
(a) D = Extent of Diversification. 
(b) Pi = the share of the i'th business relative to the firm as whole. 
(c) Wi = an assigned weight. 
(d) N = Number of businesses constituting the firm's portfolio. 
For instance, the Herfindahl Index as originally proposed is a special case of the above 
formulation (Gort, 1962), where the assigned weights Wj equal Pi. That is, 
D = 1 - 1 Pi' (2) 
has been used by researchers with a relatively high degree of significance (Comment and 
Jarrell, 1995; Chatterjee and Blocher, 1992). The Entropy (Inverse) Index measure, on the 
other hand weighs each Pi by the natural logarithm of 1/Pi. A desirable feature of the entropy 
measure is the ability to decompose the firms' total diversity into additive elements, which 
defines the contribution of diversification at each level of product aggregation to the total 
(Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). 
D = 1 - ZPi Log 1/Pi (3) 
The Concentric Index has been widely used as well (Caves, Porter and Spence, 1980; 
Wemerfelt and Montgomery, 1988) where: 
D = Z jWij Z, Wii dj, (4) 
where dji is a weight whose value depends on the relations between j and 1 in SIC code. 
Researchers have made a thorough comparative analysis of the two different ways of 
conceptualising and measuring firm diversity by business count (categorical) and by strategy 
(continuous) (Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). They have concluded that a business count measure 
is more suitable for comparing diversified and non-diversified firms, but for comparing 
differences amongst diversified firms, the strategic measure of diversity (continuous) is 
recommended. Existing research has also pointed out that there is a very high degree of 
correlation among the various measures of continuous diversity, hence adding more measures 
will not necessarily increase the explanatory power on performance (Khanna and Palepu, 
1998). 
3.2 Performance 
Regarding the measure of performance, there are clear differences again within multiple 
disciplinary streams. Studies in I/O Economics were concerned with the possible anti-
competitive effects and focused their attention on market/industry structure variables. The 
financial literature has also witnessed extension of the concepts of systematic and 
unsystematic risk used in portfolio diversification studies. The measure of alpha and beta as 
surrogates of risk has been used to measure performance in diversification studies, with quite 
a high degree of validity (Chatterjee and Blocher 1992; Montgomery and Singh 1984). 
While on the accounting side, profitability as a measure of total assets, net worth or total 
sales has been most widely used along with accounting determined risk (Bettis and Hall 
1982). Other researchers have even used growth measures with relative success 
(Varadarajan, 1986). Despite, the general weakness in accounting based measures, certain 
researchers have deplored the conclusive focus on market based performance measures on 
the ground that, a firms' decision on diversification is derived from accounting data, hence it 
would be more appropriate to use accoimting based measures to assess the efficacy of 
diversification on performance (Holzmann, Copeland and Hayya, 1975). 
It has been pointed out that, 'a firm is worth only what the market is willing to pay', and 
hence stock markets provide a very good proxy of firms worth (Brealey and Myers, 1988). 
Researchers have also used stock prices to link returns with performance (Mohanty, 2000). In 
the I/O Economics field, there is also lively interest in Tobin's Q, as a measure of 
performance (Tobin, 1969). Tobin's Q, is defined as the market value of the firm divided by 
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the replacement value of its assets. It has been stressed that market-to-book value of equity 
ratio and Tobin's Q are theoretically equivalent measures of value creation (Varaiya et al., 
1987). To measure performance effects specifically related to diversification, researchers 
have tried to assess firm value by computing stand-alone values for individual business 
segments. It is done by calculating value-multipliers, which compares the firm value as a 
whole with the sum of individual business to study value loss or gain fi-om diversification. 
This invokes the concept of 'diversificafion discount' and is also referred to as the excess -
value approach (Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
Some researchers have even used multivariate studies, linking performance with a string of 
dynamic indicators, stressing on strategic relatedness, to predict when related-diversifiers 
outperform unrelated ones (Markides et al., 1994). However, measures of strategic 
performance (i.e. gains in product market share) cannot be easily practiced in emerging 
markets, as data on such factors is not uniformly available. On the overall, it has been 
suggested that there are basically four determinants of value-creation - profitability, growth, 
risk, and investor's outlook (Branch and Gale, 1983). Several studies have therefore pointed 
out that instead of searching for a single measure that most significantly determines 
performance; a multi-factor performance assessment is better suited (Bagozzi and Philips, 
1982; Keats, 1990). 
3.3 Size 
Firm size is an important variable that needs to be controlled for to analyse the impact of 
diversity on performance (Child, 1972; Morck et al., 1988). As size grows, it becomes more 
and more difficuh to sustain impressive performance (Singh and Whittington, 1968). 
Presumably this is the rationale behind the organisational size effect (Banz, 1981). 
Researchers have also found that firm's size influences aggregate group performance 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1999). This is perhaps what certain researchers refer to as 
'conglomerate power' (Hill, 1985). 
It has been argued that the strategic importance of scope economies arise from a highly 
diversified firm's ability to share investments and costs across value chains that competitors, 
not possessing such internal and external diversity, cannot (Ghosal, 1987). Such sharing can 
take place across various business segments and may involve joint use of different kinds of 
resources. Diversified groups often share physical assets across different businesses and 
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markets. Business groups also pursue cross-subsidisation across markets and exploit a 
common group identity across different components of a business group's product and 
market portfolio. It has been also affirmed that a second important source of scope 
economies is shared external relations with customers, suppliers, and other existing 
stakeholders (Ghosal, 1987). Finally, shared knowledge is another important component of 
scope economies. But, even scope economies may prove costly as different businesses or 
products of a diversified business group may face different environmental demands. The 
effort to create synergies may fail or it may result in some compromise with the objectives of 
external consistency (Porter, 1987). 
3.4 Industry Characteristics 
Most I/O scholars have been concerned with the effects of industry characteristics on 
diversification, rather than performance. Diversified firms are widely believed to be able to 
exercise market power through such mechanisms as cross-subsidisation, predatory pricing, 
reciprocity in buying and selling, and creating or raising barriers to entry (Palepu, 1985). The 
phenomenon of groups, whose activities span to a significant extent the same markets, also 
provides support for the above linkage. There is also a converse logic that industry 
characteristics determine diversification strategies (Williamson, 1975). The argument goes 
that different diversity profiles arise due to different forms of market failure (Dundas and 
Richardson, 1980; Lecraw, 1984). 
A firms' market position - the particular market segments in which the firm competes -
broadly determines the potential for profitability and growth (Prahalad and Hamel, 1993). 
Another distinct perspective is that the industry in which a firm competes constrains its 
strategies and affects its performance (Porter's, 1980; 1987). This is primarily due to the 
differing nature of competition in different industries in which fjrm's operate. Decomposition 
studies in the developed markets (Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991; and McGahan and 
Porter, 1997) and studies in the emerging market context have indicated that industry effects 
exist, and are important determinants of performance (Chang and Hong, 2002). 
It has been highlighted that customers and suppliers are two very important factors that shape 
the competitive dynamics of an industry Porter (1980). Hence, a firm operating in a particular 
industry is more or less forced to adapt to the practices in the industry. The cost structure in a 
particular industry segment is by and large dictated by the prevailing economic conditions, 
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industry life cycle and firms' own distinct characteristics. In this regard it has been rightly 
pointed out that costs are by and large a function of external forces rather than internal ones 
(Porter, 1980). Escape hypothesis articulates that profitability of the industries in which firms 
compete have a negative influence on the extent of firm's diversification (Rumelt, 1974). 
Therefore, the better the performance of a firm from its largest business segment, the lower 
will be its diversity and vice-versa. 
3.5 Inertia 
The population ecology theorists while focusing on firms have highlighted the role of 
organisational inertia. The inertia view postulates that history and internal context of a firm 
matters in influencing its diversification strategies (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
Organisational culture rooted in regulation, top management values, structure and decision 
making constrains and retards strategic responses and performance of firms (Ray, 2000). 
Inertia therefore, seeks to explain how firms adapt and respond appropriately to a changing 
business environment. In a fast changing environment, early recognition of opportunities and 
threats, and identification of customer preferences is an important indicator of performance. 
Similarly, the evolutionary scholars argue that history matters as much as the present context 
of an organisation. It is the reflection of its historical evolution, which constrains future 
direction of evolution (Nelson and Winter, 1982; March, 1994; Dosi and Nelson, 1998). The 
inertia of an organisation surrounding current strategy develops on earlier commitments, as 
certain diversification strategies cannot be altered frequently (Ghemawat, 1991). This limits 
the choice of availability of diversification strategies from one point in time to another. As a 
result organisations show a general tendency to preserve its earlier strategy, rather than 
radically change it (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Boeker, 1989; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991). 
Several earlier researchers have maintained that inertia captured in firm age has a bearing on 
its efficacy (Batra, 1999; Lumkin and Dess, 1999; Kroszner, 2000). It has been reasoned that 
the inertial forces operating on relatively old firms is one of the key reasons why not so old 
groups, lacking capital, reputations are able to create new market niches and compete against 
older business groups (Sorenson and Stuart, 1999). The difficulties of keeping pace with 
incessant external developments can often frustrate the irmovative practices of many older 
business groups', keeping in mind the rapid technological changes. 
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In an overview researchers have identified two distinct approaches to explain such 
adaptation: external control model, strategic management model (Romanelli and Tushman, 
1986). The external control model subscribes to the enviromnental determinism perspective, 
in which a firm's evolution, performance and survival are controlled by the attributes of their 
business enviroimient. The main components of environmental determinism are the 
population ecology scholars (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979), the institutional 
theorists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Scott, 1987), and to a large extent contingency 
theorists (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Hofer, 1975; Khandwalla, 1977; Ginsberg and 
Venkataraman, 1985). They consider a firm's performance is largely governed by the 
characteristics of its business environment, and that the top management has little control in 
moderating such effects. 
The main arguments of the population ecology view are that resources are dispersed in the 
form of niches and are relatively resistant to manipulation by firms. Firms either fit into 
niches and succeed, or are selected out and fail (Harman and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979; 
Miller, 1990). Institutional scholars emphasise that a firm's behaviour is constrained and 
determined by the normative and regulatory pressures prevalent in the environment, which 
ensures similarity and homogeneity of organisational forms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 
1991). On the other hand contingency theory outlines a limited role of managers to respond 
to the changing business environment by continuously adapting to the emerging 
contingencies. They view the business environment as a system and firms as a part the 
system, which is technically constrained by the system (Astley and Fombrum, Bourgeois, 
1984). They treat the environment as exogenous with binding effects on firms and put 
emphasis on "fit" of organisational variables with the business environment. 
The deterministic view finds support from I/O Economics scholars. According to this 
perspective an organisation can neither influence conditions nor its performance and it is the 
industry structure that largely determines performance (Bain, 1968). As industry structures 
inhibit movement of firms between markets through entry barriers and limits the economic 
feasibility and appropriateness of strategies within the industr}'; a firms performance is 
simple a reflection of its industry structure (Porter and Caves, 1976). Managers therefore 
have a passive role on firm's strategies and environmental forces alone determine 
performance (Porter, 1981). To conclude, differences in structural characteristics of 
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industries or domains and various niches in the market do exist with varied attractiveness 
providing non-uniform opportunities. However, the deterministic viewpoint does not 
preclude the existence of strategic choices; they are of the opinion that environmental 
pressures severely limit the strategic choices available to managers (Astley and Van de Ven, 
1983). 
On the contrary, the main arguments of the strategic management model are that managers 
have sufficient choice to decide on the firm's course of action, which ultimately decides its 
performance, survival and evolution (Lado, Boyd and Wright, 1992). The strategic choice 
theorists posit that environment should not be viewed as a set of imposing constraints, as it 
does not play a deterministic role (Child, 1972; Weick, 1979). Firms can construct, eliminate 
or redefine the objective features of their business environment, can manipulate and 
influence it through various environment processes. They can therefore, create their own 
measures and reality, and choose their own course of actions to attain a desired goal (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Bedeian, 1990). Viewing firms as a part of complex systems, proponents 
of resource dependent model hold that firms depend on different agencies in the environment 
for their resources and in turn influence the resource provider (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
For them, managers manage their external environment as well as the internal environment; 
and the former may be as important as the latter (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). 
Accordingly, the objective environment is secondary for managerial decision-making, as the 
environment perceived by the managers becomes a reality (Child and Keiser, 1981). This 
contributes to the variation in responses to the environment among organisations, as 
managerial perceptions about the environment are different. Managers therefore possess the 
leverage to influence both objective and perceived environments. The normative schools of 
strategic management voice similar propositions. The environment offers opportunities to be 
exploited by firms as it views strategy as the pre-emptive actions to external opportunities 
and threats with a concern to match the organisational capabilities to environmental demands 
(Ansoff, 1965, 1979; Andrews, 1971). 
3.6 Cohesiveness 
Existing research has identified that there are benefits of group membership (Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001). Firms that are affiliated to a group are able to consummate favourable 
transactions that non-affiliates cannot. They can access resources and infi-astructure less 
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expensively than their non-group peers, and they can also engage in business through vertical 
and horizontal integration without the hazards of arm's-length exchange. They also have a 
superior access to the political power structure and hence draw from a richer pool of 
opportunities. The bond between group affiliated firms in some formal or informal ways is 
referred to as "cohesiveness" (Granovetter, 1994: 454). The block-model analysis of 
Japanese networks shows that group membership is particularly related to equity 
participation, bank relationships, and director inter-locks (Gerlach, 1992). 
There are two aspects of cohesiveness that binds groups together: first, the ties are numerous 
and overlapping. Second, they span the economic and the social, the formal and the informal. 
This bonding is litvked by relations of inter-personal trust, and on the basis of similar 
personal, ethnic or commercial background (Leff, 1978). Researchers particularly resist the 
idea that group's constituents can be identified purely on the basis of a single metric, such as 
inter-locking directorates; thus: "even a ban on inter-locks would not destroy nor even 
seriously impair the important group relations and pattern" (Strachan, 1976:18). In the 
context of business groups in India, the emphasis is on multiple forms of ties among group 
members: strong social ties of family, caste, religion, language, ethnicity, and region 
reinforced cohesiveness among affiliated enterprises (Encamation, 1989). 
However there are certain theoretical arguments that suggests to the contrary; cohesiveness 
may be costly as well. The major direct costs of being affiliated with a group have to do with 
the group undertaking certain coordinated and central decision-making. This may have a 
bearing on firm performance. They have, for instance, an obligation to bail out other member 
firms that are performing badly; if unaffiliated, such poor performers have no other option, 
but to go bankrupt. They may also be obliged, or at least prone, to purchase inputs from 
member firms, ignoring transaction costs (Williamson, 1975). Presumably, bases having its 
origin in centralised gains rather than decentralised benefits guide most group decisions. 
3.7 Resources & Distinctive Capabilities 
The resource-based view (RBV) regards resources more broadly than the classical I/O 
Economics point of view and conceptualises a firm as a bundle of resources (Wemerfelt, 
1984). Along with the traditional form of resources it also includes other forms of resources 
like distinctive capabilities and competencies that a firm possesses (Penrose, 1959; Grant, 
1991). Basic resources of a firm arise from performing activities over a period of time, 
43 
acquiring them from outside or some combination of the two (Porter, 1991). When more than 
one resource is linked together by a wide range of bonding mechanisms, technology, 
management information and control systems, and various formal and informal 
organisational processes, they lead to complex resources (Ray, 2000). These complex 
resources are termed as distinctive capabilities and competencies. Complex resources or 
capabilities arise when more than one basic resource is linked together by a wide range of 
bonding mechanisms, technology, management information or control systems and/or 
various formal and informal organisational processes (Ray, 2000). In support Porter (1991) 
has concluded that complex resources are developed around a group of inter-related activities 
along the value-chain. 
Firms considerably depend on their existing capabilities for creating and exploiting new 
opportunities. The resource position of a firm also determines the means to compete in a 
business and the direction to which it should grow (Penrose, 1959). There is a fundamental 
connection between resources and value-chain activities (Porter, 1985). Therefore, the 
possession of certain complex resources and leveraging these resources leads to the implant 
of fresh value creating strategies. These strategies caimot be imitated by even its closest 
competitors and helps firms achieve and sustain superior performance (Cormer and Prahalad, 
1996; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). It was also observed that diversification is not just based 
on attractiveness of markets; core competencies also guide diversifications in a major way 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Extant research has identified three distinct types of capabilities 
that firms often use to leverage its performance - business specific capability, entrepreneurial 
capability, and growth management capability (Ray, 2000). Thus the RBV takes the view 
that real source of competitive advantage lies very much inside the firm, depending upon the 
ability of the top management to exploit and leverage them (Prahalad, 1993; Barney, 1994; 
Collis and Montgomery, 1995). 
The concept of resource in the context of business groups is multi-dimensional in nature. It 
comprises a set of assets, activities and configurations, which encompasses a set of 
knowledge, information, skills, etc (Mc Kilvey, 1982). The logic is that diversification by 
business groups in emerging markets is to access both domestic and foreign markets rather 
than to reap scope economies and minimise transaction costs (Guillen, 2000). It emphasises 
that market imperfections, authority structures or late development do not accurately explain 
the importance of business across emerging markets and over time. Business groups will 
rarely bother to build integrated structures to capture cross-industry synergies (Hill and 
Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson, 1987; Chandler, 1990). The main assumption is that business 
groups are created if political-economic conditions allow them to acquire and maintain the 
capability of combining domestic and foreign resources - inputs, process technologies and 
market access - to repeatedly enter new industries. Entrepreneurs who are able to combine 
these resources quickly and effectively will be best able to create a business group by 
repeatedly entering a variety of industries. This capability for repeated industry entry consists 
of a bundle of skills that are precisely generic in nature and not industry specific (Guillen, 
2000). 
These capabilities are non-tradable because it is embodied in the group's owners, managers 
and routines. It is in excess supply immediately after a group consummates entry into a new 
industry. Once the diversification in implemented, the capability to enter new industries 
becomes idle. Therefore, this generic capability encourages business groups to diversify 
across industries, rather than remain focused in a single business line. It was fiirther observed 
that, an institutional context characterised by asymmetries in foreign trade and investments, 
market imperfections, and state autonomy allow business groups to build and leverage such 
generic capabilities (Guillen, 2000). In terms of the following categories, the capability for 
repeated industry entry is related to both discrete properties based resources and systematic 
knowledge based resources (Miller and Shamsie, 1996). It also contains excess capabilities -
tangible and intangible resources (Hoskisson and Hitts, 1990; Barney, 1991). It has been also 
shown that group affiliated firms benefit fi"om group membership through sharing of 
intangible and financial resources with other member firms (Chang and Hong, 2000). 
Like most resources that create competitive advantage, resources for competitive advantage 
in emerging markets are, on the whole, tangible. They are not necessarily product-market 
based, as would be suggested by the knowledge-based view of the firm (Conner and 
Prahalad, 1996). Although some forms of capabilities are imiform across all markets, some 
are unique to emerging markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In most emerging markets, 
however, such capabilities are difficult to establish without good relationship with local 
governments. Business groups, which are able to manage the specific circumstances in 
emerging markets, reap the benefits of superior performance (Encamation, 1989). However, 
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as institutions change, business groups that have dominated emerging markets will have less 
and less advantage relative to its competitors, both domestic and foreign, that wish to enter 
and exit a market. 
This generic and non-tradable capability to combine resources for repeated industry entry 
however becomes less crucial as free-markets evolve. It therefore, does not allow a business 
group to sustain its competitiveness over time. According to the RBV, it becomes imperative 
that certain limits to competition do exist. This capability can be accumulated through 
learning by doing and maintaining over time a rare, valuable, and inimitable asset (Barney, 
1991; Peteraf, 1993). In essence, business groups need to understand the relationship 
between its resources and the changing nature of institutional infrastructure as well as the 
characteristics of its industry in order to survive (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In doing so, 
business groups in emerging markets may be able to become an aggressive contender 
domestically and globally by using its resources as a source of competitive advantage (Dewar 
and Frost, 1999). 
It has been suggested that resources are based in a context and depending on the 
characteristics of that context; a focus on resources could create strategic inflexibility and 
core rigidities for a firm that would lead to negative returns (Leonard-Barton, 1992). It has 
been also analysed that the issue of a firm's sustainable advantage in terms of resource-base 
and institutional factors are able to create or develop institutional capital to enhance optimal 
use of resources (Oliver, 1997). Firms therefore need to manage the social context of their 
resources and capabilities in order to generate rents. However, as institutions change, 
business groups, which have dominated emerging markets, will have less and less advantage 
relative to its competitors, both domestic and foreign, that wish to enter and exit a market 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). In essence, a firm must understand the relationship between its 
assets and the changing nature of institutional infrastructure as well as the characteristics of 
its industry. 
To win competitive advantage in any market, a firm needs to be able to deliver a given set of 
customer benefits at lower costs than competitors, or provide customers with a bundle of 
benefits its rivals cannot match (Porter, 1990). It has been also highlighted that the source of 
such competitive advantage usually lies in core competencies of a firm (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990). However, to effectively exploit these costs and differentiation drivers, a firm needs to 
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have access and utilise a complex set of tangible and intangible assets. Firms that possess 
assets, which underpin competitive advantage, will earn rents (Rumelt, 1987). To the extent 
that competing firms can identify these rent producing assets, they can decide between two 
alternative ways in replicating competitive advantage: they may seek to imitate these assets 
which can earn similar rents, or they may try to substitute them with other assets (Markides 
and Williamson, 1994). 
Ahhough the RBV has offered a compelling theory of diversification in the developed 
countries, its effort in explaining performance of business groups has been quite lacking 
(Guillen, 2000). Diversified business groups in emerging markets are also different from the 
conglomerates in the developed markets as they did not grow out of a search for financial 
diversification, but instead grew out of the ability to set up new ventures across a variety of 
industries quickly and at a lower cost (Guillen, 2000). The type of industries the group will 
enter will depend on the nature and type of resources. Certain arguments suggest that a firm, 
which has developed excess capacity in non-marketable fiangible productive resources, 
should diversify in related areas to realise economies of scope, preferably by internal growth. 
On the other hand, if the productive resource is top management, and if the top management 
has skills in acquiring and managing businesses, then diversification to establish an internal 
capital market becomes a possibility. In such a case the acquisition of unrelated businesses 
might be entirely consistent with value creation. Therefore, the mere possession of certain 
distinctive capabilities does not yield superior performance. They must be exploited and 
leveraged in the right direction to realise the potentials of diversification. The resource 
position of a firm only determines the means to compete in a business and the direction to 
which it should grow (Penrose, 1959). 
Financial resources in general are the most flexible of all resources because they can be used 
to buy all other types of productive resources. The first, internal funds, consists of liquidity at 
hand and unused debt capacity to borrow at normal rates. The second, internal funds include 
accumulated reserves. The third, external funds, consists of fresh equity and possible high-
risk debts. Several theories suggests that lower levels of internal (relative to external funds) 
will lead to lower levels of unrelated diversificafion and vice-versa (Jensen, 1986; 
Montgomery and Singh, 1984; Lubatkin and O'Neill, 1987). 
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3.8 Dominant Logic 
There is a school of thought that ascribes the success of some highly diversified business 
groups to the superior skills of the (TMT) top management team (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). 
The particular skill, which they identify, is the ability of the TMT to conceptualise the top 
management task. They held that different TMT's have different 'dominant logics', different 
patterns to conceptualise. According to their view it takes a highly skilled TMT to 
conceptualise highly variegated businesses and hence is the reason for the success of some 
highly diversified groups. 
A dominant logic can be defined as the way in which the top management conceptualise its 
various businesses and make critical resource allocation decisions. To put it more simply, it 
can be perceived as a set of working rules (similar to thumb rules) that enables the TMT to 
decide what to do and more importantly what not to do. This linkage consists of mental maps 
developed by the TMT through its experiences in the core business and sometimes applied 
inappropriately in other businesses. Hence considered more broadly, it can be considered as 
both a knowledge structure and a set of elicited management processes. The TMT of a 
diversified group has a significant influence on the ways its member firms are managed. It 
influences to a large extent the style and process of management, and as a result the key 
resource allocation choices (Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983). Thus diversification strategies of 
the top management are processed through pre-existing knowledge systems known as 
'schemas' where such dominant logics are stored (Norman, 1976). 
Schemas permit managers to categorise an event, assess its consequences, and consider 
appropriate actions (including doing nothing). These systems have developed over time 
based on the personal experiences of the TMT. It consists of historical representations rather 
than of current ones. It represents its beliefs, theories, biases and propositions, which have a 
significant bearing on the diversification strategies pursued by business groups. Without 
schemas the TMT of any diversified group would become paralysed by the need to analyse 
scientifically an enormous number of ambiguous and complex situations. The selection of 
environmental elements to be scaimed is influenced by the TMT's schemas. For the present 
purpose the schema concept is introduced as a mental structure that can store, process and 
retrieve a shared dominant logic. The characteristics of the core business, often the source of 
dominant logic of the TMT, tend to cause them to define problems in certain ways and 
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develop familiarity with, and facilitate in the use of, those administrative tools that are 
particularly useful in accomplishing the critical tasks of the core business (Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1986). 
Existing research highlights four distinct streams of thought which highlights the process by 
which a dominant logic evolves. In a work having its origin in operant conditioning, it was 
argued that behaviour of the TMT is a function of its consequences (Skinner, 1953). 
Behaviour can be understood by considering the contingencies that were administered by the 
environment in response to certain behaviours. Behaviour that is reinforced is emitted more 
frequently in the fiature. In contrast, behaviour that is ignored or punished (negative 
reinforcement) is likely to diminish over time. In this perspective dominant logic can be seen 
as resulting from the reinforcement that results from doing right things with respect to a set 
of business. This in turn determines the approaches the TMT is likely to use in resource 
allocation, control over operations, and the approach to intervention in a crisis. 
The concept of dominant logic also derives support from the work on scientific and alternate 
paradigms (Kuhn, 1970; Alison's (1971). It argues that a particular science at any point in 
time can be characterised by a set of shared beliefs or conventional wisdom about the 
environment that constitutes what he termed 'dominant paradigm' (Kuhn, 1970). The work 
also points out how difficult it is to shift or change dominant paradigms. As a part of 
identifying different pattern recognition processes, researchers have identified that human 
beings decide on the basis of experience or what worked before, and not on the basis of some 
best strategy or optimising procedure (De Groot, 1965; Simon, 1979). 
A final area from which the research results are suggestive of the concept of dominant logic 
is 'cognitive psychology'. It has been stated that when dealing with imcertain and complex 
tasks the TMT often rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which greatly simplifies 
the decision making process (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The most interesting of these 
heuristic principles is what is called 'availability heuristic' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). 
Basically, the availability heuristic leads people to make decisions by using information that 
can be easily brought to mind. This field of research suggests that TMT does not necessarily 
use analytical approaches to evaluate the information content of available data or search for 
adequate information (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Therefore, decision-making based on 
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heuristics may work well under conditions of crisis, but may lead to systematic errors under 
conditions of certainty. 
The characteristics of the economic environment surrounding business groups, competitive 
structure of the industry and the underlying features of specific businesses vary over time. 
The differences in strategic characteristics surrounding its business portfolio, a measure of 
strategic variety, impact the ability of the TMT to manage its diverse portfolio of businesses. 
This premise implies that complexity of the top management process is a function of strategic 
variety, and not just the number or the size of those businesses. Therefore, the conclusion is 
strategically similar businesses can be managed using a shared dominant logic. However, 
highly diversified groups with strategic variety, impose the need for multiple dominant 
logics. Hence the ability of the TMT to manage a diversified group is limited by the variety 
of dominant logics they are used to. Unfortunately, dominant logics are not always infallible 
guides to the group and its environment. In fact, they are relatively inaccurate representation 
of the environment, particularly when conditions change and strategic variety sets in. Under 
such conditions events are not labeled accurately, and sometimes also processed through 
inaccurate and/or incomplete knowledge structures. 
In the event of strategic variety, the critical tasks for success are substantially different from 
its existing dominant logics. Due to operant conditioning, the behaviour of the top 
management and approaches they use to manage strategic variety are likely to be linked to its 
existing dominant logics, even though they may be inappropriate for the new environment. 
Therefore, the strategic variety a group can cope with is dependent on the composition of the 
TMT. Undoubtedly, organisation structure can help cope with increased strategic variety, 
though in limited ways. It can attenuate the intensity of strategic variety that the top 
management must deal with, but it cannot substitute for the need to handle strategic variety. 
It imposes the need for a single strategic approach on each business a group handles (Porter 
et al., 1983). However, the bottom-line is that the TMT at a given point of time has an in-
built limit to the extent of diversification it can manage (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986, 1995). 
The concept of organisational learning has been often mathematically embodied in the 
'learning curve' (Yelle, 1979), It assumes that learning takes place in a neutral environment. 
But as Prahalad and Bettis (1995) points out, in an organisational case a great amount of 
'unlearning' has to proceed before any actual 'learning' can take place. The dominant logic 
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theory therefore makes clear that when strategic variety occurs; 'old logics' in a sense must 
be unlearned before strategic learning of 'new logics' can take place. 
3.9 Strategic Fit 
Relatedness is a mechanism by which business groups capture synergies that can enhance the 
level of synergy across various businesses. It constitutes a major source of competitive 
advantage for firms individually and also business group as a whole (Davis et al., 1992). A 
group can achieve sustained superior performance if it is able to exploit resources that are 
unavailable to its rivals (Barney, 1991; Markides and Williamson, 1996). A group specific 
asset, which may be transferred across affiliated firms, includes technology, marketing 
networks, human capital (Teece, 1980, 1982; Levy and Haber, 1986). This transfer of assets 
being easier and beneficial for related and linked business groups (Levy, 1989). 
So, business groups that effectively capitalises on relatedness may be able to use inter-
relationships to outperform business groups with poorly conceived arrays of affiliated firms. 
Scale economies and exploitation of by-products can lead to a significant decline in unit costs 
and improvement in product/services quality and appeal to customers. In contrast, it has been 
rightly pointed out that inter-business coordination and resource sharing may result in 
inflexibilities and poor responsiveness by the top management to environmental changes that 
may adversely affect its efficacy (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). In this context, it has been 
noted that the traditional ways of measuring relatedness across businesses in terms of 
product, market or industry relatedness is incomplete because it ignores the 'strategic 
importance' and similarity of the underlying assets residing in these businesses (Markides 
and Williamson, 1994). 
Fit (also termed co alignment, consistency, and contingency) is emerging as an important 
concept in organisational research, including strategic management (Miles and Snow, 1978; 
Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). In simple terms, 'fit' between strategy and its context -
whether it is external environment (Bourgeois, 1980; Anderson and Zeithmal, 1984; Prescot, 
1986; Hambrick, 1988) or internal environment (Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974) has 
significant positive implications for performance. An alternate hypothesis that follows is that, 
profile deviation has significant negative connotations on performance. In an ideal situation, 
competitive advantage therefore comes in a way group activities fit and reinforce one 
another. It has been emphasised that 'fit' is a far more central component of competitive 
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advantage than most realise (Porter, 1986). Fit is critical because discrete activities often 
affect one another. Fit has been further classified into three categories, though they are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. First-order fit implies simple consistency between each 
activity (function) and the overall strategy. Second-order fit occurs when the activities are 
mutually reinforcing. Third-order fit goes beyond activity reinforcement, to what the author 
calls 'optimisation of effort' (Porter, 1986). In all three types of fit, the whole matter more 
than any individual part and competitive advantage grows out of the entire system of 
activities. 
The research on environment (external) - strategy co-alignment can be summarised from two 
theoretical perspectives. The reductionistic perspective of co-alignment is based on a central 
assumption that the co-alignment between two constructs (envirormient - strategy) can be 
understood in terms of pair-wise co-alignment among the individual dimensions that 
represent the two constructs (Hofer, 1975; Zeithmal, 1984; Ginsberg and Venkataraman, 
1985). The holistic perspective is based on a central premise that it is important to retain the 
holistic (i.e. systematic, gestalt) nature of environment - strategy co-alignment. It follows 
from the articulation of fit, which characterises environmental niches and organisational 
forms (that) must be joined together in a particular configuration to achieve completeness in 
a description of a social system (Van de Yen's, 1979). The results of the tests carried out 
strongly support the proposition that the attainment of an appropriate match between 
environment and strategy has systematic implications for performance (Venkataraman and 
Prescott, 1990). 
In the environment (internal) - strategy co-alignment research can be summarised from the 
perspective of dominant logic. The fit between dominant logic and its diversification strategy 
represents an equilibrium level. However, it is not a global optimimi, and when strategic 
variety sets in, a new local optimum (new dominant logic) must be developed quickly 
(including unlearning the old dominant logic) if the organisation is to survive (Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1995). Therefore, the longer a dominant logic has been in place, the more difficult it is 
likely to be to unlearn it. Hence time spent by an organisation in equilibrium is an important 
organisational variable that characterises inertia. It has been observed that organisational 
inertia due to historical evolution of firms constrains strategic responses and performance 
(Ray, 2000). Earlier research has shown that in such cases changes in the TMT may help 
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overcome the inertia against strategic change (Boeker, 1997). It has been also pointed out 
that when such a system is in equilibrium it acts as though it is blind. However, as it moves 
far from equilibriimi, it becomes 'able to perceive', to 'take into account' in its way of 
functioning (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). In other words, firms feel the need to change its 
dominant logic only when it moves substantially from equilibrium. 
Small displacements in the equilibrium, corresponding to small changes in the business 
environment will result in the firm settling back or rolling back into the original equilibrium 
level or dominant logic it currently occupies. Under such circumstances the fit between 
dominant logic and its diversification may deteriorate, but because of the low degree in 
strategic variety the current dominant logic may continue to be in force. However, if the 
change in the business envirormient is large enough to displace the current equilibrium level, 
a new dominant logic is likely to emerge. Alternatively, the firm may be unable to surmount 
the barrier and be dravra back toward the previous equilibriimi level (i.e. old dominant logic). 
In such a situation when deviation in fit occurs, it will likely to lead to failure of the firm as a 
competitively viable entity (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). 
This approach leads researchers to wonder what course of action a firm should take to ensure 
the stability function surroimding the existing dominant logic does not get too rigid. It has 
been advocated that firms should clearly differentiate between financial and strategic 
performance (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). Current financial success may limit any significant 
challenges to its dominant logic, although strategic performance (on which future financial 
success is based) may have significantly deteriorated. One of the major implications of the 
dominant logic hypotheses is that top management is less likely to 'respond appropriately' to 
situations where the dominant logic is different, as well as not respond quickly enough, as 
they may be unable to interpret the meaning of information regarding strategically dissimilar 
businesses. And all these imply 'hidden costs' which have a strong negative bearing on 
overall performance. 
3.10 Market Imperfection 
In one line of work, business groups are conceptualised as responses to market imperfections 
in an economy. This line of work was pioneered by Leff (1976, 1978), whose writings 
emphasise high transaction costs primarily in capital markets and, to a lesser extent in the 
market for entrepreneurial talent as sources of market imperfection. Khaima and Palepu 
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(1997, 2000) have argued that there is no priori reason to focus on capital market 
imperfections in search for a reason for the existence of business groups; groups might also 
alleviate from failures in product markets, labour markets, and in cross-border markets for 
technology. Business groups are but the intemalisation of market failure by entrepreneurs 
seeking to overcome the difficulties of obtaining capital, labour, raw-materials, components, 
and technology in emerging economies (Guillen, 2000). They emphasised the greater the 
market imperfections, the greater the importance of business groups in an economy. 
It has been also argued that highly diversified groups would thrive at the expense of non-
diversified firms not because they are more efficient, but because they have access to what is 
termed as conglomerate power (Hill, 1985). This power comes by way of their having 
monopoly and monopsony benefits from the imperfections existing in the economy. This 
could be by way of increase in market concentration, by mcrease in the size of an economic 
agent and also by increase in the corresponding concentration of human and non-human 
resources. In contrast, it has been added that a group with insignificant positions across a 
number of markets will not, in sum, have this power (Griffin, 1976). 
Western companies for instance take for granted a range of institutions that support their 
business activities, but many of these institutions are absent in most emerging markets 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Existing research identifies three major sources of market 
failure: informational problems, misguided regulations, and inefficient judicial systems. In 
the case of product markets, buyers and sellers usually suffer from a severe dearth of 
information for three reasons. First, the communication infrastructure in emerging markets is 
often underdeveloped. Shortages of power often render modes of communication that do 
exist, ineffective. The postal services are typically inefficient, slow, or unreliable. Second, 
even when information about products does get around, there are no mechanisms to 
corroborate such claims. Third, redress mechanisms are also underdeveloped. As a result of 
such imperfections emerging markets face much higher costs in brand building and in doing 
business in general, than their counterparts in the developed markets. 
Similar bottlenecks exist in caphal markets too. Without access to information, investors 
refrain from putting in money in unfamiliar ventures. Venture capital fiinds are also too 
nascent. In contrast, monitoring agencies make it difficult for unscrupulous investors to 
mislead sophisticated investors in the developed markets. Laws relating to capital markets 
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are also very stringent making managers and directors directly accountable to the investors 
and public at large. However, majority of the institutional mechanisms that make developed 
capital markets are either weak or too nascent in emerging markets. As a result successfully 
diversified groups often take recourse to their existing shareholders for future funding 
requirements. As a result, well established groups have superior access to the capital markets 
compared to their little known or inefficient counterparts. The advantage is so pronounced 
that many governments in emerging markets have often formulated regulations to restrict the 
credit exposure of banks and financial institutions to such large groups. 
In such cases, resources are allocated via an internal capital market: funds are distributed 
across businesses by the central headquarters of the group and it is expected to reduce the 
problem of under-investment. The miniature internal capital market could replicate the 
allocative and disciplinary roles of the financial markets, shifting resources towards more 
profitable areas. The existence of internal capital markets could be beneficial only when the 
capital market and existing financial system is not able to allocate capital efficiently (Leff, 
1976). It has been affirmed that the grounds are for the need of an internal capital market, as 
the stock market is too slow, remote and impersonal (Williamson, 1985). A business group 
will benefit immensely, when the projects are either investment intensive, technically 
complex or long-gestation oriented. But this could lead to cross-subsidisation of under-
performing businesses as well (Mathur and Kenyon, 1998). 
Most emerging markets also suffer from the dearth of well trained people, due to the lack of 
high quality technical education and vocational training facilities. In the absence of a 
developed labour market, groups create value by training and developing a pool of future 
managers. They then spread such fixed costs through appropriate resource transfers over its 
affiliated firms. Governments in most emerging markets usually restrain groups to adjust 
their workforces to changing economic conditions. Rigid labour laws often create exit 
barriers and structured labour coalitions insist on job security in the absence of government 
provided unemployment benefits. To countermand such rigidities, groups create extensive 
internal labour markets. It has been indicated that highly diversified organisations are best 
understood as alternative resource allocation mechanisms (Williamson, 1975). This is 
because headquarters typically have access to information unavailable to external parties, 
which it extracts through its own internal auditing and reporting procedures. 
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Most groups operating in developed markets know very well the government intervention in 
most emerging markets is inordinately high. They also have a difficult time predicting the 
outcomes of most regulatory bodies. On top of being heavily involved in an intricate array of 
strategic business decisions, the law also establishes a high degree of subjective criteria. This 
leaves bureaucrats with a high degree of discretionary powers to interpret the rules, and more 
often than not they use their interpretation to source nepotism and pecuniary benefits. In 
many cases educating the officials is also more important than exchanging favours. 
Diversified business groups add value by creating 'industrial embassies' to the benefit of 
their affiliated firms and foreign partners. No wonder, most emerging markets also list high 
on the corruption index published by leading international bodies (Transparency 
International, 2006). 
Despite the extensive involvement of government in most emerging markets, these 
economies lack effective mechanisms to enforce contracts. In the developed markets, firms 
can work under arm's-length contractual agreements with strong confidence in the law 
enforcement authorities. But judicial systems in emerging markets enforce contacts 
inefficiently or capriciously; detrimental to the interests of business groups and public at 
large. Thus firms are likely to depend more on out-of court settlements for resolving disputes 
and less on judicial channels. In such situations fair and honest business practices, corporate 
governance, and transparency can go in a long way establishing and leveraging reputation of 
business groups in dealing with customers, suppliers, government, and foreign partners. On 
the contrary, misdeeds can damage the reputation of the group as well as other affiliated 
firms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Research Design and Methodology 
In this chapter we attempt to present the arrangement of conditions for collection and 
analysis of data in a manner that aims to test the hypotheses and overall validity of our 
theoretical framework. Keeping in view, the above the above stated research design has been 
split into the following parts: (a) The sampling design which deals with the method of 
selecting items to be observed or the given study, (b) The observational design which relates 
to the conditions under which the observations are to be made, (c) The statistical design 
which concerns with the question of how many fields are to be obtained and how the data 
obtained is to be analysed, (d) The operational design deals with the techniques by which the 
procedures specified in the sampling, statistical and observational designs can be carried out. 
4.1 Problem Statement 
Two central questions that has been driving research on business groups in emerging markets 
in the last one decade revolves around - whether diversification by business groups creates or 
destroys value and whether firms affiliated to a business groups gains or loses from group 
affiliation? Though the dominant view is that unrelated diversification by business groups in 
emerging markets and group affiliation leads to positive performance effects; few studies in 
the Indian context report contrary findings. The major bottleneck is that the findings have 
fragile theoretical foundations, and has been unable to overturn earlier strictures. If one 
tracks a handful of business groups one can observe that unrelated diversification even 
beyond the "threshold level" has not always resulted in improved performance. Sometimes, 
the consolidated performance of a business group does not reflect its true picture, due to its 
strong initial resource position or windfall performance in some businesses. However, 
strategic failure in some diversifications was clear and apparent for a number of business 
groups. Therefore, such dichotomies should not be summarily dismissed, citing 
methodological reasons. This implies that the relationship between diversification and 
performance is not so straightforward and affiliation to a business group does not necessarily 
and automatically adds value to a firm. Researches having its origin in I/O Economics have 
not been able to provide satisfactory explanation to these contradictions. They have almost 
used market imperfection and diversity in the same breadth. The need is break out of the 
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strong-hold of I/O Economics view, instead looking at diversifications from the point of view 
of multiple theoretical lenses. 
4.2 Research Concerns & Questions 
Against this backdrop, to capitalise on the relative strengths of the two progressions (i.e. 
mechanistic versus organic), this thesis outlines an organic perspective on existing strategies 
core issues. Being organic in nature, this research derives its internal consistency from 
epistemological assumptions on time, flow and construct coupling. Paralleling the 
mechanistic perspective, it also provides a imified set of conceptual, explanatory, and 
prescriptive elements. Particularly it builds upon a concept of diversification strategy as 
adaptive coordination of goals and actions. It further extends the Organisation - Environment 
- Strategy - Performance (OESP) model, an integrative theoretical structure that links 
different middle range theories and synthesises organic and mechanistic ideas (Farjoun, 
2002). It attempts to build a diversification - performance model in which the iterative and 
integrative qualities of the model are stressed. 
These parts of the model are internally compatible, representing the field's continuity and 
progress, and are better suited to a more complex, intercormected, uncertain and ever-
changing environment. The development from an organic perspective can contribute to the 
strategy field in several aspects. First, without sacrificing key insights and contributions of 
the mechanistic perspective and its attention to prescription, an organic perspective can help 
renew mechanistic concepts and models by aligning them organic themes. Second, an 
organic perspective can integrate various streams of research that share its epistemological 
orientation, and foster cross-fertilisation of conceptual, theoretical, and analytic models. 
Third, beyond renewal and integration, the organic perspective can stimulate new ideas and 
application. Van de Ven and Poole (1995) provides some clue on how the organic 
assumptions on time, flow and coupling can be isolated from their original contributions and 
can again be applied and recombined in ways other than one originally prescribed. We intend 
to do just that. 
At this stage our objective is to evaluate theory already in place while not unduly expanding 
the existing complex of theoretical array. The purpose is one of theoretical synthesis and 
reconciliation, followed by case studies and selective empirical testing, rather than 
propoimding something, which is grand and new. Although, we do put forth theoretical 
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positions that are unique, path breaking and cuts across existing concepts and notions. The 
objective of this research is to begin the development of a unified theory by presenting a 
holistic theoretical framework for understanding previous research on the antecedents and 
consequences of diversification and group affiliation on performance outcomes. An 
integrative perspective will hopefully impel future efforts to examine more closely the 
underlying rationale for diversification before proceeding with the assessments of the 
strength of empirical relationships. To begin with we adopt an approach that combines multi-
dimensional theories and multi-lateral concepts to propose a holistic and integrative model, a 
/a Allison (1971). 
In parity with existing research we view business groups as complex systems (Prahalad and 
Bettis). Although, there is no generally accepted definition of the term "complex system"; 
Waldrop (1992:11) notes, ".... usually refers to systems in which a great many independent 
agents are interacting with each other in a great many ways". Organisations including 
business groups represent such systems. Within any system various properties emerge that 
are not a simple property of the constituent agents. In other words, reductionism is not a 
viable approach to study complex systems. Knowledge of the parts is not knowledge of the 
whole or major parts. As Polyani (1958:4) puts it: "Take a watch to pieces and examine, 
however carefiiUy, its separate parts in turn, and you will never come across the principles by 
which a watch keeps time." Therefore, while disintegrating a system into its parts is essential 
for its better understanding, a holistic view of the system is critical for identifying a solution. 
Complex systems generally remit non-linear behaviour (Gleick, 1987; Gulick, 1992; Cambel, 
1993). In other words cause and effect are not proportional. A large cause might have a 
minimal effect, while conversely a small cause can have a huge impact. This feature is what 
is explained as - sensitive dependence on initial systems. Sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions simply implies that a small perturbation in the system can have a dramatic effect 
on later results. Emergent properties of an organisation include political coalitions, values, 
informal structure and sub-optimisation. Prahalad and Bettis (1995) follows that dominant 
logic is another important emergent property of complex systems. They further believe that 
dominant logic is inherently non-linear, with impact often out of proportion to its inherently 
subtle nature. Another emergent property of complex systems is that they seek to adapt to 
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their environment (Holland, 1992; Waldrop, 1992). It views that dominant logic is one 
emergent property of complex systems seeking to adapt. 
The proposed model shall attempt to explain the dichotomies observed in extant research. We 
follow the predicament offered by Prahalad and Hamel (1995); untenured research should be 
initiated to strike out new directions, if there are strong theoretical justifications. To begin 
with it is evident from existing stream of work that the benefits of diversification are not 
automatically realised and administrative mechanisms must be consciously designed to 
realise these benefits (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). In this context, a quote by Jerome 
B. Wiesner (President Emeritus, MIT) comes to our mind, "Some problems are just too 
complicated for rational, logical solution, they admit insights and not answers." The research 
study therefore should not be considered an end, but one that is going to pave the way for the 
development of a robust and vinified framework. It specifically addresses the following set of 
research questions: 
• Why research findings on diversification are not generalisable over time and across 
different institutional contexts? 
Why different diversification strategies lead to similar effects on performance? 
Why same diversification strategies lead to different effects on performance? 
Why performance effects of group affiliation are are not uniform across all firms? 
Why are performance effects of affiliated firms and non-affiliated firms not similar? 
What are the roles of environment, industry and firm context in explaining 
diversification strategies of firms? 
• What are the roles of environment, industry and firm context in explaining difference 
in performance of firms? 
4.3 Hypotheses 
We propose that if diversification strategies of affiliated firms are consistent with the 
dominant logic of the business group, group performance is likely to be better. Further, after 
group diversification is controlled for, group affiliation will lead to better firm performance. 
One of the major implications of this proposition is that the top management is less likely to 
respond appropriately to diversification strategies, where the dominant logic is different. As 
well as respond quickly enough, as they may be unable to interpret the information 
surrounding unfamiliar environment (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). All this implies hidden 
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costs which indirectly has a negative bearing on performance. Second, diversification 
strategies consistent with group dominant logic facilitates implementation of strategies as it 
provides strategic as well as operational control of the top management over its diversified 
businesses (Ghemawat, 1991). Third, a consistent dominant logic ensures unlearning and 
learning of new skills and practices required in a fast changing business environment, evident 
in most emerging markets (Das, 1981). Fourth, it implies commitment of the top 
management, which offers a generalised form of explanation for sustained differences in 
performance across business groups (Ghemawat, 1991). Fifth, it facilitates the systematic 
development and sharing of certain complex resources, termed distinctive capabilities and 
competencies, which are the primary sources of competitive advantage across different 
markets (Selznick, 1957; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). It comprises of delivering 
unimaginable value to customers, far ahead of its competitors and at a substantial lower cost. 
These complex resources are not easily replicable, imitable or substitutable by even its 
closest competitors because of a high degree of causal ambiguity involved in it (King and 
Zeithaml, 2001). Sixth, it also results in the reinforcement of "fit" among its entire system of 
activities. This fit leads to a sustainable competitive advantage and is far more superior to fit 
based on resources (Porter, 1986). Finally, groups pursuing an intensive diversification 
strategy possess the distinct ability to override the context and change the direction and pace 
of the environmental forces in its favour so as to fit its dominant logic. 
4.4 Measurement of Variables 
4.4.1 Dependent Variables 
Performance forms our primary dependent variable. This research will evaluate the impact of 
diversification on performance on a string of seven indicators sourced from extant research: 
(a) return on capital employed (b) return on net worth (c) return on total assets (d) return on 
sales (e) operating profit margin (f) Tobin's q (g) shareholder's value. 
(a) ROCE = (PAT + Int Payments + Tax Provisions) / (Net worth + Borrowings) * 100 
(b) RONW = PAT / Net worth * 100 
(c) ROA = {PAT + Int Payments * 1- (Tax Provisions/ PAT)} / (Total Assets) * 100 
(d)ROS = PAT/Sales* 100 
(e) Operating Profit Margin = (PAT + Depreciation + Interest Payments + Tax 
Provision) / Sales * 100 
(f) Tobin's Q = (Market Capitalisation Borrowings) / (Net Fixed Assets) 
(g) Shareholder's Value = log (Market Capitalisation) 
where Market Capitalisation = no: of shares outstanding (paid-up) * (BSE year 
end closing price). 
4.4.2 Independent Variables 
Diversity forms our basic independent variable. The research has relied on continuous 
measures of group diversity because it is a better indicator when comparing across 
diversified firms. Continuous measures of firm diversity, measures firm diversity 
quantitatively (high - medium - low), on a year-to-year basis, instead of two points in time 
as used by categorical measure (single - related - unrelated), which is a qualitative measure. 
Most continuous measures are variants of the general equation -
D = 1- S (Pi Wi) (1) 
where -
(a) D = Extent of Diversification. 
(b) Pi = the share of the i'th business relative to the firm as whole. 
(c) Wi = an assigned weight. 
(d) N = Number of businesses constituting the firm's portfolio. 
For instance, the Herfindahl Index as proposed by Gort (1962) is a special case of the above 
formulation, where the assigned weights Wi equal Pi. That is, 
D = 1 - 1 Pi' (2) 
The Concentric Index has been widely used as well. Caves, Porter and Spence (1980), 
Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988), where: 
D = I jWij Z, Wi, dj, (3) 
where dji is a weight whose value depends on the relations between j and 1 in SIC system. 
4.4.3 Control Variables 
We have measured the control variables, which are detailed as follows -
The study used multiple measures to capture the effect of size: 
(a) Sales = log (Sales) 
(b) Total Assets = log (Total Assets) 
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(c) Capital Employed = log (Capital Employed) 
The logarithmic transformation of values of the above variables was carried to make the data 
distribution more normal and amenable to subsequent analyses (Kakani, 2000). The 
following proxies were used to capture the characteristics of an industry to a large extent: 
(a) Interest Coverage = (Earnings before Interest and Taxes) / (Interest Payments) 
(b) Debt-Equity Ratio = Total Borrowings / Net Worth 
(c) Current Ratio = Current Assets / Current Liabilities 
(d) Solvency Ratio = (Current Assets - Current Liabilities) / (Total Sales) 
(e) Debtors Cycle = Sundry Debtors / Net Sales * Net Working Days 
(f) Creditors Cycle = Sundry Creditors / Net Purchases * Net Working Days 
(g) Fixed Costs = Fixed Costs / Total Costs * 100 
(h) Dominant Business = (PAT from largest business segment) / (Group PAT) * 100 
We have controlled for inertia by capturing the average age of all the firms affiliated to a 
business group, which we feel is a more appropriate measure, rather than year of 
incorporation of the first affiliate firm (Kakani, 2000). 
(a) Inertia = E(Age of individual Firms) / No: of firms in the Group 
We have measured cohesiveness from the extent of internal transactions (i.e. financial 
transfers) among affiliate firms. Other forms of resource transfer (i.e. man-power, products, 
brands, physical assets) though material could not be captured due to lack of data availability. 
(a) Internal Transactions = (Borrowing from group co's + Investment in group co's + 
Internal Transfers + Loans to group co's) / (Capital Employed) 
The following proxies were used to capture the characteristics of fundamental resources to a 
large extent: 
(a) Reserves and Surplus = log (Reserves and Surplus) 
(b) Free Reserves = log (Free Reserves) 
(c) Liquidity = log (Cash + Bank) 
(d) Cash Profits = log (PAT + Depreciation) 
(e) Sustainable Growth Rate = [Retained Profits / PAT] * [ROA + {Borrowings / Net 
Worth} * {ROA-(Interest Payments/Borrowings)}] 
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The following proxies were used to capture the characteristics of distinctive capabilities and 
competencies: 
(a) Intangible Assets = (Intangible Assets + Royalty Expenses + R&D 
Expenses on Capital Account + R&D Expenses on Current Account) / (Total 
Assets) 
(b) Marketing Expenses = (Advertising Expenses + Marketing Expenses + 
Distribution Expenses) / (Sales) 
(c) Plant and Machinery = log (Plant and Machinery * Average Age) 
(d) Capital WIP = log (Capital WIP) 
(e) Working Capital Management = Average Creditors Cycle / Average Debtors Cycle 
To capture the environmental context on a longitudinal scale we composed a time-series 
index attempting to measure the degree of market imperfection in an economy. It comprised 
of thirty-seven macro-economic variables sourced from ten macro-economic segments (equal 
weight was assigned to all the variables), which are given as follows: 
(a) Market Imperfection Index = Z{wi(Population and National Income) + 
W2(Industry Variables) + W3(Transportation Variables) + W4(Energy Variables) + 
W5(Agriculture Variables) + W6(Employment Variables) + W7(Capital Market 
Variables) + wg(Public Finance) + W9(Money Market Variables) + wio(External 
Transactions). 
4.4.4 Moderating Variables 
Strategic fit between dominant logic and firm businesses forms our primary moderating 
variable. According to the moderation perspective, the impact that an independent (predictor) 
variable has on a dependent (criterion) imeven is determined by the level of a third variable, 
termed here as a "moderator". The inter-active effect between the predictor and the 
contextual variable (i.e. the moderating variable) is the primary determinant of the criterion 
variable. Researchers invoke this perspective when the underlying theory or concept specifies 
or indicates that the impact of the predictor varies across the different levels of the moderator. 
In more general terms, a moderator can be viewed as a categorical as well as a continuous 
variable, which will affect the direction or the strength of the relation between a predictor and 
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a criterion. In a formal relationship Z is a moderator if the relationship between two (or 
more) variables, say X and Y, is a function of the level of Z. 
The following is the mathematical representation: Y = fx (X, Z, X*Z) 
Diversity (X) 
i 
Moderating Variable (X*Z) Performance (Y) 
t 
Strategic Fit (Z) 
In our research context the assessment of dominant logic(s) is central to the analysis of 
strategic fit. To understand and assess the mental maps of the TMT in our research we 
propose to analyse the resource allocation decisions of the top management across its diverse 
businesses since its inception. However, special attention was focused on the resource 
allocation decisions during economic liberalisation. Existing literature has already pointed 
out that dominant logic forms the primary basis of resource allocation decisions. 
Accordingly, we reconstructed the dominant logics of the business groups under our study. 
Obviously, the more the number of businesses in the groups' portfolio, the more were the 
number of dominant logics and vice-versa. Then we compared the dominant logic(s) of the 
TMT of a particular business group with its different businesses. We refer to this consistency 
as 'strategic fit'. If all the dominant logics fit with the characteristics of a particular business, 
we categorise it as 'high fit'. If most of the dominant logics fit with the characteristics of a 
particular business, but not all, we categorise it as 'medium fit'. If some of the dominant 
logics fit with the characteristics of a particular business, we categorise it as 'low fit'. 
Based on the above classification we moved on to construct two measures of strategic fit (a) 
categorical (b) continuous. Both the measures of fit were based on two scales: two-factor 
scale (0, 1) and three-factor scale (1, 2, and 3). In the case of two-factor scale, if there was a 
consistency between the variables a value of 1 was assigned, and by default 0 was assigned, 
assuming profile deviation. In the case of three-factor scale we have considered a range from 
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1 to 3. According to the two-factor scale, if the fit category was 'high' to 'medium' we 
assigned a value of 1 to it and 0 if the fit category was 'low'. According to three-factor scale, 
if the fit category was 'high' we assigned a value of 3 to it, if the fit category was 'medium' 
we assigned a value of 2 to it, and if the fit category was 'low' we assigned a value of 1 to it. 
However, the assignment of specific values to a particular business was not constant during 
the entire time frame of our study. We appraised the fit on a year-to-year basis and in the 
event of a change in the characteristics of a particular business, or change in the dominant 
logic of the TMT we assigned a different value to that particular business. By default, ever} 
business of a group was assigned a particular value either (0, 1) in case of two-factor scale or 
(1, 2, or 3) in the case of three-factor scale. In this classification the individual businesses of 
a group were split into two categories under two-factor scale, and three categories under 
three-factor scale. 
For the construction of a continuous measure of fit (i.e. fit index) we applied our 
classification on two parameters (i.e. sales and capital employed). In continuous measure of 
strategic fit our unit of study is a firm and we consider the group as whole and assign a 
particular index value to it. Therefore, every group had a particular fit index value for a 
particular year. If majority of the businesses of firms (in terms of sales and capital employed) 
fit with the dominant logic of the TMT, the group acquired a high index value and vice-versa. 
Statistically, the value of the index ranged between 0 and 1. If the index value of a particular 
group in a particular year was 0, it implied than none of the businesses were consistent with 
its dominant logic. On the contrary, if the index was 1, it implied than all of the businesses 
were consistent with its dominant logic. 
(i) Two-factor Index, (Year „) = KF-Sales, fn')*0 + £ (F-Sales. fi)*l 
5:(Group Sales) 
(ii) Two-factor Index2 (Year „) = £ (F-C Emp. fn^ *0 + £ (F- C Emp. fi)* 1 
E (Group Cap Emp) 
where fo = low fit, and fi = high and medium fit 
(i) Three-factor Indexi (Year „) = £fF- Sales. f,)*l + £ (V- Sales. f7)*2 + £ (F- Sales. fO*3 
£(Group Sales)*6 
(ii) Three-factor Indexi (Year „) = ECF-C Emp. fi)*l + £(F-C Emp. f2')*2 + £(F-C Emp. f3)*3 
£(Group Cap Emp) * 6 
where fi= low fit, fj = medium fit, and f^ = high fit 
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We acknowledge here that firm's and businesses are distinct and different, and flirther 
business wise sales would have been a more appropriate measure for the composition of the 
"Strategic Fit Index". However, though CMIE reports business wise sales, capital employed 
is disclosed only for the firm as a whole. Therefore, to maintain consistency we adopt the 
firm values of sales and capital employed, as a close surrogate. An important limitation that 
remains as a result of this approximation is that, firms, which have an exposure in multiple 
businesses, could not be controlled for as a result. But to avoid ambiguity we went by the 
dominant business of the firm xmder consideration. 
4.5 Data Collection 
Being exploratory in nature, the basic objective of this research was to propose generalised 
relationships across variables, which have been naively defined in existing research. We also 
empirically verified our hypotheses using panel data analysis. The study is based on 
qualitative and quantitative data acquired from secondary sources. Data surrounding 
dominant logic from the point of view historical evolution and transition were gathered from 
two sources. Regarding the evolution of dominant logic we relied heavily on case studies 
published by Harvard Business School and other prominent sources. Regarding the transition 
in dominant logic we closely followed first hand interviews of the top management published 
in regular business magazines like Business World, Business Today and India Today. We also 
monitored prominent press clippings published in newspapers like Economic Times, 
Financial Express and Business Standard. The above findings were also substantiated from 
Annual Reports of firms. Regarding other contextual (exogenous and endogenous) variables, 
we sourced data from a publicly available database (Prowess Release-2.0) from Centre for 
Monitoring Economy (CMIE). This database by far, is considered reliable and comparable 
and has been widely used in extant research (Kkarma and Palepu, 1999; Khanna and Rivkin, 
2001; Kakani, 2000). It is comparable across groups and firms because CMIE adjusts data in 
a maimer to restore normality. For the purpose of additional security the aforesaid data was 
verified from multiple sources, including official firm/group websites. The above 
documentary evidences allowed us to collate informafion on - number of business lines, 
dominant business, ownership pattern, age, size. We also sourced data from CMIE Annual 
Indicators for constructing a "Market Imperfection Index", which attempted to assess the 
relative degree of market imperfection operating in the Indian economy. 
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Business groups forms the primary unit of our study. Our sample comprises of Tata group, 
Reliance group and Aditya Birla group. Being exploratory in nature, the research relies more 
on depth rather than breadth. Our choice of selection of groups was guided by factors such as 
- age, diversity, size, initial resource position, structure and dominant logic of business 
groups. Our objective was to capture the vastness of the institution of Indian business groups 
in our research. The three groups comprising our study are notably among the three best 
performers in the economy in terms of returns, growth and margins. This follows from the 
recommendation of Raman jam and Varadarajan, (1989) to focus on firms achieving non-
equilibrium performance. 
Khanna and Palepu (1998) has pointed out that identification of group membership in India is 
more reliable and easier than in many other emerging markets. First, unlike in other emerging 
markets, firms in India are members of only one group (Strachan, 1976; Goto, 1982). Further 
there is very little movement of affiliates across groups because of less M&A activity in 
India. Unlike in many SE Asian or Latin American economies, firms in India rarely swap 
allegiance from one group to another. Therefore, groups in India divest firms, promote or 
acquire new firms. CMIE databases classification of firms into groups is quite reliable as it 
uses a variety of independent sources to classify firms into business groups. In the Indian 
scenario shifts in a firm's business group affiliation is very rare, but if they take place, they 
are duly incorporated in the database. There is no ambiguity between CMIE's classification 
of firms into groups and those verified from the group's official websites, against which we 
have cross-checked. In case of many family controlled groups, which mostly are the case, 
succession from one generation to another often also results in the group being split into 
multiple parts. However, group splits were not observed across our samples during the time 
frame. 
Groups comprises of a number of firms mostly listed, while others closely held, hence not 
listed. Data regarding listed firms were easily available, reliable and could be verified from 
multiple sources. However, data regarding unlisted firms were not available and whatever 
was available from independent sources could not be relied upon. Hence for the sake of 
genuineness we incorporated data only in the case of listed firms, though its omission may 
have caused some bottlenecks. However, despite such deletion we were able to capture on 
the overall more than 90% of the data on all the three groups in terms sales, total assets or 
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market capitalisation. Summary results of all listed firms were taken as group data. Initially 
we downloaded data from CMIE covering a total of sixty-one variables over a time span 
covering (1990-2003). The results of Simmonds (1990) provide support for the suggestion 
by Palepu (1985) that the period of study does affect empirical results. But to avoid factors 
such as temporal stability influencing our study, we went for a sufficiently long time frame 
for our study. We had to cut-off our data point in 2003 to facilitate further data analysis and 
interpretation. 
The time period is considered to be of enormous significance from the point of view of 
economic liberalisation and crisis faced by business groups on account of wide-scale 
environment changes. An attempt was made to measure the relative changes in the extent of 
market imperfection in the Indian economy during the above-mentioned period. After testing 
the significance of the variables, we short-listed fifty-five variables, which we considered 
relevant for our study. All data analysis was done on SPSS software package, which is time 
tested and robust (Kakani, 2000). Our objective was also to find out the best variables in each 
category. Best variables mean variables, which have the best fit with the dependent variable 
among all variables in a particular category. We calculated the correlation matrix for all the 
three groups individually to rule out possibilities of multi-colinearity. We also conducted 
bivariate and multivariate regression analysis on consolidated group data to study the 
strength and impact of the various control and independent variables on performance 
(dependent variable). The findings caimot be considered conclusive due to lack of sufficient 
degrees of freedom on account of small sample size. Sample profiles of the unit (i.e. business 
group) of study reveal the following: 
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Table 4.1: Sample profile of business groups 
Variable 
1) Sales 
2) Total Assets 
3) Capital Employed 
4) Market Capitalisation 
5) PAT 
6) No. of Employees (app) 
9) Year of Incorporation 
13) Dominant Business 
14) Inertia 
15) Diversification Strategy 
16) Centralisation 
17) No. of Business Lines 
18) No. of Firms (app) 
19) Promoters Stake 
Tata Group 
45687.00 
66874.00 
41513.00 
20589.00 
3647.00 
150000 
1902 
Low 
High 
Divestment 
Low 
14 
More than 100 
Low 
Reliance Group 
80223.00 
85225.00 
55530.00 
44324.00 
4577.00 
40000 
1966 
High 
Low 
Integration 
High 
5 
More than 10 
High 
Aditya Birla Group 
20698.00 
26726.00 
19060.00 
10242.00 
1499.00 
80000 
1897 
Medium 
Medium 
Consolidation 
Medium 
9 
More than 40 
Medium 
Source: CMIE Note: Data as on 31.03.03; figures in Rs crore. 
The ability of business groups to circumvent the institutional context by staying in power has 
been the subject of much policy debate but of virtually very little academic enquiry (Kharma 
and Palepu, 2000). Granovetter's (1994) interpretation of Chandler's (1982) thesis on the 
importance of formal M-form systems is that coalitions of firms are looser than M-form 
conglomerates. Business groups, ought not to survive, though he offers the anecdotal 
observation that groups appear to possess much by staying in power. The broader theoretical 
question concerns changes in the efficiency of an organisational form as the ambient context 
changes. Our enquiry is predicated on a systematic understanding of changes in the 
institutional context in the Indian economy. The institutional context forms an important 
background for our research on business groups. Earlier researchers have mostly focused on 
qualitative assessment of the institutional context. However, in this study we tried to make a 
quantitative assessment institutional context on a longitudinal scale. 
To construct the "Market Imperfection Index" we sourced data across thirty-seven variables, 
covering ten integral sectors of the Indian economy. Majority of the contextual variables 
were referred from existing research (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). 
However, for the sake of robustness we included a host of other variables, which we thought 
relevant for our study. The broad objective was to make the proxy comprehensive enough. 
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The data was made available from the CMIE - Annual Indicators. A time-trend serves as a 
reliable proxy for several changes in an institutional context (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). 
Tests for multi-colinearity were also carried out across the time-trend. While constructing the 
Market Imperfection Index the base year (100) of all the variables was kept at 1990. 
However, except in the case of a few variables where the base year had to be shifted to a 
more normal year (technically termed 'masking'). Since for the year 1990 the said variables 
reported incomparable values. Table 4.2 reports the raw values of the thirty-seven variables 
for 1990 and 2003, used for the purpose of the index. 
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Table 4.2: Macro-economic variables at a glance 
Variables 
1) Per capita GDP (PPP) 
2) GDP (PPP) 
3) Gross domestic capital formation 
4) Value of output (Organised sector) 
5) Railway freight traffic 
6) Cargo handled at major ports 
7) Coal production (excl. lignite) 
8) Power capacity 
9) Crude oil production + imports 
10) Food grain production 
11) Food grain yield 
12) Gross crop area 
13) Fertilizer consumption 
14) Per capita availability of food grain 
15) Employment Private sector (Organised) 
16) Employment Public sector 
17) Capital issues (public + pvt sector) 
18)GDRs/ADRs/ECBs 
19) No. of cos. listed on BSE 
20) Market capitalisation (BSE) 
21) Trading volumes on BSE 
22) Economic Plan Outlay 
23) Tax receipt 
24) Gross fiscal deficit 
25) Bank deposits (commercial banks) 
26) Sanction by FIs + banks 
27) PLR (minimum) 
28) Inflation (CPI) 
29) Inflation (WPI) 
30) Exports 
31) Imports 
32) Tourist arrivals 
33) Foreign Capital Inflow (Net) 
34) FDI Approvals 
35) FOREX reserves (excl. gold & SDRs) 
36) External Debt (outstanding) 
37) Exchange Rate 
Unit 
US$ 
$bln 
Rsbln 
Rsbln 
mln tns 
mln tns 
mln tns 
MW 
mln tns 
mln tns 
Kg / hec 
% 
Kg / hec 
Kg/pa 
mln nos 
mln nos 
Rsbln 
$ mln 
nos 
% GDP 
Rsbln 
Rsbln 
Rsbln 
Rsbln 
Rsbln 
Rsbln 
% 
% 
% 
Rs mln 
Rs mln 
mln nos 
$mln 
$ mln 
$ mln 
$ mln 
Rs /$ 
Mean 
2138.29 
2044.29 
3238.72 
6491.86 
402.28 
221.48 
272.81 
85504.50 
73.35 
188.54 
1535.79 
38.22 
80.21 
169.96 
19.27 
8.29 
361.98 
1421.09 
4548.29 
35.78 
2379.43 
1271.57 
1221.07 
766.79 
5786.71 
505.57 
14.93 
7.95 
6.58 
30782.57 
36338.00 
2.14 
8132.29 
4480.43 
24714.64 
92703.07 
34.54 
S.D. 
527.80 
642.76 
1588.25 
3213.52 
65.96 
55.82 
43.81 
15199.62 
22.47 
14.32 
118.94 
3.02 
13.65 
12.81 
0.26 
0.43 
168.68 
1854.99 
1442.18 
13.52 
2838.09 
601.96 
543.47 
373.82 
3637.41 
302.66 
2.52 
3.57 
6.37 
11366.00 
13458.85 
0.35 
2712.26 
4096.66 
19812.39 
7279.98 
10.26 
1990 
1406 
1170 
1146 
2341 
310 
148 
200 
63336 
53.70 
171 
1350 
33.9 
63.50 
173 
18.8 
7.60 
112 
Nil 
2247 
12.1 
294 
555 
516 
356 
1735 
144 
16.5 
4.2 
-7.60 
16612 
21219 
1.70 
6529 
Nil 
3368 
75857 
16.60 
2003 
2975 
3088 
5754 
12012 
518 
313 
341 
112468 
115 
174 
1540 
43.3 
101 
148 
19.3 
8.70 
416 
188 
5675 
29.4 
3136 
2992 
2163 
1446 
13118 
169 
11.5 
4.10 
3.30 
52856 
60313 
2.45 
12113 
1638 
71890 
104551 
48.20 
Data Source: CMIE Annual Indicators (1990 - 2003) 
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4.6 Pattern of Analysis 
Similar to most exploratory research, this study relies heavily on case studies to strike out 
new directions and propose meaningful relationships across unexplored linkages. The case 
study method is a contemporary form of qualitative analysis and involves a careful and 
meaningful observation of a social unit. It is a method of study in depth rather than breadth. 
It places more emphasis on full analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their 
interrelations. It also deals with the processes that take place within the interrelationships. It 
is essentially an extensive investigation of the particular unit under consideration. The 
primary objective of the case study is to locate the factors that account for the behaviour of 
the given unit as an integrated totality. Eisenhardt (1989) provides a road map to developing 
theories from small case studies that may be appropriate in an emerging market context. 
Thus a fairly exhaustive study of what a person or group (as to what it does and has done, 
what it think it does and has done and what it expects to do and what it ought to do) is called 
a life or case history. Certain authors have used the term 'social microscope' for this 
methodology. In brief, we can say that case study method is a form of qualitative analysis 
where in careful and complete observation of a unit of study or situation is done. Efforts are 
also made to study each and every aspect of the concerning unit in minute details; then draw-
generalisations and inferences from case analyses. Research in such situations is primarily a 
function of subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviour. Hence such forms are 
also subjected to panel data analyses. 
The research was at proposing generalised relationships across variables observed through 
case studies. To supplement it, we used panel data analysis to test our hypotheses. Though a 
large number of statistical techniques could be used on the same data to address different 
research questions by testing out various hypotheses relating to diversification strategy and 
performance, we limited our analysis to a few time tested and robust techniques. SPSS 
(statistical software) was used to perform the factor, ANOVA, correlation and multiple 
regression analyses. Interpretation of the results was based on the following factors: 
(a) Adjusted R square - 'R' is the correlation coefficient between two observed set of 
variables, the value of which ranges from 0 to 1. It attempts to explain the proportion of 
variation in the dependent variable explained by the regression model. The adjusted 'R' 
square tends to optimistically estimate how well the model fits the population. The model 
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usually does fit the population as well as it fits the sample from which it is derived. Adjusted 
'R' square therefore attempts to correct R square to more closely reflects the goodness of fit 
of the model in the population, (b) Standardised Coefficients - Standardised coefficients also 
known as "beta coefficients" are the regression coefficients when all the variables are 
expressed in standardised (z-score) form. Transforming the independent variables to a 
standardised form makes the coefficients more comparable since they are all in the same 
units of measure, (c) Significance Level - The f-value is the ratio of two mean squares. A 
small significance level indicates that the results are not due to random chance. The p-value 
is the conditional probability that a relationship as strong as the one observed in the data 
would be present, if the null hypothesis were true. The t-value is used to test the null 
hypothesis when there is no linear relationship between a dependent and independent 
variable, (d) Standard Error - It is a measure of how much the value of test statistic varies 
from sample to sample. It is the standard deviation of the sampling distributions for a 
statistic. Standard deviation of the mean is normally taken as the standard deviation of the 
sample mean, (e) Eta - It is a measure of association between two variables that ranges from 
0 to 1 and is complimentary to R . Eta is asymmetric and does not assume a linear 
relationship between the variables. Eta squared can be interpreted as the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable explained by difference among groups, (f) Levene's Test -
It is homogeneity-of-variance test that is less dependent on the assumption of normality than 
most tests. It computes for each case, the absolute difference between the value of that case 
and its cell mean and performs a one-way ANOVA on those differences. 
Some of the earliest research on diversification and performance was centered on the 
conglomerates in the West. Off late, studies have focused on business groups in emerging 
markets. Yet the vast body of research continues to be fragmentary and controversial. Thus, 
the literature has so far failed to provide a definitive explanation on the relationship between 
strategic decision-making at the group level and performance outcomes. We feel a more 
plausible explanation for the inconsistencies among various research findings may be the 
failure of most empirical studies to explicitly address the indirect influences (mainly its 
antecedents) of diversification on performance outcomes. Therefore, the need is to propose a 
framework that describes the relationships among diversification strategy, intervening 
variables and performance. And for this we need to supplement empirical cross-sectional 
74 
studies with clinical, process-oriented studies of diversification (Ramanujam and 
Varadarajan, 1989). 
In this context we have pursued small sample studies using a comparative research design in 
the belief that such studies will enable us to untangle the complex web of issues and factors 
surrounding diversification and make cautious generalisations applicable to clearly defined 
contexts. We have also felt the need to shift the focus of analysis from overall profiles of 
diversification to individual diversification projects and cumulative diversification 
experiences. It is at this stage we felt the need to break out of the realms of Strategic 
Management and incorporate multi-lateral theories and multi-dimensional concepts 
combining perspectives from Organisation Theory and I/O Economics to increase the 
explanatory power of diversification strategy on performance. The broad objective was to 
incorporate a multiple-lens approach instead of the traditional single-lens approach that 
views business groups as responses to market failure alone. 
4.7 Limitations 
Research on strategies in emerging markets faces several difficulties. First, theories 
promulgated for developed markets may not be appropriate for emerging markets. Second, 
emerging markets are not a homogeneous or clearly identifiable and recognisable unit of 
study. Therefore, results in one case may not be applicable in case of another. Therefore, 
theory development in emerging markets can be problematic. There are major issues to be 
addressed with respect to the replication of tests of hypotheses and research instruments 
developed and used in developed markets in an emerging market context. An integral part of 
this approach is the development of research instruments that can be used in quantitative 
studies. In addition, the combination of quantitative and qualitative data in emerging market 
research can be particularly usefiil in yielding novel, relevant and reliable insights. In that 
case our research is akin to exploratory in nature, where the objective is the development of 
hypotheses rather than testing. 
Despite offering several advantages over other traditional methods of research, case studies 
have certain limitafions as well. They are seldom comparable. Since the subject under case 
study tells history in his own words, logical concepts and units of scientific classification 
have to be read into it or out by the researcher in the context of the given situation. Certain 
researchers do not consider case studies as an appropriated method of scientific enquiry as 
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they are not characterised by impersonal, universal, non-ethical, non-practical and repetitive 
aspects of phenomena. The dangers of over-generalisation are also there, in view of the fact 
that no set of rules are followed in collection of information and only a handful of units are 
studied. Therefore, personal bias of the researcher also carmot be ruled out. Case data and 
facts are also often vitiated, because the subject may write what he think the investigator 
wants; and greater the rapport, the more subjective the whole process becomes. The rigid 
assumptions in the case study method often put the useftilness of case data to doubt. Hence, 
its application can be based only in a limited sphere; it is not possible to use it in the case of a 
big universe. Sampling is also not amenable in this method. Response of the investigator is 
another important limitation of the case study method; therefore incomplete knowledge of the 
unit can adversely affect the consequences. 
Despite the above stated limitations, case studies are becoming immensely popular in many 
streams of sociological and organisational research (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). Most of 
the limitations can be reduced if the personal biases of the investigator are consciously 
controlled for. Provided also the investigator employs modem and reliable methods of 
collecting case data and in the scientific techniques of assembling, classifying and processing 
the same. Besides, case studies can be also conducted in a manner that the data is amenable 
to quantification and statistical analyses. The study also relies on panel data analysis to 
confirm and test the hypotheses. However, the acceptability of the robustness of the findings 
may be under question, because of the usual limitations of small sample studies. 
Despite of data limitations and lack of sufficient conceptualisation, we used suitable proxies 
to measure dominant logic and strategic fit with a reasonable degree of perfection. Here 
researchers have pointed out the difference between 'espoused theories' and 'theories in use'. 
because stated policies and intentions often vary fi-om what is actually used (Argyris and 
Schon, 1974). They suggest that a person's theory in use cannot be simply obtained by asking 
for it. Creative questionnaires and analytical procedures can elicit the true nature of these 
constructs. For example, the policy capturing methodology (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971: 
Slovie, Fischoff and Lichtenstein, 1977) seems to be a powerftil approach to measuring a 
group's dominant logic. We adopted a suitable alternative approach (i.e. historical analysis 
through case studies). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Case Analysis 
During the course of our research we undertook three in-depth case studies surrounding 
Indian business groups (viz. Tata group, Reliance group, Aditya Birla group). The cases were 
undertaken to enhance our understanding of business groups from the point of view of their 
diversification strategies and its impact on performance. We therefore tried to trace the 
origins of the three groups, its evolution, with special focus on their restructuring during the 
course of economic liberalisation. For each of the three groups a particular business was 
analysed in detail, to identify causes that led to diversification success or failure. The details 
of the "Case Studies" are presented in Annexure I to III. In this chapter we try to analyse the 
case studies, from the perspective of the variables already identified in chapter 3. 
5.1 Diversification Strategy 
With the onset of economic liberalisation, the Tata group was present in diversified 
businesses ranging from steel, cement, chemicals, and automobiles to soaps; a restructuring 
of the business portfolio included a series of divestments. As a part of the overhaul, the group 
first identified the businesses to be divested. Once the businesses to be divested were 
identified, the group evolved specific strategies for the divestments on a case-to-case basis. 
The compulsions for divestment were not the same in all cases, since the businesses to be 
divested were not necessarily loss-making units (eg. ACC). Though in some cases, certain 
businesses had become unprofitable, with prospects for turnaround becoming bleak (eg. 
NELCO). While in other cases, some businesses were currently profitable but were not likely 
to remain so over the long run (eg. Merind). In other cases, certain businesses were now 
targets of entry by players with superior capabilities and a higher stake in the concerned line 
of business (eg. TOMCO). 
The circumstances surrounding the businesses also varied widely from each other. There was 
of course, one common feature among the businesses identified for divestment; they did not 
match with the groups' new scheme of things. The commonality stopped there. As a matter 
of policy, the group decided to exit those businesses. Due to difficulty in exiting an industry, 
the group has, over fime; has become diffiised and lacked focus. While in the case of certain 
businesses the groups sold off their entire stake at one go, in case of certain businesses the 
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stake was sold in a stage-by-stage process. Only when the entire divestment process was 
complete, the group went in for some major diversifications and acquisitions. While the 
groups' business portfolio was heavily tilted towards manufacturing: automobiles, textiles, 
steel, energy and chemicals. It also had a strong presence in agri-products, white goods and 
hotels and was actively moving into new areas like InfoTech, retailing, insurance and 
telecom. The new businesses of the group were much more technology intensive, had a more 
service component and were in emerging industries. And in all cases, the presence of the 
group in its new businesses was much closer to the end consvraier. 
In the case of Reliance group, against a similar backdrop, the group primarily stuck to its 
strategy of vertical integration. The product chain included from fabrics to PFY and PSF to 
PTA and PX to MEG to PP and PE to naphtha to refining and ultimately to oil and gas 
exploration. Though certain diversifications (eg. financial services, media and advertising, 
infi:a-structure and ports and power) seemed distinctly unrelated in nature, they were in the 
nature of horizontal integration and the lirJcages though not apparent were quite distinct. For 
instance when the group diversified into power, financial services and infra-structural 
facilities the primary objective was to provide feedstock to its existing businesses. The 
telecom project launched after the completion of its vertical chain was the only project, 
which seemed for the first time the group had totally bypassed its legacy of integrating down 
its product chain. The group, till then, was basically users of technology; the only difference 
is that now they are implementing the same it in terms of business. There is also another 
striking difference; previously they were totally into manufacturing, however, with telecom 
they have added a new dimension to their business portfolio - services. 
From trading in cotton, silver, sugar and jute the group the Aditya Birla group forged ahead 
in key industries such as textiles, fertilisers, chemicals, sponge iron, cement, refineries, 
carbon black, aluminum, financial services and software. In the pre-liberalisation period 
geographical diversification was their key engines of growth. Overburdened with businesses 
in distant comers of the world, post liberalisation divesting certain businesses and 
consolidating position in key businesses, rather than entering new businesses was their new 
strategy. The reason: no certain diversification plans showed clear competitive or leadership 
edge. New businesses, for the time being, were therefore restricted to the ones already in the 
making - telecom, power and refineries and more. During the initial consolidation phase, the 
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group witnessed a shift in focus from the international to domestic arena, with the strategy 
again switching to reverse-gear post 2000. After a change in leadership in 1995, the group 
restructuring in business portfolio also witnessed a paradigm shift investments; from textiles, 
VSF and yam to non-ferrous metals and cement. For instance, of the total future 
diversification investment of Rs. 20000 crore, the group was close to allocating around Rs. 
16000 crore for its aluminum business alone over the next four years. 
Post liberalisation the group had commissioned - MRPL, India's first refinery after the sector 
was opened up to the private sector; and as group officials were quick to point out, three 
months ahead of actual schedule. It had also started operations in one circle in its telecom 
venture through Birla AT&T, and was scheduled to commission two other circles very soon. 
Working on the Bina Power project, through its joint venture Birla Powergen, was also at an 
advanced stage. The copper smelter project at Indo-Gulf, which had generated some 
criticism, had been also successfully completed. The new group chairman had spent the first 
five years of his career trying to imtangle the existing portfolio of businesses and drive 
operational efficiency. As a result of its strong resource position built up, the group was also 
in the process of finalising a massive investment outlay in line within the framework of the 
groups' new growth strategy. The plans dravra up included the setting up of two new plants. 
So far the board had not yet seen the final blueprints. But after the board ratified it, it would 
increase the aluminum capacity three times over, all at one shot, and pitchfork them into the 
global top ten manufacturers list. Clearly, the group has now chosen to shift gears. The next 
few years would mark an inflexion point within the group. For the first time, the group was 
beginning to think big, in terms of international standards. In the past, the group was simply 
focused on extracting value rather than betting big on growth. The group now typically chose 
to add capacity in small chunks or acquire healthy, but relatively small businesses. 
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Table 5.1: Group wise diversity (Herfindahl Index) 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
Tata Group 
0.8435 
0.8397 
0.8456 
0.8494 
0.8419 
0.8406 
0.8410 
0.8288 
0.8618 
0.8733 
0.8630 
0.8583 
0.8563 
0.8353 
Reliance Group 
0.2811 
0.2929 
0.2704 
0.2783 
0.2874 
0.2685 
0.3113 
0.3271 
0.2593 
0.2442 
0.2234 
0.5476 
0.5606 
0.5587 
Aditya Birla Group 
0.7528 
0.7562 
0.7670 
0.7666 
0.7625 
0.7705 
0.7585 
0.7532 
0.7572 
0.7604 
0.7740 
0.7826 
0.7849 
0.7919 
Note: Based on firm sales (Rs. crore) 
5.2 Dominant Logic 
The Tata groups' dominant logic since its inception was to implement the setting up of large, 
modem enterprises in pioneering industries. These were projects, which required sizeable 
investments in infrastructure, involved long gestations and made significant contributions to 
national development. Therefore, institution building and making India economically self-
sufficient was the primary guiding factor behind every diversification move the Tatas 
pursued during its inception days. Another factor that had continued to revolve around the 
house of Tatas was to maintain a clean image, distance itself from political interference, and 
to give its channel partners a fair deal and yet succeed in business. After the passing away of 
Jamsetji Tata, the successive leaders including JRD Tata and Ratan Tata continued to pursue 
the legacy left behind by him, though in a more subtle way. But, rarely did they go in for 
diversifications in new and emerging technologies. As a result, the group had become staid, 
solid and conservative. For many years, its risk taking ability was stinted, as it confined itself 
to marginal diversification and expansion of facilities. Leadership in costs and market shares, 
the group had leveraged its advantage well. In the second phase of its diversifications the 
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group had rarely been first movers, but it often used its size and muscle to its advantage to 
overtake early leaders. 
However, through age this dominant logic of the house of Tatas though remained intact, got 
substantially diluted over time. This was evident from the diversifications the group pursued 
in the late seventies and eighties; the group did not invest in any pioneering and emerging 
technology. However, by the turn of the century, the Tata Group under the leadership of 
Ratan Tata witnessed for the first time a paradigm shift in its mindset. While keeping the 
much revered value system and ethics intact, the group wanted to turn itself into a more 
dynamic entity, by investing once again in areas of high-technology. In tune with the 
emerging economic environment the group felt the need to enter businesses, which were 
technologically inductive and above all concentrate on a few select product-market segments. 
The group believed it was in many more businesses than it should have been in and was 
perhaps not concerned about its market position in each of those businesses. 
The group felt it needed to do businesses much more articulately and remain focused rather 
than diffused, become more aggressive than it used to be, much more market driven, and 
much more concerned about customer satisfaction. The new priority of the group was to put 
in money and managerial resources in businesses where it could achieve a dominant position, 
which in turn would provide the benchmark return the group was expecting. The new 
business realities had made the historically benevolent group clinical in its diversification 
strategies. The paradigm shift in the mindset of the group in the post liberalization period can 
be summed up as follows: from core-industries, high infra-structural investment, long 
gestation, business ethics and social responsibility to focusing on brands, trimming the 
commodity sail, expanding services, get out of businesses that are not among the top three, 
and thinking global. In this new regime the group felt the need to put its firms in a framework 
where there they would move in one direction. Previously, it was the firm first then the 
group. The earlier mind-set was now reversed: first the group then the firm. 
The dominant logic of the Reliance group had always been to invest in emerging product-
market segments, which are capable of vertical and horizontal integration. The broad idea 
was to dominate markets ahead of competifion, through cost leadership. Another distinct 
aspect of their dominant logic was that the product-market segments should be highly price-
elastic. They would then invest in creating world-scale capacities irrespective of domestic 
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market size or potential. The group never gave way to the incrementaUst mind-set. The> 
created capacities ahead of actual demand, on the basis of the latent demand. Then they 
would go about systematically removing the barriers that were holding back the demand. The 
mind-set of the Reliance Group has always been to use the price-elasticity in the product-
market segment to its advantage to blow up the market to international size and scale. Thus 
once they had built up the capacities, they systematically went about removing the 
impediments that blocked the way for increases in demand, in most cases by radically 
breaking the price barrier. 
Clearly, the dominant logic of the group rested on the fact the domestic per-capita 
consumption of most of its commodities was substantially lower than in the SE Asian or 
American markets. In most cases, the user industries were held back due to non-availability 
of supplies. They would also continuously build up capacities on every link in the value-
chain to notch up all incremental market shares. The group would then exploit the benefits of 
its early entry to create cost barriers for new entrants and existing players. Thus growth 
through continuous integration was closely linked with their dominant logic. This would also 
in a way substantially reduce the gestation of the projects and ensure the group would break-
even much ahead of its industry counterparts. This would enable them to create a market 
share of indomitable position. Right from its early days the focus of the group has been to 
dominate its industries, miles away from its competitors. Another distinct aspect of their 
dominant logic was to control every link in the value-chain. This was observed right from the 
days when the group had first set up Vimal chain stores, to its recent network for its 
Infocomm project. The group would bypass the existing market structure and set up its own 
marketing chain at every level, right up to the customer point. The group would then pursue 
this strategy at a grand scale, a practice it has maintained right from its early days. The 
bottom-line was quite clear - push hard for capital productivity. 
Also as a result of the political proximity the group wielded with most successive 
governments, its critics contended that its ability to get licenses granted; obtain preferential 
approvals for its resource mobilisation plans from the capital markets and capital goods 
imports; and get policies formulated which favoured it (or disadvantaged its competitors or 
both), was also a reflection of another facet of its dominant logic. Most business groups 
found it expedient to use 'industrial embassies' to generate private deals with politicians and 
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bureaucrats and offered disproportionate benefits in exchange for licenses, political 
contributions in return for preferential regulation and the generation of unaccounted money 
for sustaining this nexus became, for some, the short-term route for success and rapid 
growth. Again, the group took this practice to new heights. Reliance, despite adopting this 
same path to a large extent, had also kept a close eye on developing distinctive capabilities, 
which it knew would be the ingredients for success in the fixture. Though the group acquired 
licenses, clearances and duty benefits; also thought about stringent project deadlines, 
economies of scale and international benchmarking. However, post 1995; the group almost 
carried the same legacy through, minus the political bouts and exploitations. 
The dominant logic of the Aditya Birla group was traditionally built around: to establish 
world scale plants; keep the cost of funds low; ensure high rates of capacity utilisation; and 
control production costs. Political connectivity, a controlled economy, and surplus-cash 
spawned the group whose network was just beginning to extend overseas when the late 
chairman died. In the pre-liberalisation era, this worked wonders, but now the new chairman, 
re tuned them to maintain its competitiveness. The dominant logic that guided the 
consolidation strategy of the group was that the estimated return in the businesses, which 
were to be divested, would not commensurate with the investments made. As the utilisation 
capacities were in excess of market's size. Therefore, the group felt they would be better off 
without those businesses, than carry these sick businesses in the long run. Post liberalisation 
their dominant logic towards investments in new industries had become more strategic rather 
than opportunistic. But they still continued to be guided by the imperfections existing in the 
economy. The copper smelter project was a clear pointer in this regard. 
The group under the new leadership decided to retune its dominant logic in order to maintain 
its competitiveness. Context was another word the group often relied upon. If the previous 
leadership ran the group differently, it was because of a different context in which he built 
and managed his businesses. By the time his son took over the reins of the group, he had 
realised that the context was changing. India is no longer an insular economy; tariffs are 
coming down and institutional investors were coming in. It became clear that they had to 
curtail the groups' exposure to a fewer industries. Therefore the group concedes that a 
different context needs a radically different approach. The skills that were needed to manage 
and succeed in the post-liberalisation era were different from the earlier decades. Right now, 
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the dominant logic of the Aditya Birla group has the two key ingredients that go into the 
making of a global cost leader: scales and integration. A focus on world-scale capacities, 
constant attention to operational efficiencies and prudent financial management - these are 
the common strands that binds the wide range of business of the group. 
The focus for the future: to stay in the core sector, and continuously upgrade and improve 
costs and quality in existing businesses. There has been a subtle change on the strategy side 
too. The group had crafted a clear-cut criterion for new diversifications. The factors: it should 
be a differentiated value-added product, with substantial presence in the value-chain. It 
should have strategic linkages with the group's existing businesses, indicating clear 
sustainable competitive advantage. And critically, project investments needs to be evaluated 
over a sustained period - not just the initial investment. The intent is to become globally 
competitive. The route is again through cost leadership. The group was also thinking in terms 
of value creation when his peers are only thinking big in terms of size and scale. On the other 
side, having a global mind-set, including definite strengths in project identification, 
implementing projects within estimated costs and schedules and continuously improving 
quality and bringing dovm costs will guide future performances. In the past diversifications 
were undertaken by various group companies, because at that time it was a question of who 
got the license. 
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Table 5.2: Dominant logic of business groups and its roots 
Dominant Logic - Tata Group 
Set up of large, modem enterprises in 
pioneering industries. Make sizeable 
investments in infrastructure, generate 
employment, substitute for imports and 
make significant contributions to national 
development and society at large. 
Maintain a clean image, distance itself from 
political interference, give its channel 
partners a fair deal and yet succeed in 
business. 
Invest in areas of high technology and 
subsequently use its size and muscle to its 
advantage to overtake early leaders and 
become a dominant player in its area of 
operation. 
Move from commodities to differentiated 
value-added products, and concentrate on 
services in which the group had the potential 
to amongst the top three. Focus on premium 
end of the segment. 
Previously, it was the society first; the firm 
second then at last the group. The earlier 
mind-set was now reversed: now it is the 
groups' interest that stands out first. 
Its Roots 
The group learnt from their early 
experiences in dealing with the British 
monarchy that economic independence was 
central to political independence. And 
further, macro economic stability and 
growth augured well for business groups, 
including the Tatas. 
The group was unable to exploit political 
connections during the post independence 
era as a result the group had become staid, 
solid and conservative. Its risk taking ability 
was stinted, as it confined itself to marginal 
diversification and expansion of facilities. 
Rarely did it go for pioneering 
diversifications and emerging technologies. 
Post 90's, in tune with the emerging 
economic envirormient the group once again 
felt the need to enter businesses, which were 
technologically inductive and above all 
concentrate on a few select product-market 
segments. 
With the firms moving in diverging 
directions of the group interests, the group 
believed it was in many more businesses 
than it should have been in and was perhaps 
not concerned about its market position in 
each of those businesses. It felt it needed to 
do businesses much more articulately and 
that it remain focused rather than diffused, 
and become more aggressive than it used to 
be, much more market driven, much more 
concerned about customer satisfaction. 
The group was all along perceived as a 
benevolent entity with primary focus on 
societal and economic commitments. 
Keeping its commitments intact, there was a 
shift in its emphasis from society to the 
groups' interests in particular. 
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Dominant Logic - Reliance Group 
Invest in product-market segments (i.e. 
commodities), which are capable of vertical 
integration. The bottom-line was quite clear; 
push hard for capital productivity. 
Concentrate on economies of size, scale and 
scope. Use the price-elasticity in the 
product-market segment to its advantage to 
blow up the market to international size. 
Recreate and dominate markets through cost 
leadership by continuously building up 
capacities in every link in the value-chain to 
notch up all incremental market shares. 
Use political connections to get licenses 
granted; obtain fast approvals for its 
resource mobilisation plans from the capital 
markets and capital goods imports; and get 
policies formulated which favoured it (or 
disadvantaged its competitors or both). 
Shift from vertical integration to horizontal 
integration. Move into technologically 
inductive businesses, in which the group had 
proven expertise. 
Its Roots 
In the words of its late chairman, ".... 
growth has no limit in Reliance". The group 
knew very well that continuous growth was 
the key to survival. 
Instead of creating a safe capacity based on 
reasonable projection of demand. Reliance 
conceptualised world scale capacity that 
would meet the cost and quality standards on 
a global basis. Even the business heads were 
encouraged to think beyond conservative 
estimates. The same legacy has been carried 
on. 
The group realised that cost leadership could 
be attained by compressing project and 
operational costs and acquiring best of 
technology from abroad. Long before time 
based competition became management 
hype, they did everything to compress time 
in both their project and operations. Speed in 
their organisational process, lay in two 
things: careftil planning to quantification of 
tasks and then saturating the task with 
resources. Another distinct element of speed 
was their flexible and informal 
organizational structure that contributed to 
their cost competitiveness. 
The group used its 'industrial embassies' in 
the capital city to its advantage through 
extensive contacts with bureaucrats and 
politicians. 
By the turn of the century once the vertical 
limits of the product chain was complete, 
The group realised they needed to break out 
of its realms to continue its growth. By now 
they were basically users of technology, now 
they wanted to make technology their 
business. 
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Dominant Logic - Aditya Birla Group 
To establish world scale plants through 
green-field projects; keep the cost of funds 
low; ensure high rates of capacity utilisation; 
and control costs through operational 
efficiencies. 
Focus beyond geographical boundaries for 
international competitiveness. 
Curtail the group's exposure to a fewer 
industries. And critically, project 
investments needs to be evaluated over a 
sustained period - not just the initial 
investment. Divest businesses, if the group 
does have the sustainable competitiveness to 
be amongst the top three. 
Estimated returns in projects, which were to 
be divested, would not commensurate with 
the investments made since the utilization 
capacities were in excess of market's size. 
The focus for the fliture: to stay in the core 
sector, continuously upgrade and improve 
costs and quality in existing businesses. The 
factors: it should be a differentiated value-
added product, with substantial presence in 
the value-chain. Grow through mergers and 
acquisition. 
Its Roots 
The group realised that whether, through 
direct investments abroad; tie-up with 
international leaders to ' manufacture 
products and provide services for the Indian 
market; its modem management practices or 
its product profile, a global approach was the 
key to success. 
The basic motivation behind the strategy 
pursued was to become a low cost market 
leader in commodities through global size 
and scale plants. And stay away from market 
driven competition; concentrate on 
government protection. 
The groups' logic underpinning the 
consolidation is the push for market 
leadership, economies of scale, productivity 
gains and operational efficiencies. The broad 
idea was to build backward and forward 
linkages in existing businesses to gain 
control over critical inputs. 
Expand in businesses, which are capable of 
integration and thereby generate a position 
of cost leadership. Right away, Kumar Birla 
focused on two key ingredients that went 
into the making of a global cost leader: 
scales and integration. 
Within the organisation, irmovation was 
always a habit. Every time something was 
done, an attempt was made to do it 
differently and better than the previous time. 
Management through consultation and 
consensus via management committees, 
shop floor committees and quality circles 
were the basic principles of the organization. 
Delegation and decentralisation called for 
the participation of each individual. 
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5.3 Market Imperfection 
Post-independence, India witnessed policies, which created a socialistic pattern of society. 
Governmental regulations and control were excessive, and in many priority sectors there was 
an embargo for private players. Therefore, market imperfection and economic development 
almost went in opposite directions. In the subsequent periods, border wars with China in 
1962 and Pakistan in 1965, backed with harvest failures, increasing trade imbalances, 
political uncertainty and escalating social unrest forced the then government into taking a 
series of further populist measures. This resulted in an era of increased government 
regulation during the period (1965-1980). This was the period when market imperfection in 
the Indian economy reached its peak. 
The government began to tighten the parameters of business conduct through controls on 
foreign collaboration approvals, capacity licensing, differential taxation, import tariffs and 
quotas, price controls, exit blocks and approval for fund raising. These controls were largely 
intended toward large Indian business groups. To deal with the governments' intensive 
regulatory policies, most groups found it expedient to set up "industrial embassies" in the 
capital city to deal with regulatory bureaucracy (Encamation, 1989). The intensifying 
government involvement had a deleterious impact on the business environment. Over 
regulation began to retard growth. Sheltered from foreign competition, domestic industries 
became inefficient and the country lagged behind the rest of the world in terms of 
technology. 
At this stage, some business groups found it expedient to use private deals with politicians 
and bureaucrats. Contribution in exchange for licenses, political donations in return for 
preferential regulation and the generation of unaccounted money for sustaining this nexus 
became, for some, a short-term path for success and rapid growth. In other cases, pre-
empting competitors by taking multiple licenses and then not proceeding to build facilities 
became a perfectly legal route for using the regulatory regime to profit from the climate of 
artificial scarcity. As a result, efficiency was grievously hurt due to government's pursuit of 
populist policies. Essentially, excessive government regulations fractured markets and 
destroyed economies of size, scale, and scope. Indian business groups therefore became 
fractured and diffused. It was during this period most business groups diversified in unrelated 
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areas. The largest and the most successful business groups tended to be run by politico-
friendly entrepreneurs. 
Following a balance of payment crisis in 1991, the external debt-service ratio reached an all 
time low. The then government initiated drastic reforms to liberalise the Indian economy. 
Far-ranging policies began the process of delineating government control in the economy in 
favour of increasingly market-based economy. Within just a few years, there was a change 
away from the license regime and the mood of the old, protected mindset that had permeated 
the Indian economy. Product expansion and diversification became easier, as centralised 
planning ceased to operate any more. The number of industries in which only public (state 
and central government) undertakings were allowed to operate was brought down from 
seventeen to six. This opened up several new fast growing industries like telecom, passenger 
cars, electronics, banking and financial services, mining, oil exploration and insurance to the 
private sector. 
Deregulation of selected industries in India started in the mid-eighties; however, it was only 
in 1991 the Government of India initiated a sustained policy and targeting a series of 
liberalisation measures, macro-economic reforms and structural adjustments. These reforms 
had embraced major aspects of the country's economy. Under the liberalisation measures, 
industrial licensing policies and policies on foreign trade had undergone major changes. In 
the second category, macro-economic reforms, significant structural adjustments have been 
made in the banking sector and capital markets in particular. On the overall, the liberalisation 
measures were targeted towards phasing out subsidies, dismantling of erstwhile price control 
mechanisms and initiating market driven pricing mechanisms, public sector restructuring and 
disinvestments, and introducing an exit policy. And all these measures were broadly targeted 
towards integrating the Indian economy with the global economy. It is against this backdrop 
'discontinuity' had set in, posing major challenges for policy makers, academicians and 
researchers, and business groups at large. 
The government also divested minority shares of its state-owned enterprises (in some cases 
up to 25%), most notably in steel, oil refining, air transport and mining. The reforms had a 
positive effect on the growth of domestic capital market. New banking regulations were 
aimed at aiding priority sectors and small firms, in effect restricting lending to the most 
prominent business groups. GDR's and private equity investment became a popular route for 
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fundraising among large business groups. The government allowed higher ownership stakes 
for foreigners (up to 51%) in 34 high priority sectors and reduction in the red tape, which had 
earlier precluded all foreign investment. The government also encouraged foreign investment 
as a way of bringing capital, technology and management practices into the country. 
However, as foreign investment increased, so did anti-foreign sentiment? Coupled with it, the 
Indian markets became more and more efficient as it slowly merged with the global 
economy. Business groups could no longer extract benefits to sustain its business. The 
"industrial embassies" founded by most Indian business groups, were slowly dismantled and 
later wounded up. Groups began to focus more on their inherent resources and capabilities to 
diversify, rather than lobby politicians and bureaucrats for licenses. Opportunism slowly 
started giving away in favour of diversification strategies guided by principles of reality. 
Governmental control slowly started giving way to the law of the "invisible hand". As a 
result the Indian economy witnessed a drastic improvement in market efficiency, especially 
in the first few years of liberalisation. 
5.4 Industry Characteristics 
When the telecom sector was opened up for the private sector sometime in 1995, separate 
licenses for separate circles were issued to players waiting to operate in basic, cellular, wire-
less, Internet and value-added services. At that point of time the Tata Group was prepared to 
invest up to Rs. 6000 crore over the next six years. Global research and advisory firm Gartner 
Inc forecasted a convergence in call tariffs of Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM) and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) in 2004, even as it predicts pre-paid 
services to gamer 68% of the present market-share in India. However, with industry moving 
towards a unified license regime, the players can now compete in a given circle in any area 
they feel comfortable; which was hitherto restricted in the earlier regime. By the turn of the 
century Tatas were then contemplating investing around Rs. 20000 crore in this sector. 
Therefore, characteristics of an industry can change the rules of the game; and more 
importantly change the posture of the players in the industry. 
Due to its high degree of vertical integration in the same product chain, the industry effects 
are extremely high on the Reliance Group. Any disruption in the link may have a cascading 
effect in the entire value-chain. However, given the group's entry into telecom with a 
substantial investment, the downsides of industry risk would be minimised to a large extent 
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in the near fliture. The group had contemplated investments to the tune of Rs. 25000 crore 
characterised by the open regime in the industry post 2000. 
In the case of Aditya Birla Group commodities are no exception, long-term viabihty hinges 
on the group's ability to produce it cheaply through the ups and downs of the commodity 
cycle. The 30-mtpa global aluminum market is growing at around 4.5% every year. What is 
more important, major activity lied in Asia. Despite China, Middle East and SE Asia already 
soaking up capacities, a shortage of around 2 mtpa was in the offmg. In the case of the non-
ferrous (aluminum) industry, which is characterised by long and stable upswings had forced 
the Aditya Birla Group to contemplate Rs. 16000 crore as investments in this sector, out of 
the total group investments of Rs. 20000 crore. Post liberalisation therefore, changing 
industry characteristics became a major force to reckon with. Some of the dramatic changes 
can be summarised as follows: 
• Entrepreneurial freedom released the growth impulse and altered the rules of the 
game significantly. The open regime offered entrepreneurs greater freedom in the 
matter of- industries to be entered, investments to be made, and raising of capital. It 
became manifested through mergers, acquisitions, takeovers and amalgamations. This 
was all in a bid to consolidate their business position. Above all, the industrial 
scenario witnessed a diversification spree. 
• The massive entry and consolidation on the part of the MNC's was another major 
aspect of industrial change. With the removal of FERA restrictions majority of the 
MNC's raised their stake in their Indian counterparts to 51% or more. Many other 
MNC's started entering India anew, through JV's with Indian partners or through 
100% subsidiaries. The strategic intent was of building a strong presence in the Indian 
market. Even core sectors were not spared. 
• Imports went out of government domain and became a new source of opportunity for 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs, who depended substantially on imports, started 
handling their imports directly; bypassing the state owned canalising agencies. 
International business emerged as a new entrepreneurial opportunity. 
• The banking sector comes into a competitive environment. Deregulation in interest 
rates led to a competition in garnering deposits. Partial privatisation of nationalised 
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banks was another major development. The industry also witnessed the emergence of 
a number a private sector banks. As an offshoot financial services emerged as a major 
business. 
• The benefits of the industrial changes were apparent in the capital market as well. The 
abolition of the CCI and the introduction of free pricing, added buoyancy to the 
capital markets. More and more entrepreneurs started relying on the equity route to 
finance their diversification plans. Indian firms also started raising capital from global 
sources. FII investments became a new source of short-term funds. NBFC's became 
another new business opportunity for many entrepreneurs. 
• The ascendancy of the private sector was another milestone for the Indian economy. 
Barring a few sectors, private players entered almost all core industries. The 
government started promofing 100% EOU's, EPZ's, SEZ's to launch Indian 
entrepreneurs into the global forefront. 
5.5 Resources and Capabilities 
The "Tata" brand name was a symbol of immense value. It carried an enduring image of 
reliability, honesty and integrity to its customers, investors and business partners. The name 
also generated immense trust. Bankers and lenders were ready to stretch their resources to 
lend to the house of Tatas. This was the basic cornerstone of leverage for the Tata Group. It 
had built a strong presence in almost all the major areas it operated in as well a well-founded 
reputation for technological capabilities. As a result the Tata Group had successfully tied up 
a number of joint ventures with foreign partners, especially in its new businesses. The 
groups' size and scope also gave it an incredible financial muscle. The Tata Group was also 
distinguished by its ability to repeatedly recognise, recruh, develop and support highly 
talented executives. The group also gave its top management significant support and 
commitment to experiment and innovate and provided a high degree of allowance for their 
idiosyncrasies in order to draw out the best in them. As a result, the senior Tata management 
team had become a constellation of very capable and powerful managers. 
However, the Tata's lacked the skill to be flexible and vibrant in businesses where consumer 
patterns and trends were changing rapidly. This was an area the group desperately needed to 
build upon. As a result, speed was not one of the Tata Groups' core strength; which was 
92 
essential while operating in an open environment. In all its earlier diversifications the group 
had built upon its projects right from the scratch. However, as an auto maker the group now 
focused sharply on just one point on the value-chain that stretched between raw materials and 
after sales service and assembling the parts into a complete automobile. This was the new 
entity of the Tata Group, from a systems generator to systems integrator. 
Here the system became the product, and the group did not involve much actual 
manufacturing into the product. It bought the components, but it actually designed that 
product and assembled it. The groups' transformation involves, from an integrated truck 
manufacturer to an automobile integrator; from a product driven company to competence-
centric company; from an engineering-oriented operation to a strategy-fixation enterprise; 
from an inward-focused company to a partnership-powered company; from a local company 
to a global corporation; from an efficient organisation to a world-class organisation. For now, 
the group was organising itself around capabilities and alliances, not only products. A deeper 
analysis revealed how the group closed in on the resource gaps: by stretching existing 
resources; by using existing resources to acquire or build new complex resources; by 
concentrating and complementing existing resources. The ability to integrate and leverage a 
project of international size, scale and complexity was something the Tata Group did not 
possess a decade ago; but it had become a distinct reality. 
The Reliance Group as a practice had continuously invested in state-of-the-art technologies. 
Right from its early days it used its import entitlements that were permitted against exports, 
in addition to importing raw materials, to import state-of-the-art technology for value-
addition to its existing products like nylon, rayon and polyester. In 1975, a World Bank team 
that came to India to inspect the condition of textile mills here, it described Reliance's textile 
plant as 'excellent' even by developed country standards. However, the most distinct ability 
the Reliance Group possessed amongst its top leadership was to have the ability to foresee 
industry-market trends much ahead of its industry counterparts. This stems from another 
important facet of the Reliance Group, was their enormous grasp for information. This 
enabled the group to recreate new markets, repeatedly, right Jfrom the scratch. This was the 
distinct capability the group possessed. 
Another distinct feature stemmed from their unique ability; the group was extremely vibrant, 
responsive and flexible to market and customer needs. As a result it had always devised 
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unique business models, financial instruments and marketing strategies, which had resulted 
in their indomitable market position. The groups' confidence in the future also stemmed 
from their high degree of integration (vertical and horizontal), leading to low operational 
costs - a formidable entry barrier. Of course, integration also helped the group in balancing 
cyclical pressures in most of its product categories. There were other benefits too: at every 
stage of manufacture, the group saved (2-3) % in terms of re-melting costs, inventory 
management, indirect taxes, freight and marketing and distribution costs. These capabilities 
gave the group to lead by organic growth and avoid joint ventures. 
Contrary to the view of the Tatas, the Reliance group felt this acted as an impediment to their 
basic organisation structure, - speed. Today, at Reliance, whoever was there at the top 
management, the speed at which the structure moved would still be there. This element 
formed the very basis of their project calculations. As a result the Reliance Group had 
already built up a reputation for setting up projects quickly and squeezing operation times, 
comparable even against global benchmarks. This would enable them to implement projects 
at unimaginable low costs. A distinct capability the Reliance Group had built up over time 
was its unique ability to complete projects before time and design unconventional ways of 
working its plants to the maximum capacity. This was also perhaps because the groups' size 
and scale was matched by its vmparallel operational excellence. 
For one, it was able to compress project implementation and operations time substantially. 
This indirectly followed from their distinct ability to develop command over top-of-the-line 
process technologies (forward and backward) totally in-house. The ability to backward 
integrate process technologies had also resulted in substantial savings in project outlays. 
Therefore the groups' low per unit capital cost was another primary tool to leverage its cost 
advantage. Further, by relentlessly pursuing scale, vertical integration and operational 
economies, the group had emerged as one of the lowest-cost producers of polymers and 
polyesters in the world. Because of this secondary cost-leveraging factor the Reliance Group 
today generated enormous respect in the financial capitals of the world. 
In terms of capital structure, while the Tatas and most Indian business groups adopted the 
debt route to finance its diversification plans, the Reliance Group recreated a new source 
altogether, right from the scratch - the capital markets. As a departure from the prevailing 
practice pursued by most Indian business groups. Reliance approached for the first time, the 
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investing public directly to fund its growth plans. Most groups sought to fund their projects 
by mobilising funds - typically debt instruments - from state ovsoied financial institutions. 
After its initial IPO in 1977, it again approached the investing public in 1979; and many 
times thereafter. High interest rates choked business groups and halted growth. In contrast, 
Reliance kept upping dividends year after year, regardless of a dip in profits. 
Reliance preferred to mobilise the funds directly from the public as the ftands mobilised from 
financial institutions often had a "rider" attached to them; an option to convert the debt into 
equity at a later date. The distinctive capability of the Reliance Group in this regard was to 
recreate the size and status of the Indian capital market through innovative financial 
instruments by understanding the psyche of an average Indian investor. Thus, while the Tatas 
had an enormous reputation amongst banks and financial institutions, the Reliance Group 
was held in a very high esteem amongst the numerous small shareholders and capital market 
investors, to which the group provided consistently high returns. As a result, every time the 
group approached the investing public, the issues were over-subscribed many times, despite 
stiff obstacles. In addition to the domestic capital markets the giant was also penetrating the 
global financial markets. 
Yet, another facet of Reliance's growth history was its astute tax planning. While its profits 
continued to grow, it had not paid a single rupee to the exchequer as corporate income tax till 
the 80's. The groups' continuous investment in expansion and modernisation of its facilities 
enabled it to set off the profits from operations against tax credits it was allowed on the 
investments made (i.e. investment allowance reserves). The groups' strong cash flows were 
therefore an extended arm of its complex financial engineering. On the overall, the capability 
the Reliance Group had built upon under its current leadership was that the group which were 
primarily users of technology, transformed technology as their business. This transformation 
had taken Reliance's place on successfully delivering capabilities and competencies against 
several global benchmarks. It could mobilise large amounts of capital and had demonstrated 
competence in managing mega projects. At one level the Infocomm project was no different; 
it would fetch returns higher than their cost of capital and create a new growth opportunity. 
Whether, through direct investments abroad or in the domestic arena; the Aditya BirIa Group 
had tied-up with international leaders to manufacture products and provide services for the 
Indian market. The groups' modem management practices or its product profile, a global 
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approach was observed in all spheres of its activities. Through a constant up-gradation of 
technology and unflagging vigil over quality, international standards were maintained for the 
diverse range of affiliated firms. Within the organisation, innovation was a rule. Every time 
something was done, an attempt was made to do it differently, better than the previous time. 
These were some of the basic values that had been ingrained in the structure of the Aditya 
Birla Group. For any commodity, and aluminum being no exception, long-term viability 
hinged on the groups' ability to produce it cheaply through the ups and downs of the 
commodity cycle. Currently, the group's cost of production of aluminum features among the 
top quartile of the world's most efficient producers. But with a capacity of just around 0.4 
mtpa, it had remained an insignificant player. However, with the group going in for major 
investment in capacities, size and scale would no longer be a handicap. Fortimately for the 
Aditya Birla Group, despite its late-mover status, it still had a window of opportunities to 
scale up and enter the global league. Therefore, the issue just comes down to global 
competitiveness to sustained long-term performance. 
5.6 Group Structure 
The Tata group despite having a federal form of structure, consensual approach to decision 
making dominated the organisation. It encouraged each Tata firm to operate autonomously 
and adopt an organisational structure suited to its business, as long its business practices 
conformed to the overall Tata philosophy. The result was the development of a managerial 
environment marked by decentralisation, participatory decision-making and professionalism. 
This perhaps could have been the result of two independent phenomenon's; one, it was a part 
of the leadership style that characterised the leadership under JRD, and secondly, an 
economic environment characterised by low degree of efficiency and stagnation. As a result 
of its structure the group strongly supported and gave considerable freedom to its business 
heads. 
The group also suffered from a huge bureaucracy resulting in slow decision-making. The 
Parsi community had significant shareholdings in most Tata companies and regarded the 
group less as a business, more as a Parsi institution in which they took great pride. They were 
occasionally appointed as outside directors on Tata boards, and while the Tatas were 
professionally managed at the operating level, the group was distinctly Parsi at the board 
level. Recognising that the number of businesses of the group would always be more than the 
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number of key people available to head them, JRD played the role of a promoter - as a key 
investor and strategic advisor - to perfection. By playing the role of a hands-on CEO, Ratan 
Tata had reversed that, creating an autocracy. Admittedly, a group as large as the Tatas 
required systems, but it was one thing to exercise control through systems, and another to do 
so through centralisation. 
In contrast to the Tatas approach, the Reliance Group had all along thrived on decentralised 
and informal decision-making process, which drove its operational dexterity. Rather than 
putting in place a formal succession, its founder chairman had loosely divided the 
responsibilities between his two successors, aiming to foster a team-like approach. So, if the 
younger normally managed the groups' finance, marketing and public relations, the elder 
looked after the operational and technological issues. The result of such a structure was a 
high degree of ambiguity, but also a high level of flexibility. People could be brought into the 
organisation from the outside quite easily; responsibilities could be adjusted without openly 
declaring winners and losers; and positions could be created and abolished overnight. But the 
two successors were clearly and firmly the ultimate decision makers. 
They were supported by a group of senior managers whose relative role and status within the 
group changed frequently within a loose organisational structure and were always in a flux. 
Given the constant flux in both the status and role of the top management, it was difficult to 
draw a formal organisation structure nor was it readily available from known sources. 
Historically, the group had been managed along fiinctional lines. Its focus on rapidly building 
and tightly managing its assets was supported by the professional excellence of a group of 
managers who had complete responsibility for specific functional areas like finance, 
operations, marketing within a specific business. Therefore, organisation structure at the 
Reliance group was akin to project groups (M-form). The top management of the Reliance 
group comprised of three disfinct levels (though not necessarily in order of hierarchy). In the 
first group was a set of early business associates of its ex chairman (including in some cases 
their kith and kin) who had historical links with him, personally, rather than with the group. 
They were his intermediaries in the groups' financial operations, in its relationship with 
government fiinctionaries and in de-bottlenecking its implementation plans. With the 
evolvement of the group, their role had diminished significantly, but they still remained 
involved in a largely consulting capacity. 
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In the second group, were a number of people whom the group had attracted away from very 
senior positions, mostly from India's large PSU's. The fact was that the group recognised 
that, in India, only PSU managers had the kind of experience in executing projects of size 
and complexity that Reliance was contemplating. So the group hired the best people from 
this sector and made the optimum use of their skills and experience. The plethora of new 
opportunities, in turn, raised questions about Reliance's unique organisation and management 
style. Historically, the different managers heading the key functions came together only at 
the level of the family members at the apex of the company. While this structure worked 
well, it did so at the cost of a severe overloading at the top. Another key constraint of the 
existing organisation structure was the lack of teamwork and cooperation within the top 
management group heading the different businesses and functions. Given the diversity of 
their backgrounds, each of them had a different style and was the product of a different 
culture. 
The existing organisation structure provided little incentive for them to collaborate 
horizontally or to build a shared culture within the businesses they managed. This resulted 
out of the lack of coherence and integration at the top, as a result sharing and learning of best 
practices within the group suffered. To overcome this barrier the group created a distinct 
third level; a new group of professionally qualified managers were inducted to typically 
assist the top management on a regular basis on strategy matters. This group had been 
typically educated in some of the best technical and management schools in the US with vast 
international working experience. The relative role of these three categories of managers was 
always in a flux. But the primary objective was to bring in some sort of horizontal integration 
in the group's HR structure. One of the options under consideration was to reshape the group 
into a classic multi-divisional (M-form), structured around sectors, with each business head 
reporting to a Group Executive Committee, which will be reporting to the Chairman himself 
With integrated business responsibility, the business heads would be responsible for existing 
businesses, freeing the top management for only strategic oversight and corporate 
entrepreneurship. Such a restructuring would call for a major readjustment of the roles and 
tasks of existing businesses and functional managers, together with substantial delegation of 
operational responsibility from the family to them. 
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After ten years of succession, it was clear to the top management that the strength of the 
Aditya Birla group lay in being a conglomerate. It did not therefore split its firms into entities 
focused on a specific business. Since a young CEO headed the Aditya Birla group, its long-
term stability was almost assured. But what could be critical to the group - which will surely 
include other companies in future - was the people factor. Managing a diversified 
conglomerate would need managers who were professional and focused - something the 
group yet lacked. At the moment, septuagenarian and octogenarian loyalists, who believe in 
unconditional loyalty to the CEO, ran the group. While this may well have its advantages in 
the short run, in the long nm it could be crucial. The balancing act will not be easy. On one 
hand the top management had to ensure that the group's precedent oriented senior 
management, collaborators and lenders perceive no crises in the Group Empire and systems. 
On the other hand, the top management had to make its own path to establish its identity as 
capable of leading the multi-national and multi-dimensional group into the next century. A 
series of changes were evident. It began the process of contemporisation by inducting in 
fresh talent at midlevels, vertically and horizontally. Management through consultation and 
consensus via management committees, shop floor committees and quality circles were basic 
principles of the evolving organisation structure. Delegation and decentralisation called for 
the participation of each individual. Within the organisation, that is exactly what the top 
management was doing: it had begun the process of what they calls institutionalising 
procedures and creating a systems orientation. First came the rising sun logo - to impart, as 
they put it, a feeling of identity to group companies. 
Alongside was a major thrust on human resource development: The HR function was being 
treated at the corporate level. They instituted a performance appraisal across the group, and a 
programme for tracking and developing high potential managers, which included developing 
skills, inter-unit transfers and positioning abroad. The top management had also personally 
visited premier management institutes to attract entry-level talent. More critical, perhaps, 
were the three new corporate cells, which had already become fimctional for about a year. 
The new recruits got more autonomy. While the top management monitored daily production 
at every unit, sales and cash flows, it also managed the group by giving the senior executives 
greater autonomy and depending on CVA analyses and MIS. Traditionally, the group had 
grown through green-field projects, though in future the group will be relying more on 
acquisitions and joint ventures. However, the group plans to go by a minimum 50% stake to 
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ensure management control. Although most of group firms were cash rich, the promoter's 
stake in many of them was low to moderate. That could be one reason why the group had not 
tapped the capital market even once in the last few years, financing every diversification 
from internal accruals and huge cash flows from its operations. Perhaps the top management 
did not want to dilute the groups' shareholding levels any further. 
5.7 Inertia 
In the case the Tata group, because of the long history of foundation of and its tolerant 
philosophy it was often found carrying businesses which had outlived its utility. While merit 
was recognised and rewarded, a poor performer rarely left the organisation, resulting in the 
middle management getting over burdened with survivors rather than performers. The slow 
turnover of directors caused some frustration among top executives who had been waiting, 
for decades in some cases, for that top position. As a result, inertia had slowly crept into its 
organisational structure. Inertia is a property of matter (organisations in the instant case) by 
which it remains at rest or in uniform motion in the same direction unless acted upon by 
some external force. 
The downside was that the while the Tatas had done well in technology-intensive areas it had 
failed on the market side. There was some concern with the top management about its 
inability to perform in competitive market conditions, which stemmed from its inability to 
take decisions quickly. The precepts did not gear up the flexibility and dynamism of the Tata 
group, required for diversifications that were marketing intensive. The group was sluggish in 
some areas in the increasingly open and competitive environment. Although, in 1982, the 
government had partially eased price controls in several product-market segments the group 
was slow in reacting to the opportunity. In times when the economic scenario was fast 
changing, organisations needed to respond appropriately and timely to capture early entry 
advantages. The absence of which implied various 'hidden costs'. 
However, to bring the much-required speed in the organisational decision-making process, 
the group had initiated a series of structural changes and reversed its earlier policy of 
decentralisation. Another significant change was to replace the age-old executives with 
young generation professionals. However, the drastic changes in the business environment, 
compelled the top management to restructure the group altogether, keeping in mind the pace 
of economic liberalisation. However, highly diversified groups like the Tatas were slow to 
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react to the changing demand of the environment. Organisational culture rooted in 
bureaucracy and regulation, top management mind-set, structure and decision-making 
process retarded the process of restructuring. However, once the restructuring was almost 
over by the turn of the century, the top management added a thrust to the groups' 
diversification strategies once again. Having overcome the barriers of resistance, it knew, it 
could implement the groups' vision as conceived earlier. 
The very essence of Reliance's organisation structure had been speed. All strategic 
considerations are guided by it. The organisation structure at the helm of Reliance group 
resulted in a high degree of ambiguity but also accorded a high level of flexibility. People 
could be brought into the organisation from the outside quite easily; responsibilities could be 
adjusted without openly declaring winners and losers; and positions could be created and 
abolished overnight. The top management was supported by a group of business heads whose 
relative role and status within the group changed frequently within a loose organisational 
structure; that was always in a flux. With the constant flux in both the status and role of the 
top management, the formal organisation structure was very flaccid. Therefore, organisation 
structure at the Reliance group was more akin to project groups, where a structure could be 
formed when a diversification was initiated, and abandoned after delivery. This loosely 
bonded organisation structure was the primary source of organisational speed, which had 
enabled them to overcome the forces of inertia. Therefore, contrary to average research 
opinion besides age, organisation structure was also another distinct soiirce of inertia. 
Despite stiff opposition the Aditya Birla group had made sufficient headway into the second 
stage of the groups' growth cycle, though much was yet to be done. Given the short time the 
present chairman had taken over at the helm of the group, he had already proved himself to 
be a successful change agent. This had been possible despite having a rigid organisation 
structure; the high degree of centralisation empowered the group chairman to a large extent. 
The high degree of autonomy enabled the top management to carry out the necessary 
transformation. Within the organisation, that was exactly what the group was doing: it had 
begun the process of what it calls 'institutionalising procedures' and creating a 'systems 
orientation'. Alongside was a major thrust on human resource development: The group 
instituted a performance appraisal system across the group, and a programme for tracking 
and developing high potential managers, which included developing skills, inter-unit 
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transfers and positions abroad. More critical, perhaps, were the three new corporate cells, 
which had become functional for about a year. 
The first was the corporate strategy cell; which examined new investments and projects, and 
evaluated national and international developments that will impact group activities. The 
second cell was the project-monitoring cell; this tracked ongoing projects on a regular basis 
to ensure that the same were proceeding on schedule. The third was the manufacturing 
systems cell; which was expected to track and suggest improvements in quality and 
productivity. And for the most important part of it, the group had hired people in the young 
age group for industry specific functions. Not creating crosscurrents however, the group was 
quick to point out that these project teams were meant only for the group chairman, they 
were also purely a support function for the top management across the group. 
5.8 Cohesiveness 
It was infact a matter of pride and status to work in Tata firms, which was regarded among 
highly professional and ethical organisations. Tata Steel, for instance, had a history of 
constructive and innovative industrial relations. It introduced the eight-hour workday, leave 
with pay, accident compensation, maternity benefits, and profit-sharing decades before its 
counterparts in the US. A joint-consultative system was also set up in to ensure better 
cooperation between employees and the management. To knit the group together, the Tata 
Group set up Tata Administrative Services (TAS), composed of management professionals 
selected by very senior Tata directors, and placed them in key middle management positions. 
They could move horizontally within the group, and were primarily encouraged to develop a 
vision of the Tatas as a unified group, rather than as a conglomerate of disjointed companies. 
The group had a philosophy of always recruiting the brightest people and then encouraging 
them to operate freely and develop independent minds. A strong centralised leadership was 
perhaps the single most important driver behind the high degree of cohesiveness (i.e. degree 
of bonding) of the Tata group. Cohesiveness implies the tendency among member firms to 
exhibit or produce cohesion or coherence (i.e. a cohesive social unit). 
However, cohesiveness witnessed a historical low within the group, almost throughout the 
eighties, when there was a transition in group leadership. The new group leader was not 
perceived as a favourable amongst the chairmen of various firms. Hence the early eighties 
saw numerous investment companies being established by different Tata firms, with the aim 
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of carving out their own domains within the group. A number of firms began competing 
against one another. Mobility across firms decHned, and each firm began evolving its own 
culture and management cadre. Thus the group became just a social club, with the central 
group having little legal, financial, or moral control. As a result the Tatas no longer existed as 
a group entity, except in their culture and in name. The firms did not see any reason to show 
allegiance to the group headquarters. It was only because of the financial institutions, which 
were the major shareholders that group management was allowed in those firms. 
However, post the 90's; three measures had a significant impact on the groups' cohesiveness. 
First, the group conceived, proposed and implemented 'Tata Brand Equity Scheme'. Though 
the participating firms later made the plan volvmtary, it brought back the long lost group 
identity. Second, it also revived a much-ignored 'Tata Retirement Policy'. This paved the 
way for a new generation of members to take over on the board of group headquarters. Third, 
the group set up a Group Executive Office (GEO) at the group level and Business Review 
Committees (BRC's) at the firm level. All diversification strategies were now to be proposed 
by the BRC's and approved before the GEO in order to be implemented. These autonomous 
policies brought in some degree of autonomy and in a way increased cohesiveness within the 
group to a large extent. However, cohesiveness across firms was primarily restricted to 
sharing of human resources. 
A fascinating aspect of Reliance was its capital allocation model. Reliance had always been a 
low debt group. However, if one takes a look at Reliance Infocomm the other way, it had 
zero external debt. It is really like Reliance's ovra debt, Reliance as group. Therefore, 
Reliance as a group had financed most of its diversifications through ploughing back of 
profits, mostly from member firms. Thus while transfer of human resources within the Tata 
group was the cornerstone behind its cohesiveness, financial flexibility and leverage were the 
foundations within the members of the Reliance group. 
Historically, the Aditya Birla group had operated independently, and exercised control only 
from the headquarters, with very nominal investments and resource transfer among the 
member firms. However, post liberalisation resource transfer among member firms included 
HR and finance, though in a very small way. On the structure side the group was heavily 
networked. All member firms freely interacted at the executive as well as board level. The 
top management was highly decentralised; every profit centre had total operational freedom 
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within certain broad parameters. The concept of knowledge moving around the group was an 
evolving process. The attitude was of wanting to absorb from everything surrounding the 
business environment, continuously upgrading and learning. 
5.9 Strategy Implementation 
Prior to the 90's, major aspects of Tata group's strategy implementation were left to the 
individual firms. Perhaps this was an adept strategy during the seventies when the group had 
rarely gone in for any major path-breaking diversifications. However, since the eighties, and 
more specifically in the nineties, most of the diversifications pursued by the group involved 
the total involvement and commitment of the group at all stages of strategy implementation -
right from conceptualisation - implementation to rollout. This in a way enabled the group to 
implement strategies much more efficiently and effectively. Some striking references - the 
car project was successfully implemented at a cost of Rs. 1700 crore, supposedly much 
below the international benchmark of roughly $3 billion (Rs. 12750 crore), within a gestation 
of 31 months much against an industry average of 48 months with a steady 20% market 
share, which was created from the scratch, speaks volumes. 
In case of Reliance's strategy implementation, careful plans to quantification of tasks and 
saturating the tasks with resources formed the very basis of its strategy implementation. They 
put in all their resources that the task could absorb, without resources tripping over each 
other. If time were not a constraining factor, they would have optimised. But given their 
tremendous opportunity cost of lost production, it almost did not matter how much it costs 
because, if they could get the production going earlier, they would always come out ahead. 
Only when the group puts the value of time in the equation did they get sound economics and 
then saturation almost always makes sense, as always has been in the case of Reliance. 
Reliance today has delivered a project of international size and complexity all alone, without 
any joint venture or technological tie-ups. Some striking references - the telecom projected 
was successfiilly executed on a total outlay of $ 5 billion, against an intemafional benchmark 
of around $ (18-20) billion; within a gestation of around 24 months; capital recovery and 
break-even within 12 months. Having already delivered it. Reliance is now concentrating on 
delivering its capabilities in strategy implementation in newer areas. However, in the case of 
the Aditya Birla Group, we did not observe any unique distinctive capabilities in 
implementing its diversification plans. 
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5.10 Strategic Fit 
In the case of Tata group, the following traditional businesses: steel, chemicals, automobiles, 
and cement had a very 'high' strategic fit with its dominant logic. In all these businesses the 
group had made sizeable investments in infrastructure, was labour intensive, substituted for 
imports and made significant contributions to economic development. They were also in core 
industries, which involved a high gestation. When these businesses were set up in the early 
parts of the century, they were indeed large modern enterprises in pioneering industries. 
In the second set of businesses we have: energy, tea and hotels, which had a 'medium', fit 
with its dominant logic. The energy business had a high strategic fit with all dominant logics" 
mentioned above, except for one. Even in the post-independence era, energy was one area, 
which was heavily controlled by the state. And that meant for every strategic decision, the 
group had to approach the bureaucracy for permission and approval. Critical success factor 
for this business therefore meant using political connections to get licenses granted; obtain 
fast approvals for its resource mobilization plans and get policies formulated in its favour. 
However, this was one area the group was not accustomed to and always avoided. In case of 
its tea business, divergence was caused because sizeable investment in infrastructure was 
lacking, and therefore did not have a very high gestation. While hotels had a more service 
component than manufacturing, which the group was not accustomed to. 
In the last set of businesses we have: pharmaceuticals, paints, electricals that had a 'low', fit 
with its dominant logic. Primarily, none of these businesses were in the core-manufacturing 
sector, while some had a strong service component. Therefore changing customer tastes and 
preferences was a major force to be reckoned with. And this is one area; the group was not 
quite familiar with, as its structure was consistent with bureaucracy and slow decision-
making. These businesses received a set back since they had a major deviation with all its 
dominant logics'. 
There were some transition businesses as well (i.e. businesses in which the degree of fit 
changed during the sample time-frame). They are primarily: hotels, telecom, information 
technology, and automobiles. In the first three cases the fit improved, while only in the last 
case there was deterioration. In the case of its hotel business, the strategic fit improved 
because it was consistent with the evolving dominant logics' in which differentiated products 
and services had a higher component. The same logic applies to information technology as 
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well though; the characteristics of the business remained the same. In the case of its telecom 
business it was due to the changing characteristics of the business. With economic 
liberalisation, many businesses went out of governmental control, which includes telecom as 
well. Hence, the groups increased its investments in this sector, as it was then consistent with 
its dominant logic of minimum governmental interference. In the case of its automobile 
business, the changing face of its investments from commercial vehicles to passenger cars, 
made the group vulnerable to changing customer tastes and preferences, which the group was 
not accustomed to. In case of its IT business, it was deviant with most of its earlier dominant 
logics'. However, in terms of its evolving dominant logics' it was quite consistent, hence the 
strategic fit improved. It had a high very component in products and services were 
investment in brands, which fetched a premium and had the potential to be among the top 
three. 
In the case of the Reliance group, the following businesses: petro-chemicals and petroleum 
had a very 'high' strategic fit with its dominant logic. In both the businesses the group had 
pursued its dominant logic of vertical integration. It amassed the benefits of size, scale, and 
scope to create positions of cost advantage. In all these product-market segments the group 
used the price-elasticity to their advantage and blowed the market to international size and 
acquired an indomitable position. Its energy and infi-astructure business had a 'medium' with 
its dominant logics'. These businesses were in the nature of integration, though not precisely 
vertical in nature (i.e. horizontal). Further, since governmental control was very high in these 
two segments, they could not use the price-elasticity to their advantage to recreate markets 
and cost barriers. Even size and scale was not a limiting factor. While in case of financial 
services, only the integrating factor (i.e. horizontal) was apparent. 
In the case of Aditya Birla group its texfiles, cement, and metals business had a very 'high' 
fit with its dominant logic. In all these segments the group had established world scale plants 
through green-field projects; kept cost of fimds low; ensured high rates of capacity 
utilisation; and controlled costs through operational efficiencies. The group was the market 
leader in all these segments. In case of its chemicals and diversified businesses the fit was 
'medium'. Though they were in the nature of green-field projects, operational efficiency was 
lacking. This resulted in low capacity utilisation. Finally, their financial services business 
was in deviation of its major dominant logics'. 
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Table 5.3: Strategic fit between dominant logic and business characteristics 
Year 
1990-2003 
1990-2003 
1990-2003 
1990-1999 
2000 - 2003 
1990-1999 
2000 - 2003 
1990-1999 
2000 - 2003 
1990-2003 
1990-2003 
1990-1997 
1990-2000 
1990-2000 
1990-1999 
2000 - 2003 
2000 - 2003 
Year 
1990-2003 
1990-2003 
1990 - 2003 
1990-1999 
2001 - 2003 
Year 
1990-2003 
1990-2003 
1990-2003 
1990-2003 
1990 - 2003 
1990-2003 
Business - Tata Group 
Steel 
Energy 
Chemicals 
Hotels 
Hotels 
Telecom 
Telecom 
Automobiles 
Automobiles 
Tea 
Cement 
Pharmaceuticals 
Paints 
Electricals 
Information Technology 
Information Technology 
Retailing 
2-Factor Scale 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
Business - Reliance Group 
Petro-Chemicals & Petroleum 
Energy 
Infra-Structure 
Financial Services 
Telecom 
2-Factor Scale 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
Business - Aditya Birla Group 
Cement 
Diversified 
Textiles 
Non-Ferrous Metals 
Chemicals 
Financial Services 
2-Factor Scale 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
3-Factor Scale 
3.00 
2.00 
3.00 
1.00 
2.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
2.00 
2.00 
3.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
2.00 
2.00 
3-Factor Scale 
3.00 
2.00 
2.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3-Factor Scale 
3.00 
2.00 
3.00 
3.00 
2.00 
1.00 
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Table 5.4: Group wise 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
strategic fit index 
Tata Group 
0.8416 
0.8444 
0.8251 
0.8234 
0.8418 
0.8375 
0.8398 
0.8463 
0.8119 
0.7880 
0.7489 
0.7448 
0.7475 
0.7432 
Reliance Group 
0.9425 
0.9394 
0.9452 
0.9423 
0.9369 
0.9418 
0.9281 
0.9223 
0.9415 
0.9434 
0.9484 
0.9795 
0.9743 
0.9758 
Aditya Birla Group 
0.7758 
0.7730 
0.7750 
0.7608 
0.7549 
0.7507 
0.7670 
0.7612 
0.7679 
0.7786 
0.7891 
0.7826 
0.7819 
0.8045 
Note: Based on firm sales (Rs. crore) 
5.11 Performance 
Prior to 90's, because of its good operating management in relatively protected markets, the 
steel, electrical and chemical division reported impressive performances. TISCO acquired 
several unprofitable downstream businesses, and then turned them around. The chemicals 
division also grew impressively and began planning numerous large projects in oil refining, 
petrochemicals and fertilisers. Demand for TELCO's HCV (its primary product) peaked in 
1983. Meanwhile, in a new segment altogether; demand for LCV's started rising. The 
government allowed manufacturers of one class of vehicles to make vehicles of another class 
without seeking a separate license. TELCO capitalised on this opportunity. It entered the 
market with its indigenously developed LCV (i.e. Tata 407) and cornered a significant 
market-share. Several new business groups used this opportunity to enter the LCV market in 
collaboration with foreign partners. Though TELCO entered the market later than its 
competitors, it had already garnered a position of market leadership. Its product was better 
suited for Indian road conditions and its powerful HCV distribution and service network was 
an added advantage for its LCV segment. 
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As a result, in the medium to long term, TELCO's LCV sale was more than the sales of all 
the new companies combined. The central group also experienced a spectacular growth. Tata 
Industries spawned several new businesses. Titan Industries promoted to manufacture 
watches, shook an industry dominated by a government PSU. Tata Unisys and TCS 
dominated the rapidly growing IT industry. Indian Hotels spawned several new projects in 
India and abroad. On the other hand, the continued poor performance and bleak prospects of 
the textiles business forced the Tatas to, in effect; implement the recommendations of the 
1983 Strategic Plan by trying to exit from that industry'. The Tatas filed for liquidation of one 
company and closed down operations of a second. Post 1990, after hibernating for about two 
decades the Tatas were once again initiating gigantic diversification projects in accordance 
with its 1990 Strategic Plan. Brand business fetched about a fifth of sales and profits in 1990; 
today they account for half of the revenues and 58% of net profits. The fact that one-third of 
the portfolio had been reviewed and restructured implied that the Tata group had done it. 
From an initial investment of Rs. 15000 (less than $2000) in 1958 to start a trading house, 
followed by the setting up of a tiny manufacturing facility in 1966, the Reliance group has 
managed to set up a synthetic yam, textiles and petrochemicals empire with a market 
capitalisation in excess of Rs. 80 billion (about $2.7 billion) in 1994; and was the only 
entrant in Business Week's listing of the 50 largest companies headquartered in developing 
countries. In India, Reliance was the largest non-government company by almost every 
measure including sales, profits, net worth and asset base. Between 1977, when the group 
first went public and 1993, the groups' turnover had increased from Rs. 1.2 billion to Rs. 
41.06 billion, operating profit from Rs. 150 million to Rs. 8.81 billion, net profit from Rs. 25 
million to Rs. 3.22 billion, net worth from Rs. 140 million to Rs. 26.13 billion and asset base 
from Rs. 310 million to Rs. 46.41 billion. To fund this staggering growth the group had 
mobilised over Rs. 30 billion from the Indian public increasing its shareholder base from 
58000 in 1977 to over 3.7 million in 1993. 
Its earnings growth is, however, more re-assuring, averaging over 20 % during the same 
period. In terms of operating margins the figure increased from 8.84% in 1990 to 15.55% in 
1996, only to decline to 8.06% in 2003. Its historical peak of 15.55% in 1996 is perhaps a 
sort of record, when compared to its closest competitor Indo Rama Synthetics in the same 
year at 0.15%. This had been primarily possible because of its focus on vertical and 
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horizontal integration, which had manifested in this enormous cost leadership. The 
shareholders value in terms of market capitalisation increased from Rs. 1044.54 crore in 
1990 to a historical peak of Rs. 69037.23 crore in 2001, only to consolidate its position to Rs. 
44324.87 crore in 2003. The steady rise in the groups' market capitalisation despite market 
volatility makes one thing is very clear - Reliance is averse to market risk. As a result of 
Reliance's demand creation activities, it achieved a 100% capacity utilisation for most of its 
products, while most of its competitors struggled to achieve 50%. The group also commands 
a staggering market share of around 50% in most of the product-market segments in which it 
operates. However, with the Reliance Infocomm (a wholly owned subsidiary of Reliance 
Industries) holding enormous market power, the fiature is full of opportunities. 
By relentlessly pursuing scale, size and efficiency, the Aditya Birla group has emerged today 
as the biggest player in most its businesses today. The groups' turnover today spans Rs. 
27000 crore with a geographical presence in 18 countries and an employee base of 0.72 lacs. 
It is the largest producer of cement in India; it controls 45% of the aluminum and 40% of the 
copper markets; it is the market leader in insulators, VSF, yams and carbon black. For the 
Aditya Birla group the move in commodities was towards value-added products: previously 
at Hindalco, 50% of the total production was in the form of base metals, while the rest was in 
value-added products. By the turn of the century 75% of its sales have come from value-
added products. Marketing is being geared up towards brands that can command a premium. 
As a result, diverse as its activities are, the group affiliates are dominant players in each of 
the business segments they operate in. 
Grasim was in the forefront in developing new-generation specialty, high performance fibres. 
It had also developed a solvent spinning process for manufacturing cellulose fibre. The 
company is also working on manufacturing cellulosic thermoplastic polymer, which can be 
converted into fibre/filament by melt spirming techniques. It had developed new processes to 
produce rayon grade pulp from bamboo, eucalyptus and mixed hard woods. It was a leading 
supplier of technology and machinery related to the production of man-made fibres. It 
possessed some strong premium brands and has received prestigious awards in the areas of 
productivity and TPM. Hindalco was among the world's most effective producers of 
aluminum. It had received several national awards for exports and energy consumption. To 
keep ahead of the market, Hindalco was moving ahead towards even higher value-added 
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products. It had implemented a modernisation and expansion programme, with technology 
sourced from Reynolds International Inc, US. The company's Renusagar power plant had 
consistently achieved a plant load factor of over 95%. Grasim also accounted for about 9% of 
the global production of VSF. 
Indian Rayon was a branded leader in white cement category. Its hi-tech carbon plant was the 
first unit in India to introduce high temperature technology for manufacturing carbon black. 
It also pioneered the recovery of waste heat and the use of waste gases to generate power. 
The seawater magnesia plant at Visakhapatnam produces refractory grade magnesia from 
seawater. Indo-Gulf s Jagdishpur plant was one of the most energy efficient ammonia/urea 
plants in the country. It was also the first to introduce gas-based fertiliser plant in the private 
sector. Its urea brand Shaktiman had become the market leader. It was also setting up a 
copper smelter complex at Dahej in Gujarat. The smelter with a capacity of 1.5 lacs tpa was 
perhaps the only plant in India to have the flexibility to use a wide range of copper 
concentrates. Indian Rayon was also the second largest textile manufacturer in the countr> 
today. 
Managalore Refineries and Petrochemicals (MRPL) incorporated the latest hydro-cracker 
technology to convert heavy fractions to high value distillates. MRPL had sourced process 
technologies from three leading companies: Universal Oil Processes, US; Kinetic 
Technology, US; Shell, Netherlands. Its capacity had been recently enhanced from 3 mtpa to 
9 mtpa. It was also the first joint sector refinery in India. The newly formed joint venture 
Birla AT&T was all set to revolutionise the communication scenario in the country. Birla 
Global Finance had already made a foray in a wide range of financial services. It had tied up 
with Capital Group, US to launch to distinctive mutual funds in the Indian market. It had also 
tied up with Merlin Partners, UK for dealing in investment banking acfivities globally. 
Currently, nearly 80% of the group's turnover comes from its textiles business (including 
PSF and PFY), cement, carbon black, aluminum and fertiliser. In all these businesses the 
group faced little or no threat from local or global competition, even as tariff barriers were 
falling. In carbon black, despite the tariff barriers being reduced from 179%) in 1991 to 30% 
in 1998, the group had fended off import threats successfully and kept hs bottom-lines 
healthy. Beyond the geographical boundaries, the group's affiliates in Thailand - Thai 
Carbon Black and Alexandria Carbon Black, together produced 1.2 lakh tpa of carbon black; 
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making them the largest producer in SE Asia. Besides it had built plants in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Egypt and its products were exported to US, UK, France, Italy and 
Japan. 
The share is likely to go up in the future because stringent norms discourage new capacities 
in the developed world. These industry specific problems, like environmental pollution, 
makes imports a dwindling threat to the group. As such the landed price of VSF and most of 
its products are far higher than its domestic prices. A healthy annual growth in demand at 
around 8%, fortifies the group's market position. As for cement, domestic capacity pre-empts 
imports, however increasing threat is from global players like La Farge, which have strong 
resource position. In aluminxrai, the prices are linked to the London Metal Exchange, but 
Hindalco's low freight cost makes it more attractive for local users. Businesses like paper 
have became sick, with import duties being slashed from 140% in 1991 to 20% in 1998. 
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Table 5.5: Summary of association among variables 
Variables 
1) Market Imperfection -
Diversity 
2) Dominant Logic - Diversity 
3) Diversity - Performance 
3) Fit-Performance 
4) Strategy Implementation -
Performance 
5) Capabilities - Performance 
6) Inertia - Performance 
7) Cohesiveness - Performance 
8) Geographical Diversity -
Performance 
9) Size - Performance 
10) Industry Effects 
Performance 
11) Market Imperfection -
Performance 
12) Resources - Performance 
10) Size, Age, Structure - Inertia 
11) Fit - Cohesiveness 
12) Fit- Capabilities 
13) Market Imperfection -
Dominant Logic 
14) Industry Characteristics -
Dominant Logic 
15) Group Characteristics -
Dominant Logic 
16) Strategic Shift 
Tata Group 
Divestment 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
High 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Low 
High 
High 
Positive 
Positive 
Low 
Medium 
High 
High 
Reliance Group 
Integration 
High 
Low 
High 
High 
High 
Low 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
High 
Low 
Positive 
Positive 
High 
High 
High 
Medium 
Aditya Biria Group 
Consolidation 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
Positive 
Positive 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
Low 
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CHAPTER 6 
Hypotheses Development 
In this chapter we present meaningful bivariate and multivariate relationships surrounding 
the variables identified during the course of our research, which have been highlighted in 
chapter 3 and 5. Our understanding of the case studies went in a large way in developing the 
hypotheses. Through these hypotheses we attempt to seek answers to the research questions 
posed in our research problem. 
6.1 Dominant logic and business portfolio 
Strategic frames are the mental models that shape how the top management view and 
interpret its competitive landscape. These frames stores and reflect the groups' way of doing 
things. These frames also provide focus, allowing top managers to identify critical pieces of 
information and recognise how new data fits into a broader pattern (Sull, 2004). While 
frames enable managers to see, they also blind them. By continuously focusing on the same 
dimensions of business, frames can also constrict the vision of the top management, blinding 
them to novel opportunities and threats beyond their normal periphery of business (Barton, 
1992). These frames are what we refer to as a groups' dominant logic. Typically, the 
dominant logic of a business group tends to be influenced by its core business; which was 
historical basis of its formation. 
Within its core business, the critical success factors therefore become ingrained in the minds 
of the top management. These heuristic principles became more and more reinforced and 
prominent from the result of doing right things with respect to its core business (Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1986). These cumulative experiences therefore reflect how the top management views 
the internal and external economic environment surrounding it. Hence, whenever the top 
management of a business group is faced with the decision of diversifying into a new 
business, they rely not on the basis of some ideal strategy or optimising procedure, but on the 
basis of experience or what worked before (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). When dealing with 
such uncertain and complex tasks, the top management often rely on a limited set of heuristic 
principles, which greatly simplifies the decision making process (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). 
Historically, the Tata groups' business portfolio was heavily tilted towards core 
manufacturing: automobiles, textiles, steel, energy, cement, and chemicals. All these 
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diversifications went close in hand with the groups' dominant logic. Their basic frame of 
mind was to implement the setting up of large and modem enterprises in pioneering 
industries. These were projects, which required sizeable investments in infrastructure, 
involved long gestations and made significant contributions to economic development 
through import substitution. They were convinced that all round prosperity augured well for 
business groups in general. This was the legacy the group carried till the pre-independence 
stage. Post independence, the approach was to maintain a clean image; distances itself from 
political interference, and to give its business partners a fair deal and yet succeed in business. 
In contrast, during the entire 60's and 70's majority of the business groups had set up 
"industrial embassies" in the capital city to extract mileage through political coimections. But 
this was in contradiction to the philosophy the Tatas pursued. Hence, during this period the 
group maintained status quo, followed by only marginal expansions and diversifications. Post 
the 90's, the group started believing that it was carrying a large nimiber of sick businesses, 
and in majority of these businesses, industry profitability had become stagnant. Therefore to 
maintain the groups' leadership, it needed to enter emerging industries once again. As a 
result, the group once again started making fresh diversification moves, this time in emerging 
technologies: passenger cars, telecom, insurance, IT, and retailing. 
Since the inception of the Reliance group, the mindset of the group was always to invest in 
emerging product-market segments, which are capable of vertical integration. They went 
about establishing huge capacities conforming to global standards, and building up positions 
of cost advantage though capital productivity at every link in the value-chain. Finally, use 
price-elasticity to its advantage to blow up the market to international size and scale and 
dominate markets ahead of competition. The group knew very well that if it could control the 
value-chain, the market would be under their control. Thus at each and every stage they 
moved one step backward, and also simultaneously expanding existing capacities to attain a 
position of indomitable superiority. 
However, the vertical product chain of the group was almost complete with the end of the 
80's. Therefore, to further their cost advantage they decided to move from vertical to 
horizontal integration. Thus the group diversified into: financial services, media and 
advertising, infrastructure, ports and power. Though these diversifications seemed distinctly 
unrelated in terms nature, they were in the nature of horizontal integrations and the linkages 
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though not apparent were quite distinct. The broad objective behind these diversifications 
was to provide parallel feedstock to its existing businesses. Once the horizontal chain was 
coming to an end, the group decided to enter businesses where they can capitalise on their 
expertise gained through managing complex in-house technologies. It is at this point; the 
group launched its telecom business. The telecom business was the only project, which 
seemed for the first time that the group had totally bypassed its earlier legacy. But still there 
was an insular linkage, though not tacitly expressed. The Reliance groups till then were 
basically users of technology; the only deviation was that now they were implementing 
technology it in terms of business. 
The legacy of Aditya Birla group was traditionally built aroimd: establishing world scale 
plants; keeping the cost of funds low; ensuring high rates of capacity utilisation; and 
controlling costs. Political connectivity, a closely controlled economy, and surplus funds 
networked a conglomerate whose reach extended beyond the geographical boimdaries of the 
coimtry. A focus on world-scale capacities, constant attention to operational efficiencies and 
prudent financial management - these were the common fi-ames that binded the wide range 
of businesses of the group. With this mind-set the group diversified from trading in cotton, 
silver, sugar, jute and forged ahead in key industries such as textiles, fertilisers, chemicals, 
sponge-iron, cement, refineries, carbon black, aluminium, financial services and software. 
With the onset of the 90's, the group realised that not a single diversification plan showed 
clear sign competitive or leadership edge. The focus for the future: to stay in the core sector, 
and continuously upgrade and improve costs and quality in existing businesses. The group 
had crafted a clear-cut criterion for new diversifications. The factors: it should be a 
differentiated value-added product, with a substantial presence in the value-chain. It should 
also have strategic linkages with the group's existing businesses, indicating clear sustainable 
competitive advantage. And critically, project investments needed to be evaluated over a 
sustained period - not just the initial investment. The intent was to become globally 
competitive. The route is again through cost leadership. 
The group was also talking of value creation when its peers were only thinking big in terms 
of size and scale. Overburdened with businesses in distant comers of the world, post 
liberalisation the group divested certain businesses and started consolidating its position in 
existing businesses. The reason: new businesses, for the time being, were therefore restricted 
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to the ones already in the making - telecom, power and refineries. The group restructuring 
also witnessed a paradigm shift in investments from textiles, fibre, yam, and cement to non-
ferrous metals. Clearly, the top management has now chosen to make a strategic shift. The 
next few years will mark a critical point within the group. In the past, the group was simply 
focused on extracting value rather than focus on growth. They typically chose to add capacity 
in small chunks or acquire healthy, but relatively small businesses. Again the groups' focus 
is, making its presence felt in the international markets. 
Though these various businesses seem distinct in terms of industry count (SIC), nevertheless 
there existed a common bond in terms of their dominant logic. Thus the top management of a 
diversified group should not be viewed as a faceless abstraction, but as a collection of key 
individuals (i.e. a dominant coalition) who have significant influence on the way a firm is 
managed (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). These collections of individuals, to a large extent, 
influence the style and process of management and as a result the key resource allocation 
choices (Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983). Kiesler and Sproul (1982: 557) advocates that 
managers operated on mental representations of the world and those representations are 
likely to be of historical environments rather than of current ones. Hence it is proposed that -
Hypothesis 1: The choice of portfolio of businesses of a diversified business 
group is shaped by the dominant logic of the top management. 
6.2 Business portfolio and performance 
In the late 60's the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) offered a new way to look at strategic 
planning activities (Henderson, 1970, 1973). In essence, the BCG approach views the firm as 
a portfolio of businesses, each one offering a unique contribution to growth and profitabilit>' 
(Hax and Majluf, 1983). These largely independent units have strategic directions, which are 
addressed separately. In order to visualise the relative role played by each business unit, BCG 
developed the growth-share matrix. The growth-share matrix was helpfiil in three ways. First, 
it offered a powerful display of the strengths of the businesses in the groups' portfolio. 
Second, it identified the capacity of each business to generate cash and also reveal its 
requirement for cash; thus assists in balancing the groups' cash flow. And third, it reflected 
the distinct characteristics of each business unit; it could also suggest strategic directions for 
each business, thus influencing overall performance (Hax and Majluf, 1983). 
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The primary objectives of large corporations, be it the conglomerates in the West, or business 
groups operating in emerging markets, implicit in the initial conceptualisation of BCG, was 
growth and profitability (Henderson and Zakon, 1980). The fundamental advantage that a 
multi-business organisation possessed was its ability to transfer funds from one business that 
was highly profitable but had limited potential for growth, to others that offered expectations 
of sustained future growth and profitability. This led to an integrative management of the 
portfolio that would make the whole larger than the sum of its parts. To obtain this 
synergistic result, resource allocation had to be centralised and designed to produce a 
balanced portfolio in terms of the generation and uses of ftinds (Hax and Majluf, 1983). 
Zakon (1976) pointed out that the maximum-sustainable growth was a critical dimension of 
the growth objective of the firm. This concept represented the maximum growth rate a firm 
could support using its internal resources and its debt capabilities. 
An in-depth analysis of the business portfolio of three prominent business groups in India 
provides interesting insights; which overall profiles like diversity are unable to. The diversity 
pattern of the Tata group had more or less remained constant throughout the entire post-
liberalisation period, though its performance improved radically. What then, explains the 
sharp turnaround in performance? It appears that, diversity is perhaps a limited indicator as 
far as performance is concerned. A closer look at the composition of the business portfolio of 
the Tata Group during the same period reveals some interesting facts. In 1990, steel was the 
largest revenue earner at 25%, followed by automobiles at 22%, cement at 17%, consumer 
durables at 8%, and fertiliser at 6%. The comparable figures for 1997 reveals that the largest 
revenue-earning segment was automobiles at 32%, followed by steel at 20%, cement at 12%, 
international trading at 7% and fertiliser at 6%. A closer look reveals the following subtle 
changes. The group had consolidated its position significantly in the automobile segment, in 
which its relative share has increased significantly from 22% to 32%. Its relative share in the 
other segments had declined; steel from 25% to 20%, cement fi-om 17% to 12%. Consumer 
durables, which were among the top five businesses in 1990, ceased to exist anymore, 
international trading, had occupied this slot. Only the relative share of the fertiliser business 
had more or less remained constant. The top five businesses explained about three-fourth of 
the groups' total revenue in 1990, which more or less remained the same even in 1997. 
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We now look at the comparable figures that existed in 2003. The largest revenue-earning 
segment continued to be automobiles at 25%, followed closely by steel at 24%, IT at 14%, 
telecom at 11% and energy at 9%. The trend during this period is quite unsettling. The 
groups' strong dominance in automobiles and steel remained unchallenged. IT, telecom and 
energy had overtaken in the third, fourth and fifth slot compared to the earlier cement, 
international trading and fertiliser. However, there was another discerning trend, which could 
not be captured through diversity analysis. A detailed analysis of the groups' business 
portfolio revealed that the group had radically shifted its focus from manufacturing to 
services. The fact that the last three slots were all occupied by businesses in the service 
sector, explained this point. During the same time frame the group had diversified into fifteen 
new businesses and exited eleven others. The composition of its business portfolio had 
changed dramatically, though diversity had not. Consider this: brand businesses fetched 
about a 20% of sales and profits in 1990. In 2003, they accounted for nearly 50% of the 
revenues and 58%) of the profits. Therefore, it is not diversity, but the entry of the Tata group 
into relatively emerging businesses that helped improve overall performance. 
The diversity of the Reliance group was also observed to be moving within a narrow range 
during the period (1990-2000), while most of its performance indicators doubled during the 
same period. What then explains this sharp turnaround in performance? Diversity hardly 
provides any useful insight! In terms of its business portfolio, petrochemicals was the single 
largest revenue-earning segment of the group averaging at around 85%). The second slot was 
occupied by its energy business averaging at around 15%, while the share of its financial 
services business was almost negligible. However, during the same period the composition of 
its petrochemicals business had changed dramatically. In fact, while the levels of vertical 
integration was moderate in 1990, by the turn of the century the group had reached the 
highest levels of integration and also carved out a separate petroleum business. The improved 
performance came not because of diversity, but because of the substantial savings in costs 
that came with each level of integration. 
However, during the period (2000-2003), the diversity of the Reliance group more than 
doubled from the then existing levels. In contrast during the same period most of its 
performance indicators declined sharply. Again, diversity hardly provides any clues. The fact 
is that the group had invested close to about Rs.40000 crore into its two newly carved 
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businesses: petrolevun and telecom. Both these investments were outside the domain of its 
vertical integration, hence did not deliver the earlier returns generated through vertical or 
horizontal integration. Further, these were projects where gestation was severely long. 
Hence, in the short-term though the investments got tied up, performance did not measure up 
to extent of the investments already made. However, this does not mean that we put the 
viability of the projects in question? Therefore, once again it's the composition of the 
business portfolio that accounts for changes in performance, and not diversity. 
In the case of Aditya Birla group, diversity increased nominally during the period (1990-
2003). However, during the period (2000-2003), majority of the performance indicators 
improved significantly. It is again the composition of the groups' business portfolio that 
explains this sharp turnaround. The composition of the groups' top five business in 1990 
reveals the following: textiles 35%, cement 32%, metals 14%, paper 7%, and electricals 5%. 
The group had clearly realised that its future lay in metals; and some of its insignificant 
businesses were absorbing majority of the profits. The groups' business composition in 2003 
reflects just this: metals 46%, textiles 24%, cement 23%, paper 4%, and electricals 3%. Thus 
the groups' improved performance came not because of its increased diversity, but because 
of its increased exposure in its metal business. The metals business revived globally in the 
current decade enabling the group to report such performance. 
Hence, the above insights clearly reveal that composition of business portfolio is 
comparatively a better indicator of performance than overall measure of group diversity. Hax 
and Majluf (1982) rightly indicated that it could be severe pitfall to use the achieved market-
share at the end of the value added chain to measure performance and, therefore the 
competitive strength of the firm. Resources shared among various businesses at each 
functional level are ignored when market-share is measured at the consumer end. For the 
BCG matrix to provide a clear representation of the profitability and competitive strength of 
each business, it is important that each business be portrayed as totally independent and 
autonomous. Therefore, the growth-share matrix can make major contributions to strategic 
thinking; however naive use of the same could produce inappropriate and misleading 
recommendations. Hence it is proposed that -
Hypothesis 2: It is not diversity per se, but the composition of the groups' 
business portfolio contributing to diversity that influences performance. 
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6.3 Strategic fit and performance 
If there existed a uniform and consistent relationship between diversity and performance, 
then all additions to diversity in the emerging market context across a broad spectrum of 
business groups would have enhanced performance in a similar manner. But a clear glance 
reveals that this is not so. Therefore, this in a way supports our view of fit from the 
contingency perspective. The positive performance impact of a co-alignment between the 
environment and the strategy of a business has been well explored (Venkatraman, 1989; 
Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990). At this stage we extend this concept of fit as consistencies 
between a groups' dominant logic and its diversified businesses. We refer to this as "strategic 
fit". Strategic management has generally followed the axiom that no strategy is universally 
superior, irrespective of the environmental or the organisational context. They have 
commonly used a contingency perspective that has been operationalised within a moderation 
view. According to the moderation perspective, the impact that a predictor variable has on a 
criterion variable is dependent on the level of a third variable, termed here as the moderating 
variable. Here we view strategic fit as the moderating variable on the relationship between 
diversification strategy and performance. 
Logic behind this inference can be drawn from multiple theoretical lenses. One of the major 
implications of this argument is that the top management is less likely to respond 
appropriately to businesses, where the dominant logic is different. As well as respond quickly 
enough, as they may be unable to interpret the information surrounding unfamiliar 
environment (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). All this implies hidden costs, which indirectly has a 
negative bearing on performance. Second, businesses consistent with group dominant logic 
facilitates better implementation of strategies as it provides strategic as well as operational 
control of the top management over its diversified businesses (Ghemawat, 1991). Third, a 
consistent dominant logic ensures unlearning and learning of new skills and practices 
required in a fast changing business environment, evident in most emerging markets (Das, 
1981). Fourth, it implies commitment of the top management, which offers a generalized 
form of explanation for sustained differences in performance across business groups 
(Ghemawat, 1991). Fifth, it facilitates the systematic development certain idiosyncratic 
resources, which are the primary sources of competitive advantage across different markets 
(Selznick, 1957; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Sixth, it results in the reinforcement of fit 
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among its entire system of activities. This fit leads to a sustainable competitive advantage 
and is far more superior to fit based on resources (Porter, 1986). 
In the case of Tata group, the businesses, which had a high fit with, the dominant logic of the 
top management includes: steel, cement, and chemicals. There were also some transition 
businesses, which included: automobiles and information technology. In the case of Reliance 
group, the businesses, which had a high fit with, the dominant logic of the top management 
includes: petro-chemicals and petroleum. While, in the case of Aditya Birla group, the 
businesses, which had a high, fit with the dominant logic of the top management includes: 
cement, textiles and metals. We measured the industry-adjusted performance of these 
individual businesses on three counts over a time frame of thirteen years. The industry-
adjusted performance was measured by subtracting the industry average fi-om the firm value 
(Shrader, 2001). In all the above cases, the businesses outperformed the industry in most of 
the cases. In the case of transition businesses, the businesses outperformed the industry for 
the cases in which the fit was consistent with the dominant logic. However, performance of 
the business was found to be deviating when the fit was inconsistent with the dominant logic. 
In the case of Tata group, the businesses, which has a low fit with, the dominant logic of the 
top management includes: pharmaceuticals, paints, and electricals. For the case of Reliance 
group, the businesses, which has a low fit with, the dominant logic of the top management 
includes: energy and financial services. While, in the case of Aditya Birla group, the 
businesses, which has a low, fit with the dominant logic of the top management includes: 
chemicals and financial services. In the following cases performance was found to be 
lacking, and industry outperformed the businesses in most of the cases. These were 
businesses in which resource commitment of the group was lacking; slow in strategic 
decision making; comparafively less innovative; and did not possess any distinctive 
capabilities, which ultimately resulted in poor performance. Overall group performance in 
terms of CAGR is also consistent-with group fit index. The average fit of the Tata group 
stood at 0.81, Aditya Birla group at 0.77, and Reliance group at 0.95. While the CAGR of the 
Tata and Aditya Birla group were observed to be respectively 13.69%, while in the case of 
Reliance Group it was significantly higher 31.81%. Thus, performance of the group was 
clearly dominating, where majority of the businesses fit with dominant logic. 
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Diversification strategies within a business group, therefore, makes sense to the extent that 
parent creates sufficient value for the firm to compete with other intermediaries. That occurs 
when parent's skills and resources fit well with the needs and opportunities of the businesses. 
Thus while a high fit can create value; a low one can destroy it (Campbell et al., 1995). In 
situations where the fit is deviating, firms are coming to understand that it is often easier to 
change the portfolio to fit the group, than to change the group to fit the business (Campbell et 
al., 1995). Therefore, at this stage, it is viewed that firm performance is best maximised when 
the firm business matches with the majority of the groups' dominant logic's. In contrast, 
group performance is best maximised when majority of the firm businesses matches with the 
dominant logic of the group. Any profile deviation will have a deteriorating effect on 
performance (Venkatraman, 1989). Hence it is proposed that -
Hypothesis 3A: The greater the extent of fit of an individual business, within 
the portfolio of businesses, with the dominant logic of the top management, 
higher is the likelihood of better firm performance. 
Hypothesis 3B: The greater the number of individual business, within the 
portfolio of businesses, which fit with the dominant logic of the top 
management, higher is the likelihood of better group performance. 
6.4 Environment and dominant logic 
Typically, the dominant logic in a diversified firm tends to be influenced by its largest 
business or its "core business"; which was the historical basis for the groups' formation 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). The characteristics of the core business tend to cause managers 
to define problems in certain ways and develop familiarity with, and the facility in the use of, 
those administrative tools that are particularly useful in accomplishing the critical tasks of the 
core business (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). In the pre-liberalisation period politically friendly 
entrepreneurs controlled the largest and most successful modem business groups in most 
emerging markets. 
A study even emphasised that industrial embassies were maintained by large business 
groups, ostensibly for the group companies to interface with the regulatory apparatus 
(Encarnation, 1989). Ir^  some cases, charges were levied that groups secured licenses; 
obtained fast approvals for its resource mobilisation plans from the capital markets and 
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capital goods imports; and got policies formulated which favoured it (or disadvantaged its 
competitors or both). Most business groups found it expedient to establish contacts with 
powerful politicians and bureaucrats and offer donations in exchange for licenses, illegal 
political contributions in return for preferential regulation and the generation of unaccounted 
money for sustaining this nexus became, for some, the recipe for quick success and rapid 
growth (Bardhan, 1997). Some glaring observations -
In June 1986, the GOI banned the conversion of NCD portion of debentures into equity of 
Reliance group hours before the board of directors were to meet to recommend conversion of 
the NCD portion of its E and F series into equity. The ban followed allegations in the press 
that many state owned banks had funded investment firms belonging to the Reliance group 
huge sums of money in violation of the prevailing lending norms enabling them to acquire 
large quantities of E and F series debentures months before the board meeting. In response, 
the group got sanctioned Rs. 5 billion offer of fully convertible debentures (G series), which 
was over-subscribed by over seven times. Subsequently, there was also a show cause notice 
from the Customs authorities, alleging import and installation of additional machines 
unauthorised and also alleging misdeclaration of more than twice the declared capacity. The 
authorities' alleged differential duty together with penalty estimated at Rs. 1190 million. 
However, the group contested the claim and got a preferential ruling issued in its favour. In 
July 1986, the GOI imposed a Customs levy (anti-dumping duty) on the import of PFY 
around the same time when Reliance Groups PFY plant was being commissioned. The 
government action was triggered by the by the accusation that while being publicly justified 
as protection to domestic producers from low imports, the duty actually enabled the domestic 
producers - Reliance in particular - to generate windfall profits. A series of favourable 
government decisions followed that began to turn the tide of the groups' fortune since early 
1987: imports of PSF was canalised through a state agency thus preventing direct import by 
end users; a special Customs levy Rs. 3 per kg on PTA (which-Reliance was still importing) 
was abolished; the groups' Patalganga complex was granted the status of a refinery, thus 
enabling it to lower level of domestic excise duties for raw materials like naphtha; and the 
group was permitted to prepone the conversion of G series debentures into equity, which 
resulted in an estimated saving of about Rs. 330 million in interest costs. All these facts 
points to the fact that the extent of market imperfection in an economy is a predominant 
factor shaping the dominant logic of business groups. 
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However, post liberalisation the groups' entry into power, the first major divergence from its 
vertical chain, was perhaps initiated from the groups underlying strength in implementing 
complex technologies. The group could foresee a terrifying deficit of the order of 50000 MW 
power in the economy. Recognising the need for massive investments to improve both the 
size, and the quality of the power sector, the GOI had offered a very exciting scheme for 
attracting private companies. It will provide exchange rate protection; guarantee a 16% return 
on equity, all calculated on a plant load factor significantly below what the group believed to 
be achievable. The Reliance group already had the experience of running its own 100 MW 
captive power plants at Patalganga and Hazira. They were among the most sophisticated and 
best run power plants in the country, which were routinely operated at 95%(+) capacity. The 
group also had proven its ability to mobilise large amounts capital and have demonstrated 
competence in managing mega projects. Thus the group, which was basically users of 
technology, was now diversifying into areas where technology was their business. 
Besides power, similar one-time opportunities were also available in various other emerging 
areas; telecom being one of them. This time again the major criteria that went behind their 
telecom diversification were that the group had the inherent strength and the capability to 
implement such complex technologies. At their Jamnagar unit, while setting up their refinery, 
they had used a lot of technology - communication, systems and infrastructure. The 
movement happened in phases. The group was among the earliest to have implemented giga-
bit Ethernet capacity and video conferencing. So again in the midst of the technology boom, 
the group, which had exposure in using technology, were basically diversifying into areas 
where they could leverage similar technologies as their business. 
Similarly, the telecom and automobile diversifications of the Tata group were based on the 
relative merits of the project. The institutional voids in the economy had little role to play 
behind such diversification strategies. When the telecom sector was opened up for the private 
sector in 1995, separate licenses were issued for separate circles to players wanting to operate 
in basic, cellular, wire-less, Internet and value-added services. At that point of time the Tata 
group was prepared to invest up to Rs. 6000 crore over the next six years. Global research 
and advisory firm Gartner Inc forecasted a convergence in call tariffs of GSM and CDMA in 
2004, even as it predicts pre-paid services to gamer 68% of the present market-share in India. 
However, with industry moving towards a unified license regime, the players can now 
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compete in a given circle in any area they feel comfortable; which was hitherto restricted in 
the earlier regime. With the onset of the 90's the Tatas were then contemplating investing 
around Rs. 20000 crore in this sector. Therefore, characteristics of an industry can change the 
rules of the game; and more importantly change the posture of the players in the industry. 
In the case of Aditya Birla group commodities were no exception, long-term viability hinged 
on the group's ability to produce it cheaply through the ups and downs of the commodity 
cycle. The 30-mtpa global aluminium market was growing at around 4.5% every year. What 
was more important, Asia was the hub of major activity. Despite China, Middle East and SE 
Asia already soaking up capacities, a shortage of around 2 mtpa was in the offing. In the case 
of the non-ferrous (aluminium) industry, which was characterised by long and stable 
upswings had forced the Aditya Birla group to contemplate Rs. 16000 crore as investments in 
this sector, of the total group investments of Rs. 20000 crore. Post liberalisation therefore, 
changing industry characteristics became a major force to reckon with. So at this stage it is 
quite clear that industry and group characteristics are also critical factors, responsible for 
shaping the dominant logic of business groups. However, our insights suggest that perhaps 
market imperfection was pre-dominant in shaping dominant logic of business groups prior to 
economic liberalization. However, post-economic liberalization industry and group 
characteristics are pre-dominant in shaping dominant logic of business groups. This is, 
however, a conjecture that awaits further analysis. Hence it is proposed that -
Hypothesis 4: Dominant logic of the top management is shaped by 
characteristics of its core business, industry characteristics, together with the 
extent of market imperfection in an economy. 
6.5 Economic liberalisation and market imperfection 
During the last two or three decades a number of coimtries around the world have undertaken 
economic reforms of varying magnitude to liberalise and globalise their economies. The term 
"industrialising countries" was first applied to a few fast-growing countries in Asia and Latin 
America in the early 1980's. Because of the widespread liberalisation and adoption of 
various market-based policies by many developing coimtries, the term 'industrialising 
countries' was then replaced by the broader term 'emerging market' (Arnold and Quelch, 
1998). An emerging market can be defined as a country that safisfies two criteria: a rapid 
pace of economic development and government policies favouring economic liberalisation 
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and the adoption of a free-market system. The International Monetary Finance (IFC) 
currently identifies fifty-one such rapid-growth developing countries in Asia, Latin America, 
Africa, and the Middle East as emerging markets. To these fast-followers the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) adds thirteen transition economies in this 
classification (Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
Most researchers tend to define emerging markets in terms of size, growth, or how recently it 
has opened up to the global economy. In contrast, Khanna and Palepu (1997) viewed 
diversified groups as responses to market failure. The authors put forth three sources of 
market failure, which characterises most emerging markets. They are informational 
problems, misguided regulations, and inefficient judicial systems. Political economy 
considerations generally suppress the likelihood of information flowing freely and 
intermediaries gradually emerging in an economy. This led Khanna and Palepu (2000) to 
conclude that economic liberalisation will be characterised by a gradual emergence of 
intermediaries and a reduction in ambient transaction costs. Stated equivalently, there will be 
a rise in threshold level of group diversification above which groups have an incentive to 
invest in creating an internal intermediation system. This is perhaps an indication of the fact 
that group effects might have diminished since markets became more efficient and groups' 
ability to create value by circumventing market efficiency may have subsided. 
In July 1991 Government of India (GOI) initiated a sustained policy and administrative 
reforms, popularly known as economic liberalisation. Deregulation of selected industries 
started in the mid eighties. However, it was only since July, 1991 GOI started implementing 
a large number of policies and administrative reforms such as delicensing of industrial 
investment, trade reforms entailing gradual reduction of import duties and promotion of 
exports. Public Sector Units (PSU) disinvestment, encouraging Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), exchange rate reforms, capital market reforms including free pricing of equity and 
access to off-shore equity and debt, financial sector reforms to ensure capital adequacy and 
establishment of private sector reforms (Ray, 2000). These reforms were collectively known 
as economic liberalisation. They had embraced almost all aspects of the country's economy. 
We shall now look at some of the sectors in detail and its impact on transaction costs. Our 
broad objective is to assess how economic liberalisation fills up the institutional voids in the 
economy and increase market efficiency. These policies can be broadly classified under two 
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distinct categories: (i) liberalisation measures (ii) macro-economic reforms and structural 
adjustments. 
In terms of economic liberalisation, delicensing of several industries had been the most 
important measure initiated under the New Industrial Policy (NIP). In the new set up, 
business groups were needed only to file an information memorandum with the government 
on their new projects, expansions or diversifications. A new broad-banding facility has also 
been introduced, giving more flexibility of operations to industries. Moreover, powerful 
bureaucratic structures like the Directorate General for Technical Development (DGTD) and 
the office of Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (CCI&E) had been abolished as a part 
of the process of liberalisation. As a result of the above, exports and imports increased fi-om 
Rs.16612 mln and Rs.21219 mln in 1990 to Rs.52856 mln and Rs.60313 mln in 2003. 
Deposits of scheduled commercial banks and sanctions by financial institutions and banks 
increased from Rs.l735 bin and Rs.l44 bin in 1990 to Rs.l3118 bin and Rs.l69 bin in 2003, 
with an intermediary high of Rs. 1013 bin in 2000. The NIP being a policy specifically aimed 
at attracting FDI, had introduced many changes in the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 
(FERA), which had incorporated a plethora of controls on firms whose foreign equity 
exceeded 40%. With subsequent modifications, many of the inhibiting conditions governing 
foreign investment were removed. Automatic clearance for foreign equity up to 51% for new 
firms had been allowed in thirty-four high priority industries. This provision was later 
extended for existing firms as well. In certain high priority sectors like IT, FDI was allowed 
up to 100%. Automatic clearance was given for import of capital goods where foreign 
exchange availability was ensured through foreign equity. 
Another important move was the creation of specially empowered Foreign Investment 
Promotion Board (FIPB) for expeditious clearance of FDI's. Under the NIP, drastic changes 
had been made in the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTPC). The Act 
had been changed altogether to do away with the threshold asset limits. As a result FDI 
inflows increased from a near transient level in 1990 to $1638 mln in 2003, with an 
intermediary high of $11338 mln in 1997. The NIP also curtailed PSU's pre-eminent role in 
priority sectors and threw open the industrial arena to the private sector in almost full throttle. 
The GOI further amended the Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA) and extended the 
purview of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) to the PSU's. 
128 
Liberalisation had been the crux of the New Trade Policy (NTP), too. At one stroke, many of 
the age old controls governing exports and imports were dismantled. Imports had been 
liberalised almost totally, except for a few non-permitted list of items. 
There has also been steep reduction in import tariffs from over 200% to the current level of 
around (30-40)%. The GOI also introduced partial convertibility of the domestic currency in 
1992-93 and full convertibility (cunent account) in 1993-94. As a result of the NIP and NTP 
the value-of-output of the organised sector increased from Rs.2341 bin in 1990 to Rs.l2012 
bin in 2003. Railway and sea traffic increased from 310 mln.tns and 148 mln.tns in 1990 to 
518 mln.tns and 313 mln.tns in 2003. Employment in the combined public and private sector 
increased from 26.4 mln.nos in 1990 to 28 mln.nos in 2003. The GOI also brought about a 
series of macro-economic reforms and structural adjustments. The reduction of fiscal deficits 
and overhauling of the entire tax system was based on fiscal reforms. On the monetary side, 
major reforms were also carried out in the banking sector. According to the recommendations 
of the Narasimham Committee there was a phased reduction of statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) 
and a high degree of flexibility in interest rates was also permitted. It also allowed scheduled 
banks to approach the capital market to improve their capital adequacy norms. A series of 
reforms were also carried out in the capital markets. 
The ceiling on the acquisition of shares by NRI's, overseas corporate bodies and FII's was 
raised from 5% to 24%; the office of Controller of Capital Issues (CCI) was abolished and 
free pricing of shares was allowed under the purview of Securities Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI). As a result total capital issues increased from Rs.l 12.9 bin in 1990 to Rs.416.1 bin in 
2003. Indian corporates approaching the global equity markets by way of GDR increased 
from a transient level in 1990 to Rs.l88.5 bin in 2003, with an intermediary high of 
Rs.6217.7 bin in 2001. Number of firms listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
increased from 2247 in 1990 to 5675 in 2003. Among the various structural adjustments, 
phasing out of various subsidies constituted another major element of the reforms program. 
The Cash Compensatory System (CCS), which formed the bulk of export subsidy, was 
totally abolished. Public sector restructuring was also a major part of the reforms exercise. 
The GOI decided against setting up of fresh PSU's. It also decided that further expansion of 
existing PSU's through additional government equity would not take place. Disinvestment of 
government equity in the PSU's was another major element of public sector restructuring. 
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The government ultimately recognised that if liberalisation was to be taken to its logical 
conclusion, an exit policy for industry was essential. It found voluntary retirement scheme 
(VRS) as the instrument to balance social and economic risks. 
As a result of the various economic liberalisation measures, Indian economic environment 
underwent a rapid change. Entrepreneurial freedom provided through economic liberalisation 
brought about major shifts in the industrial scenario. There has been an emergence of an 
altogether new category of third generation entrepreneurs. There has also been a 
diversification spree and a spate of mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. In the wake of 
globalisation, most MNC's consolidated their positions in India. They acquired majority 
stakes in their Indian enterprises, entered afresh through a 100% subsidiary or created new 
joint ventures. Their entry even altered the rules of the game in core sectors like telecom, oil, 
mining and power. Imports went out of the domain of the govenmient and became an 
entrepreneurial activity. International trade emerged as a separate business opportunity. 
Capital markets underwent a radical change. Domestic markets became buoyant followed by 
increased activity from Foreign Institutional Investors (FII's) and foreign brokers. Mutual 
funds became an emerging area of investments. And slowly Indian capital markets got 
integrated with the global capital markets. The restrictions in the banking sector were done 
away with. Disinvestment of government equity in nationalised banks followed by 
deregulation of interest rates leads to a competitive environment in the banking sector. 
Banking services got branded, and banks started functioning as viable commercial 
institutions. Financial services emerged as a new business area, leading to a multiplicity of 
fund raising options for business groups. All these points to the fact that with economic 
liberalisation markets by and large transaction costs have come down and the economy has 
become more efficient. The importance of market efficiency lies in the fact that, value 
business groups add may be contingent on the time period under study, as different stages of 
economic liberalisation may affect the optimal mix of activity in which groups' should 
engage (Lu. et al., 2000). Hence it is proposed that -
Hypothesis 5: Economic liberalisation leads to a significant decline in the 
extent of market imperfection in an economy. 
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6.6 Market imperfection and dominant logic 
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) contend that changing mix of businesses can impose strategic 
variety in the case of a diversified business group. But over time even unchanging mix of 
businesses can also lead to strategic variety. In the post liberalisation phase, strategic 
characteristics of most businesses changed due to changes in structural characteristics of 
industries. At this stage we conjecture that strategic variety was also imposed on business 
groups as emerging markets were liberalised, due to a significant decline in market 
imperfection in the economy. When such transition takes business groups are faced with a 
radically changing business environment, which they have not witnessed before. Changes in 
a business environment in most cases is taken for granted, however, only radical changes in 
the business environment (similar to economic liberalisation) imposes strategic variety on 
business groups. Business groups in most developed markets take for granted a range of 
institutions that support their business activities. But many of these institutions are very 
nascent or may be altogether absent in most emerging markets, including India (Khaima and 
Palepu, 1997). In product-markets buyers and sellers usually suffer from a severe dearth of 
information due to underdeveloped communications, infrastructure, power shortages, 
inefficient postal services, lack of independent rating agencies and capricious and slow law 
enforcement systems. Similarly in the capital markets, institutional mechanisms that enable 
capital markets function efficiently are absent or ineffective. Also in most developed markets 
the Securities and Exchange Commission acts as a deterrent for unscrupulous firms to 
mislead investors. Without access to information, investors refrain from investing their funds 
in unfamiliar ventures. 
However, this intensifying government involvement has a deleterious impact on the overall 
Indian business climate. Overregulation began to retard economic growth. Protected from 
foreign competition, domestic industries became inefficient, and the country lagged behind 
the rest of the world in terms of technology. Unaccustomed to doing business in this way, the 
Tatas often found themselves at odds with those in power. In 1978, a strong bid to nationalize 
TISCO orchestrated by a coterie of powerftal politicians barely failed, due to protests from 
JRD backed by the company management, unions, customers, suppliers and associates. 
Faced with difficulfies of operating in such a hostile environment, the Tatas stopped 
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promoting major projects, and went into a defensive mode, trying to protect and maintain 
their existing businesses. 
In such situations the Aditya Birla group was primarily dependent on raising capital through 
internal capital markets. This finds support from the findings of Williamson (1975), which 
indicates that the diversified organisation is best understood as an alternative resource 
allocation mechanism. Most emerging markets also suffer from a huge scarcity of well-
trained people. Thus the Tatas were prompted to form TAS, to promote, train and elevate its 
senior personnel. On the regulation side, most successive governments in India were heavily 
involved in an intricate array of economic decisions. The law established subjective criteria 
for a majority of such decisions; in such a situation the powerful bureaucrats had a great deal 
of discretionary powers on how to apply the rules. Indeed, it was the Reliance Group, which 
showed how to use this powerful nexus to its advantage. They added value by acting as 
intermediaries when their firms or foreign partners needed to deal with the regulatory 
bureaucracy. Prior to economic liberalisation, market imperfection in the Indian economy 
was evidently quite high. Therefore, it may be quite that the extent of market imperfection in 
the economy was pre-dominant in shaping the dominant logic of most successful business 
groups prior to economic liberalisation and in its early stages. 
However, post liberalisation the efficiency of the economic environment had increased 
dramatically. This put forth a totally different nature of diversification strategies before the 
top management of most business groups. These diversification strategies were totally set 
apart from those adopted in the pre-liberalisation periods. Thus, most business groups were at 
a juncture where they found that their dominant logic had become inconsistent with the 
changed economic environment. Their mental representations did not match with the new set 
of diversification strategies, as they were of historical ones. Therefore, dominant logic of the 
top management is not always an infallible guide to business groups and its environment. In 
fact, some are relatively inaccurate representation of the world, particularly as conditions 
change (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). As a result, events are not labeled accurately, and are 
sometimes processed through inaccurate and/or incomplete knowledge structures. Therefore 
in fresh diversifications, the top management recognised the fact that hasty attempts to 
impose its dominant logic may leave the new business dysfunctional. Often the new business 
is 'left alone', at least for the time being (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). This perhaps explains 
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the delay of the Reliance Group in implementing its telecom project, though the license was 
acquired as early as 1998. In such situations, the top management also recognises the fact 
that the skills and capabilities required for such new businesses might be radically different 
from those developed earlier. Therefore, post liberalisation, industry and group 
characteristics are perhaps pre-dominant in shaping dominant logic of successful business 
groups. 
One of the implications of our thesis, so far, is that the top management is less likely to 
respond appropriately to situations where the economic environment is quite different, as 
well as not respond quickly enough, as they may be unable to interpret the meaning of 
information regarding unfamiliar businesses (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). The series of 
bottlenecks in the early stages of the Reliance groups' telecom project, perhaps explains this 
logic. Reliance offered low call charges, but kept entry costs high. The price plan aimed at 
locking in subscribers could not bring in the desired numbers. Faulty technology led to 
heating up of handsets on using internet services. Most cellular companies denied Reliance 
complete access to their networks, and also fought back competition heavily which Reliance 
had not anticipated earlier. The much touted chaimel strategy threw a spanner in their 
marketing plans. And finally. Reliance was surrounded by a series of TRAI regulations, 
which seemed difficult to overcome. Perhaps, for the first time Reliance publicly accepted 
failure in implementing its diversification strategies. However, once the unlearning process 
of its old dominant logic was over and new dominant logics were learnt, diversification 
strategies were executed efficiently. Thus unlearning maybe just a special case of learning, 
where a crisis triggers the top management to change its dominant logic. Hence, it is 
proposed that -
Hypothesis 6A: Economic liberalisation necessitates business groups to 
change its dominant logic. 
Economic liberalisation also brings in major shifts in regulation, technology, competitive 
dynamics of industries, and consumer preferences. The top management usually see them 
coming. But many a times, the top management fails to respond because they get trapped by 
the success formula that led to their past success. So why do they fail to respond effectively 
and appropriately to shifts that they see on the horizon? The top management invariably 
anticipates the changes and often commission reports from management consulting firms that 
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describe the shifts. Therefore top management in most cases is anything but lacking 
commitment (Ghemawat, 1991). Rather they put in more effort than their counterparts that 
responded appropriately to changes in the envirormient. If the top management foresees 
changes and respond promptly, why do their efforts fail? As in most cases they are the same 
top management that are responsible for the groups' previous success. 
Sull (2004) uses the term 'active inertia' to describe the tendency of the top management to 
respond to even the most disruptive changes by accelerating activities that worked in the 
past. Because the longer a dominant logic remains in place, the more reinforced it gets 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). The top management more often than not responds to major 
changes by repeating the same strategy that led to its historical success. Inertia results when a 
group's success formula hardens. A critical success formula refers to a groups enduring set of 
strategic frames, resources, processes, relationships, and values that collectively shapes the 
behaviour of the top management. If a formula facilitates initial success, it can attract 
customers, employees, investors and imitators. This positive feedback reinforces belief that 
the top management should maintain its success formula through additional investments that 
reinforce it (Sull, 2004). This is what certain authors refer to as commitment (Ghemawat, 
1991). With time and repetition, the top management stops considering alternatives to its 
success formula. The individual components of the success formula grow less flexible; 
strategic frames become blinders, resources harden into milestones, processes settle into 
routines, relationships become shackles, and values ossify into dogmas (Sull, 2004). 
Historically, the dominant logic of a business group is often the result of its cumulative 
learning experiences (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). In general it is assumed that learning takes 
place in a neutral environment (Starbuck and Hedberg, 1977; Argyris and Schon, 1978). In 
reality however, this is seldom the case. There is often previous learning that inhibits new 
learning. In situations, when industry structures change radically, business groups need to 
add new dominant logics to its existing portfolio of dominant logics. However, in the event 
of a complete economic transformation, the old dominant logic must be totally unlearned, 
before learning of any new dominant logic can take place. It seems apparent at this stage the 
amount of learning in a particular period is a function of the amount of unlearning in the 
previous period. However, unlearning in a particular period does not necessarily imply that 
learning will occur in the subsequent period proportional to the unlearning in the previous 
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period. In fact many business groups may fmd it impossible to unlearn at all (Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1995). This need to unlearn suggests why new competitors often displace experienced 
incumbents when major structural changes take place. At this stage it has been observed that 
many groups as a result of failing to unlearn, are unsuccessful in changing its dominant logic 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). 
The dominant logic in this sense represents an equilibrium level. As long as the external 
economic environment remains static, this equilibrium remains in place. Time spent by a 
business group in equilibrium is therefore an important organisational variable that creates 
inertia (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). Whenever a business group is in equilibrium its decisions 
become repetitive. When such a system remains in equilibrium for long, it acts as though it is 
blind. However, when a system moves far from equilibrium, it becomes able to perceive, to 
take into account in its way of functioning, differences in the economic environment. So it 
can be argued that business groups become more adaptive as they move far from equilibrium. 
However, small displacements from equilibrium, corresponding to small changes in the 
environment will result in the group settling back into its previous equilibrium or its existing 
dominant logic. However, if there are large enough changes, the group may get far from 
equilibrium from which a new dominant logic is likely to emerge. Therefore, the longer a 
business group remains in an equilibrium position, the more difficult will it be to replace its 
existing dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). As a result the group would be drawn 
towards its existing dominant logic, unable to surmount the barrier. 
With the onset of the 80's, JRD Tata started a process of stepping down from chairmanship 
of various firms in favour of their managing directors, after a tenure extending for about half 
a century. However, the legacy of his dominant logic has a history, which can be traced from 
the origins of the group. As JRD's involvement in the firms diminished, each firm became 
increasingly independent, and the tenuous ties binding the group together weakened. It was at 
this juncture Ratan Tata became chairman of Tata Industries in 1981. It endeavoured to 
redefine the groups' objectives, future strategies and its action plans. It was widely 
recognised that this plan was only an initiation of a mechanism to give a new direction to the 
group. The plan received very little enthusiasm from the various firm heads, who vehemently 
opposed it. 
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He hoped that the group would bond closer together, retains its continuity, and yet moved 
ahead with changing times. The dominant logic of the Tata Group had already become deep-
rooted and inconsistent with the changing times. It became difficult for Ratan Tata to suggest 
new directions, leave alone implementing it. The firm heads were apprehensive that this 
exercise was a guise to autocracy. But the resistance, perhaps, may be the result of a 
desperate attempt to prevent any new form of learning, which the new strategic directions 
may necessitate. Perhaps the firm heads were apprehensive of the fact that unlearning of old 
dominant logics and learning new ones may prove to be too difficult at this stage. Hence the 
pro-active attempt to restore continuity. The group retirement policy introduced in 1992 was 
perhaps a step in the direction, to overcome such inertia. In 1997, seven directors retired from 
the board of Tata Sons to pave the way for several young executives to join the board and 
implement the new group plans. The group once again started reviving the TAS to put in 
place the "Tata Group Mobility Plan". By end 1999, the new group structure had fallen in 
place, and Ratan Tata went ahead with his strategic plan. 
However in contrast, the legacy of the top management in the case of the Reliance and 
Aditya Birla group was barely three to four decades old. Hence their dominant logic as it 
existed in the 90's was more in the state of a flux, and not as deep-rooted as evident in the 
case of the Tata group. Hence, in such instances the process of unlearning and learning of 
dominant logics was relatively smooth and transition comparatively easy. Evidently, in the 
case of the above two groups the exposure to "activity trap" was also relatively low. This 
phenomenon can be also explained by the fact that the dominant logic of the Reliance and 
Aditya Birla group has been in equilibrium for a much shorter period than in the case of the 
Tata group. Thus the top management of the above two groups seldom responded to major 
changes by repeating the same formula that led to its historical success. More often than not, 
they came up with radically different ideas and solutions. Thus inertia in terms of the 
reinforcement of groups' success formula was relatively weak for the Reliance and Aditya 
Birla group than in the case of Tata group. The degree of commitment the Reliance and 
Aditya Birla group was also evidently low than witnessed in the case of Tata group. 
During the 90's, the leadership of the top management of all the three groups underwent a 
change. In general it has been observed that changes in the ways organisations solve 
significant new problems (i.e. change dominant logics) is triggered by substantial problems 
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for crises (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Downs, 1967; Herdberg, 1973: 
Starbuck, 1976). Herdberg (1981) suggests that opportunities or change in key executives 
may also trigger unlearning, but here the evidence is too small by comparison. In other 
words, survival is likely to become dependent on finding a new dominant logic(s). Given that 
the opportunity for learning has been elicited by a crisis or an event the organizational 
learning literature suggests that unlearning must occur to make way for new mental maps 
(Herdberg, 1981). Thus it may be quite that a change in the composition of the top 
management of a business group facilitates it to overcome the forces of inertia. This is, 
however, a conjecture that awaits further analysis. Hence, it is proposed that -
Hypothesis 6B: Inertia constrains business groups from changing its 
dominant logic. 
6.7 Strategic fit, capabilities, and strategy implementation 
Entrepreneurs in emerging markets create a business group if politico-economic conditions 
allow them to acquire and maintain the capability of combining foreign and domestic 
resources like - inputs, processes, and market access - to repeatedly enter new industries 
(Guillen, 2000). Here the capability so developed is precisely generic in nature and not 
industry specific. The Reliance group has clearly shown its capability in raising funds from 
the capital markets, by designing innovative financial instruments, which meets the appeal of 
the investors. As a result, more often than not, they were oversubscribed multiple times. The 
group has leveraged this capability time and again. In the case of the Tatas, banks and 
financial institutions would stretch themselves that extra mile to acquire a lending position. 
Such was the degree of trust the name lent, that invariable led the group to do business on a 
very low cost of capital. The name also enabled the group to tie-up for joint ventures with 
some best partners in the world. By virtue of the same, the Tatas are also a group of some of 
the brightest people in the country. On the market side, this trust again enabled the Tatas to 
successfully leverage their brand name across a diverse set of products and markets. In the 
case of the Aditya Birla group, it had built up an enviable record of running its plants across 
various geographical locafions over a diversified set of commodities efficiently and 
effectively with or without foreign collaborations. These are perhaps some aspects of 
distinctive capabilities that Indian business groups' have developed, to get a competitive 
edge over others. Though the concept of group resources and capabilities are quite complex 
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and multi-dimensional in nature, its effectiveness in leveraging performance has been widely 
acclaimed (Penrose, 1959). However, how sets of ordinary resources are inter-linked to 
create complex resources like distinctive capabilities and competencies still appears very 
nascent. The big question is - What enables this? 
Porter (1991) points that complex resources are developed around a set of interrelated 
activities along the value-chain. There is also a fundamental connection between resources 
and value-chain activities (Porter, 1985). By repeating prior activities over time, business 
groups acquire complex resources in the form of skills and routines, which gets reinforced at 
every stage. The larger the number of basic resources constituting a capability, the greater is 
likely to be the number of their inter-linkages leading to the formation of a capability, with 
lesser possibility of imitation and higher value to the group. Causal ambiguity refers to this 
impediment associated with the uncertainty of pinpointing which specific factors or 
processes are required to acquire such a strategic asset, the precise chain of causality is 
ambiguous (Markides and Williamson, 1994; King and Zeithmal). 
The logic that we surmount here is that, business groups, which are successful in diversifying 
in businesses that are high on "strategic relatedness", (i.e. where majority of the firm 
businesses are perfectly co-aligned with the dominant logic of its top management), acquire 
such distinctive capabilities. Even though relatedness in terms of SIC, markets or 
technologies may be very low. Traditional measures of relatedness provide an incomplete 
and potentially exaggerated picture of the scope of a diversified business group to exploit the 
inter-relationships between its firms. This is because traditional measures look at relatedness 
only at the, product, market or industry level, which provides an incomplete and potentially 
exaggerated picture of the scope for corporation to exploit interrelationships between its 
firms' (Markides and Williamson, 1994; Collis and Montgomery, 1995). 
As we explain below, relatedness that really matters is that between strategic assets 
(Markides and Williamson, 1994). These assets can be accessed quickly and cheaply by 
member firms within a diversified business group. Thus fit occurs when activities are 
reinforcing. This fit at every stage in the value-chain leads to the creation of these distinctive 
capabilities. And more the number of chains in the fit more is the sustainability of the 
competitive advantage that arises out of this resource. If a firm with a distinctive capability 
understands the link between the resources it controls and its advantages, then other firms 
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can also learn about the link, acquire necessary resources (assuming they are not perfectly 
imitable) and implement the relevant strategies (Barney, 1991: ,109). However, causal 
ambiguity blocks the ability of imitation by even its closest competitors. Though we do not 
undermine the impact of economies of scale and scope; but such benefits of relatedness are 
only short lived. Thus the real leverage comes from exploiting relatedness to create and 
accumulate strategic assets more quickly and cheaply than others. These strategic assets give 
rise to distinctive capabilities over time. However, they need not be confined to people and 
technology alone; they may extend to physical assets as well (Ray, 2000). 
The Reliance group has been successful in exploiting its capital raising abilities across its 
diversified businesses; even its ability to compress project and operation times is quite 
evident. Its ability to backward integrate complex back-end technologies without 
technological tie-up speaks a lot about its capabilities. The Tata group has been able to attract 
and retain some of the brightest people in the industry across most of its firms and also 
proved its ability to extend its brand name across a diverse set of businesses. Across its 
emerging businesses it has successfully used its existing resources for multiple uses, 
concentrating and complimenting them and stretching them to acquire a broad set of 
distinctive capabilities. The Aditya Birla Group has been successfial in efficiently running its 
plants across diverse products and locations and yet containing its costs. This has been 
possible because all the above business conform very well on the "strategic fit" scale, though 
the same fit may not be quite visible in terms of products, market or technologies. This fit 
factor brings about the involvement of the top management and its commitment in terms of 
resources leading to the development of complex resources. Here in terms of commitment we 
mean allocating the maximum amount of resources a task can absorb without over saturating 
it. And all this also comes about due to a high degree of strategic and operational control 
exercised by the top management over its strategically related businesses (Prahalad and 
Betfis, 1986; Ghemawat, 1991). Hence, it is proposed that -
Hypothesis 7A: Extent of fit between dominant logic of the top management 
and individual businesses within the portfolio of businesses enables a business 
group to develop distinctive capabilities. 
In strategy implementation there is great emphasis on speed, speed at which things are done. 
Speed here represents time (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1994). Most economic calculations go 
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wrong because the cost of time is not taken into account. If time was not a constraint, 
business groups would have optimised on it. But given the opportunity cost of lost 
production, it is perhaps always value enhancing to implement strategies efficiently and 
effectively. It is only when the cost of time is taken into account that one gets sound 
economics and then saturation almost always makes sense. And perhaps, all these come 
when groups' are in position to exploh and leverage its capabilities across diversified 
businesses (CoUis and Montgomery, 1995; Hamel and Prahalad, 1991). 
The RBV views firms as a collection of tangible and intangible assets and capabilities. These 
assets and capabilities determine how efficiently and effectively a company performs its 
functional activities (Collis and Montgomery, 1995). The authors further contend that 
competitive advantage, whatever its source, can be attributed to the ownership of a valuable 
resource that enables the firm to efficiently implement its strategies better than others. 
Following this logic, a firm will be positioned to succeed if it has the best and most 
appropriate stock of resources for its business and strategy. It will inevitably enable business 
groups to effectively implement its strategies. 
By the late 80's the Reliance group had already buih up a reputation for setting up projects 
quickly; it had, for instance, set up its worsted spinning plant within eight months of the grant 
of the license. However for its PFY plant, it outdid even its collaborators by getting it ready 
in fourteen months, a feat Du Pont, until then had not managed anywhere else in the world. 
And what made this feat possible? Instead of adopting the normal practice of linking the 
various pieces of the equipment through a long array of pipes (typical for a continuous 
process plant) after receipt of equipment, the group had laid scores of kilometers of pipes in 
readiness for the equipment to arrive and to be installed as soon as they landed. By the 90's 
this capability was not restricted to their projects alone; they were successfully implementing 
it in their operations as well. When one of the groups' complexes was washed by flash 
floods, international experts were of the opinion that the minimum recovery time would be 
around 90 to 100 hundred days. Some were even less optimistic, predicting that some of the 
units would not be functional even in five months time. Reliance got the entire complex fully 
functional in 21 days. 
The group had by and large replicated the same set of capabilities even while implementing 
its telecom project. The group conceived the telecom project in 1998; however, by the end of 
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2002 the group had launched its services across 151 cities and 600 cities by mid 2003. This 
was again made possible because the group had already developed the network across 60,000 
miles way ahead before the back-end technology was ready. So when the technology was 
ready to take off, the network was already in place. And all this has been made possible 
because the group had been able to draw upon its earlier experiences. Strategic fit, which 
enables it to determine - what amount of resources to allocate for a particular task? This is 
perhaps a holistic view, which only groups, which have built such capabilities, can draw 
upon. 
The Tata group while implementing its car project had faced enormous resource gaps. The 
group made it all happen because it had developed a set of capabilities on which it could 
back-upon; the ability to align certain existing capabilities with a set of emerging capabilities, 
which it had to create and deliver. The skills of various project groups were made to 
converge to lower procurement costs and ensure effective value-chain configuration. And 
throughout the duration of the project the top management laid down the specific attributes of 
the project. This was also observed in the Reliance telecom project, where the involvement of 
the top management was significant in implementing its strategies. In areas, where the group 
had proven expertise, it used its existing capabilities to develop new capabilities. However, in 
areas where they were lacking the necessary skills to build new capabilities, the group was 
quick to complement its existing capabilities. This has been possible because of the high 
degree of strategic fit, which made the top management committed in terms of involvement 
and resources. Hence, at this stage it is proposed that -
Hypothesis 7B: Extent of fit between dominant logic of the top management 
and individual businesses within the portfolio of businesses enables a business 
group to implement strategies better. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Diversification Theory Revisited 
In this chapter we try to integrate across the various hypotheses leading to the development 
of a unified theoretical framework on diversification. The theoretical framework relies 
heavily on the multi-lateral concepts drawn from multiple theoretical lenses. It also tries to 
integrate them in a way to identify the antecedents of diversification strategies and explain its 
outcomes on performance in a more meaningful manner. 
7.1 Theoretical Framework 
This research follows up on the notion that there is no unique diversification strategy. 
Sacrosanct, a diversification strategy can be economically and strategically justified, 
depending upon certain ex-ante and ex-post factors. These factors are specific to business 
groups and are also contingent upon the stage of nation's economic transition (Lu, et al., 
2002). Despite substantial research on diversification strategies facing business groups (i.e. 
nature and extent of diversification, direction of diversification and mode of diversification), 
management of diversity (i.e. strategy implementation) has been comparatively neglected 
(Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). It is evident from the various streams of research that 
the benefits of diversification are not automatically realised, the active involvement and 
commitment of the top management is essential to realise these benefits (Bettis, Hall and 
Prahalad, 1978; Bettis and Hall, 1981; Dundas and Richardson, 1982; Porter, 1985; Prahalad 
and Bettis, 1986; Ghemawat, 1991; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). 
The major implication of the above studies is that top management is as critical in explaining 
differences in performance as any other factor. We therefore tried to incorporate the "top 
management" as a major intervening variable in explaining different perspectives of 
diversification facing business groups. At the lower levels of an organisation the concept of 
efficiency is applied where operating responsibilities are clearly defined, discretion is 
limited, communication channels are set and position in the command structure is distinct. 
This concept of efficiency loses force however, as we approach the top of the management. It 
is here diversification strategies facing business groups become a major factor in explaining 
differences in performance across firms. The top management of a diversified business group 
should not be therefore viewed as a faceless abstraction, but as a collection of key individuals 
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(i.e. dominant coalition) who have significant power to override the context and influence the 
way a group is managed (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). 
In this context Das (1981) observed that it is not the quality of business - its competitive 
structure - or the patterns of diversification per se that determines early failures and 
successes later, but the evolution of the top management and its ability to acquire new skills. 
However, incorporating the top management as a control variable is a difficult task. As there 
is very little evidence available in existing research in operationalising this construct. In 
retrospect, we try to build on the concept of dominant logic to provide additional insights in 
this research domain (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). The broad objective of this framework is to 
supplement existing research on business groups and increase its explanatory power on 
performance. This research follows up on the notion that views business groups as complex 
systems (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). Business groups in emerging markets obviously 
represent complex systems. Standard theories in strategic management, economics and 
finance typically concentrate on 'end points', whereas in reality complex adaptive systems 
never get there. In such cases improvement is usually much more important than optimisation 
(Holland, 1992). In parity with extant research we view dominant logic as an emerging 
property of complex adaptive systems (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). 
The top management of a diversified business group operates on certain mental 
representation of the business environment around them (Kiesler and Sproul, 1982). These 
mental structures represent its beliefs, theories, concepts, propositions and biases surrounding 
its diversified businesses. This informal framework enables the top management to 
selectively scan the business environment surrounding it and form certain distinct 
perceptions and opinions. These perceptions and opinions represent its dominant logic 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). Logics are ways of perceiving, acting and responding built into 
an organisations top management team. When integrated these individual logics become 
dominant logics. Typically, the dominant logic of a diversified business group tends to be 
influenced by its core business, which was the historical basis for the group evolution and 
growth. Hence considered more broadly dominant logic can be considered as both a 
knowledge structure and a set of elicited management processes. 
Dominant logic takes shape through the critical experiences of the top management team. 
These critical experiences are likely to be historical ones rather than current ones. Critical 
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experiences are closely related to the organisation self-definition and self-reconstruction. 
These experiences reflect the open-ended ness of organisational life - the existence of 
alternative ways of thinking, responding and changing (Ghemawat, 1991). Dominant logic is 
therefore a way the top management conceptualises its various business patterns. It shapes a 
groups outlook and orientation to the job, resulting in distinctive patterns of judgment and 
emphasis (Ghemawat, 1991). Thus the tendency of the top management of a group to 
develop fixed ways of perceiving itself and the environment, often unconsciously, is 
therefore of considerable importance (Selznick, 1957). 
Building upon the notion of dominant logic which views it as critical factor explaining the 
linkage between diversity and performance, we argue dominant logic also plays an 
antecedent role on diversification strategies facing business groups in most emerging 
markets. Dominant logic not only plays a moderating role on such strategies, but on its 
execution as well, thereby influencing its outcome significantly. Extant research supports the 
view that the internal and external environment facing business groups has a major bearing 
on its diversification strategies and performance (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989; 
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). Diversification strategies are guided not only by environmental 
perception, but also by the belief about "what can be done" and "what cannot be done" based 
on implicit assessment of the organisation and its capabilities. 
Under conditions of perfect markets the effect of environmental forces on firm performance 
is direct. However, since perfect markets remain a distant reality even in the most developed 
markets, the top management possesses the distinct ability to moderate the power and 
direction of the environmental forces in its own favour, thus influencing performance. As 
evident, a series of such "schumpeterian shocks" buffet most economic systems (Hill, 1994). 
Hence, the impact of the environmental forces is not uniform across all business groups. It 
has been observed across markets that business groups achieve different levels of 
performance, by adopting similar diversification strategies. Or on the contrary, business 
groups achieve same levels of performance by adopting different diversification strategies. 
To explain this dichotomy, we explore how a group's dominant logic acts as a moderating 
force between the environmental forces and diversification strategies and strategy 
implementation as well. The social structure of an organisation acts as a filter to these 
environmental forces (Ghemawat, 1991). 
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The six elements of social structure are - assigned roles, internal interest groups, social 
stratification, beliefs, perceptions and dependencies, taken together, forms a complex 
network of relations among persons and groups. These networks acts as a filter through 
which information is gathered, processed, decisions taken and communicated. It represents a 
system of accommodation among potentially conflicting parts. As a result any information in 
the filtration process may be outright rejected, conditioned in a different form or accepted in 
originality (Ghemawat, 1991). As the environment facing business groups are an agent of 
continuous change, the study of dominant logic is therefore a phase of institutional analyses. 
When change in general orientation is apparent, perhaps, the most obvious indicator of 
organisational character as a palpable reality is the abandonment of old logics and creation of 
new logics (Selznick, 1957). 
Therefore, the emphasis is on embodiment of values in a group structure through the 
elaboration of commitments - ways of thinking, acting and responding that can be changed, 
if at all, only at the risk of a severe organisational crisis (Ghemawat, 1991; Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1986). As a new crisis occurs, ways of thinking, perceiving and responding that 
served the organisation well in the earlier stages may be ill fated for the new tasks. Hence 
dominant logic is not always an infallible guide to the organisation and its environment. In 
fact, some are relatively inaccurate representation of the environment, particularly as 
conditions change (Norman, 1976). As we ascend the echelons of organisation, the analysis 
of top management decisions making becomes increasingly complex. Not simply because 
they are important, critical and characterised by irreversibility, but because a new logic 
emerges (Selznick, 1957). Dominant logic emphasises the adaptive change and evolution of 
organisation forms and reacting to internal and external forces. It reflects new logics 
emerging and old logics declining, not as a result of conscious design but as a natural and 
largely unplanned adaptation to new situations or contexts (Selznick, 1957). 
Groups need to dynamically adapt to new logics in such situations. Dynamic adaptation 
connotes more than simple activity change or growth. It suggests certain impelling forces that 
have a quite different role and origin. The point is not the degree of involvement, but the 
reconstruction of needs, the changing posture and strategy and the commitment to new type 
offerees (Selznick, 1957). Adaptation fails when it is static. By static adaptation we mean 
such an adaptation to patterns as leaves the basic character traits unchanged, and imply the 
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adoption of a new habit. It has Umited effect on new traits (Selznick, 1957). The Umit of 
organisational engineering becomes apparent when we need to create a structure uniquely 
adapted to new logics. This adaptation goes beyond a tailored combination of uniform 
elements; it is an adaptation in depth, affecting the nature of the parts themselves. Thus there 
is a need to see the group as a whole and observe how it is transformed as new ways of 
dealing in a changed enviroimient endures. This process of becoming infUsed with the values 
is a part of what is called institutionalisation (Ghemawat, 1991). 
In analysing this institutional change, the factors that shape dominant logic of business 
groups is then of considerable importance. Prahalad and Bettis, (1995) is of the opinion that 
extant research in strategic management has rather neglected managerial forces in explaining 
performance differences in favour of purely economic forces. This research tries to 
incorporate the effects of both economic forces and managerial forces on diversification 
strategies moderated dominant logic, albeit in a different manner in different stages of 
economic transition. Prior to economic liberalisation, most emerging markets were highly 
regulatory driven. Hence, envirormiental efficiency in such markets was very low, leading to 
very high market imperfections. This led to various sorts of market failure, institutional voids 
and high transaction costs (Kharma and Palepu, 1997). 
In such contexts, majority of the diversification strategies were subject to government 
ratification and approval. Therefore, strategic control at best resided outside the organisation. 
Dominant logics of successful groups were guided by their ability to acquire licenses and 
quotas, obtain priority approval for its resource mobilisation plans, approval for capital 
imports and get policies formulated which favoured it (or disadvantaged its competitors or 
both). In general they were broad based, large in number, with very little consistency in 
between them. Business groups, which were successful in exploiting these dominant logics, 
entered a large number of businesses, and diversified extensively. Encamation (1989) 
mentioned large diversified business groups in India, ostensibly for the purpose of lobbying 
politicians and bureaucrats to extract benefits, maintained 'industrial embassies' in the capital 
city. Therefore, market imperfection was pre-dominant in explaining dominant logic of most 
business groups prior to economic liberalisation. 
Business group which did not view market imperfection prevailing in the economy as a 
distinct reality, found themselves at odds with those in control. As a result they were not able 
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to implement their diversification strategies. As the economic environment remained more or 
less static prior to economic liberalisation, business groups did not feel the need to change 
their dominant logics. However, the various measure of economic liberalisation pursued by 
the Government of India since 1991, resulted in sharp increases in environmental efficiency 
in a large number of segments (Ray, 1998). This resulted in overall reduction in market 
imperfections in the economy over time. Government controls over diversification strategies 
facing business groups were slowly withdrawn. Hence, groups could no longer leverage the 
advantages of market imperfection in its favour. 
In this scenario, most of its earlier dominant logics had become inconsistent with the 
emerging economic environment. Groups then found themselves at odds with the new rules 
of domain selection and navigation. Dominant logic inconsistent with the economic 
environment led to misguided diversification strategies. The relation of an organisation to its 
external environment is however, only one source of institutional experience. There is also an 
internal social world to be considered (Selznick, 1957). In this emerging environment, group 
characteristics became pre-dominant in shaping dominant logic of successful business 
groups, as market imperfections had become primarily negligible. Dominant logics' guided 
by group characteristics were focused, consistent and few in number. In support, Penrose 
(1959) had observed that group's internal resources largely govern its diversification 
strategies. 
The responsibility now lied on the top management to scan the economic environment, and 
exercise its diversification strategies in domains that were consistent with its resource profile, 
organisation structure, size, diversity and scale of operations. In contrast, business groups, 
which still attempted to exploit the advantages of market imperfection in its favour, failed, 
because the market forces were too strong to be tampered with. Liberalisation also changed 
the underlying structural characteristics of most industries. As a result, even groups, which 
did not change its business portfolio, had to cope with increasing strategic variety, hence had 
to revise its dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). The nature of competitive forces 
had changed radically, including bargaining power of customers and suppliers, coupled with 
increasing threat of product substitutes and new entrants. Groups now had substantial power 
to override the industry context, as strategic control slowly moved into the organisation. 
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In this transition we attempted to explain three concerns, (a) why many institutions fail to see 
change in the environment? (b) why many institutions see change in the environment, but are 
unable to act? (c) how certain institutions adapt on the face of a changing environment and 
successfully transform themselves. We will address the first issue earlier. The direction -
extent - pace - timing of diversification strategies facing business groups are conditioned by 
changing self definitions and by alteration in the internal and external commitments of the 
group (Ghemawat, 1991). Commitments here mean more than verbal assent or even 
ideological attachment. The making of certain value - commitments, marks the evolution of 
a business group i.e. diversification strategies which fixes the assumpfion of decision making 
as to the nature of enterprise - its distinctive aims, roles in the community and society at 
large (Ghemawat, 1991). 
It should be mentioned here that earlier commitments mentioned here, constrain 
implementing of latter ones. It creates a tendency for precedents to become normative 
benchmarks (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). It also results in the tendency of diversification 
strategies to persist over time. Business groups, whose earlier commitments were too sticky, 
generated inertia (i.e. opportunity costs of earlier commitments exceed its new one). Inertia is 
however only one source of commitments. It is also widely caused by lock-in, lock-out and 
lags (Ghemawat, 1991). Such business groups remained preoccupied and stressed by its 
existing dominant logics. It forced them to reject all information regarding changes in the 
environment. As a result information regarding environmental changes remained 
unprocessed. 
Business groups, which were unable to grow beyond their earlier commitments, failed to 
transform their dominant logic from the perspective of economic transition. Therefore the 
speed and agility of a group to adapt to emerging contingencies depends on its receptive 
barriers. Like human beings, business groups are not equally agile and responsive to change. 
This agility depends on socio-cultural factors, formal and informal training and more 
importantly on genetic factors that conditions the responsive ability of business groups 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1996). It also pre-disposes a group to certain types of problems and 
often interacts with organisational structure and systems in causing strategic bottlenecks. 
These factors account for the responsive agility of groups to environmental changes. If the 
responsive agility is slow compared to the pace of environmental change, the process of 
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transformation of dominant logic is retarded. As a result groups fail to acquire, build or 
develop certain distinctive capabilities and competencies necessary to execute and support 
the change. Hence these groups though see the need for change, are unable to act at the 
appropriate time or successfully implement its strategies. 
However business groups, which successfully transformed its dominant logic appropriate to 
the emerging economic environment, enhance their performance. In this transformation new 
generation business groups substantially out performed their older counterparts. The logic 
behind this inference is that the new generation business groups started with a new dominant 
logic altogether and hence did not have to undergo through the process of unlearning its 
earlier dominant logics, like its older counterparts (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). Hence their 
response to economic liberalization was faster, as it did not face any earlier commitments. 
This was reflected by the fact that most of the early entrants in emerging and deregulated 
industries were new generation business groups. When a group is permitted to drift, the 
greatest danger lies in the uncontrolled effects on its organisational character (Ghemawat, 
1991). If ultimately there is a complete transformation, with a new character emerging, those 
who formed and sustained the group in the earlier stages may find themselves misfit to the 
newly evolved organisational traits. This has been reflected by the fact that most business 
groups who were successful in transforming its dominant logic, had to revamp its group 
structure altogether. There is also the likelihood that the organisation character will not be 
transformed; it will be attenuated and confused (Ghemawat, 1991). 
At this stage the central contention of this research is that as long as diversification strategies 
of business groups are consistent with its dominant logic, performance will be enhanced. 
This conclusion has major implications for top management decision-making. Logic behind 
this inference can be had from multiple theoretical lenses (discussed earlier). Groups 
pursuing an intensive diversification strategy possess the distinct ability to override the 
context and change the direction and pace of the environmental forces in its favor so as to fit 
its dominant logic. This fit between dominant logic and diversification strategies facing 
business groups represents an equilibrium level (Prahalad and Betfis, 1986). However, due to 
radical changes in internal and/or external contexts strategic variety sets in. With increasing 
strategic variety top management needs to revise its dominant logic or add newer dominant 
logics to its existing portfolio of dominant logics, or disequilibria will set in. If the top 
149 
management is unable to acquire dominant logics consistent with changing conditions, the 
resulting fit will be disturbed and negative performance effects will follow. As industry 
structures change radically, diversification strategies undertaken in the wake of opportunities 
offered often resulted in setbacks. This is because strategic and operational control of the top 
management over its diversified business were lacking. 
When diversification strategies are not consistent with the groups' dominant logic, yet 
decisions need to be taken, opportunism sets in. Opportunism is the pursuit of immediate, 
short run advantages in a way inadequately controlled by considerations of principle and 
ultimate consequences. If opportunism goes too far in accepting the doctrines of reality 
principle, utopianism sets in. Utopianism attempts to avoid diversification choices that are no 
longer consistent with its dominant logic. Utopian thinking enters when men who purport to 
institutional leaders attempt to rely on over generalised purposes to guide their decisions. 
When guides are unrealistic, yet decisions are to be taken, more realistic but uncontrolled 
criteria will somehow fill the gap. Responsible diversification strategies steers a course 
between reality, opportunism and utopianism (Ghemawat, 1991). When diversification 
strategies fail, it is perhaps more often by default than by positive error or reason. One type 
of default is the failure to set goals. Another, type of default occurs when goals, however 
neatly formulated, enjoys only skeptical and superficial acceptance and does not influence 
the total structure of the group (Selznick, 1957). In another situation when the fit between 
dominant logic and diversification strategies concerning its business portfolio is deviating, 
the strategic business unit is often 'left alone', as hasty attempts to superimpose its dominant 
logic may render its diversification strategies dysfunctional. 
Prior to economic liberalization market failure and high transaction costs forced business 
groups to enter a large number of businesses and diversify extensively. It enabled business 
groups to acquire a set of broad based resources, with which it could cater to wide variety of 
industries. It primarily comprised of access to various critical inputs such as labor, raw 
material, process related technologies, markets and distribution channels. These resources 
were precisely generic in nature and not industry specific. Firms, that could combine its 
resources quickly and effectively, were best able to create a business group by repeatedly 
entering a number of industries in a short time (Guillen, 2000). During those periods market 
structure was monopoly in nature or at best oligopoly. Groups therefore did not face much 
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difficulty in navigating domains as long as they performed efficiently. Hence the role of the 
top management was primarily reduced to operational in nature. 
However, post liberalisation industry competitiveness had increased radically. As a result 
generalised resources built in the regulated era provided very little competitive advantage to 
business groups. A group would be best positioned as much for its quality of resources as 
much for its appropriateness in view of its business and strategy (CoUis and Montgomery, 
1995). Because these resources were easily replicated, imitated or substituted by its 
competitors; hence not appropriate for the emerging competitive environment. As a resource 
loses its competitiveness in a chronological context, a resource that is valuable in a particular 
industry might fail to deliver the same value in a different industry. Therefore developing 
competencies without examining the competitive dynamics of the industry would be 
detrimental to performance. Such situations arise, particularly, when dominant logics are 
inconsistent with the context. Hence the effects of such generalised resources built in the 
regulated era diluted the effects on performance in the liberalized era. In situations when 
markets are relatively perfect complex resources forms the primary source of competitive 
advantage (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). 
Complex resources have distinctly different characteristics from basic generalised resources. 
It is formed by a wide range of bonding mechanism around a set of basic resources. Complex 
resources are also often termed distinctive capabilities and competencies. Groups, which 
could transform its dominant logics appropriate to the emerging scenario successfully, 
acquired or developed certain complex resources, by using its existing pool of resources to 
develop distinctive capabilities. This was facilitated by the intensive involvement and 
commitment of the top management. As it enabled the group to set distinct targets, quantity 
tasks and expedite the process of development of such capabilities and competencies. 
Business groups whose diversification strategies fit ideally with its dominant logic built such 
complex resources; which has the potential to contribute to the benefit of multiple businesses. 
The expeditious development of such distinctive capabilities and competencies depended on 
the speed of the group's transition to economic liberalisation. Groups, which were fast to 
respond to such change, outperformed other groups in the process of building such distinctive 
capabilities and competencies. As a result groups, which were slow to respond to such 
changes, lost out on certain early entry advantages. Selznick (1957) also suggested that 
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groups pursuing an intensive strategy accumulate certain distinctive competencies, and 
preferred to choose diversification strategies that benefited from those competencies. It 
helped deliver competitive advantage along the value chain (Porter, 1991). These resources 
were inimitable, replicable or even substitutable by its closest competitors. It enabled the top 
management in effective designing of its resource allocation profile and leveraging its 
resources to stretch it (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). It also enabled the top management to 
compliment its existing resources and put it to multiple uses over its diversified businesses. 
Therefore, these complex resources went in a long way in enhancing group performance. In a 
dynamic competitive environment resources are the primary drivers of performance. It 
determined how efficiently and effectively a group implemented its strategies (Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995). 
Complexity of strategy implementation increases dramatically as the size, scale and scope of 
the businesses change. It is frequently asserted that strategy implementation, in general, has 
received less attention than strategy formulation (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). This 
criticism takes on added piquancy, especially in strategic management research. Only a 
handful of studies have directly examined the issue of how groups implement strategies, and 
fewer still are studies that explore the performance consequences of different approaches to 
implementation. However, certain notable exceptions are Dundas and Richardson (1982), 
Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986), Gupta and Govidarajan (1984), and Leonatiades (1986). By 
ignoring strategy implementation many of the benefits of diversification strategies have 
therefore been attenuated (Ghemawat, 1991). For instance, we still do not know why synergy 
in strategies is so elusive to obtain, or why certain strategies are sometimes successful and 
sometimes not (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). Nonetheless, several pieces of overall 
picture are beginning to emerge. 
The commonly used tools or levers of implementation are structure (Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 
1974; Hill and Hoskisson, 1987), systems (Berg, 1973; Pitts, 1976), and management style 
(Kerr, 1985; Tezel, 1981; Napier and Smith, 1987). However, a lack of a common thread 
among these studies makes them difficult to integrate. They remain important fragments of 
evidence on the cmcial, but only partially understood, role of implementation aspects in 
determining the performance consequences (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). In 
supplementing extant research we argue that distinctive capabilities and competencies are as 
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critical for successful strategy implementation as any other factor (Hitt and Ireland, 1985; 
Miles and Snow, 1978; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980). Group resources are critical for the 
purpose of strategy formulation. However, successful strategy implementation is dependent 
on existing resources as much on distinctive capabilities and competencies that are to be 
developed expeditiously. 
Prahalad and Hamel (1994) argued that groups should exercise diversification strategies in 
which they have experiences and developed distinctive capabilities that can be leveraged to 
gain competitive advantage. If diversification strategies were not consistent with its dominant 
logic, groups would entail difficulty in developing certain complex resources to support its 
strategy implementation. The involvement of the top management will be lacking in 
providing strategic direction. Further, the fit factor between dominant logic and 
diversification strategies also goes in a long way in enforcing critical involvement of the top 
management in strategy implementation. It enabled the top management in setting realistic 
goals and tasks to expedite its strategies. It also enabled the learning of new skills and 
unlearning of old ones, to facilitate strategy implementation. If the fit remained elusive, the 
involvement of the top management will be found to be lacking. However still, if decisions 
are to be taken, the respective businesses surrounding such choices are 'left alone'. Only 
when fit is resumed, either through change in-group dominant logic or environmental 
changes, critical involvement of the top management will be restored. 
However, business groups, which could not transform its dominant logic, appropriate to the 
changing economic environment; failed to develop such complex resources. As a result 
groups possessing generalised resources failed to sustain their competitive advantage on the 
face of intense competition. As a resuh, its resources eroded, and their entity atrophied over 
time. However it need not be necessary concluded that with economic liberalisation group 
effects in general will slowly atrophy or sublime over time. Business groups, which are 
successftil in adapting to economic liberalisation, transform their dominant logic and build 
certain complex resources, would sustain their competitive advantage over time. The 
conclusion is market failure alone does not completely explain the evolution, existence and 
competitive advantage of business groups in emerging markets. In fact, groups may be the 
result of a wide range of organisational and socio-economic factors that has little to do with 
economic efficiency (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). 
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CHAPTER 8 
Results and Findings 
In this chapter we have presented the results of analyses performed by using various 
contemporary statistical techniques. At first, we explored whether there were any significant 
changes in the external environment after economic liberalisation. For testing the Hypothesis 
on changes in market efficiency we constructed a time series index and observed the 
significance of the changes in the index values during the period of economic liberalisation. 
Next, we observed whether changes in market imperfection lead to a change in industry 
characteristics, and group characteristics such as cohesiveness, inertia, resources, capabilities, 
diversity, and performance across business groups. For this we sourced values of these 
internal and external variables across groups in our sample. We observed the mean and 
standard deviation of the above variables. The central tendency and spread of the data points 
provides a primary overview of the data set over a sample time frame. 
Then we explored whether significant relationship existed between various pairs of 
dependent and independent variables through correlation matrices. We also wanted to know 
if they were significantly related, and what was the strength of relationships. We adopted 
muUiple regression analysis to seek answer to these questions. To find the relative strength 
and direction of relationship between diversity and performance with the help of a 
moderating factor (i.e. strategic fit) we used simple regression analysis. To find the effect of 
the moderating variable (strategic fit * diversity) we converted their values into their 
respective z-scores for normalisation purpose. Subsequently, we also used several control 
variables to study the effect of the above. For this, we used multiple regression analysis and 
observed the significance of the individual variables by conducting t-tests. We also observed 
the overall significance of the model through F-tests and adjusted R Square. To find out the 
strength and direction of relationships we observed the beta coefficients and their respective 
standard errors. 
As multivariate analysis demands normal distribution of data, testing of univariate and 
multivariate normality was carried out before taking up these analyses. Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
one sample test of goodness of fit was carried out to test the univariate normality distribution 
of data. We observed the respective values of skewness and kurtosis to test the multivariate 
normality of data. As advised in earlier studies, natural logarithmic transformation of these 
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variables was carried out to make the data distribution more normal. This was carried out as 
data limitation related to case studies over traditional empirical studies. The assumption of 
perfect linear relationships among variables in organisational research is too much to expect. 
To test the degree of linearity of relationships among variables we also used bivariate scatter 
plots. In most cases the scatter plots were found to be by and large oval shaped, which 
indicated the assumption of linearity between variables more or less hold good. We also 
conducted test of means (one sample and paired sample) and ANOVA to test the differences 
in dependent variables (i.e. performance) across various business units. These values were 
reported across various classes of strategic fit and were also tested for its significance. In all 
the above cases we report the values across multiple classes of dependent, independent, 
moderating, and control variables to judge the efficacy of our model. 
8.1 Tests of Univariate Relationships 
8,1.1 Market Imperfection over two sample periods 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 we had constructed a "Market Imperfection Index", which shows 
a gradual and significant decline over our sample time frame. We now split our sample time 
fi-ame into two equal sample periods of seven years (i.e. 1990- 1996 and 1997-2003). The 
detail of the index values of market imperfection over our sample time frame (segregated into 
two equal samples S| and S2) are given in the table below: 
Table 8.1: Market imperfection index values 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Index (^ i) 
100.00 
94.10 
83.73 
80.15 
64.81 
56,83 
54.57 
Year 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
Index (fii) 
50.44 
46.23 
44.06 
38.02 
36.28 
38.27 
34.39 
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Over this fourteen-year time frame (1990-2003) we are interested in knowing whether there 
has been a significant reduction in market imperfection in the economy. We shall now 
explain the technique for testing of differences in means. The null hypothesis and alternate 
hypotheses are thus stated as follows: 
Ho: The market imperfection index is the same for two sample periods (i.e. |ii = 1^2) 
H]-. The market imperfection index is different for two sample periods (i.e. fj.i > [Xi) 
where p.] is the sample mean for the period (1990-1996), and 1^2 is the sample mean for the 
period (1997-2003). In the above illustration we took the standard significance level of 5% 
and this implies that //Q will be rejected when the sampling result (i.e. observed evidence) has 
a less than 0.05 probability of occurring if Ho is true. In other words, the 5% level of 
significance means that we can say with 95% confidence of occurring if Ho is true. Thus our 
risk level of 5% is deemed appropriate for the context of hypothesis testing. We then applied 
a one-tailed test since we do not specify any value for the null hypothesis; or otherwise a 
two-tailed test would have been appropriate. Because of the matched pairs we used paired t-
test and worked out the test statistic 't' as under: 
t = D - 0 
adiff/Vn 
where -
D = ZDi and adiff= VlDj ^-(D)^*n 
n Vn-1 
Degrees of freedom - (n - 1) = 7 - 1 = 6. As //o is one-sided, we shall apply a one-tailed test 
(in the right tail, because Hj is of more than type) for determining the rejection region at 5% 
level of significance which comes to as under, using the table of t-distribution for 6 degrees 
of freedom: R: t = 1.943. The observed value oft is 8.97, which falls in the rejection region, 
and thus we reject HQ at 5% level and accept H;. Therefore, the conclusion is that the market 
imperfection in the first sample period (Si) is significantly greater than in the second sample 
period (S2). This by and large confirms our Hypothesis-5, that economic liberalisation has 
resulted in a significant reduction in the extent of market imperfection in the economy. To 
further strengthen our analysis we measured the slope of the Market Imperfection curve in 
the two periods Si and S2 separately. Because of the inverse nature of the relationship, we 
expected the slope to have a negative intercept. For the period Si the slope of the curve was 
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observed to be -8.20 and -2.56 for the period S2. This is also an indication of the fact that fall 
in the extent of market imperfection is sharper in period Si than compared to S2, thus 
rejecting our null hypothesis once again on the grounds that p-i > [X2, The spread of the index 
(in terms of standard deviation) was also significantly higher in period Si at 4.80 compared to 
2.58 in S2. This indicates that there was indeed a significant fall in the extent of market 
imperfection during the period (1997-2003), as compared to (1990-1996). 
Figure 8.1: Market imperfection trend 
Market Imperfection Index 
10 11 12 13 14 
8.1.2 Difference in Performance across Strategic Fit 
We first used test of means to analyse the difference in performance across various business 
categories. For the sake of comprehensiveness and objectivity we measured industry-adjusted 
performance (Shrader, 2001; Waldman et al, 2001) on three different counts (i) Return on 
Sales (ROS) (ii) Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) (iii) Tobin's Q. We used absolute 
differences in performance figures across a sample of firms sharing the same SIC code for 
industry adjustment (David et al, 2002). To avoid biases we used average from a minimum 
sample of three firms for all calculations. Industry-adjusted performance measured across 
businesses having different fit categories clearly reveals that extent of strategic fit is directly 
proportional to performance (i.e. businesses in which the strategic fit is high clearly 
outperform others). 
Though we do not reveal the performance figures in the case of 2-factor scale, but they are 
equally convincing. Since fit was based on subjective categories, while performance was 
objective, we did not expect to find very high correlation values between the two. However, 
consistent with our Hypothesis we found a positive correlation in all cases, and the highest 
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correlation value was observed at +0.32. Test of means across different fit categories clearly 
reveal that as we move up higher in the fit, average performance is enhanced. This 
phenomenon has been uniformly observed across all categories of fit. We first report the 
performance values across all the individual fit categories (Table 8.2), and then facilitate a 
comparison by combining two categories of fit (Table 8.3A) and (Table 8.3B). The results 
are unequivocal. 
Table 8.2: Test of Means (Summary: Strategic fit 1,2, i& 3) 
Factor 
l)3-factor Scale-1 
2) 3-factor Scale - 2 
3) 3-factor Scale - 3 
Total / Significance 
No. of 
Cases 
77 
110 
85 
272 
ROS 
-3.65 
+2.48 
+7.28 
*** 
ROCE 
-1.39 
+0.21 
+2.59 
* 
Tobin's Q 
-3.64 
-2,43 
+0.92 
NS 
Table 8.3A: Test of Means (Cases: Strategic fit 1 Vs Strategic fit 2 «& 3) 
Factor 
1) 3-factor Scale - 1 
2) 3-factor Scale - 2 & 3 
Total / Significance 
No. of 
Cases 
77 
195 
272 
ROS 
-3.65 
+4.57 
*** 
ROCE 
-1.39 
+1.24 
* 
Tobin's Q 
-3.64 
-0.96 
NS 
Table 8.3B: Test of Means (Cases: Strategic fit 1 & 2 Vs Strategic fit 3) 
Factor 
1) 3-factor Scale - 1 & 2 
2) 3-factor Scale - 3 
Total / Significance 
No. of 
Cases 
187 
85 
272 
ROS 
-0.04 
+7.28 
*** 
ROCE 
-0.45 
+2.59 
* 
Tobin's Q 
-2.93 
+0.92 
NS 
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Next, we were interested in finding whether difference in mean can be attributed to specific 
causes (i.e. strategic fit) or purely due to chance. Based on t-distribution t-test was 
administered forjudging the significance of difference between the means of two samples, in 
case of small sample(s) when population variance is not known (in which case we use 
variance of the sample as an estimate of the population variance). Since the samples were 
related, we also used paired t-test (or what is known as the difference test) for judging the 
significance of the mean of difference between two samples. The relevant test statistic - t, 
was calculated from the sample data and then compared with its probable value based on t-
distribution at 90% level of significance. We next report the values of one and paired sample 
t-tests across the businesses in our sample. 
Table 8.4A: One sample t-test of performance across businesses 
Dependent 
Variable 
1)R0S 
2) ROCE 
3) TOBIN'S Q 
4) 2-factor scale 
5) 3-factor scale 
" • 
t-value 
2.810 
0.703 
-1.630 
25.058 
43.321 
Signiflcance 
*** 
NS 
NS 
*** 
*** 
Mean Difference 
2.2441 
0.4989 
-1.7248 
0.7000 
2.0300 
90% Confidence 
Inter '^al of the 
Difference 
Lower Lt 
0.9262 
-0.6728 
-3.4711 
0.6500 
1.9500 
Upper Lt 
3.5620 
1.6707 
2.1508 
0.7400 
2.1100 
In case of one-sample t-tests the confidence interval displayed a range of values based on 
paired difference. Since the interval does not contain 0, it can be concluded that paired 
differences differs significantly from 0. The mean difference reflects the mean for one group 
minus the mean for the other group. In case of paired sample t-tests the differences are 
significantly large to suggest that performance varies across different fit categories and 
cannot be attributed to chance. The results clearly indicate that the difference in means 
cannot be due to random fluctuations of sampling. However, because of small sample 
selections, the probability of drawing of incorrect inferences cannot be ruled out altogether. 
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Table 8.4B: Paired sample t-test of performance across businesses 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Factor Scale 
t-value 
Significance 
Correlation 
Significance 
Std. Error Mean 
Lower Limit (90%) 
Upper Limit (90%) 
Model 1 
ROS 
2-fac 
1.955 
* 
0.295 
*** 
0.7907 
0.2405 
2.8507 
Model 2 
ROS 
3-fac 
0.274 
NS 
0.320 
*** 
0.7848 
-1.0805 
1.5099 
Model 3 
ROCE 
2-fac 
-0.283 
NS 
0.144 
** 
0.7064 
-1.3656 
0.9664 
Model 4 
ROCE 
3-fac 
-2.170 
** 
0.132 
** 
0.7053 
-2.6946 
-0.3664 
Model 5 
Tobin Q 
2-fac 
-2.294 
** 
0.066 
NS 
1.0566 
-4.1672 
-0.6795 
Model 6 
Tobin 0 
3-fac 
-3.561 
* + * 
0.102 
* 
1.0543 
-5.4944 
-2.0141 
Analysis of variance or ANOVA is an extremely important tool for testing difference in 
sample means for homogeneity, where more than two samples is involved (i.e. in our instant 
case three samples were used across fit categories). It also requires us to assume that there is 
some sort of relationship between the determining factor and the reason for difference in 
means, which holds well. ANOVA consists of splitting the variance for analytical purposes 
(i.e. whether differences in mean across sample categories can be attributed to specific causes 
or due to chance). We use one-way ANOVA, as there is one tactor (i.e. strategic fit) that 
explains difference in means across different categories. The basic principle of ANOVA is to 
test for differences among the means of the population by examining the degree of variance 
between the samples, relative to the degree of variance between the samples. While using 
ANOVA we assume that each of the samples is drawn from a normal population and that 
each of these populations has the same variance. It was also assumed that all factors other 
than the one whose treatment is being tested are effectively controlled for. F value is 
calculated as follows -
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F == Estimate of population variance based on between samples variance 
Estimate of population variance based on within sample variance 
The F-value was compared to the F-statistic for given degrees of freedom. The F-value was 
deemed to be significant as the calculated F-value exceeded the F-limit. We subsequently 
report the F-values of ANOVA, which we found to be significant. One-way (or single factor) 
ANOVA considers only one determining factor that causes difference in mean across two or 
more samples. It should be remembered that ANOVA is always a one-tailed test, since a high 
value of F from the sample data would mean that the fit of the sample means to the alternate 
hypothesis is not a very good fit. The degree of freedom for total variance is equal to the 
number of cases in all samples minus one (i.e. n-1). Also the degrees of freedom for between 
and within must add upto to the degrees of freedom for total variance. 
Table 8.5A: One-Way ANOVA across 2-factor scale 
PAT 
ROCE 
ANOVA 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Sum of 
Squares 
5592.07 
41404.75 
402.41 
36748.29 
df 
1 
270 
1 
270 
Mean Square 
5592.07 
153.35 
402.41 
136.10 
F 
36.46 
~ 
2.95 
• 
Sig 
*** 
* 
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Table 8.5B: One-Way ANOVA across 3-factor scale 
ANOVA 
PAT 
ROCE 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Between 
Groups 
Within 
Groups 
Sum of 
Squares 
5290.42 
41706.40 
255.80 
36894.90 
Df 
2 
269 
2 
269 
Mean Square 
2645.21 
155.04 
127.90 
137.15 
F 
17.06 
0.93 
*" 
Sig 
• 
NS 
i 
8.2 Tests of Bivariate Relationships 
So far we have dealt with those statistical measures that we use in the case of samples 
consisting of only one variable. We next move on to use bivariate and multivariate statistical 
techniques where more than two variables are involved. In correlation analysis we seek to 
know if the relationship between two related variables is a causal one or there is a definitive 
relationship between the two. We use Karl Pearson's coefficient of correlation to understand 
the nature of association between two variables, which varies between +1 to -1. A perfect 
positive or negative relationship indicates that variations in the independent variable explain 
100% of the corresponding variations in the dependent variable. A correlation equal or close 
to 0 indicates that the relationship between the two variables is a causal one. 
We next report the consolidated correlation matrix in Tables 8.6, which comprises thirty-five 
variables selected from environmental, industry, and group characteristics. The detailed 
structure of the variables includes, a) Performance (1-7), b) Diversity (8-10), c) Strategic Fit 
(11-12), d) Industry Characteristics (13-20), e) Size (21-23), f) Cohesiveness (24), f) 
Resources (25-28), g) Distinctive Capabilities (29-33), h) Inertia (34), i) Market Imperfection 
(35). 
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Table 8.6: Group correlation matrix (continued) 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Par 
ROCE 
RONW 
ROA 
PAT_M 
0PM 
TOBINSQ 
SHVALUE 
H_DIV 
CDIV 
G_DIV 
FITSALE 
FIT_CAP 
INT_COV 
DEBTEQ 
SOLVENCY 
CUR_RAT 
DEB_CYL 
CRED_CYL 
FXDCOST 
DOM_BUS 
SALES 
TOT_ASST 
CAP_EMP 
INT_TRA 
FREE_RES 
LIQ_DITY 
CASH_PRO 
SUSGROW 
INT ASST 
MKTG_EXP 
PLN_MCH 
CAP_WIP 
W_CAP_MG 
AVG_AGE 
MKTIMP 
Mean 
7.55 
13.80 
5.38 
7.85 
10.31 
4.70 
4.13 
0.65 
2.60 
0.25 
0.84 
0.87 
4.34 
1.54 
1.88 
1.81 
48.47 
78.81 
11.16 
50.76 
4.14 
4.29 
4.14 
19.86 
3.74 
2.65 
3.23 
8.51 
0.46 
4.77 
3.98 
3.85 
1.81 
36.71 
68.61 
S.D. 
1.94 
4.10 
1.48 
3.25 
2.92 
4.42 
0.38 
0.24 
1.13 
0.14 
0.08 
0.10 
1.84 
0.87 
0.38 
0.47 
17.01 
24.97 
1.75 
28.36 
0.37 
0.39 
0.39 
12.08 
0.46 
0.52 
0.38 
3.96 
0.40 
2.45 
0.37 
0.65 
0.88 
7.69 
25.44 
1 
1.00 
0.83 
0.95 
0.58 
0.48 
-0.07 
0.22 
0.10 
0.00 
-0.05 
-0.05 
0.05 
0.19 
0.00 
0.07 
0.15 
-0.21 
-0.11 
-0.50 
0.17 
0.02 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.07 
0.04 
0.04 
0.14 
0.74 
-0.08 
-0.01 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.11 
-0.18 
0.05 
2 
1.00 
0.73 
0.34 
0.23 
-0.06 
0.14 
0.15 
0.07 
-0.14 
-0.09 
0.07 
-0.03 
0.35 
-0.35 
0.16 
-0.15 
-0.04 
-0.50 
0.17 
-0.12 
-0.19 
-0.21 
-0.19 
-0.26 
-0.11 
-0.07 
0.39 
-0.24 
-0.04 
-0.15 
-0.22 
0.11 
-0.18 
0.34 
3 
1.00 
0.75 
0.64 
-0.24 
0.19 
-0.11 
-0.21 
-0.02 
0.08 
0.20 
0.18 
-0.06 
0.10 
0.25 
-0.35 
-0.17 
-0.51 
0.33 
-0.05 
-0.03 
0.00 
-0.03 
0.07 
0.07 
0.13 
0.88 
-0.22 
-0.11 
0.02 
0.03 
0.18 
-0.32 
-0.02 
4 
1.00 
0.81 
-0.26 
0.21 
-0.47 
-0.45 
0.19 
0.25 
0.16 
0.24 
-0.17 
0.19 
0.44 
-0.40 
0.09 
-0.16 
0.45 
-0.06 
0.12 
0.18 
0.13 
0.24 
0.35 
0.21 
0.77 
-0.33 
-0.33 
0.22 
0.25 
0.42 
-0.55 
-0.25 
5 
1.00 
-0.34 
-0.04 
-0.51 
-0.62 
0.09 
0.19 
0.40 
0.07 
-0.03 
0.20 
0.39 
-0.59 
-0.26 
-0.15 
0.51 
-0.17 
-0.02 
0.04 
0.14 
0.13 
0.18 
0.09 
0.63 
-0.34 
-0.24 
0.08 
0.07 
0.33 
-0.45 
-0.25 
6 
1.00 
0.31 
0.53 
0.67 
O.ll 
-0.49 
-0.80 
0.47 
-0.06 
0.41 
-0.13 
0.57 
0.48 
0.30 
-0.59 
0.41 
0.37 
0.32 
-0.05 
0.27 
0.35 
0.31 
-0.34 
0.61 
0.21 
0.31 
0.32 
-0.21 
0.25 
-0.21 
7 
1,00 
0.19 
0.26 
0.70 
0.10 
-0.43 
0.18 
0.06 
0.18 
0.54 
0.02 
0.42 
-0.45 
-0.12 
0.80 
0.81 
0.81 
0.44 
0.72 
0.65 
0.80 
0.15 
0.36 
-0.05 
0.78 
0.83 
0.40 
-0.38 
-0.62 
8 
1.00 
0.90 
-0.19 
-0.83 
-0.39 
-0.04 
0.07 
0.16 
-0.19 
0.49 
-0.10 
-0.18 
-0.80 
0.35 
0.20 
0.14 
-0.41 
0.16 
0.03 
0.16 
-0.20 
0.47 
0.82 
0.07 
0.09 
-0.58 
0.62 
-0.10 
9 
1.00 
-0.13 
-0.70 
-0.67 
0.19 
-0.08 
0.14 
-0.27 
0.73 
0.26 
0.08 
-0.88 
0.38 
0.26 
0.20 
-0.38 
0.18 
0.17 
0.19 
-0.31 
0.54 
0.63 
0.13 
0.17 
-0.49 
0,60 
-0,07 
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Table 8.6: Group correlation matrix (continued) 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
10 
1.00 
0.40 
-0.32 
0.03 
0.01 
0.28 
0.61 
-0.30 
0.28 
-0.16 
0.19 
0.76 
0.81 
0.82 
0.77 
0.75 
0.65 
0.82 
0.01 
0.32 
-0.34 
0.86 
0.73 
0.61 
-0.62 
-0.66 
11 
1.00 
0.22 
0.00 
-0.09 
-0.24 
0.16 
-0.38 
0.22 
-0.03 
0.66 
-0.04 
0.02 
0.06 
0.57 
0.00 
0.05 
0.06 
0.14 
-0.23 
-0.84 
0.11 
0.06 
0.65 
-0.64 
0.07 
12 
1.00 
-0.55 
0.16 
-0.36 
0.10 
-0.54 
-0.68 
-0.36 
0.53 
-0.59 
-0.57 
-0.52 
-0.19 
-0.45 
-0.59 
-0.51 
0.32 
-0.66 
0.02 
-0.53 
-0.50 
-0.06 
-0.02 
0.29 
13 
1.00 
-0.38 
0.51 
-0.22 
0.40 
0.43 
0.26 
-0.17 
0.14 
0.19 
0.18 
0.08 
0.18 
0.34 
0.18 
0.16 
0.43 
-0.23 
0.19 
0.30 
-0.07 
-0.01 
-0.17 
14 
1.00 
-0.45 
0.26 
-0.28 
-0.13 
-0.30 
0.22 
-0.04 
-0.10 
-0.11 
0.06 
-0.22 
-0.11 
-0.08 
-0.25 
-0.21 
-0.04 
-0.06 
-0.12 
0.18 
-0.24 
0.21 
15 
1.00 
0.03 
-0.03 
0.01 
0.10 
-0.22 
0.47 
0.51 
0.51 
0.30 
0.63 
0.45 
0.52 
0.30 
0.57 
0.17 
0.49 
0.51 
-0.03 
-0.01 
-0.66 
16 
1.00 
-0.47 
-O.OI 
-0.40 
0.33 
0.38 
0.47 
0.50 
0.36 
0.46 
0.43 
0.50 
0.26 
-0.13 
-0.14 
0.53 
0.45 
0.50 
-0.59 
-0.45 
17 
1.00 
0.42 
0.43 
-0.70 
0.01 
-0.04 
-0.09 
-0.49 
-0.11 
-0.04 
-0.14 
-0.44 
0.40 
0.30 
-0.14 
-0.03 
-0.60 
0.60 
0.16 
18 
1.00 
0.35 
-0.20 
0.25 
0.33 
0.30 
0.16 
0.17 
0.47 
0.24 
-0.22 
0.25 
-0.38 
0.31 
0.38 
0.39 
-0.18 
-0.05 
19 
1.00 
-0.18 
-0.27 
-0.18 
-0.20 
-0.15 
-0.19 
0.05 
-0.27 
-0.45 
0.12 
-0.16 
-0.17 
-0.19 
-0.17 
0.24 
0.18 
20 
1.00 
-0.31 
-0.23 
-0.18 
0.42 
-0.19 
-0.19 
-0.13 
0.33 
-0.54 
-0.71 
-0.09 
-0.18 
0.52 
-0.69 
0.16 
21 
1.00 
0.97 
0.95 
0.60 
0.91 
0.74 
0.96 
-0.05 
0.64 
0.11 
0.92 
0.88 
0.31 
-0.27 
-0.80 
22 
1.00 
1.00 
0.63 
0.96 
0.84 
0.98 
0.00 
0,57 
0.02 
0.98 
0.95 
0,41 
-0.37 
-0.88 
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Table 8.6: Group correlation matrix 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
23 
1.00 
0.65 
0.97 
0.84 
0.98 
0.05 
0.52 
0.00 
0.98 
0.96 
0.44 
-0.41 
-0.90 
24 
1.00 
0.59 
0.48 
0.67 
0.02 
0.25 
-0.56 
0.70 
0.59 
0.72 
-0.72 
-0.53 
25 
1.00 
0.81 
0.96 
0.17 
0.53 
0.09 
0.94 
0.93 
0.35 
-0.34 
-0.94 
26 
1.00 
0.82 
0.08 
0.48 
-0.09 
0.85 
0.86 
0.50 
-0.40 
-0.74 
27 
1.00 
0.12 
0.53 
-0.02 
0.98 
0.92 
0.45 
-0.44 
-0.87 
28 
1.00 
-0.25 
-0.05 
0.04 
0.11 
0.18 
-0.27 
-0.16 
29 
1.00 
0.23 
0.50 
0.48 
-0.14 
0.24 
-0.45 
30 
1.00 
-0.10 
-0.02 
-0.64 
0.74 
-0.17 
31 
1.00 
0.92 
0.51 
-0.49 
-0.86 
32 
1.00 
0.42 
-0.39 
-0.90 
33 
1.00 
-0.79 
-0.29 
34 
1.00 
0.28 
35 
1 00 
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8.2.1 Market Imperfection, Diversity, and Performance 
A firm's environment has been defined as the aggregate of those external factors that have 
impacts or the potential to have impacts on its functioning (Emery and Tryst, 1965; 
Thompson, 1967). Environment is also a source of constraints, contingencies, problems and 
opportunities that effect the terms on which an organisation transacts business (Khandwalla, 
1977). It provides a firm with opportunities and options about the various aspects of 
management of business - growth, profits, business scope, geographical scope, diversity, 
economies of scale and other forms of resources (Ray, 2000). This attribute of the 
environment indicates its munificence. Munificence is governed by the presence of various 
resources in an environment and the competition among firms for those resources. 
Environmental influence can thus be broadly classified into: intensity of market forces and 
regulatory intensity. In a regulated environment, the government rather than the market 
forces regulates the behaviour of firms (Dill, 1958; Desai, 1993). This is what we term 
"market imperfection". 
Under conditions of high market imperfection, munificence is found to be low, resulting in 
low level of competition among firms for those resources. Being a source of resources, 
market imperfection has certain governing influence on diversification strategy as well as on 
firm performance (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In terms of performance, market imperfection 
was found to positively influence returns and negatively influence margins. This is an 
indication that munificence presents potential growth opportunities and also increased 
competitiveness in the market. Market imperfection was also found to positively influence 
diversity. This by and large supports the findings of Khanna and Palepu, (1997). Perhaps, 
institutional voids and gaps have an important role to play in explaining unrelated 
diversifications by business groups in emerging markets. Further, economic liberalisation 
induces business groups to become more focused in the light of reduction in gaps that 
prevailed in the economy. 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) are of the opinion that highly diversified business groups can be 
particularly well suited to such institutional contexts. They conclude that it is the difference 
in institutional context that explains success of large diversified corporations in many 
developing economies. Business groups can thus add value by imitating the functions of 
several institutions that are present in most advanced economies. They effectively mediate 
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between their affiliates and the rest of the economy. This line of work was pioneered by 
(Leff; 1976, 1978) and finds use in the subsequent works of Caves and Uekusa (1976), Choi 
(1988) and Aoki (1990). This leads to the general conclusion that business groups in 
emerging markets add value by diversifying in unrelated areas. However, our results indicate 
that this may be only partially true. Therefore, the existence of business groups may be the 
resuh of a wide range of sociological and cultural factors, which has little to do with 
economic efficiency. 
8.2.2 Industry Characteristics, Diversity, and Performance 
Industry characteristics have been proposed as an important variable influencing performance 
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Porter, 1980). Industry variables such as solvency, liquidity, and 
dominant business have been found to positively influence performance (i.e. a strong 
solvency and liquidity positions gives additional bargaining power to firms in dealing with 
suppliers, hence lowering input costs and enhancing performance). They have the potential to 
create synergy across diversified businesses. This idea of diversification has often been 
linked with risk reduction. One potential benefit of increased diversity arises from combining 
businesses with imperfectly correlated earning streams. This 'coinsurance effect' gives 
diversified groups greater debt carrying capacity than single-line businesses of similar size 
(Lewellen, 1971). A business group also has to bear extra costs for having a diversified 
operation. They are due to distractions of the top management from its areas of excellence 
and also partially due extra burden of managing diversified operations. Porter (1986) argued 
that a group diversifying into varied areas create costs, some visible some hidden. In contrast, 
factors such as debtors and creditors' cycle, fixed costs have been found to negatively 
influence performance (i.e. it induces a firm to block more investments in fixed and working 
capital). However, consistent with existing findings we also observed that industry 
characteristics negatively influenced diversity. 
8.2.3 Size, Diversity, and Performance 
Size has been proposed as an important variable influencing performance (Child, 1972; 
Morck et al., 1988). Market power view suggests that diversified firms will, "thrive at the 
expense of non-diversified firms not because they are more efficient, but because they have 
access to what is termed as conglomerate power" (Hill, 1985:9). The author defines that this 
power comes by the way of deriving monopoly and monopsony benefits from the market. In 
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support of this context, Griffin (1976) adds, that a firm with insignificant positions in a 
number of markets will not, in sum, have this power. In contrast, size was found to 
negatively influence performance captured by accounting based measures. Though extant 
research has identified conglomerate power with positive perfonnance effects, our research 
findings points to the contrary. Perhaps, conglomerate power is more associated with 
additional costs and inertia that nullifies the positive performance effects. Ghosal (1987) also 
argued that strategic importance of scale and scope economies arises from a diversified 
group's ability to share investments and costs across value chains that competitors not 
possessing such internal and external diversity cannot. However, when performance was 
captured by market based measures, size was found to positively influence performance. 
Consistent with existing notions we found that size positively influences diversity. 
8.2,4 Cohesiveness, Diversity, and Performance 
The very basis of a firm being affiliated with a business group in an emerging market is its 
access to a centralised pool of resources (Chang and Hong, 2002). Indeed, most business 
groups assume this characteristic to efficiently intermediate between various markets and 
have access to substantial upstream and downstream integration (Chang and Choi, 1988). 
Central firms develop strong inter-connections with smaller member firms that provide 
support in critical areas and various feeder services. This mechanism is important since most 
emerging markets are grossly underdeveloped and distorted by inefficient government 
intervention (Cole and Park, 1983). Furthermore, business groups also operate an internal 
labour market, thereby ensuring better allocation of scarce managerial resources. They also 
share technological resources and promote group-wide advertising, which generates 
economies of scale and scope (Chang and Hong, 2000). Chang and Hong (2002) suggest that 
business groups substantially influence the profitability of individual affiliates through these 
actions. Firms tend to display cohesion through various forms of mutual cooperation and 
resource transfer among various member firms. Average resource transfer in terms of 
cohesiveness was the highest in the case of the Reliance group averaging at around 30%, 
17% for Tata group and 12% for Aditya Birla group. Consistent with such notions we found 
cohesiveness to positively influence performance margins. 
However, such sharing can only take place across business segments only when they are 
strategically similar (Porter, 1985). Shared knowledge and external relations is another 
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component of cohesiveness that may affect diversity (Porter, 1987). Different business 
segments or products of a diversified business group face different types of environmental 
demands. Therefore, an effort to create synergies may fail or it may result in some form of 
compromise with the objective of external consistency. Theoretical arguments suggest that 
group affiliation may prove to be costly as well. For instance, group affiliation is also 
associated with centralised costs, which may or may not be beneficial for the firm. We also 
found cohesiveness to influence performance returns negatively. 
This has been clearly observed through the implementation of the "Tata Brand Equity Plan"; 
while it clearly benefited the larger firms, the smaller ones were deprived of such benefits. In 
addition to such direct burden, they are other indirect, but less obvious burdens too. They 
have, for instance an obligation to bail out member firms that are performing badly; if 
unaffiliated, such poor performers would be left to go bankrupt. Moreover, secure in the 
cohesiveness of the group, firm managers may have weak incentive to run their business 
efficiently. They may also be obliged, or at least prone, to purchase inputs from member 
firms, efficient or otherwise. Presumably, groups also include firms whose decisions are 
mostly driven by considerations other than local economic gain. Social and cultural ties keep 
firms bound to their groups despite economic costs, and poor performance can persist 
because selection pressures are modest. Consistent with earlier research findings, 
cohesiveness was also found to negatively influence group diversity, and positively influence 
geographical diversity. 
8.2.5 Resources, Capabilities, Diversity, and Performance 
Existing research supports the view that possession of certain basic resources and the 
development of distinctive capabilities form the very basis of competitive advantage and 
superior performance. Barney (1986) suggested that strategic resource factors differ in their 
tradability and that these factors can be specifically identified and their monetary value 
determined via a strategic factor market. Barney (1991) later established the criteria to more 
fully explicate the idea of strategic tradability. Penrose (1959) argued that heterogeneous 
capabilities give each firm its unique character and form the essence of competitive 
advantage. This led Wemerfelt (1984) to conclude that that evaluating firms in terms of their 
resources could lead to insights different from the tradifional I/O Economics perspective 
(Porter, 1980). The measure of resource as an antecedent factor of performance has been 
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identified across various existing research across firms in the developed market context 
(Penrose, 1959; Wemerfeh, 1984; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). Consistent with such findings 
we observed that resources positively influences performance across business groups in 
emerging markets as well. 
Hoskisson et al. (2000) noted that resources for competitive advantage in emerging markets 
are, on the whole, intangible. They are not necessarily product-market driven as would be 
suggested by the knowledge-based view of the firm (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Although 
some form of capabilities (i.e. first mover advantages) are standard across markets, many of 
which are specific to business groups and emerging markets. In most emerging markets, 
capabilities are difficult to establish without a close relationship with home governments. 
However, as institutions change business groups are likely to have less and less advantage 
relative to domestic and foreign players who wish to enter the market (Khanna and Palepu, 
1999) Therefore business groups need to carefully appraise its portfolio of capabilities in the 
emerging context. In essence, a group must understand the relationship between its assets 
and the changing nature of the institution and the emerging characteristics of its industry 
(Hoskisson, et al., 2000). 
However, in the emerging market context the nature of capabilities are somewhat different. 
Guillen (2000) approach is based on the notion that entrepreneurs in emerging markets create 
business groups if political-economic conditions allow them to acquire and maintain the 
capability of combining foreign and domestic resources - inputs, processes, and market 
access - to repeatedly enter new industries. The study of Encamation (1989) observed that 
once such capabilities are acquired they could be successfully exploited and leveraged across 
diversified businesses to enhance performance. This also goes with the findings of Bardhan 
(1997) on corruption issues. Consistent with such findings we observed that distinctive 
capabilities positively influence performance. 
Relatedness is a mechanism by which business groups capture synergies among various 
firms; it also constitutes as a potential source of competitive advantage (Davis et al., 1992). 
An organisation can achieve sustained superior performance by increasing its diversity; if it 
is able it is able to exploit its resources or assets that are unavailable to its rivals (Barney, 
1991; Markides and Williamson, 1996). As Prahalad and Hamel (1990) put it, competencies 
are not only the glue that binds existing businesses, they are also the engines for new 
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business development. Core competencies are the wellspring of new business development. 
Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, and not just by the 
attractiveness of markets. These forms of resources being highly tangible and flexible in 
nature can be exploited across various sets of businesses, adding to the diversity of the group 
(Chatterjee and Wemerfelt, 1991). Penrose (1959) arguments suggest that if the fungible 
resource is centered on the top management; and if the top management has skills in 
acquiring and managing businesses, then diversification to establish an internal capital 
market becomes a possibility. In such a case the acquisition of unrelated businesses might be 
entirely consistent with value creation. Guillen (2000) forwards the opinion that capabilities 
of business groups in emerging markets basically centres around their ability to combine 
critical inputs to repeatedly enter new industries. Our research findings support existing 
views that resources and capabilities positively influence diversity as well. 
8.2.6 Inertia, Diversity, and Performance 
History of a business group has an influence on its strategic adaptation, as it abets inertia. 
Inertia is also known to constrain strategic change (Ray, 2000). Miles and Cameron (1982) 
observed that past strategic response to environmental changes constrict the nature and range 
of diversification strategies that may be feasible. Major shifts in technology, regulation, 
competitive dynamics or consumer preferences seldom occur suddenly. Some business 
groups spot these changes early and then respond aggressively to these changes. However, at 
times they fail to respond because they get trapped by the success formula that led there past 
success. 
In terms of corporate business portfolio there exists a great diversity in the population of 
business groups owing to the historical difference in the strategic evolution of firms in the 
regulated era. There are unrelated diversified groups, there are related diversified groups, and 
there are single business firms operating side by side. Diversity attempts to capture this 
difference in strategic predisposition of groups (Ray, 2002). It captures the dimension of 
corporate strategy in the earlier period by taking a stock of the corporate portfolio in terms of 
the number of distinct businesses. The inertia of the Tata group was observed to be the 
highest, followed by Aditya Birla group, and Reliance group. In line with our expectation, we 
found inertia to negatively influence performance. However, if we decompose the effect of 
inertia on three-business groups separately, we found that while inertia was negative for the 
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Tata and Aditya Birla group, it was positive for the Reliance group. However, against 
contrary expectations inertia was also found to positively influence group diversity, and 
negatively influence geographical diversity. 
8.2.7 Diversity, Strategic Fit, and Performance 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) observed that net performance effects of affiliation with a 
diversified business group would be curvilinear. Firm performance will initially decline with 
increases in group diversity, until group diversity reaches a threshold. Beyond this threshold. 
marginal increases in group diversity will yield marginal increases in firm performance. They 
also concluded that, the threshold above which marginal increases in unrelated group 
diversity will result in marginal increases in firm performance would rise as market 
institutions evolve over time. Thus if we study the diversity-performance relationship in 
emerging markets context over a longitudinal time horizon we expect to observe a transition 
in the diversity-performance relationship of business groups from a positive to a negative 
one. However, negative relationship between diversity and performance can be only expected 
when an emerging market witnessed a consistently high level of efficient market 
intermediation. Consistent with existing research findings we found that group diversity 
negatively influences performance. 
Geographical diversification involves producing (or providing) the same products or services 
but developing a wider geographical reach (Buhner, 1987; Mudambi et al., 1999). Many 
authors (Slocum, 1997; Rees, 1998) stated that geographical diversification offers several 
advantages. First, it allows business groups to take advantage of new market positions (Wan, 
1998). It also helps to stabilise returns by producing economies of scale and scope 
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994). Geographical diversification also allows business groups to 
exploit its distinctive capabilities across a wider market base (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). 
Therefore, having a broader geographical scope may allow a group to achieve long-term 
strategic competitiveness. Consistent with existing research findings we found that 
geographical diversity positively influences performance. We also found that strategic fit 
negatively influences performance. Perhaps, fit has a more prominent role in enhancing firm 
performance than group ones. It prevents the group from diversifying into emerging 
businesses and thereby secures a higher rate of return over traditional businesses. Therefore, 
diversity enhances group performance only if the strategic fit is positive. 
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8.2.8 Size and Inertia 
Ray (2000) observed that organisational inertia due to historical evolution of firms captured 
in size among others constrained strategic responses of firms. Highly diversified, older and 
larger firms were slow to react to the changing demand of the environment. In contrast 
younger and smaller firms were more aggressive in their strategic responses and performed 
better than older and larger firms. Among other factors, organisation culture rooted in 
regulation, top management values, present structure and decision-making process perhaps 
retarded their strategic response and performance. In a fast changing economic environment, 
early recognition of opportunities and threats are a key factor to success. Boeker (1997) 
suggests that in such cases changes in the top management may help groups overcome the 
forces of inertia that constrains strategic change. However, inconsistent with above findings 
we found that size negatively influences inertia. 
8.2.9 Cohesiveness and Capabilities 
The linkage between group cohesiveness and capabilities is well documented in strategic 
management research. In the words of Prahalad and Hamel (1990), in the long run, 
competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than 
competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The author's point out 
that difference in competitiveness comes not from people or technology related capabilities. 
But the adherence of the top management to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily 
limits the ability of individual businesses to fully exploit the deep reservoirs of technological 
capability that the entire group possesses. If core competence is about harmonising streams 
of technology, it is also about the organisation of work and delivery valueAs Porter (1996) 
points out that competitive advantage comes from the way activities fit and reinforce one 
another. This way strategic fit creates competitive advantage and superior performance. 
Strategic fit among many activities is fundamental not only to competitive advantage but also 
to the sustainability of that advantage. Competitive advantage thus grows out of the entire 
system of activities. The author concludes that positions built on a system of activities are far 
more sustainable than those built on individual activities. And all this comes from increased 
sharing of resources (tangible or otherwise) within diversified business groups, which we 
term as cohesiveness. Consistent with our observations we observe that cohesiveness 
positively influences capabilities. 
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8.2.10 Strategic Fit, Inertia, and Capability 
The importance of fit among functional policies is one of the oldest ideas in strategic 
management. A firm has been viewed from the point of view of structure, resources, and key 
success factors, however, fit is a far more central component than most realise (Porter, 1996). 
Fit is important because discrete activities often affect one another. Although some fit among 
activities is generic and applies to many firms, the most valuable fit is strategy specific 
because it enhances a position's uniqueness and amplifies trade-offs. Any form of capability 
grows out of the entire system of activities, rather than any individual activity alone (Porter, 
1996). Inertia is one factor that acts as constraint to the development and/or enhancement of 
this fit. The bonding mechanisms between ordinary resources that lead to capabilities are 
distinctly absent when firms are characterised by inertia. In support, we found that strategic 
fit positively influences capabilities; and inertia negatively influences capabilities. 
8.2.11 Size and Capabilities 
As Prahalad and Hamel (1990) points out that in the short run, a firm's competitiveness 
derives from the price-performance attributes of current products. However, in the long run, 
competitiveness derives from an ability to build at a lower cost and more speedily than 
competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The critical task for 
the top management is to create an organisation capable of infusing products with irresistible 
functionality or, better yet, creating products those customers need, but have not yet even 
imagined. Core competencies are the collective learning in the organisation, especially how 
to coordinate diverse production function skills and integrate multiple streams of 
technologies. If core competence is about harmonising streams of technology, it is also about 
the organisation of work and the delivery of value. It is also about communication, 
involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organisational boundaries. The 
authors make it clear that core competence does not mean out-spending rivals on research 
and development. The benefits of competencies, like the benefits of money supply, depend 
not much on the size of the stock the company holds, but on the velocity of their circulation. 
When competencies become imprisoned in the cages of size, skills begin to atrophy. 
However, inconsistent with the above observation we found that size positively influences 
capabilities. Perhaps the effects of conglomerate power are too dominating in emerging 
markets. 
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Table 8.7: Summary of correlation results -
Variables 
(i) Market Imperfection - Performance 
(ii) Market Imperfection - Diversity 
(iii) Industry Characteristics - Performance 
(iv) Industry Characteristics - Diversity 
(v) Size - Performance 
(vi) Size - Diversity 
(vii) Cohesiveness - Performance 
(viii) Cohesiveness - Diversity 
(ix) Resources and Capabilities - Performance 
(x) Resources and Capabilities - Diversity 
(xi) Inertia - Performance 
(xii) Inertia - Diversity 
(xiii) Diversity - Performance 
(xiv) Strategic Fit - Performance 
(xv) Size - Inertia 
(xvi) Cohesiveness - Capabilities 
(xvii) Strategic Fit - Capabilities 
(xviii) Inertia - Capabilities 
(xix) Size - Capabilities 
Proposed 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(-) 
Result 
(-) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(') 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(-) 
(+) 
Significance 
(*) 
NS 
(*) 
NS 
('**\ 
NS 
NS 
(**) 
(*) 
(**) 
(**) 
r**\ 
(**\ 
f**\ 
(*) 
/**^ 
r**\ 
/**^ 
r**\ 
Note: NS - Not Significant, *** denotes 99%, ** denotes 95%, and * denotes 90% 
significance, and significance <90% indicates not significant (NS). 
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8.3 Tests of Multivariate Relationships 
In this section we tried to relate one dependent variable with two independent variables and 
one moderating variable using regression analysis. In each performance category (dependent 
variable) we carried out four trial test runs, selecting one measure of diversity, one measure 
of fit (independent variable), and one measure of the moderating variable. However, we 
report the results of regression runs on consolidated group data in which the adjusted R was 
observed to be the highest. Since the unit of measure of fit and diversity are different, we had 
do convert them into their respective z-scores for normalisation of data. R attempts to 
measure goodness of fit assuming a linear model. It explains the proportion of variation in 
the dependent variable explained by the regression model. The value of R^ ranges from 0 to 
1. A small value of R^ indicates that there is little or no linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variable. A small value also indicates that the model does not fit 
the data well. The adjusted R^  tends to optimistically estimate how well the model fits the 
population. Adjusted R^ therefore attempts to correct R^ to more closely reflect the goodness 
of fit of the model in the population. 
Table 8.8: Summary of partial regression results 
Particulars 
1) Herfindahl Diversity 
2) Concentric Diversity 
3) Fit (Sales) 
4) Fit (Cap Employed) 
5) HD * FS 
6) HD * FC 
7) CD * FS 
8) CD * FC 
9) Adjusted R^ 
10) Rank 
ROCE 
(+) 
(.) ** 
/ • - ) . " ) * * * 
0.173 
5 
ROA 
(-) 
( - ) * 
/•+\ *** 
0.207 
3 
RONW 
(+) 
(-) 
/ ^ \ Hc^ icllc 
0.192 
4 
ROS 
(\ *** 
/ \ :tf** 
r_^\ * * * 
0.441 
2 
0PM 
/_\ *** 
/ \ :|<:(C!|< 
(^\ *** 
0.484 
1 
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We do not report the values of regression tests on Tobin's Q and Shareholders Return, as 
they were not found to be significant. Perhaps the measurements of the constructs were not 
robust enough, which has also been pointed out by some earlier researchers (Kakani, 2000). 
In cases when performance was measured by returns, Concentric Diversity was selected as 
the best variable. However, when performance was measured by margins, Herfindahl 
Diversity was selected as best variable. Adjusted R^ was highest in the case of 0PM at 0.484, 
This indicated that roughly 48.4% of the variation in performance has been explained 
through this model. This can be considered highly significant, especially when new 
boundaries are being explored. However, when other variables are controlled for, which we 
report in the full regression models, we witness a significant increase in the explanator> 
power of the model. The main observation was that despite diversity having an inconsistent 
effect on performance, the effect of the moderating factor (i.e. strategic fit) has always 
remained positive and significant at the 99% level. Subsequently, all the environmental, 
industry, group (including strategy) and performance variables in the standardised form were 
used for consolidated regression analysis to analyse their cause and effects. We then carried 
out regression analysis on two parallel models. In the initial model, performance was derived 
as function of-
Performance = fx (Market Imperfection + Industry Characteristics + Size + 
Cohesiveness + Inertia + Resources + Capabilities + Diversity + Strategic Fit) 
This is in line with the school of thought that considers that strategy variables (i.e. diversity) 
together with industry and group variables determine performance (Ramanujam and 
Varadarajan, 1989; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). In our second model, we have based our study 
on the lines of Rumelt's (1974) escape hypotheses. As originally proposed, "...or a great 
many firms, diversification is the means employed to escape from declining prospects in their 
original business area, poor absolute performance is often the result of participation in a 
highly competitive and non-innovative slow growth industry" (1974: 82). It implies 
therefore, the profitability of the industries in which firms compete will have a negative 
influence on the extent of firm diversification among other factors. In the subsequent model 
diversity was derived as a function of-
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Diversity - fx (Market Imperfection + Industry Characteristics + Size + 
Cohesiveness + Inertia + Resources + Capabilities + Performance + Strategic 
Fit) 
We experimented with different models of regression analysis available in the SPSS software 
package to test whether non-linear models gave better results. However, none of these 
models yielded substantially better results in terms of adjusted R^ than those given by linear 
models. This observation coupled with our earlier observation of scatter plots further boosted 
our confidence in assuming that the relationship among the variables under study was by and 
large linear. Linear multiple full model regressions were performed using best variables. Best 
variables mean variables that best fit among all the variables for a particular category in the 
regression model. We use 'best variables' (provides highest adjusted R ) to capture the effect 
of a particular category of independent variable on the dependent variable. Standard variables 
have also been used in regression models; however, its explanatory power is by no means 
superior to the earlier. This is perhaps indicative of the fact that R^ has a very modest role in 
regression analysis, being a measure of goodness of fit (Goldberger, 1991: 177-78). 
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Table 8.10: Summary of full regression results with diversity as dependent variable 
(continued) 
Independent Variable ^ 
Dependent Variable 1 
a) Market Imperfection 
(i) MI Index • 
b) Industry Characteristics 
(i) Interest Coverage 
(ii) Debt-Equity Ratio 
(iii) Solvency Ratio 
(iv) Current Ratio ^ 
(v) Debtors Cycle 
(vi) Creditors Cycle 
(vii) Fixed Costs 
(viii) Dominant Business - • 
c) Size 
(i) Sales • 
(ii) Total Assets 
(iii) Capital Frnplnyfifi ^ 
d) Cohesiveness 
(i) Internal Transactions • 
e) Inertia 
(i) Avg Firm Age ^ 
f) Resources 
Model lA 
Her. Diversity 
0.505 *** 
(9.802) 
-0.059 
(-1.010) 
0.901 *** 
(13.561) 
-0 177 *** 
(-2.994) 
0.044 
(0.752) 
Model 2A 
Con. Diversity 
0.448 *** 
(6.271) 
-0.353 *** 
(-3.854) 
0.960 *** 
(9.128) 
-0 341 *** 
(-3.506) 
0.285 *** 
(3.045) 
Model 3A 
Geo. Diversity 
0.260 
(1.527) 
0.261 *** 
(2.763) 
0.179 
(0.365) 
0.189 
(1.324) 
-0.173 
(1.368) 
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(i) Free Reserves 
(ii) Liquidity ^ 
(iii) Cash Profits • 
(iv) Sustainable Growth ^ 
g) Capabilities 
(i) Intangible Assets 
(ii) Marketing Expenses ^ 
(iii) Plant and Machinery 
(iv) Capital WIP 
(v) Working Capital Mgt 
h) Performance 
(i) ROCE 
(ii) ROA 
(iii) RONW 
(iv) ROS 
(v) 0PM 
(vi)Tobin's Q • 
(vii) Shareholder Value • 
i) Strategic Fit 
(i) Fit (Sales) • 
(ii) Fit (Capital Employed) 
(Constant) 
Adjusted R^ 
No. of observations 
Rank 
0.122** 
(-2.600) 
0.255 *** 
(2.286) 
-0.010 
(-0.217) 
-0.440 *** 
(-6.675) 
-0.884 
0.979 
42 
2 
0.042 
(0.921) 
0.446 *** 
(-3.130) 
-0.049 
(0.643) 
-0.487*** 
(-4.526) 
-4.308 
0.944 
42 
1 
0.050 
0.749 * 
(1.959) 
-0.003 
(-0.021) 
-0.249 ** 
(2.320) 
-1.790 
0.839 
42 
3 
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Note: In figures reported in Table 8.9 and 8.10 we used regression estimations using ordinary 
least squares techniques with non-zero correlations across the error terms for consolidated 
group data, following Moulton (1986, 1990). Heteroscedasticy-consistent standard errors 
were used to compute t-statistics, which are reported in parentheses together with their 
respective beta values. We ranked the models in terms of their overall explanatory power 
indicated by its Adjusted R . 
Note: *** denotes 99%, ** denotes 95%, * denotes 90% Significance level, and as per 
standard practice Significance level <90% has not been reported. 
8.3.1 Market Imperfection, Performance, and Diversity 
Market imperfection was found to have a positive effect on performance, except when 
performance was measured by margins. Existing research has rightly pointed that higher 
returns is actually achieved through increase in size and scale of operation, introduction of 
increased number of product lines in the existing businesses and diversification in the related 
areas (Ray, 2000). However, the negative effect on margins can be explained through 
increase in intensity of competition and bargaining power of customers over economic 
liberalisation (Ray, 2002). The above effect was foimd to be significant when accounting 
captured performance based measures, while it was not significant when performance was 
captured by market-based measures. Market imperfection was also found to have a positive 
effect on both group as well as geographical diversity. This begins by suggesting groups 
acting in perfectly competitive markets cannot benefit through diversification. In such 
conditions, stockholders can achieve diversification by reconstructing their financial assets at 
a much lesser cost. Thus if groups diversify, it follows that they are acting in markets that are 
imperfectly competitive. In the case of Tata group the effect of market imperfection on 
diversity and performance was found to be negative as positive compared to Reliance or 
Aditya Birla group. This perhaps corroborates our earlier observations. 
This can also be explained by the fact that economic liberalisation has resulted in a more 
munificent environment, providing business groups with a wider range of opportunities and 
strategic choices. Ray (2000) has rightly pointed out that although in the liberalised era firms 
showed wider variation in strategic responses, a general pattern has primarily emerged. In 
contrast, in the pre-liberalisation era firms in general diversified into new product and 
business lines and expanded their geographical base indiscriminately. While the effect of 
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market imperfection on group diversity was significant at the 99% level, the effect was not 
significant on geographical diversity. The individual explanatory power (in terms of adjusted 
R square) of market imperfection in explaining differences in performance was around 3% 
and around 2% in explaining differences in diversity. The standard error of the variable 
contained in the regression analysis was low. 
8.3.2 Industry Characteristics, Performance, and Diversity 
Industry characteristics when measured in terms of in terms of liquidity, solvency, dominant 
business, and leverage were found to have a positive effect on performance. However, the 
effect of the same on performance was negative when industry characteristics were measured 
by debtors' cycle. These effects are consistent with existing findings (Kakani, 2000). There 
were other variables (i.e. creditors' cycle and fixed costs) also, but they were not included as 
best variables. In the case of individual group regressions, industry characteristics were found 
to have the strongest impact on the Reliance group. Perhaps the group had the distinctive 
edge to override the context, and change the characteristics of an industry context like no 
other. Industry characteristics measured in terms of dominant business was found to have a 
negative effect on group diversity. A group having presence in a few dominant businesses 
perhaps has little incentive to diversify than compared to groups with presence in a cluster of 
businesses with none of the businesses dominating the other. While industry characteristics 
measured in terms of liquidity had a positive effect on geographical diversity. The individual 
explanatory power (in terms of adjusted R square) of industry characteristics in explaining 
differences in performance was around 6%, while at around 2% in explaining differences in 
diversity. Therefore, external environmental factors has a bearing in explaining differences in 
diversity as well as performance, with the same found to be significant at the 99% level. This 
was consistent with the findings of Porter (1980, 1985). The standard error of the variable 
contained in the regression analysis was low. 
8.3.3 Size, Performance, and Diversity 
Size was found to have negative effect on performance, while it was also found to have a 
positive effect on group as well as geographical diversity. Scale and scope of operations 
inevidently increases as groups diversify across markets and industries. Hence, the positive 
effect of size on diversity. As explained earlier, the effect of size is more predominant in 
generating inertia rather than market power. Hence, instead of inducing groups to enhance 
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their performance, it reduces it. This leads to negative effect of size on performance. In most 
cases the results were consistently significant at the 99% level. In the size category sales was 
selected as the best variable. On the overall, the effects were found to be significant at the 
99% level. The individual explanatory power (in terms of adjusted R square) of size in 
explaining differences in performance was around 3%, while significantly higher in the range 
of 10% in explaining differences in diversity. Size was also the single most important 
variable capturing the characteristics of the group. The standard error of the variable 
contained in the regression analysis was medium. 
8.3.4 Cohesiveness, Performance, and Diversity 
Cohesiveness was found to have a negative effect on all measures of performance, except for 
margins, when the effect was positive. This finding is consistent with existing research, 
which had observed that, firms in general tend to increase the sharing of resources across 
departments, divisions, and business units within the firm (Ray, 2000). Though there are 
various theoretical arguments that suggest in favour of internal transactions in the group 
affiliation, there are also indications which points to the contrary; (Khanna and Palepu, 
2000). The effect can be considered negative from the point of view that affiliate firms are 
placed at a disadvantage by other less obvious factors, i.e. bailing out member firms which 
are performing badly. The effect of the same was positive on margins because group 
headquarters through strong centralised control usually pre-empt member firms to do 
businesses with each other, even at the cost of an external opportunity gain. Cohesiveness 
was found to have a negative effect on group diversity while a positive effect was found on 
geographical diversity. Thus, while it enabled member firms to enhance their performance, it 
also prevented the group from making fresh diversification moves because of paucity in 
fimds, which were tied up with failing units. The results were mostly significant at the 99% 
level. The individual explanatory power (in terms of adjusted R square) of cohesiveness in 
explaining differences in performance was around 3%, while at around Wo in explaining 
differences in diversity. The standard error of the variable contained in the regression 
analysis was medium. 
8.3.5 Inertia, Performance, and Diversity 
Inertia was found to have an overall negative effect on all measures performance. Ray (2000) 
observed that organisafional inertia constrained strategic responses and performance. The 
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ability of the TMT to acquire new skills is an important determinant of performance, 
especially, in fast changing environment. Inertia was also found to have a positive effect on 
group diversity and negative effect on geographical diversity. Thus while inertia retarded 
group performance; it enabled business groups to diversify further. Thus, it was the older 
groups, which were highly diversified, compared to relatively younger groups. Overall, 
economic liberalisation had resulted in a more munificent environment characterised by 
opportunities for higher growth and return, greater availability of various resources and 
easier access to the international market both for imports and exports (Ray, 2000). However, 
older firms found it difficult to penetrate foreign markets for lack of global competitiveness 
and also because changing rules of the game enabled relatively younger firms to adapt faster. 
In terms of intra-group analysis the impact of inertia on performance was the strongest in the 
case Tata group, followed by Aditya Birla group. In contrast, the effect of inertia was almost 
negligible in the case of Reliance group. This by and large conforms to our use of average 
firm age as a surrogate for inertia. The effect of inertia was found to be significant at the 
99% level when performance was captured by accounting based measures; however, when 
performance was captured by market based measures the effect was not found to be 
significant. The effect on diversity was also found to be significant at the 99% level. The 
individual explanatory power (in terms of adjusted R square) of inertia in explaining 
differences in performance was around 3% while at around 4% in explaining differences in 
diversity. The standard error of the variable contained in the regression analysis was very 
low. 
8.3.6 Resources and Capabilities, Performance, and Diversity 
Resources were found to have a positive effect on performance. The results were identical 
when we analysed the effect of resources on diversity. The effects on performance were 
found to be consistently significant at the 99% level, while the effect of the same on diversity 
was not found to be significant. This is perhaps in divergence from the earlier view that 
initial resource position played relatively limited role in explaining variations in strategic 
choices in the post liberalisation period (Ray, 2000). In case of resources liquidity and cash 
profits entered the category as best variables. The individual explanatory power (in terms of 
adjusted R square) of resources in explaining differences in performance was around 4%, 
while at around 3% in explaining differences in diversity. The standard error of the variable 
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contained in the regression analysis was medium. Capabilities were also found to have a 
positive effect on performance as well as diversity. This is in parity with existing research, 
which observed that, greater entrepreneurial capability helped firms expand geographically in 
the domestic market, while marketing capability helped strengthen international operations 
(Ray, 2000). In our regression runs working capital management was unanimously selected 
as the best variable when its effect on performance was analysed. In contrast, when its effect 
on diversity was analysed marketing expenses together with plant and machinery entered the 
model as best variables. The results were consistently significant at the 99% level when its 
effect on diversity was analysed, the same was not found to be significant when its effect on 
performance was analysed. The individual explanatory power (in terms of adjusted R square) 
of capabilities in explaining differences in performance was around 2 %, while significantly 
higher in the range of 7 % in explaining differences in diversity. The standard error of the 
variable contained in the regression analysis was also medium. Thus both resources and 
capabilities are more effective in explaining diversity, rather than performance. 
8.3.7 Strategic Fit, Performance, Diversity 
Strategic fit was found to have to negative effect on performance as well as diversity. 
However, the moderating effect between strategic fit and diversity was consistently found to 
be positive on performance. When performance was taken as the dependent variable fit 
(sales) as well fit (capital employed) entered the regression model as best variables. 
However, when diversity was taken as the dependent variable only fit (sales) entered the 
regression model as best variable. The effect of fit on performance was found to be 
significant at 99% level only in one model; in all other cases it was found to be non-
significant. In contrast the effect of fit on diversity was consistently found to be significant at 
95% level or higher in case of all the models. However, the effect of the moderating variable 
was not found to be significant. This was presumptive on our part given its nascent 
characteristics. The negative effect of strategic fit on performance can be explained by the 
fact that it benefits the firm more than the group as a whole, in the form of higher resource 
allocation. As a high fit induces the group to concentrate more on its core businesses, and 
thereby ignore emerging businesses where the profitability levels are comparatively higher. 
A higher fit would also prevent the group from adding newer businesses to its portfolio of 
existing businesses, and hence a negative effect on diversity. A lower fit would enable the 
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group to broaden its horizon of businesses and thereby enhance profitabiUty. However, a 
positive effect of the moderating factor is perhaps an indication of the fact the benefits of 
diversification are only realised when the same are consistent with the dominant logic of the 
TMT. This has been observed universally across all the regression models, though not found 
to be significant. The individual explanatory power (in terms of adjusted R square) of 
strategic fit in explaining differences in performance was around 4 %, while significantly 
higher in the range of 7 % in explaining differences in diversity. The standard error of the 
variable contained in the regression analysis was low. 
8.3.8 Diversity and Performance and vice-versa 
The effect of group diversity on performance remains inconclusive in our research, without 
any clear picture emerging. The same applies to geographical diversity as well. This confirms 
existing research findings that this research domain though large is yet to reach maturity. 
Perhaps, diversity in isolation has a very little bearing on performance. In two regression 
models diversity was found to be significant at the 99% level, while in other cases it was not 
found to be significant. In case of group diversity, both the measures (i.e. Herfindahl Index 
and Concentric Index) entered the regression runs as best variables. The individual 
explanatory power (in terms of adjusted R square) of group diversity in explaining 
differences in performance was around 3 %. The individual explanatory power (in terms of 
adjusted R square) of geographical diversity in explaining differences in performance was 
around 2%. The explanatory power of these two variables also fluctuated within a wide 
range. These wide variations are perhaps indicative of the fact that much depends on the 
choice of selection of measure of diversity and performance to explain its effect. The 
standard error of the variable contained in the regression analysis was high. 
In contrast to the above, performance was found to consistently have a negative effect on 
diversity, though the same was not found to be significant. In case of performance, market 
based measures were selected as best variables, rather than accounting based measures. This 
strongly supports the "escape hypothesis" proposed by Rumeh (1974) as also later suggested 
by Christensen and Montgomery (1981). Stimpert and Duhaime (1997) also concluded that 
profitability of the industries in which firms compete would have a negative influence on the 
extent of firm diversification or more specifically high performance eliminates the need for 
greater diversification. Conversely, low performance may provide an impetus to 
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diversification especially, if resources exist to pursue it. Bowman (1980) found a negative 
relationship risk and return measures of performance. This finding aligns with prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) that performance below a reference point creates 
incentive for greater risk taking, while target above it produces risk aversion. The individual 
explanatory power (in terms of adjusted R square) of performance in explaining differences 
in group diversity as well as geographical diversity was around 3%. The standard error of the 
variable contained in the regression analysis was low. Also by controlling for several 
variables the explanatory power of our research model has been reportedly quite high ai 
around 80% and in some test-runs even over 90%. This indicates that the impact of most of 
the variables influencing diversity and performance has been captured through the model. 
This is also in line with recommendations of earlier research (Stimpert and Duhaime, 1997; 
Hill, 1994). 
Table 8.11: Summary of regression results 
Independent Variable ^ 
Dependent Variable 
' 
(i) Market Imperfection 
(ii) Industry Characteristics 
(iii) Size 
(iv) Cohesiveness 
(v) Inertia 
(vi) Resources 
(vii) Capabilities 
(viii) Diversity 
(ix) Performance 
(x) Strategic Fit 
(xi) Moderating Variable 
Performance 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
NA 
(-) 
(+) 
Significance 
*** 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
NS 
*** 
NA 
* 
NS 
Diversity 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
NA 
(-) 
(-) 
NA 
Significance 
* * + 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*+* 
** 
* * + 
NA 
NS 
* * + 
NA 
Note: NS -Not Significant, *** denotes 99%, ** denotes 95%, and * denotes 90% 
significance, and significance <90% indicates not significant (NS). 
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CHAPTER 9 
Discussion and Interpretation 
In this chapter we report the discussion on results and findings presented in earlier chapter. 
The discussion also contains plausible explanation of the results. These explanations have 
been arrived at by a combination of factors such as our understanding of business groups, 
quantitative information sourced from databases and contextual familiarity of the researcher. 
The chapter also tries to explore the acceptability of the hypotheses proposed earlier, and 
causes for rejection, if any. 
9.1 Economic liberalisation and Market Imperfection 
During the last two decades or so a number of countries around the world have undertaken 
economic reforms of varying magnitude and scale to liberalise and globalise their economies. 
In July 1991 the GOI also initiated a sustained policy of administrative reforms, popularly 
known as economic liberalisation. Deregulation of selected industries in India started in the 
mid eighties. However, since 1991 the Government of India initiated a large number of 
policy and administrative reforms such as liberalisation of industrial licensing, curtailment of 
public sector, abolition of import licenses and lowering of import tariffs, followed by 
convertibility of the Indian rupee and encouragement of FDI's. This was followed by various 
fiscal and monetary reforms, including reforms in the banking sector, capital markets, and 
macro-economic adjustments included phasing out of subsidies, dismantling of price 
controls, and introduction of an exit policy. These reforms are collectively known as 
economic liberalisation. 
By and large the new economic policy has reduced governmental control in favour of 
market-based control. This resulted in a more efficient economic environment. In support of 
our Hypothesis 5, we observed a significant reduction in market imperfection in the Indian 
economy as a result of economic liberalisation. Our test of hypotheses rejected the null 
hypothesis (^\) at the 95% level, that the extent of average market imperfection in the Indian 
economy during the period (1990-1996) was the same as during the period (1997-2003). The 
alternate hypothesis (^2) lends credence to Hypothesis 5 that the extent of market 
imperfection during the period (1990-1996) was significantly higher than the period (1997-
2003), or conversely, market imperfection during the period (1997-2003) was significantly 
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lesser than in the period (1990-1996). The slope of the regression equation (indicated by its 
beta) was also significantly higher at -8.2 during the period (1990-1996) as compared to -2.5 
(1997-2003), supporting our contention. 
9.2 Strategic Fit and Performance 
Researchers have used the concept of fit in strategic management research in a variety of 
perspectives from the point of view of content and context. From the point of view of 
content, fit has been viewed as moderation, mediation, matching, gestalts, profile deviation, 
and co-variation (Venkatraman, 1989). And from the point of view of context, fit has been 
studied across inputs, markets, technologies etc. However, none of these perspectives has 
been able to provide a satisfactory explanation of the relationship between diversity and 
performance. This has been indicated in our full regression analysis (Table 8.9) the effect of 
diversity on performance as indicated by its beta coefficient. In some models the beta 
coefficient is positive, while in some models it is negative. The findings are clearly 
inconsistent with existing research findings. 
The possible inference could be that the surrogates of diversity (i.e. Herfindahl and 
Concentric Index) and performance (i.e. Accounting and Market based) are not robust 
enough or that the relationship between diversity and performance is spurious, negated by 
extraneous factors. Our research study points to the latter. Analysis of composition of 
businesses in our sample clearly indicates that performance clearly varies across different 
classes of strategic fit (Table 8.3) and not across different diversity levels. For instance, 
chemicals have an edge over steel; tea has an edge over hotels; aluminium has an edge over 
textiles; and petro-chemicals have an edge over financial services. In all these businesses, the 
group outsmarted the industry average in more number of counts than its closest competitors, 
where the strategic fit was high and vice-versa (see Table 9.1). This clearly supports our 
Hypothesis 2, that composition of businesses is a far more effective indicator of firm 
performance than diversity. 
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Figure 9,1: Comparative performance analysis across various businesses 
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Next, there is another area of contention among researchers whether group affihation is 
profitable for a firm or not. While there are benefits associated with group affiliation, there 
are costs too. Our test of means clearly reveal that firm performance is enhanced; if the firm 
business is consistent with the dominant logic of the TMT (see Table 8.2 and 8.3), though at 
the cost of group performance. The electronics business of the Tata Group is a clear example 
in this regard. The group continued to pump in funds, though long term survival looked 
bleak. Thus, while this benefited the firm, the performance of the group deteriorated. The 
table indicates that fit is directly proportional to performance with a correlation of +0.32. 
ANOVA (see Table 8.5) across these businesses with two measures of fit indicates that 
performance difference across these categories is too significant to be refuted as a mere 
aberration. This supports our Hypothesis 3A that firm performance is enhanced when the 
individual business fit with the dominant logic of the TMT and vice-versa. In this context we 
moved from simple measures of fit, to a much more complex measure of strategic fit; which 
we feel is far more superior. 
A further look at fiill regression analysis (Table 8.9) clearly indicates though the beta 
coefficient of diversity on performance is inconsistent, we have observed a consistent pattern 
of the effect of strategic fit and its moderating effect on performance (see Table 8.8). While 
the beta coefficient of strategic fit is consistently negative, indicating firm performance is 
enhanced at the cost of the group exchequer. While, a positive moderating effect supports our 
Hypothesis 3B that group performance is enhanced when greater the number of individual 
business, within the portfolio of businesses, fit with the dominant logic of the TMT. This 
perhaps enables the group to manage its various firm businesses better, if they are 
strategically similar. 
9.3 Dominant Logic and Diversity 
We had observed that dominant logic provided the greatest impetus to the composition of 
business portfolio of a group, hence its diversity. In fact, the composition of the group 
portfolio was the cause, while diversity was its effect. Though we do not deny the impact of 
the internal and external environment on the composition of the group portfolio; but it is 
primarily influenced by the dominant logic of the TMT. The negative beta coefficient of 
strategic fit on diversity is an indication of just that (Table 8.10). While a high strategic fit 
enhances firm performance through better allocation of resources, higher commitment of the 
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top management leading to more efficient strategy implementation. This strength can have 
dysfunctional effects too. Because new diversification projects represent a group's response 
to market changes, they are also the focal point for the tension between growth and inertia. 
Therefore strategic relatedness exposes the downside of new diversifications: strategic 
rigidities. The factor that constitutes strength also comprises vulnerability. Therefore, 
diversifications often become dysfunctional because they do not overcome strategic 
rigidities. This is indicated by the negative beta coefficient of strategic fit on diversity. The 
initial bottleneck faced by the Reliance group in implementing its telecom project is a prima-
facie example in this regard. This by and large lends credence to our Hypothesis 1 that the 
composition of portfolio of business of a diversified business group is shaped by the 
dominant logic of the TMT. 
9,4 Strategic Fit and Capabilities 
Increasingly, leveraging the distinctive capabilities of a firm is being suggested as the way to 
gain competitive advantage in the market place. Moreover, distinctive capabilities are 
fundamental to the success of new diversification projects that groups depend on to advance 
a market. Distinctive capabilities of firms also grow stronger with each diversification 
project. Furthermore, because a group becomes known for some particular strength (i.e. 
distinctive capabilities), it attracts the best of people in those disciplines, financing 
institutions tend to lend money at attractive rates, joint-venture partners provide best of 
technologies, supplier of inputs provide long standing credit. The project management skills 
reflecting the Reliance groups' distinctive capability to compress project as well as 
operational times is a distinct example. While a firm, which does not possess these 
capabilities, becomes trapped in inertia unable to undertake fresh diversification moves. The 
paradoxical nature of distinctive capabilities can pose severe challenges to the TMT, because 
failure to recognise and continuously manage distinctive capabilities can hamper firm 
performance and compromise the groups' future. How distinctive capabilities affect new 
diversifications and how they can be managed to ensure success of the diversification 
depends on how well the requirements of the diversification align with distinctive capabilities 
currently held by the firm. The success of the Reliance groups' telecom diversification can be 
explained just from this point of view; though unrelated in terms of SIC. The diversification 
demanded certain distinctive capabilities (i.e. command over complex technologies. 
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backward integrate projects, compress project times), which the group already possessed. 
The initial bottlenecks (i.e. lack of the ability to integrate complex sub-processes) faced by 
the Tata group in implementing its car project another distinct example in the opposite 
direction. The positive beta coefficient of resources and distinctive capabilities on 
performance and diversity (see Table 8.9 and 9.10) is just an indication of this corroboration. 
This also supports our Hypothesis 7A that strategic fit facilitates the development of 
distinctive capabilities, which has a strong bearing on overall group performance. 
9.5 iDertia and Dominant Logic 
We observed that inertia due to historical evolution of firms constrained strategic responses 
and thereby overall performance. Comparatively yoimger groups like the Reliance were more 
aggressive in their diversification strategies as compared to the Tatas and also performed 
better than older groups. Relatively younger groups like the Aditya Birla group with a few 
dominant businesses also performed better. Comparatively younger groups stressed more on 
intra-group resource sharing (i.e. cohesiveness). While older groups were also slow to react 
to the changing demand of the environment. Organisational culture rooted in bureaucracy, 
top management values, structure, and decision-making process retarded diversification 
moves and performance. Sensing economic opportunities in the wake of deregulation of 
industries, the Tata group initiated a strategic shifi; in 1983; however the same was delayed 
and could not be implemented before 1991. The inability of the group to exploit the growth 
and profit opportunities in the initial years reflected upon their poor performance. In a fast 
changing economic environment, early recognition of opportunities was a strong determining 
factor of performance. 
In the 80's and early 90's these groups led by septuagenarian and octogenarian managers 
were slow to respond to changes. They found it difficult to change old values and cultures 
deeply embedded in their people. But most importantly, to unlearn many dominant logics, 
which enabled them to successfully manage businesses in the pre-liberalised era, but posed 
difficulties in the post-liberalisation regime. Old logics developed in the core businesses in 
the protected era and regulated enviroimient had been institutionalised over a long period, 
thus making strategic shift difficult. However, the rules of the game in most industries had 
been changing fast. Many old practices such as cornering licenses, maintaining power 
relations with bureaucrats and politicians, and creating artificial supply gaps were fast 
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becoming obsolete and grossly ineffective. However, changes in the top management with 
relatively younger generation professionals led to unlearning of these old practices and 
learning of new rules of the game enabling them to change their dominant logics and 
discharge these tasks effectively. The negative beta coefficient of inertia on performance 
(Table 8.9) and positive beta coefficient on diversity (Table 8.10) confirms just this. This by 
and large confirms our Hypothesis 6A and 6B that economic liberalisation compels business 
groups to change its dominant logic, while inertia constrains it. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Final 
10.1 Summary 
In the past several years, researchers have sought to assess the relative importance of 
industry, business, and corporate factors in determining profitability differences across firms. 
To answer this question, researchers focused on empirical studies that use variance 
decomposition techniques. These studies incorporate the relative role of entire classes of 
effects in explaining differences in profitability. The ctirrent debate about the importance of 
industry, business, and corporate effects began with a study by Schmalensee (1985), 
followed by studies by Wemerfeh and Montgomery (1988), Rumelt (1991), McGahan and 
Porter (1997, 1998), Chang and Singh (1997) and Fox, Srinivasan and Vaaler (1997). These 
studies decompose the variance of business group or firm performance into components 
associated with corporate (strategy), industry and business effects, and some studies include 
year effects and interaction effects as well. Their findings having its origin in I/O Economics 
concluded that industry effects dominated profitability, followed by business effects, and 
corporate effects are insignificant. However, off late, a revisionist view is going around that 
corporate effects does matter; has gained considerable influence in recent years (Bowman 
and Helfat, 2001). 
Our thesis reaffirms faith in strategy literature that factors at the corporate level of business 
groups significantly contribute to differences in profitability, but evidences also suggest that 
factors specifically associated with diversification strategy significantly contribute to 
corporate effects. Corporate strategy in fact does matter. In order to evaluate such inferences, 
we first ask: what in theory are the corporate level factors that influence firm or business 
profitability, and to what extent these factors reflect corporate strategy. Corporate influence 
on profitability results from factors associated with membership of multiple firms or 
businesses within individual groups. Of the many corporate level factors that influence 
performance, much research has focused on the scope of the firm, including selection of 
industries in which they operate. Building on the work of Rumelt (1974), research has 
analysed the link between relatedness in diversification and firm performance. A large 
amount of research also has investigated the consequences of vertical integration of firms, 
which pointed out to the advantages of vertical integration when transaction costs are high 
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(Williamson, 1975, 1985). Prahalad and Hamel (1990) point to the importance for corporate 
success of core competencies that span businesses within a corporation, as another well-
known example of corporate level factors thought to affect profitability. 
With regard to conglomerates in the developed markets, Chandler (1962, 1977) emphasised 
the advantage of multi-divisional form of organization structure over the functional 
organisation of multiple-business form (M-form). Research related to firm organisation has 
shown that organisational structure also affects corporate profitability (Hansen and 
Wemerfelt, 1989). Other research has dealt with the systems of planning and control, 
including the use of strategic versus financial control (Goold and Campbell, 1987). 
Additionally, profitability may be influenced by top management skills, which includes 
managerial ability, and manifests itself concretely in managerial plans, decisions, directives, 
advice, and goal setting for the group as a whole and for individual businesses within the 
group (Andrews, 1987; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Further, researchers have also used 
similar techniques to estimate top management effects (in terms of leadership) on 
profitability. It captures one type of transient corporate effect for both single-business and 
multi-business firms (Lieberson and O'Connor, 1972; Weiner and Mahoney, 1981). 
A fundamental part of any group's strategy is its choice of business portfolio to compete in. 
According to strategy literature, this decision by and large reflects the superiority of related 
over unrelated and single business firms (Ansoff, 1965; Rumelt, 1974; Bettis, 1981; Lecraw, 
1984; Palepu, 1985); though some authors point towards unrelated diversification by 
business groups in emerging markets as a more effective strategy (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). However, despite over four decades of 
extensive research, there is still considerable disagreement about precisely how and when 
diversification can be used to build long term competitive advantage (Markides and 
Williamson, 1994). The proposition of related diversifications seems robust and 
comprehensive, because, it presumably allows the corporate epicenter to exploit the inter-
relationship that exists among its various businesses to achieve competitive advantage 
through cost and/or product differentiation. We argue traditional measures of relatedness 
provide an incomplete and potentially exaggerated picture of the scope for a corporation to 
exploit the interrelationships between its different businesses. This is because traditional 
measures look at relatedness only at the product, market or industry level. In this controversy 
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we try to build upon a more dynamic concept of strategic relatedness, which is superior to 
other traditional measures of relatedness (Markides and Williamson, 1994). 
We further argue that traditional ways of measuring relatedness are incomplete because they 
ignore the strategic importance and similarity of the underlying assets residing in these 
businesses, and primarily because it tends to equate the benefits of relatedness with static 
exploitation of economies of scope. In order to predict how much a strategy of related 
diversification will contribute to superior long-term returns, it is necessary to adopt a more 
holistic view of strategy and need to incorporate the entire gamut of corporate level factors to 
understand the influence of strategy on performance, and not merely concentrate on diversity. 
Theoretically, this thesis attempts to overcome this major weakness in explaining how 
relatedness can yield synergy across a diversified set of businesses. 
We built on the concept of dominant logic to develop a platform, which enabled us to take an 
birds eye view of factors that influences strategy and performance. In other words, dominant 
logic can be seen associated deeply with the genetic factors embedded in the roots of an 
organisation. Its influence is pervasive. It permeates the organisation, yet it is invisible. It 
predisposes the firm to certain kinds of strategic problems and often interacts with 
organisational systems and structures in a complex way in causing these problems. The major 
theoretical advance of this study is the contention that, as long as a diversification strategy 
(i.e. choice of business) is strategically related with the dominant logic of the group, 
performance will be enhanced and vice-versa. Unlike previous studies, this centrality will not 
only enable us to identify factors that relate to strategic successes, but strategic failures as 
well. This concept not only enables us throw more light on the nature of relationship between 
diversity and group performance, but also on the nature of impact of group affiliation on firm 
performance. 
However, dominant logic is not a static tool, especially when emerging markets use 
economic liberalisation as tool to further economic growth. The factors that shape dominant 
logic is then of considerable importance, in analysing these institutional changes. Prior, to 
economic liberalisation most emerging markets were characterised by institutional voids and 
gaps. During such periods market imperfection was pre-dominant in explaining strategic 
choice of business portfolios. However, as markets become more and more efficient and 
emerging markets integrated with the global markets, group resources and more particularly, 
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distinctive capabilities became more and more pre-dominant in explaining such strategic 
choices. In such situations, business groups need to dynamically respond and adapt to such 
changes in the business environment, by changing its dominant logic. And more importantly 
restore strategic fit, when the equilibrium between dominant logic(s) and business portfolio 
becomes deviating. Perhaps, one of the safest ways to take exposure in industries where the 
fit is deviating is to radically change the composition of the top management or hand over 
control of the business to a strategic partner. Or else wait for the industry to take its own 
course of acfion till it fits the dominant logic of the business group. Not only business groups 
should be able to see change in the environment but also transform themselves in the light of 
the changing economic enviroimient. Business groups, which responded appropriately to 
such changes, succeeded; in contrast business groups which fail to respond to the changing 
faces of the economic envirormient, inevitably perished. This phenomenon has not only been 
observed in emerging markets, but in the case of developed markets as well. Strategic 
restructuring of business portfolio is the key to superior performance, especially when the 
institutional context changes. This is perhaps an indication that the growth trajectory 
followed by a business group is not primarily the outcome of its socio-economic, political 
and cultural forces surrounding it. Diversification strategies facing business a group is also an 
outcome of its own volition. 
10.2 Implications, Contribution, and Limitations 
Why is synergy elusive to diversification? The answer to this question has tremendous 
implications for top management decision-making. Whenever, diversifications strategies fail 
or businesses experience low profits, the top management usually resort to stopgap 
approaches. We have observed that the top management usually seeks short-term remedies. 
However, when the origin of a problem lie deeply embedded in genetic factors of an 
organisation, a more pragmatic approach is essential. The top management should consider 
an approach that involves an altogether different paradigm. Any attempt to tamper with 
surface level factors will only add complexity to the problem and make the entire 
restructuring process futile. In such situations, a change in the organisational systems and 
structure will not suffice nor by simply diversifying to break out of the independence of this 
industry. Introspection into the dominant logic(s) of an organisation is likely to provide long-
term solutions. Therefore, when strategic bottlenecks are evident, ensuring strategic fit is the 
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key to diversification successes. There are evidently two strategic measures to ensure 
adequacy of this fit. One v a^y is to totally recast the composition of the top management or 
hand over control to an outside strategic partner. Second, wait for the industry to adjust its 
forces till it fits the dominant logic. 
From the point of view of contribution to theory, the study is an attempt to dig out a concept 
(i.e. dominant logic) that is lying dormant for more than two decades, despite being 
considered a milestone in strategic management research. It enabled us to study the 
applicability of this concept in the emerging market context. The concept has been ignored in 
most of subsequent research, because of the mystifying way in which the concept of 
dominant logic has been proposed. Criticality, of the concept is undoubtedly acknowledged. 
However, its implementation remained a major bottleneck, as the authors did not provide any 
clues on measurement of the construct. As assessed by the original authors, it is not only 
sufficient to develop methods of directly assessing dominant logic. It is more important to 
establish techniques to assess the degree of strategic fit between the dominant logic and 
businesses characteristics. 
The study also tries to integrate some useful concepts from multiple theoretical lenses to 
propose a unified theoretical framework on diversification. Most of earlier studies have 
looked at the diversity-performance relationship from the point of view of a single 
theoretical lens. This is perhaps an attempt to marry theories combining multiple theoretical 
lenses. Managerial explanations have been merged with explanations grounded in economic 
theory to enable a holistic view of the research problem. Though the need of the same has 
been felt much earlier, but most authors failed to move beyond the conceptualisation phase. 
And in some cases even the conceptualisation was incomplete, leaving little or no scope for 
further improvement. An important offshoot of the study is the capturing of the dimension of 
envirormiental efficiency on a longitudinal scale, which has seldom been attempted before. 
We have also made an attempt to develop reliable proxies for certain critical industry and 
organisational variables. These proxies can be replicated in other economic contexts to test 
their cross-context robustness and to further improve upon them. 
To do full justice to addressing this kind of exploratory research, the research design would 
have been ideal to use a combination of complementary research designs, viz., a few in-depth 
studies followed by large sample survey. Case studies are an ideal platform for an in-depth 
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understanding of strategy crises. However, a full scale empirical research to confirm the 
robustness of the proposed framework could not be carried out because one doctoral thesis 
alone is not enough for carrying out a research of such magnitude as time, as resources poses 
a major constraint. Currently, as our research stands, much room remains for further 
development. A distinct step towards ensuring higher significance for our study is to bypass 
longitudinal clinical investigation to assess dominant logics. A more direct approach through 
top management interaction would be much more meaningful and incisive. Perhaps, the first 
step towards assessment of the robustness of the framework is to confine the model to a large 
scale empirical testing comprising not less than fifty business groups, coupled with 
sophisticated modeling techniques, including neural networks. At successive steps of 
analysis, as we move from univariate to bivariate to simple multivariate analyses some of the 
relationships between variables become insignificant. This is a pointer that simple linear 
regression models may not adequately represent the complex reality surrounding 
diversification strategies facing business groups. Finally, efforts should be made to explore 
the application of this model over a wide range of strategic choices, and not focusing on 
choice of diversification alone. 
10.3 Conclusion 
The study is a small beginning towards a step in developing a unified theoretical framework 
on the nature and extent of diversification, its antecedents and impact on performance. It has 
adopted a holistic view combining multiple theoretical lenses to identify external and internal 
variables that has a bearing on the nature of relationship between diversity and performance. 
Select case studies were drawn across three largest business groups in India to analyse the 
nature of inter and cross-relationships among these variables. Special attention was focused 
on nature, and impact of the variables and its change from the point of view of economic 
liberalisation in India. More specifically, we tried to determine how business groups 
restructured their business portfolio in response to the same and its resulting effect on 
diversity and performance. Our observations led us to conclude that diversity in isolation has 
very insignificant bearing on performance. The composition of the business portfolio of a 
group is a far more superior indicator than diversity. We subsequently propose an integrated 
model of diversification strategies pursued by business groups in emerging markets. Our 
contention is that performance effects of high levels of diversifications may not be declining 
204 
provided business groups makes a conscious effort to restructure their portfolio of dominant 
logics, and diversify in businesses which are consistent to the same. 
In this study we have taken a birds-eye view by including a large number of critical 
variables. Though breadth is definitely missing from our study, one would appreciate that 
especially when new horizons are being explored, depth is more important than breadth. As a 
result we have been able to significantly increase the explanatory power of the diversity -
performance relationship, which was not achieved earlier. Economic liberalisation has 
formed the primary background for our study. The model has been framed by and large by 
incorporating the impacts of first and second phase of economic liberalisation in India on 
choice of diversification strategies facing business groups. But as we enter the third and the 
most important phase of economic liberalisation, which many other emerging markets have 
gone through, the validity of the model may pose questions. During this phase we expect to 
witness some critical ratification's (i.e. capital account convertibility, free foreign entry and 
exit, etc), which may pose a different set of diversification strategies not experienced earlier. 
This may enhance performance of business groups, or may put the entire institution of 
business groups at stake. These factors may be required to be controlled for. Though we have 
tried to generalise the model as far as practicable, fiirther research studies on this platform 
may be launched in other emerging markets to study the efficacy of this model, as different 
countries have used different models of economic liberalisation. Hence the crises faced by 
business groups in such markets and their subsequent strategies of business portfolio 
restructuring may be unique and different from the Indian context. We sincerely hope that 
this study will generate sufficient interest, which is likely to spark off new direction for 
future research on this framework. 
10.4 Directions for Future Research 
The validity of our integrated diversification model has been found to hold well across our 
sample survey. However, the robustness of the model may be put to question, given the 
limitations of sample size. Therefore, at this stage it would be wise to broaden the size of the 
sample by including business groups of varying profiles and cross-sections. This would 
better our understanding of business groups regarding the centrality of diversification 
choices. In order to position our model as a true unified theory, it also needs to be tested 
across a wide section of emerging markets. As the origin of business groups in different 
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markets can be traced to different sources of market failure. Our intuitive feelings also 
suggests that perhaps our proposed model would also hold good over an array of strategic 
choices, viz. choice of mode of strategy implementation, selection of strategy partner, etc. An 
extension along those lines would truly make the theory more generalisable in nature. 
Finally, assuming that behavioral patterns of business groups represent complex systems, use 
of statistical tools like neural networks for testing the model and its validation would be more 
incisive. 
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Appendices 
Appendix lA: Tata group data matrix (continued) 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Particulars 
Sales (log) 
Total Assets (log) 
Capital Employed (log) 
Interest Coverage (*) 
Debt-Equity Ratio (*) 
Solvency Ratio (*) 
Current Ratio (*) 
Debtors Cycle (*) 
Creditors Cycle (*) 
Fixed Costs (%) 
Dominant Business (%) 
Internal Transactions (*) 
Free Reserves (log) 
Liquidity (log) 
Cash Profits (log) 
Sustainable Growth Rate (%) 
Intangible Assets (%) 
Marketing Expenses (%) 
Plant and Machinery (log) 
Capital WIP (log) 
Working Capital Mgt (*) 
Market Imperfection 
Herfmdahl Diversity 
Concentric Diversity 
Geographical Diversity 
Avg Firm Age (yrs) 
ROCE (%) 
RONW (%) 
ROA (%) 
PAT Margin (%) 
0PM (%) 
Tobin's Q 
Shareholders Value (log) 
Scalar Fit Index (Sales) 
Scalar Fit Index (Cap Emp) 
1990 
3.93 
3.93 
3.75 
2.70 
1.27 
1.44 
1.50 
49.99 
83.76 
11.49 
30.53 
9.80 
3.27 
2.19 
2.87 
7.50 
0.26 
5.33 
3.60 
2.69 
1.68 
116.86 
0.84 
3.77 
0.13 
42.15 
8.21 
15.37 
5.33 
5.38 
8.01 
3.36 
3.79 
0.84 
0.82 
1991 
4.00 
4.01 
3.82 
2.92 
1.45 
1.42 
1.39 
53.68 
93.74 
11.46 
25.06 
9.74 
3.34 
2.38 
2.99 
8.86 
0.25 
5.23 
3.64 
3.21 
1.75 
109.96 
0.84 
3.77 
0.14 
42.00 
9.60 
18.46 
6.18 
6.33 
8.18 
4.09 
3.96 
0.84 
0.82 
1992 
4.09 
4.14 
3.94 
3.16 
1.91 
1.42 
1.48 
61.25 
108.39 
11.39 
28.88 
8.96 
3.41 
2.48 
3.04 
8.09 
0.45 
5.32 
3.72 
3.60 
1.77 
97.85 
0.85 
3.94 
0.22 
43.74 
7.82 
16.88 
4.96 
5.53 
6.96 
9.95 
4.54 
0.83 
0.82 
1993 
4.14 
4.26 
4.07 
2.84 
1.73 
1.61 
1.62 
71.38 
123.84 
12.35 
20.37 
9.59 
3.53 
2.68 
3.03 
4.73 
0.64 
5.95 
3.82 
3.89 
1.73 
93.66 
0.85 
4.01 
0.26 
44.07 
4.87 
10.85 
3.21 
4.18 
2.53 
5.71 
4.19 
0.82 
0.81 
1994 
4.19 
4.32 
4.16 
4.18 
1.23 
1.74 
1.66 
75.85 
118.44 
10.78 
18.12 
8.52 
3.65 
2.67 
3.17 
7.08 
0.63 
5.89 
3.94 
4.08 
1.56 
75.74 
0.84 
3.82 
0.23 
39.58 
6.82 
14.60 
4.70 
6.43 
4.95 
10.41 
4.46 
0.84 
0.82 
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Appendix IB: Tata group data matrix 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
1995 
4.31 
4.41 
4.24 
7.20 
1.11 
1.78 
1.67 
72.88 
106.52 
9.61 
16.46 
11.23 
3.78 
2.68 
3.36 
9.28 
0.93 
5.65 
4.08 
4.16 
1.46 
66.42 
0.84 
3.86 
0.24 
42.16 
9.11 
18.14 
6.18 
7.77 
8.40 
8.28 
4.61 
0.84 
0.79 
1996 
4.43 
4.51 
4.32 
6.20 
1.15 
1.80 
1.57 
74.31 
95.40 
10.29 
23.03 
17.06 
3.96 
2.90 
3.52 
10.31 
0.93 
5.25 
4.14 
4.22 
1.28 
63.77 
0.84 
3.88 
0.24 
40.76 
11.55 
19.64 
7.56 
9.01 
11.79 
7.80 
4.53 
0.84 
0.78 
1997 
4.49 
4.55 
4.38 
6.71 
0.95 
1.88 
1.81 
82.41 
86.27 
9.57 
21.47 
16.77 
4.03 
2.91 
3.50 
7.12 
1.04 
5.47 
4.19 
4.28 
1.05 
58.94 
0.83 
3.76 
0.25 
40.97 
8.98 
15.08 
6.10 
6.98 
8.86 
6.41 
4.42 
0.85 
0.81 
1998 
4.47 
4.62 
4.44 
6.50 
1.20 
1.81 
1.72 
80.58 
89.01 
11.89 
17.82 
15.84 
4.07 
3.17 
3.48 
5.19 
0.88 
5.87 
4.23 
4.36 
1.10 
54.03 
0.86 
4.27 
0.29 
41.74 
6.43 
12.15 
4.33 
5.99 
7.35 
5.71 
4.42 
0.81 
0.77 
1999 
4.47 
4.66 
4.48 
6.38 
1.05 
1.94 
1.67 
72.49 
89.79 
12.97 
15.19 
20.98 
4.12 
3.14 
3.51 
5.18 
0.77 
5.96 
4.28 
4.42 
1.24 
51.49 
0.87 
4.46 
0.30 
39.75 
6.04 
11.43 
3.98 
6.19 
6.51 
9.83 
4.31 
0.79 
0.67 
2000 
4.53 
4.69 
4.52 
5.63 
1.08 
2.29 
1.45 
66.21 
96.58 
13.36 
21.12 
24.44 
4.17 
2.85 
3.57 
4.81 
0.84 
5.45 
4.32 
4.47 
1.46 
44.43 
0.86 
4.32 
0.29 
39.17 
5.99 
10.41 
4.01 
5.82 
6.62 
5.95 
4.26 
0.75 
0.68 
2001 
4.58 
4.75 
4.58 
6.36 
1.13 
2.42 
1.43 
61.23 
103.21 
13.84 
29.58 
25.12 
4.22 
3.30 
3.60 
3.58 
0.81 
5.59 
4.41 
4.50 
1.69 
42.40 
0.86 
4.12 
0.34 
37.05 
4.91 
8.46 
3.29 
4.91 
7.63 
12.96 
4.19 
0.75 
0.67 
2002 
4.60 
4.78 
4.56 
5.69 
1.03 
2.55 
1.80 
61.92 
102.29 
12.73 
10.37 
28.80 
4.17 
3.16 
3.60 
4.27 
0.74 
5.39 
4.44 
4.52 
1.65 
44.73 
0.86 
3.97 
0.33 
38.28 
5.40 
9.60 
3.27 
4.89 
8.40 
16.81 
4.26 
0.75 
0.67 
2003 
4.65 
4.82 
4.61 
8.75 
1.70 
2.98 
1.83 
56.59 
114.41 
14.03 
27.75 
31.22 
4.30 
3.57 
3.77 
5.73 
1.86 
4.18 
4.48 
4.53 
2.02 
40.19 
0.84 
3.51 
0.39 
36.97 
8.79 
13.09 
5.45 
7.98 
12.21 
21.54 
4.31 
0.74 
0.59 
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Appendix 2A: Reliance group data! matrix (continued) 
No, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Particulars 
Sales (log) 
Total Assets (log) 
Capital Employed (log) 
Interest Coverage (*) 
Debt-Equity Ratio (*) 
Solvency Ratio (*) 
Current Ratio (*) 
Debtors Cycle (*) 
Creditors Cycle (*) 
Fixed Costs (%) 
Dominant Business (%) 
Internal Transactions (*) 
Free Reserves (log) 
Liquidity (log) 
Cash Profits (log) 
Sustainable Growth Rate (%) 
Intangible Assets (%) 
Marketing Expenses (%) 
Plant and Machinery (log) 
Capital WIP (log) 
Working Capital Mgt (*) 
Market Imperfection 
Herfmdahl Diversity 
Concentric Diversity 
Geographical Diversity 
Avg Firm Age (yrs) 
ROCE(%) 
RONW (%) 
ROA (%) 
PAT Margin (%) 
0PM (%) 
Tobin's Q 
Shareholders Value (log) 
Scalar Fit Index (Sales) 
Scalar Fit Index (Cap Emp) 
1990 
3.34 
3.45 
3.30 
2.39 
0.65 
1.61 
1.06 
60.26 
55.06 
15.31 
84.06 
12.81 
2.88 
1.41 
2.38 
1.74 
0.39 
2.22 
3.28 
1.99 
0.91 
116.86 
0.28 
1.17 
0.14 
42.50 
3.67 
6.22 
2.58 
3.33 
8.84 
0.97 
3.01 
0.94 
0.98 
1991 
3.40 
3.49 
3.32 
4.31 
0.71 
1.61 
1.00 
57.07 
61.75 
15.62 
77.36 
14.88 
2.89 
1.69 
2.51 
6.43 
0.06 
2.09 
3.30 
2.55 
1.08 
109.96 
0.29 
1.18 
0.12 
43.50 
6.86 
11.34 
4.67 
5.71 
10.21 
1.29 
3.27 
0.94 
0.97 
1992 
3.55 
3.74 
3.61 
5.86 
1.27 
1.48 
1.20 
52.73 
99.62 
12.08 
69.78 
19.63 
2.88 
1.94 
2.51 
2.47 
0.22 
1.64 
3.35 
3.41 
1.89 
97.85 
0.27 
1.16 
0.10 
44.50 
3.04 
6.19 
2.27 
3.56 
8.02 
2.32 
3.85 
0.95 
0.97 
1993 
3.69 
3.85 
3.74 
6.03 
1.91 
1.50 
1.25 
46.22 
83.21 
12.33 
82.08 
24.50 
3.14 
2.46 
2.83 
8.08 
0.15 
1.43 
3.58 
3.56 
1.80 
93.66 
0.28 
1.17 
0.15 
32.00 
6.97 
13.18 
5.45 
7.96 
10.93 
1.57 
3.70 
0.94 
0.89 
1994 
3.80 
4.00 
3.91 
6.16 
1.09 
2.02 
1.43 
42.61 
96.45 
10.08 
85.87 
24.32 
3.50 
2.30 
2.98 
11.82 
0.01 
1.18 
3.66 
3.69 
2.26 
75.74 
0.29 
1.19 
0.15 
26.75 
8.16 
13.70 
6.55 
10.40 
13.18 
3.04 
4.10 
0.94 , 
0.94 j 
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Appendix 2B: Reliance group data matrix 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
'' 
1995 
3.92 
4.17 
4.08 
7.95 
0.37 
2.72 
2.44 
33.51 
89.67 
10.76 
84.76 
25.28 
3.87 
2.69 
3.20 
22.46 
0.00 
1.71 
3.76 
3.94 
2.68 
66.42 
0.27 
1.17 
0.23 
27.75 
10.37 
14.19 
8.40 
15.09 
13.76 
1.57 
4.14 
0.94 
0.91 
1996 
3.98 
4.29 
4.21 
7.98 
0.39 
2.25 
1.69 
28.58 
63.89 
11.62 
81.12 
24.73 
3.95 
3.30 
3.31 
17.42 
0.38 
1.49 
3.92 
4.13 
2.24 
63.77 
0.31 
1.21 
0.34 
28.75 
9.87 
14.73 
8.12 
16.82 
15.55 
1.60 
4.11 
0.93 
0.90 
1997 
4.03 
4.41 
4.31 
4.45 
1.17 
1.86 
1.70 
44.25 
108.23 
12.01 
80.08 
22.69 
3.95 
3.05 
3.35 
10.38 
0.08 
1.18 
4.10 
4.24 
2.45 
58.94 
0.33 
1.23 
0.29 
22.00 
8.01 
14.51 
6.41 
15.18 
14.34 
1.22 
4.18 
0.92 
0.88 
1998 
4.19 
4.50 
4.38 
2.89 
1.52 
1.65 
2.78 
26.15 
100.09 
11.02 
80.45 
29.98 
4.00 
3.39 
3.45 
9.74 
0.12 
1.51 
4.27 
4.30 
3.83 
54.03 
0.26 
1.17 
0.38 
23.00 
7.97 
14.75 
6.10 
12.37 
14.66 
1.44 
4.30 
0.94 
0.88 
1999 
4.22 
4.57 
4.44 
2.73 
2.72 
1.48 
2.30 
22.52 
114.25 
12.48 
81.49 
37.71 
3.98 
3.72 
3.51 
7.54 
0.11 
1.72 
4.29 
4.37 
5.07 
51.49 
0.24 
1.17 
0.31 
24.00 
7.44 
15.99 
5.50 
12.38 
14.46 
1.16 
4.16 
0.94 
0.87 
2000 
4.36 
4.77 
4.65 
3.59 
2.12 
1.56 
3.39 
35.69 
112.70 
11.47 
83.29 
33.30 
4.13 
3.17 
3.65 
7.07 
0.08 
1,60 
4.41 
4.55 
3.16 
44.43 
0.22 
1.15 
0.72 
22.43 
6.43 
13.60 
4.88 
12.44 
14.28 
2.91 
4.81 
0.95 
0.89 
2001 
4.83 
4.86 
4.74 
2.34 
2.01 
1.69 
2.30 
18.27 
62.21 
7.57 
84.83 
37.72 
4.28 
2.89 
3.90 
10.52 
0.14 
2.72 
4.68 
4.58 
3.41 
42.40 
0.55 
1.58 
0.57 
22.22 
8.79 
16.79 
6.64 
7.09 
10.07 
1.62 
4.83 
0.98 
0.89 
2002 
4.84 
4.90 
4.79 
2.25 
2.37 
1.99 
2.75 
22.13 
55.77 
9.44 
90.14 
48.54 
4.43 
3.32 
3.90 
6.81 
1.15 
1.92 
4.74 
4.62 
2.52 
44.73 
0.56 
1.61 
0.54 
22.40 
5.80 
10.92 
4.43 
5.12 
8.90 
1.28 
4.57 
0.97 
0.89 
2003 
4.90 
4.93 
4.74 
3.09 
2.07 
2.07 
1.85 
18.64 
65.11 
7.35 
89.67 
0.67 
4.45 
2.36 
3.93 
9.02 
0.01 
1.81 
4.76 
4.65 
3.49 
40.19 
0.56 
1.59 
0.55 
24.00 
8.24 
13.26 
5.37 
5.71 
8.06 
1.76 
4.64 
0.98 
0.90 I 
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Appendix 3A: Aditya Biria group data matrix (continued) 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Particulars 
Sales (log) 
Total Assets (log) 
Capital Employed (log) 
Interest Coverage (*) 
Debt-Equity Ratio (*) 
Solvency Ratio (*) 
Current Ratio (*) 
Debtors Cycle (*) 
Creditors Cycle (*) 
Fixed Costs (%) 
Dominant Business (%) 
Internal Transactions (*) 
Free Reserves (log) 
Liquidity (log) 
Cash Profits (log) 
Sustainable Growth Rate (%) 
Intangible Assets (%) 
Marketing Expenses (%) 
Plant and Machinery (log) 
Capital WIP (log) 
Working Capital Mgt (*) 
Market Imperfection 
Herfmdahl Diversity 
Concentric Diversity 
Geographical Diversity 
Avg Firm Age (yrs) 
ROCE(%) 
RONW (%) 
ROA (%) 
PAT Margin (%) 
0PM (%) 
Tobin's Q 
Shareholders Value (log) 
Scalar Fit Index (Sales) 
Scalar Fit Index (Cap Emp) 
1990 
3.64 
3.62 
3.45 
3.33 
1.38 
1.55 
1.67 
34.82 
48.89 
9.86 
53.56 
10.52 
2.81 
1.96 
2.70 
7.90 
0.20 
5.27 
3.41 
2.45 
1.40 
116.86 
0.75 
2.45 
0.10 
37.64 
9.69 
25.23 
6.56 
6.62 
9.78 
2.05 
3.42 
0.78 
0.95 
1991 
3.69 
3.71 
3.54 
3.94 
4.65 
1.51 
1.57 
36.88 
54.83 
9.31 
66.82 
9.88 
2.99 
1.92 
2.74 
8.15 
0.14 
5.14 
3.47 
2.86 
1.49 
109.96 
0.76 
2.50 
0.12 
35.83 
9.23 
21.18 
6.36 
6.91 
11.10 
2.78 
3.66 
0.77 
0.94 
1992 
3.76 
3.79 
3.64 
3.93 
3.75 
1.42 
2.03 
44.71 
53.36 
10.18 
63.83 
10.05 
3.05 
2.13 
2.79 
6.50 
0.14 
5.12 
3.54 
3.13 
1.19 
97.85 
0.77 
2.56 
0.12 
35.36 
7.77 
18.62 
5.48 
6.10 
11.11 
5.71 
4.11 
0.78 
0.97 
1993 
3.85 
3.94 
3.75 
2.54 
3.68 
1.47 
1.92 
44.11 
57.57 
10.37 
63.82 
11.07 
3.23 
2.30 
2.88 
6.29 
0.14 
5.95 
3.74 
3.28 
1.30 
93.66 
0.77 
2.61 
0.12 
37.83 
7.40 
16.15 
4.76 
6.09 
8.98 
3.19 
3.99 
0.76 
0.95 
1994 
3.90 
4.03 
3.87 
2.74 
1.69 
1.70 
2.23 
44.00 
55.03 
9.45 
84.84 
10.09 
3.46 
2.20 
3.00 
10.52 
0.10 
6.67 
3.77 
3.48 
1.25 
75.74 
0.76 
2.60 
0.14 
41.64 
9.56 
18.53 
6.62 
9.14 
10.76 
4.03 
4.17 
0.75 
0.96 
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Appendix 3B: Aditya Birla Group Data Matrix 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
1995 
3.95 
4.14 
4.01 . 
3.24 
1.26 
1.82 
2.33 
40.53 
56.73 
9.25 
63.66 
8.33 
3.69 
2.24 
3.13 
13.29 
0.09 
6.66 
3.88 
3.63 
1.40 
66.42 
0.77 
2.64 
0.18 
40.23 
9.72 
16.81 
7.27 
11.83 
13.26 
5.10 
4.17 
0.75 
0.96 
1996 
4.02 
4.20 
4.08 
3.74 
1.11 
2.08 
2.10 
44.42 
50.29 
10.36 
58.01 
10.09 
3.78 
2.43 
3.24 
15.83 
0.17 
6.13 
3.95 
3.74 
1.13 
63.77 
0.76 
2.52 
0.19 
37.85 
10.81 
17.92 
8.23 
12.55 
15.46 
2.63 
4.18 
0.77 
0.96 
1997 
4.06 
4.24 
4.13 
3.72 
1.15 
1.91 
1.87 
45.74 
51.43 
10.63 
51.93 
10.67 
3.84 
2.36 
3.17 
10.06 
0.15 
7.51 
4.01 
3.85 
1.12 
58.94 
0.75 
2.51 
0.18 
38.85 
7.37 
12.26 
5.72 
9.02 
11.56 
2.66 
4.08 
0.76 
0.95 
1998 
4.11 
4.28 
4.19 
2.19 
1.77 
1.81 
2.10 
48.15 
47.04 
10.58 
42.40 
12.14 
3.88 
2.39 
3.19 
8.09 
0.14 
8.11 
4.10 
3.89 
0.98 
54.03 
0.76 
2.52 
0.19 
39.85 
5.85 
9.76 
4.64 
7.06 
10.70 
3.19 
3.98 
0.77 
0.95 
1999 
4.12 
4.31 
4.19 
2.37 
1.81 
2.02 
2.47 
47.86 
45.13 
11.74 
16.80 
14.01 
3.90 
2.42 
3.20 
6.56 
0.16 
7.65 
4.16 
3.92 
0.94 
51.49 
0.76 
2.53 
0.18 
39.25 
5.14 
8.23 
3.86 
6.28 
10.38 
5.22 
3.75 
0.78 
0.95 
2000 
4.17 
4.32 
4.19 
2.62 
1.40 
2.02 
1.77 
43.84 
52.84 
10.86 
2.93 
14.53 
3.94 
2.73 
3.14 
5.22 
0.84 
8.50 
4.19 
3.96 
1.21 
44.43 
0.77 
2.58 
0.20 
46.86 
4.41 
6.68 
3.29 
4.65 
10.61 
2.52 
4.02 
0.79 
0.95 
2001 
4.21 
4.33 
4.22 
2.57 
1.14 
2.17 
1.64 
41.56 
50.28 
10.76 
36.72 
18.66 
3.99 
2.76 
3.32 
13.26 
0.80 
9.38 
4.20 
3.98 
1.21 
42.40 
0.78 ^ 
2.66 
0.22 
44.73 
8.20 
12.02 
6.24 
8.32 
12.38 
2.11 
3.99 
0.78 
0.96 
2002 
4.21 
4.36 
4.19 
4.06 
0.71 
2.29 
1.51 
37.35 
52.49 
10.51 
29.47 
17.64 
3.97 
2.84 
3.30 
10.56 
0.71 
9.27 
4.21 
4.02 
1.41 
44.73 
0.78 
2.68 
0.20 
45.73 
7.74 
11.42 
5.27 
7.33 
11.59 
1.82 
4.00 
0.78 
0.96 
2003 
4.31 
4.42 
4.28 
4.11 
0.86 
2.53 
1.76 
32.47 
54.43 
9.79 
36.21 
15.21 
4.07 
2.80 
3.39 
11.89 
0.65 
8.10 
4.24 
4.06 
1.68 
40.19 
0.79 
2.79 
0.30 
45.88 
7.87 
11.32 
5.61 
7.25 
11.89 
1.63 
4.01 
0.80 
0.96 
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Annexure I: Case Study - Tata Group 
Jamsetji Tata founded the Tata group. Bom in 1839, he had joined his father as a trader in the 
1860's, venturing into Far^ast and Europe. By 1874, he had built enough capital to promote 
a textile mill. Emboldened by its early success, in 1886, he risked his fortune and reputation 
by acquiring a failing mill with the help of some outside investors from the Parsi community. 
Over the next eight years, he turned it into a profitable operation. Next Jamsetji Tata set out 
to introduce in India the modern manufacturing methods he had observed in his travels 
abroad. At the turn of the century, he went to England and the United States, exploring the 
possibility of setting up India's first steel mill. Despite much skepticism, Tata Steel was 
inaugurated in 1907. Under his able leadership the Tata Group ventured into the hotel 
business by forming Taj Mahal Hotel, one of India's, and world's premier hotels. After his 
death in 1904, his son Dorab Tata continued to implement his vision. Tata Hydro-Electric 
was set up in 1910 to supply electricity to Greater Mumbai. At that time it was the first and 
only private-sector project of such size and scale. It also collaborated in opening the first 
cement plant in the country in 1912. In 1917 it entered into soap and detergent 
manufacturing. In the 1919 it entered the insurance business with the creation of New India 
Assurance Company. By 1922, the Tata Group diversifications had snowballed into the 
promotion of 11 companies with an aggregate capital of Rs. 270 million. The group was 
organized with Tata Sons as the managing agency, which administered existing operations 
against payment of agency commissions and promoted new projects. 
When Jamsetji Tata set up the tentacles of the group he had observed that, "The acquisition 
of wealth was always subordinate to the constant desire in my heart to improve the industrial 
and intellectual condition of the people of this country (Harvard Business School Working 
Paper, August, 1992). This was aptly reflected in some of his early diversifications. At the 
turn of the century, he had gone to England to explore the possibility of setting up India's 
first steel mill. When the then chairman of the railway board heard that the Tatas were 
proposing to make steel rails to British specifications, he scoffed, "I will eat every pound of 
steel rail they succeed in making (Harvard Business School Working Paper, August, 1992). 
However, despite much skepticism, Tata Steel was inaugurated in 1907. When Jamsetji Tata 
had expressed his desire to visit a Bombay hotel, he was shown the board "(f) or Europeans 
only", this sparked of his desire to build the Taj Mahal Hotel, which was opened in 1903. 
Therefore to do India proud was a prime motivafing factor behind all major diversifications 
moves by Jamsetji Tata. 
Several of the new Tata companies were overcapitalised in anticipation of rapid expansion. 
During the period 1922-1938 as the post First World War boom subsided and the economy 
slowed, they faced severe financial crises. Initially, Tata Sons and other healthy units 
supported and sustained the weaker companies. But as several Tata establishments faced near 
bankruptcy, the Tata family sold a part its property and pledged a significant part of its 
fortune and family heirlooms to raise fimds to prevent insolvency. The Parsi community, to 
which the Tatas belonged, was very generous supporters of the group, especially during such 
troubled times. Parsis are a small community of about one lakh, who migrated to India from 
Persia in the lO"' century, and are now concentrated on the west coast of India in south 
Gujarat and around Mumbai. They practice, one of the oldest and smallest religions in the 
world. An ancient, monotheistic religion, the precepts of Zoroastrian ethics focus on 
maintenance of life and struggle against evil. Socially, they integrated into the multi-cultural 
223 
fabric of the country without causing antipathy in other rehgious groups. However, they tried 
to preserve their own distinct identity through social customs, religious practices and 
endogamy. Parsis were extremely successful in commerce and Industry in India. They had 
significant shareholdings in most Tata companies and regarded the Tata Group less as a 
business than as a Parsi institution in which they took great pride. Parsis were occasionally 
appointed as outside directors on Tata boards, and while the Tatas were professionally 
managed at the operating level, the group was distinctly Parsi at the board level. 
After Jamsetji Tata's death in 1904, his sons continued to implement his vision of building 
large, modem enterprises in core industries. Later when JRD Tata took charge of the group in 
1938, he resolved, "to dedicate himself and the firm to the task of carrying on Jamsetji Tata's 
vision of a politically free and economically strong India (Harvard Business School Working 
Paper, August, 1992)." The founder's vision implicitly guided the group during JRD's 
helmsmanship, as he himself acknowledged, " for me, everything starts with Jamsetji 
Tata. He had the clearness of vision to predict what India needed in order to achieve 
economic freedom. When I have to take major decision, I wonder what he would have 
thought. Following his precepts, we have considered it our duty to develop projects of 
national importance (Harvard Business School Working Paper, August, 1992). "The 
philosophy of the Tata Group in the pre-liberalization era can be best illustrated from the 
comment of a Tata Sons, Director, N.A. Soonawala, "If every one is told not to go into 
unrelated businesses, how will the airlines, oil and telecom industries develop? The 
government has said they can't do it. So there's a social benefit to all these diversifications 
(Harvard Business School, Working Paper, April, 1998)." 
Having struggled through the past several years for their very survival, the Tata were looking 
for fresh leadership and insight when Tata Sons elected JRD Tata 1938, son of Jamsetji Tatas 
cousin, as its youngest chairman. Taking over businesses with an asset base of around Rs. 
105 million, JRD was all set to give new directions to the group. The Tata Group was always 
based on a federal structure that reveres a king; the chairman of the Tata Sons' board. That 
worked fine when people like JRD was at the helm. When JRD took over as the chairman of 
the group, he was barely 34 years old. At that point of time there were many senior 
executives in the group whose understanding of the complexities of industrial life was much 
deeper. JRD felt it would have been a virtual disaster if he had chosen to throw his weight 
around beyond a point. Thus consensual approach to decision making became a part of his 
career till the end. It is quite possible that his consensual style was a result of the corporate 
environment in which he had to operate, but it became an integral part of his management 
style. The result was the development of a managerial environment marked by 
decentralisation, participatory decision-making and professionalism. Ajit Kerkar, chairman 
Indian Hotels reminisced, "He (JRD) was the kind of chairman any professional manager 
would like to have. He laid down the policies but never interfered with the day-to-day 
working. Even those areas where he and the board did not agree with me, he never imposed 
his own will on anything. That was his greatness (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, 
April, 1998)." 
In 1944, as the Indian independence struggle gained momentum under the leadership of 
Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, JRD and some other business leaders presented the 
"Bombay Plan", a blueprint for economic development in free India. The plan proposed that, 
after independence, imports should be reduced and domestic production geared to meet 
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internal demand. India gained independence in 1947, and Prime Minister Nehru imveiled an 
economic plan, which contained parts of the 'Bombay Plan', since it aimed at import-
substitution driven industrialization. However, the government was also strongly influenced 
by the Soviet command-economy model of industrial development. The budget therefore 
allocated investment - intensive strategic and infra-structural industries to government-
owned enterprises. The Tata Group, which had focused on several infra-structural industries, 
was not permitted to expand in many of them. Tata Airlines established in 1932, was 
converted into a national airline - Air India in 1947; which was also subsequently 
nationalised in 1953. The Tata Insurance Company was nationalised in two phases, in 1956 
and 1971. Tata Steel was not allowed to expand any further. However, protected from 
foreign competition, the Tatas and several other business groups flourished in the industries 
open to them. 
A fresh wave of diversifications started, as these groups strove to establish their position of 
eminence. Tata Chemicals started manufacturing caustic soda in 1939, among six other 
companies in the world. In 1954, TELCO collaborated with Daimler-Benz to introduce 
modem commercial vehicles on the Indian roads. In 1957, the Tatas bought the shareholding 
of the Forbes Group from Lead Industries, UK, which wanted to exit operations from India. 
By 1964, the assets of the Tata Group burgeoned to Rs. 4.2 billion ($884 million). The Tatas 
continued to contribute generously to philanthropic activities - about 85% of the Tata's 
family holdings in-group companies were held in charitable trusts. Many of the scholars who 
had benefited from JN Tata Endowment Trust (formed by Jamsetji Tata in 1892) returned to 
India and rose to positions of eminence. Further to the setting up of Indian Institute of 
Science in 1911 by Jamsetji Tata, JRD established the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in 
1936, the Tata Memorial Centre for Cancer Research in 1941, the Tata Institute of 
Fundamental Research in 1945, and the National Centre for Performing Arts in 1966. 
By then the "Tata" brand name had become a symbol of immense trust and value. It was 
worth its weight in gold, carrying an enduring image of reliability, honesty and integrity to its 
customers, investors and business partners. "The name generates immense trust, bankers and 
lenders would be ready to stretch themselves that extra mile for the Tatas" (Business Today, 
January, 1998), says Udayan Bose, CEO, Lazard Credit Capital. Despite its strong presence 
in all the major areas it operates in as well a well-founded reputation for technological 
capabilities, the Tata Group has tied up a number of joint ventures, especially in new 
businesses. "The Tatas are a favourite of foreign technology providers that are comfortable 
entering India only with a reputable partner (Khanna, T. and Palepu, K., 1997, "Why 
Focussed Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets", Harvard Business Review, 
75(4); 41-51. The groups' size gives it incredible financial muscle. However, "Speed is not 
one of the Tata Groups' strengths (Business Today, January, 1998)" says Raj Nair, M.D. 
Business Consulting Group. 
Border wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965, backed with harvest failures, 
increasing trade imbalances, political uncertainty and escalating social unrest forced the then 
socialist Congress government into taking a series of populist measures. This resulted in an 
era of increased government regulation during the period (1965 - 1980). The government 
began to tighten the parameters of business conduct through controls such as foreign 
collaboration approvals, capacity licensing, differential taxation, import tariffs and quotas, 
price controls, exit blocks and approval for fund raising. These controls were largely 
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intended toward large Indian business groups. To deal with the governments' intensive 
regulatory policies, most Business Groups found it expedient to set up "industrial embassies" 
in the capital city to deal with regulatory bureaucracy. The intensifying government 
involvement had a deleterious impact on business the business environment. Over-regulation 
began to retard growth. Sheltered from foreign competition, domestic industries became 
inefficient and the country lagged behind the rest of the world in terms of technology. 
At this stage, some business groups found it expedient to cut private deals with powerful 
politicians and bureaucrats. Bribes in exchange for licenses, illegal political contributions in 
return for preferential regulation and the generation of unaccounted money for sustaining this 
corrupt nexus became, for some, the recipe for quick success and rapid growth. In other 
cases, pre-empting competitors by taking multiple licenses, and then not proceeding to build 
facilities, became a perfectly legal strategy for using the regulatory regime to profit climate 
of artificial scarcity. As a result efficiency was grievously hurt due to government's pursuit 
of populist policies. Essentially, excessive government regulations fractured markets and 
destroyed economies of scale, size and scope. Indian business groups therefore became much 
more diffused. The largest and the most successful business groups tended to be run by 
political savvy entrepreneurs. One study even emphasises the 'industrial embassies' 
maintained by large business groups in New Delhi, ostensibly for the group companies to 
interface with the regulatory apparatus. 
Besides, with so many legal constraints many business groups resorted with success to the 
pursuit of the loopholes and the illegal. Also most business groups became accustomed to the 
strict government regulations, which were responsible for limiting competition and thereby 
guaranteeing success in any line of business. Unaccustomed to wheeling and dealing in this 
fashion, the Tatas often found themselves at odds with those in power. In 1978, a strong bid 
to nationalise Tata Steel orchestrated by a coterie of powerful politicians barely failed after 
nationwide strong protests. Faced with difficulties of operating in such a hostile environment, 
the Tatas stopped promoting major projects, and went into a defensive mode, trying to 
protect and maintain its existing businesses. The new ventures that were initiated between 
1965 and 1980 were primarily in service sector. The group's assets in 1977 stood at Rs. 11 
billion (US $ 1.4 billion). A Tata Director commented bitterly: 
"Efficiency has been grievously hurt due to the government's pursuit of 
populist policies. Essentially, government regulations fractured markets and 
destroyed economies of scale. Due to difficulty in exiting an industry, our 
companies have, over time, become much more diffused than we would like 
them to be. Besides, with so many legal constraints, several of our competitors 
have resorted with success to the pursuit of the loopholes and the illegal 
(Harvard Business School, Working Paper, August, 1992)." 
In 1969, the government abolished the managing agency system, which it considered a 
vestige of colonial times that allowed large business houses to accumulate and exercise 
excessive market power. With the dissolution of the system, Tata companies became legally 
independent, but they continued to have JRD as common chairman. They attempted to 
formalize synergy across the companies through a network of common directors. Also, there 
was a web of inter-corporate holdings. JRD encouraged each Tata Company to operate 
autonomously and adopt an organisational form suited to its business; so long its business 
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practices conformed to the Tata philosophy. Thus while Tata Steel had a departmental 
organisation - Voltas was structured as a matrix organisation - and TCS was organised 
around project groups. 
JRD's helmsmanship was distinguished by his ability to repeatedly recognise, recruit, 
develop and support highly talented executives. As a result, the senior Tata management 
became a constellation of very capable and powerful managers whom JRD supported and 
gave considerable latitude. As a result it became a matter of pride and status to work for the 
Tata Group, which was regarded as highly professional and ethical organisation. On the other 
hand, there was also a feeling within the group that it was carrying dead wood because of the 
tolerant Tata philosophy. While merit was recognised and rewarded, a poor performer rarely 
left the organisation, resulting in the middle management getting clogged with survivors 
rather than performers. A senior Tata Executive observed: 
"Many of our companies are grossly over-maimed. We have very high wages, 
and yet we have very high absenteeism. It is very difficuh to squeeze work out 
of our workers. The employees have no fear of punishment. They can always 
appeal against a harsh decision to JRD and given his tolerant and charitable 
nature, he would say - "We can't have this in the Tatas" (Harvard Business 
School, Working Paper, August, 1992)." 
On the defensive mode in the since the 1970's, internally the Tatas curbed initiative and 
encouraged continuity. By 1980's, most of the senior managers were in their late sixties, or 
even older. Thus gerontocracy came to rule the House of Tatas. One of the senior directors 
defended the practice of senior directors remaining involved in the Tata boards: 
"Most healthy people live beyond 85 years of age these days. By insisting on 
retirement at 60, do we condemn them to the shelf for the next 25 years? Will 
you tell them to stop at the pinnacle of their achievements, at the peak of their 
performance? Besides, all the parameters of our philosophy have been tried, 
tested, and lay down, and I can't see any new input possible to it. We have to 
hold on the pattern set by Jamsetji Tata, and it is these senior people who 
provide the strongest support (Harvard Business School Working Paper, 
August, 1992)." 
The slow turnover of directors caused some frustration between second tier executives who 
have been waiting in the wings, for decades in some cases, for that top slot. Fumed a younger 
Tata executive: 
"Unfortunately, the senior directorships have become a priesthood which is 
unable to induct new, young people and impart values to them. Just as nothing 
grows under a banyan tree, most of the charismatic directors do not have a 
strong second or third line to take over behind them. We have an ageing 
leadership with very little concern for or understanding of modern 
management. People held back in their more energetic, formative years are 
able to manifest their creativity only in the evening of their lives, when they 
are physically slower and intellectually stagnant (Harvard Business School 
Working Paper, August, 1992)." 
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To knit the group together, they set up Tata Administrative Services (TAS), composed of 
management professionals selected by very senior Tata directors and placed in key middle 
management positions. They could move horizontally within the group and were primarily 
encouraged to develop a vision of the Tatas as a unified group rather than as a conglomerate 
of disjointed companies. JRD remarked on his philosophy of always recruiting the brightest 
people and then encouraging them to operate freely and develop independent minds. He 
summarised his philosophy as follows: 
"Once I get good people, I am able to get the best from them, probably 
because I am somewhat of a democrat. An outstanding manager is somewhat 
strong willed and of independent character with a distinctive style of 
management and personal behaviour. I give such a person an allowance for 
his idiosyncrasies in order to draw out the best in him. Of course, this has 
made it difficult sometimes to ensure that a reasonably uniform style of 
management prevailed in the Tata Group. The Tatas have nevertheless been 
surprisingly cohesive and successfiil because their directors and managers 
have been professional persons and have been allowed full freedom to deploy 
their talents and ideas keeping within the Tatas ethos (Harvard Business 
School Working Paper, August, 1992)." 
The policy of the Tatas has always been to give the nation, shareholders, customers and 
employees a fair deal. The management gave also gave its top management considerable 
latitude and an allowance for its idiosyncrasies in order to draw out the best in them. It 
therefore became a matter of pride and status to work in Tata companies, which were 
regarded as highly professional and ethical organisations. Tata Steel, for instance, had a 
history of constructive and irmovative industrial relations. It introduced the eight-hour 
workday, leave with pay, accident compensation, maternity benefits, and profit-sharing 
decades before its counterparts in the US. A joint-consultative system was also set up in 1957 
to ensure better cooperation between employees and the management. A senior Tata 
Executive observed: 
"Bright young people join the Tatas, not because the salary is extraordinarily 
high, but because the prestige of working for a clean, decent organisation. On 
the labour front, the Tatas have made a name for themselves by being at the 
forefront of supporting employee rights. Thus, we have excellent industrial 
relations with our work force (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, 
August, 1992)." 
As the 1980's dawned, JRD started to step down from the chairmanships of various Tata 
companies in favour of their Managing Directors. The leadership battle that followed when 
JRD decided to step down was perhaps a logical corollary of his style of management. As his 
involvement in the companies diminished, each company became increasingly independent, 
and the tenuous ties that bonded the group together further weakened. In 1981, JRD stepped 
down in favour of Ratan Tata, grand nephew of JRD, as Chairman of Tata Industries, a 
ceremonial position as head of the junior of the two central companies, the other being Tata 
Sons. He reminisced: 
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"Even as I am forcing myself to slowly disappear from the Tata companies, I 
am content that, throughout my tenure at the top, we have maintained a clean 
reputation and yet managed to succeed in business. And I am confident that, 
though things will change after me, our basic values will remain unchanged. 
The next generation is also equally committed to the ideals which our group 
stands for (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, August, 1992)." 
Ratan Tata elected to use his position to convert Tata Industries into the strategic planning 
cell of the entire group. The Tata Group, one of biggest institutions and respected business 
house was poised at a momentous point in the century old history. A new generation of 
leaders was emerging, and the environment was also undergoing unprecedented changes. A 
senior Tata Director commented: 
"With the departure of JRD's generation and new, relatively unproven 
generation taking charge, the future is rife with both opportimities and risks. 
The group can become much more powerful if we are able to seize the 
openings ahead. On the other hand there is gnawing doubt whether we will be 
able to retain the vision and values which have really been at the core of our 
success, and which have kept the Tatas at the forefront of the Indian business 
for so long (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, August, 1992)." 
Ratan Tata recalled: 
"Tata Industries was a shell company with no ongoing operations. But it had 
on its board the chief executives of all major operating companies. I requested 
that the board become the strategic arm of the Tatas, but I didn't get great 
enthusiasm from any of my colleagues. Some of them were apprehensive that 
I might use the strategic planning exercise as a guise to build an empire. There 
was also resistance to openly sharing information with their colleagues from 
other companies, owing to strains of inter-company rivalry (Harvard Business 
School Working Paper, August, 1992)." 
There were several skeptics among the directors, even JRD himself A senior director 
summed up the mainly negative reactions: 
"Our approach was strategic planning is a gimmick. We have done very well 
without these new-fangled ideas. All decisions are incumbent on government 
policy anyway. So, why is this young man thrusting new jargon down our 
throats? In any case, every one of our companies does continuous strategic 
planning, and there is an advantage in having different, independent, 
autonomous units loosely tied together by broader policies. Our companies are 
so diverse, their technologies so different, that centralized planning may lead 
to disastrous strategic mistakes (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, 
August, 1992)." 
However, Ratan Tata and his team at Tata Industries pressed ahead with the strategic plan. 
They matrixed the Tata Group into seven business areas and tried, somewhat unsuccessftilly, 
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to get the company heads to thing in terms of business areas. He offered to take a leadership 
position in the area of high technology. He reasoned: 
"I felt that the Tatas were absent from the high-technology areas of the 
1980's. This was rather strange, for at the turn of the century, Jamsetji Tata 
had invested in pioneering long-gestation projects in emerging technologies. 
In order to carry the same philosophy through, I suggest an eighth business for 
the Tatas, which would be my own focus - high technology (Harvard 
Business School, Working Paper, August, 1992)." 
The re-constituted proposed business areas were - High Technology Industries, Metals and 
Associated Industries, Consumer Products, Utilities, Engineering Industries, Chemicals and 
Agro Industries, Service Industries and International Business. Since the abolition of the 
Managing Agency System, cohesion amongst the various Tata companies had greatly 
diminished and is in danger of disappearing altogether. A long term business overview or 
strategy would contribute substantially towards synergetic growth for the Tatas in the coming 
years. The 1983 Strategic Plan endeavored to define possible group objectives, future 
strategies and action plans. It was recognised that the plan only constitutes the initiation of a 
group mechanism and a first statement of possible group direction, which would have to be 
followed up in a more formal and on-going basis. The fixture synergy would have to come 
from a new organisational structure. The major recommendations of the group formed to 
examine environmental trends for the coming decade are: 
• Joint venture partnerships should be explored with the government. 
• In addition to promoting new projects, Tatas should adopt the route of 
acquisitions, mergers and divestitures. 
• Tatas should increase their shareholding in their group companies. 
• Tata organisations should form mutually beneficial complementary 
relationships with the small-scale sector. 
• Tatas need to adopt a technology-oriented policy for growth and survival, and 
they must exit low technology businesses. 
The overall strategies for the Tatas, which underlie the business areas, were aimed at 
achieving a position of leadership through thrust on: 
Technology driven leadership. 
Concentration on selected product-market segments. 
Joint-sector projects. 
Acquisition, merger and divestiture. 
Synergy. 
The Indian economy was grievously hurt by a double blow at the turn of the 1980's: the 1979 
oil shock and the subsequent worldwide recession skewed India's trade balance and led to a 
recession, while cost push inflation continued unabated. Coupled with this was the sharp 
decline in agricultural production. The economic scenario seemed very bleak under the 
existing regime of licenses and controls. To spur growth, the government relaxed restrictions 
on business, and shifted its emphasis toward achieving greater productivity, efficiency, 
competitiveness, and exports with more reliance on the private sector. Policy changes 
included an easing of licensing requirements, greater trade and foreign investment 
liberalisation, and export promotion through more flexible exchange rates. As a result, new 
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opportunities opened up for private enterprise. The economy rebounded: real GDP grew 
5.8% on average during 1985 - 1990; inflation was lowered to 6.4%; exports grew by over 
10%. Ratan Tata remarked on how the Tata Group was faring in this more open environment: 
"Our 1983 recommendations proved prophetic to some extent. The 
government's new policy could have been drawn from our strategic plan 
forecasts. The various business groups started moving in the directions our plan 
had indicated. However, very few companies wholeheartedly implemented our 
recommendations, and when they actually did, they gave no credit to the plan. 
In the high-technology areas though, most of Tata Industries applications for 
new businesses came through (Harvard Business School Working Paper, 
August, 1992)." 
Because of good operating management in relatively protected markets, the steel division, the 
electrical division and the chemical division turned in stellar performances during the second 
half of the 1980's. Tata Steel acquired several unprofitable downstream businesses, and then 
turned them around. The chemicals division also grew impressively and began planning 
numerous large projects in oil refining, petrochemicals and fertilisers. Demand for TELCO's 
HCV (its primary product) peaked in 1983. Meanwhile, in a new segment altogether demand 
for LCV's started rising. The government allowed the manufacturer of one class of vehicles 
to make vehicles of another class without seeking a separate license. TELCO was quick to 
capitalise on this opportunity. It entered the market with its indigenously developed LCV (i.e. 
Tata 407) and cornered a significant market-share. Several new business houses used this 
opportunity to enter the LCV market in collaboration with foreign partners. Though TELCO 
entered the market later than the new collaborations, it had already garnered a position of 
market leadership. Its product was better suited to Indian conditions and its powerful HCV 
distribution network and service network was an added advantage for its LCV segment. As a 
result, within six months of introduction, TELCO's LCV sales were more than the sales of all 
the new companies combined. The central group also experienced a spectacular growth. Tata 
Industries spawned several new companies. Titan Industries promoted to manufacture 
watches shook an industry dominated by a government PSU. Tata Unisys and TCS 
dominated the rapidly growing IT industry. Indian Hotels spawned several new projects in 
India and abroad. After hibernating for about two decades the Tatas were once again 
initiating gigantic projects. 
On the other hand, the continued poor performance and bleak prospects of the textiles 
business forced the Tatas to, in effect; implement the recommendations of the 1983 Strategic 
Plan by trying to exit from that industry. The Tatas filed for liquidation of one company and 
closed down operations of a second. The public was astounded. A government bi^reaucrat 
commented acerbically, "It is difficult to believe that the Tatas do not have the resources to 
bale out their companies. It calls into question the social commitment of the group (Harvard 
Business School, Working Paper, August, 1992)." In response, the then chairman of the 
textile group remarked, "Tata companies are independent companies (Harvard Business 
School Working Paper, August, 1992)." 
The Tatas were somewhat sluggish in some areas in the increasingly open and competitive 
environment. Though, in 1982, the government had partially eased price controls on cement. 
ACC, a Tata company was slow in reacting to the opportunity. TOMCO and NELCO 
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continued to falter in the market. VOLTAS faced setbacks in the traditional retail distribution 
business as its suppliers integrated forward and its distributors integrated backward to take 
away business. In a significant departure from its normal practice, in 1981, VOLTAS 
appointed R. Sarin, a senior executive from an MNC as President. Sarin brought in a fresh 
team to re-synthesize the amorphous giant. His team transplanted performance evaluation 
and responsibility systems from their multi-national experiences. However, these steps met 
with considerable resistance and smoldering resentment. Tensions developed at the senior 
levels, factions and cliques formed and as a result neither revenue nor profits improved. 
Eventually, in 1986, Sarin left VOLTAS, citing incompatibility and difference in cultural 
styles as the reason for his exit. Despite some setbacks, by the end of the 1980's the Tatas 
had reasserted themselves as the largest Indian business group. Ratan Tata was appointed 
deputy chairman of Tata Steel in 1985 he became chairman of TELCO in 1988, and also 
deputy chairman of Tata Electric in 1989. In 1991, he emerged as the chairman of the Tata 
Group by virtue of being appointed as chairman of Tata Sons. Taking this opportunity Ratan 
Tata forged ahead with his unfinished task by proposing the 1991 Strategic Plan, which is 
basically, an extension of the 1983 Strategic Plan. The basic outline of the plan was laid 
down as follows: 
Mission -
• To selectively enter and manage technology based businesses. 
• To be the organisational catalyst for inducting new technology based activities 
into group companies. 
• To supplement, support, and protect Tata shareholding in group companies. 
Objectives -
• Achieve better growth and returns over a long term than the average 
performance in its industries. 
• Achieve a position of leadership over three to five years in new businesses. 
• Provide staff inputs to associate companies. 
• Facilitate induction of new technology-based activities into group companies. 
• Provide help in consolidation of group companies operating in similar 
business areas. 
Strategies -
• Selectively enter and manage technology-based businesses. 
• Facilitate diversification of group companies. 
• Create synergy amongst group companies. 
Opportunities -
• Biotechnology. 
• Electronics & Telecommunications. 
• Services. 
After proposing the 1991 Strategic Plan, Ratan Tata observed: "I think we are in many more 
businesses than we should have been in and were perhaps not concerned about our market 
position in each of those businesses. I think the needs today are that we define our businesses 
much more articulately and that we remain focused rather than difftised, and that we become 
more aggressive than we used to be, much more market driven, much more concerned about 
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our customer satisfaction (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, 1998)." Ratan Tata on 
being questioned in an interview regarding - what criteria will he choose in deciding what to 
keep and what not to, in his groups' exercise in portfolio restructuring? To this he replied, 
"One is certainly going to be: can we be in the first three in that industry in the country? 
Secondly, are we willing to continue to put money and managerial resources into that 
industry to have it continue to be that way? The third is the most serious one, as to whether 
that particular firm will provide us with the returns that we are expecting (Business World, 
September, 1999)." 
Strong resentment followed with other business heads. As a result marked differences began 
to emerge within the Tata group with distinct centrifugal tendencies. A senior director 
expressed the commonly held concern that the group was beginning to break apart: 
"The early eighties saw numerous investment companies being established by 
different Tata companies, with the aim of carving out their own domains with 
the Tatas. A number of Tata companies began competing against one another. 
Mobility across group companies declined, and each company began evolving 
its own culture and management cadre. Thus the Tatas became just a social 
club, with the central group having no legal, financial, or moral clout. And, 
however much senior directors may like to believe otherwise, several Tata 
executives even violated the Tata ethos (Harvard Business School Working 
Paper, August, 1992)." 
JRD commented on his selection of Ratan Tata, "There is no doubt in my mind, objectively 
and subjectively, that Ratan will do very well as my heir and carry on our family traditions 
(Harvard Business School, Working Paper, August, 1992)." Russi Modi of the steel division, 
Darbari Seth of the chemicals division, Nani Palkhivala of the cement division, H.N. Sethna 
of the electric division and Ajit Kerkar of the hotels division had emerged as extremely 
powerful chairmen of these dynamic clusters. These directors viewed the Tatas as an 
agglomeration of very loosely held clusters. Regarding Tata Group's shared identity, Darbari 
Seth commented, "In law and theory, all Tata companies constitute a commonwealth of 
nations (Harvard Business School Working Paper, August, 1992)."While Russi Modi 
remarked, "Today, the Tatas no longer exist as a group, except in their culture and in name. 
Legally, none of the companies has any reason to show allegiance to Tata Sons. It is only 
because of the financial institutions, which are the major shareholders that Tata management 
is allowed in these companies. Tomorrow, if the companies decide to go their separate ways, 
it will be perfectly legitimate - not popular perhaps, but legitimate (Harvard Business School 
Working Paper, August, 1992)." 
However Ratan Tata commented, "The clusters within the Tata group do have enough 
shareholdings in their associate companies to be called groups in their own rights (Harvard 
Business School Working Paper, August, 1992)." All throughout its history the Tata Group 
had basically followed the precepts set by Jamsetji Tata. This was ingrained in the top 
leadership at the helm of the Tata Group considering an almost static business environment 
during the major part of the entire 20"^  century. However, the drastic changes in the business 
environment due to economic liberalisation, since Ratan Tata becoming the chairman of Tata 
Sons, forced him to restructure the group structure and strategy altogether keeping in mind 
the pace of economic liberalisation. However, highly diversified groups like the Tatas were 
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slow to react to the changing demand of the environment. Organisational culture rooted in 
bureaucracy and regulation, top management mind-set, structure and decision making 
process however, retarded the process of restructuring. 
By then the group assets had burgeoned to Rs. 75.8 billion. Ratan Tata feh that, while 
managing the external environment effectively was a major challenge, as critical as a 
challenge would be managing the internal group dynamics and moulding the available human 
resources. By the late 1990's inertia within the Tata Group had been reduced drastically, the 
restructuring was nearly complete enabling Ratan Tata with a platform to carry out his 
proposed diversifications to give the Tata Group a new identity. In order to face the 
immediate hazards and grasp the opportunities, the Tatas needed to become more vibrant. He 
noted, "The Tatas have been a club for a generation. As a result, we have become staid, solid 
and conservative. For many years, our risk taking ability was stinted, as we confined 
ourselves to marginal diversification and expansion of facilities. Rarely did we go for new 
and emerging technologies. Now we have to take bolder steps. We do have capable, young 
people to carry out our ambitious plans. We have to keep them excited, mobile, lean and 
hungry. Besides, the lieutenants of yesterday have carved out their domains by ringing the 
bell, but dare you penetrate the boundaries unasked! Hopefully, the group will again fold 
back together as the next generation takes charge (Harvard Business School Working Paper, 
August, 1992)." However, the task before Ratan Tata was not easy. He had commented: 
"....we had a visionary chairman before me but organisationally it was still very traditional, 
in many cases we were resistant to change (Business World, September, 1999). 
With cash rich foreign firms encroaching on the Indian economy, corporate uneasiness was 
heightened by India's new takeover code which no longer protected companies from hostile 
takeovers; only groups with at least 26% ownership could block resolutions. In short most 
business groups in emerging markets have to unlearn and imdo what their predecessors had 
done. With the onset of economic liberalization Ratan Tata remarked; "In order to face the 
immediate hazards and grasp the opportunities on the horizon, the Tatas need to become 
more vibrant. Now we have to take bolder steps. We do have capable, young people to carry 
out ambitious plans. We have to keep them excited, mobile, lean and hungry. Besides, the 
lieutenants of yesterday have carved out their own domains. You are welcomed if you enter 
these domains by ringing the bell, but dare you penetrate the boundaries unasked (Harvard 
Business School, Working Paper, 1992)." 
With this the Tata Group for the first time in its history posit a major shift in its mindset. The 
group had always followed Jamsetji's precepts of entering heavy, long-gestation projects that 
would contribute to nation building. The flip side was that the Tatas have done well in 
technology-intensive areas, but failed on the market side. The precepts did not gear up the 
flexibility and dynamism of the Tata Group required for diversificafions that were marketing 
intensive. During the 1990's, the Tatas had stumbled in industries where investment was not 
intensive but competition was intense, such as textiles and consumer products. There was 
some concern with the top management that this inability to perform in competitive market 
conditions stemmed from its inability to make hard-nosed decisions quickly. In this context 
Ratan Tata remarked, "Now what we are doing in not just looking at companies, but looking 
at businesses within a company, and besides it must fit with the group's way of doing 
business (Business Today, March, 2002)." 
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The current group chairman Ratan Tata, 65, hopes to govern a homogenised and highly 
focused group. It was for the first time that the Tata Group witnessed a significant shift in the 
mind-set of the top management; in a way they foresaw their group businesses. In the context 
of the emerging economic environment Ratan Tata once remarked, ".... the threshold of 
acceptability or the line between acceptability and non-acceptability in terms of values, 
business ethics etc. is blurring (Business World, September, 1999)." In the post liberalization 
period the main focus of the group was to reorganise its firms on the basis of synergies. 
Another area of serious concern that faced the group in the early stages of economic 
liberalization is how its firms would prepare for an era of intensified competition. Leadership 
in costs and market shares, the Tata group has leveraged their advantage well. They have 
rarely been first movers, but often using their size and muscle, have come from behind to 
overtake early leaders. Says B.R. Dey, Director, Tata Management & Training Centre: 
"Ratan Tata would like us to redesign our training methods to meet the objectives of the Tata 
Group (Business Today, January, 1998)." And what might these be? While keeping the much 
revered value system and ethics intact, the group wants to turn itself into a more dynamic 
entity. The paradigm shift in the mindset of the Tata Group in the post liberalization period 
can be summed up as follows. From core-industries, high infra-structural investment, long 
gestation, business ethics and social responsibility to focusing on brands, trimming the 
commodity sail, expanding services and get out of businesses that are not among the top 
three, and thinking global. 
During the same period several small and medium sized groups embarked on ambitious 
expansion and diversification plans. Outstanding among these was the Reliance Group. Led 
by the astute Gujarati entrepreneur, Dhirubhai Ambani, the group leveraged government 
export promotion policies, a rapidly expanding class of middle-income group investors, and 
access to key politicians and bureaucrats, to diversify at a breathtaking pace fi-om a virtual 
non-entity in 1970 to become by 1990 the third largest business group in India, after the 
Tatas and Birlas. However, the Tatas has always stayed away from political interferences. 
This has been clearly brought out in a recent interview where Ratan Tata clearly remarked: 
".... I can't handle political manipulation (India Today, February, 2003)." With the stage 
being set, the task before Ratan Tata remained two fold. Firstly he needed to raise ftinds to 
consolidate group's shareholding in its different affiliates that would provide him with a 
greater degree of financial control and secondly recast the top management of the Tata Group 
to carry out his strategic plans and exercise better operational control. 
However, Ratan Tata did not command the kind of authority that any of his predecessors did. 
The. result: the group now lacks the spirit of central cohesiveness. There was also strong 
resistance to change, built as resuh of more than 100 years of legacy. Therefore he had to 
ensure that strong systems were in place to restructure the group. Without which Ratan Tata 
felt that he would not be able to carry out his vision. Therefore he needed to re-position the 
entire top management, to let the Tatas new vision percolate down to the parts of the empire 
that flourished during times when left to manage on their own freedom. In contrast to the 
earlier view offered on JRD's style, Ratan Tata when asked on his view on consensus, he 
remarked: "By and large, I believe in it. But if it is going to lead to everybody going off in 
his own direction, I think a time comes when the leadership has to indicate where it should 
go (India Today, February, 2003)." Says J.J. Irani, MD, Tata Steel: "It is true that in the 
present competitive environment, business strategies have to be clearly defined, the structure 
of the business groups has to be streamlined, and, in many cases the family size has to be 
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reduced (Business Today, January, 1998)." This is a cause for consternation, considering the 
Tata Groups' loose financial control over its key firms. The group needed to rectify this by 
increasing its stake in its member firms. But continuously generating funds to increase 
stakes, given the high market capitalisation of most firms would be an onerous task for the 
group. 
The group suffered from a huge bureaucracy resulting in languorous decision-making. It is a 
multi-layered group and Ratan Tata had tried to de-layer the decision making process by 
proposing the formation of Business Review Committees (BRC) at the firm level and Group 
Executive Office (GEO) at the group level. But agility is not yet a part of the Tatas. When 
Ratan Tata was asked to comment on the group new structure, he commented, ".... the 
reason for that was age. There were CEO's in there 70's that never left their office. They did 
not have a connection with the market place and I thought we were losing our aggressiveness 
as a result of that (India Today, February, 2003)." On the issue of size and structure Ratan 
Tata remarked, "The globalisation issue featured in our 1983 Strategic Plan, but was not 
done. But we could not revive it in the 90's because we were too pre-occupied (Business 
Today, February, 2004)." Ratan Tata obviously refers to the structural problems that existed 
then. In this perspective Ratan Tata then commented: "We have somehow to consider 
ourselves as one group. That's what we're trying to do in terms of corporate 
communications. We need to get the companies to operate synergistically with each other. 
After that, we will have to evolve a structure that has to be accepted, not mandated (Harvard 
Business School, Working Paper, April, 1998)." 
However, Ratan Tata pressed ahead with this strategic plan and structured the group profile 
into businesses and not individual firms. A first step in that direction was the creafion of the 
Group Executive Office (GEO) under the aegis of Tata Sons. The GEO would look into the 
groups' diversificafions, restructuring and acquisitions. The GEO comprised senior Tata Sons 
directors like R. Gopalakrishnan, Ishaat Hussain and N.A. Soonawala. In turn each Tata 
affiliate would have a Business Review Committee (BRC), which will interact with the GEO 
for all strategic decisions. The broad idea is to facilitate greater interaction between Tata 
Sons and its affiliates - and greater control. In this context Rata Tata remarked: "There was a 
need to put the companies in a framework where there they would move in one direction. 
Previously, it was the company first then the group. The earlier strategy was reversed: first 
the group then the company (India Today, February, 2003)." 
Ratan Tata was considering several steps that he hoped would give the group a stronger 
collective identity and a greater degree of financial control. The principal move he was 
considering was for Tata Sons to undertake the responsibility of centrally promoting a 
unified 'Tata Brand', which could be used by all member firms, which subscribed to the 
'Tata Brand Equity Scheme'. Every firm that subscribed to the scheme would derive the 
benefits of the centrally promoted Tata brand and of the Tata affiliation. Tata Sons would 
require an annual contribution related to each firm net income in order to meet the costs of 
the development, promotion and protection of the unified Tata brand. He further proposed 
that subscribing Tata firms each pay a contribution (he adamantly avoided using the term 
"royalty"), the amount of which would depend upon each firms' degree of association with 
the brand. 
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Contributing rates would range between 0.10% to 0.25% of a firms net income after 
excluding taxes and non-operating income, and would be capped at a maximum of 5% profit 
before taxes. Participating firms would be required to subscribe to a code of conduct, which 
would ensure uniformly high standards of quality and ethical business practices. Participating 
firms would also be eligible for recognition of outstanding representation of Tata values with 
'JRD Quality Value Award', modelled after the 'Malcolm Baldridge National Quality 
Award' in the US. Ratan Tata had not anticipated the resistance that it would face within the 
group, indicating more than opposition to just this plan. This proposition was healthily 
questioned and debated by some Tata company heads, while a long-time Tata senior member 
and former chairman ACC led the revolt. A disgruntled Indian Hotels shareholder 
complained: 
"Any payment made by the company for questionable returns substantially 
affects my income from the company. It will only tighten the grip of Tata 
Sons over the company at our expense. By advertising that our hotels belong 
to the Tata Group, we will confiise prospective clients and undermine the 
significance of the Taj Group of Hotels brand name which has been buih up 
over 92 years (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, April, 1998)." 
Ratan Tata commented: "The intention has been that it (brand) would create a single strong 
entity that will benefit all the member firms. If you are to fight a Mitsubishi or an X or Y in 
the free India of tomorrow, you better have one rather than forty brands. You better have the 
ability to promote that brand in a meaningful manner. Do we have a common thread that runs 
through the Tata Group? In the past, the thread was embodied in a personality, maybe JRD 
Tata. But I think times are different now. You have to institutionalize certain things. You 
cannot be forever on personalities. There may a Mr. Tata as chairman, or there may not be a 
Mr. Tata as chairman of the group (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, April, 1998)." 
Tata Sons plarmed to use the fee money to build a national and later international group 
brand image, by emphasizing a set of core values and ethics, largely through advertising. 
Tata Sons estimated that a meaningful domestic brand promotion alone would cost at least 
Rs. 300 million per annvmi. 
Many Tata firms urged Tata Sons to adopt a strong, global Tata corporate campaign, and 
were pleased with Ratan Tata's plan. The managing director of Titan Industries, a Tata group 
affiliate, wrote, "Tata firms have in recent years been pressing Tata Sons to put their act 
together with some speed so that they can both take advantages of the opportunities and ward 
off the competitive threats which have suddenly and so dramatically emerged with the 
opening up of the Indian economy. The "Tata" name is a powerfiil force and hugely valuable 
commercial property (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, April, 1998)." While some 
member firms felt otherwise. However, despite much discontent the scheme was again put 
before the Tata Sons board for consideration and approval. 
After much discussion, finally, the mandatory scheme was made a voluntary one. To meet 
the overall shortfall, Ratan Tata contemplated selling a 20% private equity stake in a holding 
wholly owned by Tata Sons, Tata Industries, to Jardine Matheson, a Hong Kong based 
diversified conglomerate. The deal was expected to push Tata Industries share-capital from 
Rs. 476 million to Rs. 595 million. Ratan Tata planned to use this capital influx to 
consolidate Tata's share holding in group companies and partially for venture start-ups 
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promoted by Tata Industries. He also anticipated that the Hong Kong based conglomerate 
would bring in expertise in a wide rage of business activities such as retailing and 
distribution, real estate, hotels, construction and financial services. The broad idea was to 
complement Tata's skill in businesses where consumer patterns and trends change rapidly. 
Indeed while the group has been quick to enter certain newly liberalised areas, it lacks 
exceptional people systems. "Our growth is a little too fast, I'm not sure that we have the 
right people necessary to sustain it, says, N.A. Palkhivalla (Business Today, January, 1998)." 
In the meantime, Ratan Tata revived a much-ignored Tata policy, which set the mandatory 
retirement age for executive directors at 65 and non-executive directors at 75. After much 
discussion, the policy was made enforceable and in 1997, seven senior directors retired in 
deterrence to the new order, paving the way for new members to take on the board of Tata 
Sons. Some of the younger generation members that took on the Tata board subsequently 
were: R.K. Krishnakumar, steering the tea and hotel business; S. Ramadorai, the technical 
consultant the group often consults; P. Gopalakrishnan, spearheading the GEO and 
supervising agro and chemical businesses; Ishaat Hussain, manages the groups finances and 
provides inputs on new investments; Kishore Chaukar, in charge of integrating the groups 
telecom foray; Noel Tata, leading the groups retail revolution. 
Says Faroukh Mehta, Advisor (HRD) Tata Industries: "The Tata Group believes that 
executives should become CEO's by the age of 45 years so that they get time to implement 
their plans (Business Today, January, 1998)." For one, the group is again reviving its 
premium management cadre, TAS; and the "Tata Group Mobility Plan" is also in place. The 
group has an enormous responsibility to shoulder. It faces an uncertain future, not because of 
what it already is, but because of what it is trying to become. Recognising that the number of 
businesses of the group will always be more than the number of key people available to head 
them, JRD played the role of a promoter - as a key investor and strategic advisor - to 
perfection. By playing the role of a hands-on CEO, Ratan Tata has reversed that, creating an 
autocracy. Admittedly, a group as large as the Tatas requires systems, but it is one thing to 
exercise control through systems, and another to do so through centralisation. 
However despite much opposition, by the end of the 1990's when the group re-structuring 
was nearly complete, a clear new mind-set had evolved under the leadership of Ratan Tata. 
The group which was historically skewed towards manufacturing, tried to shift gears and 
move into branded products and services, which realise more value. The shift is from selling 
commodities to marketing branded products and services that not just differentiate but 
fetches a premium. With manufacturing ceasing to on the groups advantage, the thrust is on 
knowledge-based industries. The next objective as in the words of Ratan Tata, " is to 
become globally competitive, leverage global opportunities and have the required global 
capabilities (Hindustan Times, September, 5, 2004)." Consider this on the performance side. 
Remarks R. Gopal Krishnan, Director, Tata Sons, "Brand business fetched about a fifth of 
sales and profits in 1990; today they account for half of the revenues and 58% of net profits. 
The fact that one-third of the portfolio has been reviewed would imply that in some 
mysterious way (we) have been at it (Business Today, March, 2002)." 
Once the restructuring was almost over Ratan Tata added a thrust to his diversification 
strategies once again. Having overcome the barriers of resistance, he knew, now he could 
implement his vision. According to independent estimates around Rs. 50000 crore projects 
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were in the pipeline or under implementation. Approximately half of them are for expanding 
and modernising while the rest are in areas where the group does not operate at present. 
During 1991 when Ratan Tata took over as group chairman, cohesiveness was at its historical 
low. All the firms in the Tata Group were pursuing independent strategies and often their 
business interests clashed with each other resulting in fierce competition amongst different 
Tata firms. 
A close look at the major diversifications of the group in the post liberalization period reveals 
- IT: from being a software giant, TCS was set to become one of the largest end-to-end 
solution providers. Though it missed the initial phase of the IT boom, it promised to be the 
biggest on the stock market with an expected valuation of around Rs. 60000 crore; Steel: cut 
the staff size by a third, divested non core businesses like cement and trimmed costs to 
emerge as the cheapest steel maker in the world; Tea: realized growing tea was bad business, 
bid for "Tetley" and turned Tata Tea into the worlds second largest tea maker; Telecom: 
from being a non-entity in Andhra Pradesh, the acquisition and joint venture of VSNL and 
'Idea' gave the group the imprint that now spans the entire bandwidth from basic, cellular, 
national and international long distance, internet, wireless and other value added services; 
Automobiles: engineered the potential of TELCO from a manufacturer of HCV's and LCV's 
to an integrated car manufacturer. Despite following its usual route of organic growth in case 
of TACO, Trent, Tata Finance, it also went in for joint ventures like - Idea Cellular with 
Aditya Birla Group and Tata AIG with AIG of US and also for PSU acquisitions like VSNL 
and CMC. This not only made the Tata Group leaner and tighter, it also helped them to 
consolidate its business in major areas (TACO - in car manufacturing, Tata Power - in steel 
business, Tetley - in retailing tea. Idea Cellular - in telecom operations, CMC - in its IT 
operations). A close look at the major changes in the groups' business portfolio: 
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Sell-offs.... 
Cosmetics (Lakme) 
Pharmaceuticals (Merind) 
White Goods (Voltas) 
Cement (Tata Steel) 
Bearings (Tata Timken) 
Cement (ACC) 
Paints (Goodiass Nerolac) 
UPS (Tata Liebert) 
Oil Drilling (Hitech Drilling) 
IT / Telecom (Tata Industries) 
Deficit (-) 
Total 
Rs. crore 
256 
42 
230 
550 
120 
950 
99 
77 
78 
325 
8769 
11496 
. . . . and diversifications 
Auto Components (TACO) 
Cars (TELCO) 
Retailing (Trent) 
Cold-Rolled Steel (TISCO) 
Captive Power (Tata Power) 
Hotels (Indian Hotels) 
Tetley (Tata Tea) 
Internet Services (Tata Industries) 
Insurance (Tata AIG) 
Telecom (Tata Tele / Idea Cellular) 
Infrastructure (Tata Power) 
Financial Services (Tata Finance) 
CMC (Tata Sons) 
VSNL (Tata Sons) 
Total 
Rs. crore 
150 
1700 
120 
1600 
1860 
500 
1890 
65 
250 
1170 
500 
100 
152 
1439 
11496 
Source: Business Today, March 31, 2002, Vol. 11, No. 6. 
The new business realities had made the historically benevolent group clinical in its 
diversification strategies. During the last decade, product lines that showed no promise of 
becoming segment leaders were dispensed with. In 1993 Ratan Tata began by selling off loss 
making TOMCO to Anglo-Dutch major Hindustan Lever. What followed were a series of 
other sell-offs. The majors were - Lakme, Merind, Voltas, ACC, Tata Timken, Goodiass 
Nerolac, Tata Liebert and Hitech Drilling. In most of the other businesses the Tatas were not 
doing as badly as in the case of TOMCO. To this Ratan Tata cited, "Most of the above 
businesses did not fit with our way of doing business (Business Today, March, 2002)." Even 
today, there is a lot of scope for sell-offs, considering that about half-a-dozen firms fetches 
85% of the top line and 90% of the profits. 
Despite having undertaken a series of diversifications post 1991, the car project proposed by 
TELCO remained at the heart of Ratan Tata. Himself a staunch automobile enthusiast, he 
wanted to personally lead the transformation of TELCO from an integrated manufacturer of 
commercial vehicles to a car integrator. The diversity of the Tata Group in 1990 stood at 
0.8435 with a presence in 16 industry segments, which peaked at 18 segments in 1993. Till 
1998, diversity of the Tata Group, more or less remained static. However, post liberalisation 
coinciding with the group-restructuring plan, the strategy has been of consolidation during 
the period (1998-2003). 
TELCO was incorporated in 1945 under the British rule, to take over Peninsular Locomotive 
works to manufacture steam locomotives and boilers for Indian Railways. After 
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independence, under the then industrial pohcy announced by the GOI the production of 
locomotives was reserved exclusively for state-owned enterprises. As a result TELCO 
decided to diversify into the manufacture of HCV's in 1954, under technical collaboration 
with Daimler-Benz. In 1961 it started manufacturing excavators and earth moving 
equipment. In 1981, the GOI allowed four Japanese firms - Toyota, Mitsubishi, Mazda and 
Nissan to enter the Indian market through joint ventures for manufacturing LCV's. In 1985, 
the GOI under its deregulation policies announced its decision to allow "broad-bonding" of 
licenses. 
By then TELCO collaboration with Daimler-Benz had come to an end and it was capable of 
manufacturing all classes of commercial vehicles with negligible import content. TELCO 
availed this opportunity and developed a totally indigenous LCV (i.e. the Tata 407) in a 
record time of 18 months. Close on the heels, two more models were launched: Tata 608 and 
Tata 709. Although the Japanese collaborated vehicles were more fuel efficient, the Tata 
LCV's outsmarted its Japanese counter parts in terms market-share (i.e. 59%, TELCO 
Annual Report, 1995). This was made possible because TELCO's vehicles were cheaper and 
sturdier; were tolerant to abuse and better suited for Indian road conditions; and moreover 
enjoyed the countrywide sales and service network of TELCO. 
Ratan Tata decided to integrate TELCO's operations even further, and manufacture cars in 
collaboration with Honda of Japan. However, the GOI refused permission citing tight foreign 
exchange situation. When the proposed joint venture failed TELCO designed and launched 
"Tatamobile" in 1988, which was a cross between a car and a LCV. In 1992 TELCO 
introduced the "Tata Sierra", a two-door personal transport vehicle and the 'Tata Estate, a 
four-door extension; both built on the 'Tata 207' platform. In 1994, TELCO launched "Tata 
Sumo" a MUV; a first significant deviafion from the "Tata 207" platform. When bookings 
opened for the Tata Sumo; the company received bookings for an awesome 90000 vehicles, 
and still date enjoys a steady market-share of around 20%. 
Around that time Ratan Tata proposed at the AGM of Automobile Component Manufacturers 
Association (ACMA) of delivering a "peoples car". After a gestation of about 5 years, 
booking for TELCO's first passenger car (i.e. Indica) in the true sense opened at more than 
50 dealership points across the country. TELCO had initially planned to accept 10000 
bookings in the first phase and another 50000 bookings in the second phase of its operations. 
However, surpassing all expectations within seven days of the opening of the offer TELCO 
closed its bookings with 115000 applications - that's 1 booking every 5 seconds. This 
volume was significant enough to assure that the project would break-even within (18-24) 
months of its operation. 
As an auto maker it will now focus sharply on just one point on the value-chain that stretches 
between raw materials and after sales-service: assembling the parts into the complete 
automobile. In this context Ratan Tata remarked on the different scales and complexities of 
manufacturing, "You can be manufacturer in the context of what many Indian companies are. 
That is you have a license agreement, you manufacture. You don't embrace any of the 
technologies. You don't set up capabilities to develop a product. But you continue to 
manufacture the given product. When you can't do it any more, you find a collaborator who 
gives you the license to manufacture, or to import whatever the collaborator says. You install 
a plant and produce that product. That's one interpretation. 
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Then, there is a second level of manufacturing. Here you really adopt the technology and 
develop a product. You see the product through its crude stage and its gestation period. With 
experience, you refme the product. It is at least a me-too product, and at least good enough to 
sell in the market. That's truly manufacturing in a sense, because you really own that 
product. Finally, there is a third category that is coming into its own today. This is when you 
are a systems integrator. You develop a system and might consider that system to be your 
product. And you don't do very much actual manufacturing in that product. You buy the 
components but you design that product and you assemble that product (Business World 
January, 2005)." From an integrated truck manufacturer to an automobile integrator; from a 
product driven company to competence-centric company; from an engineering-oriented 
operation to a strategy-fixation enterprise; from an inward-focused company to a partnership-
powered company; from a local company to a global corporation; from an efficient 
organisation to a world-class organisation, a close look at TELCO from this point of view, 
which in way also reveal the group's new outlook. 
As a systems integrator TELCO is out-sourcing 80% of the value of the "Indica", translating 
into 1200 to 1500 plus parts, from 200 odd vendors. It is said that it takes an average of 48 
months and roughly $3 billion (Rs. 12750 crore) to develop a new car; but Indica was built in 
31 months on a shoe-string budget of Rs. 1700 crore. Hitherto, TELCO had all along focused 
on the domestic market, relying on demand and relative lack of competition to sell its 
products. Now it is setting its sights on the international car market. The power train under 
TELCO's hood for this shift: a rise to world-class standards, which is essential since, even in 
the domestic car market, it competes against companies with those standards. It is in the 
strategic choice of the route that it has taken to reach world-class levels lies the key to 
TELCO's metamorphosis. 
For now, it is organising itself around capabilities and alliances; not products. The focus of 
those capabilities: managing the supply chain. Thus by learning to build and manage a supply 
chain, it is setting the ground for leveraging the capabilities. So its skills as an integrator; 
bringing together products and services from both upstream and downstream operations, and 
packaging them for the customer under a brand name is what TELCO plans to use in its 
globalization drive. A look at how Ratan Tata made this paradigm shift possible. As it 
prepares for that stage, the company is also cutting teeth on managing alliances, which is 
only, way in which it can extend its reach without expending its own precious resources. 
While there is no doubt about the value-capture potential of the auto-components business, 
integrating the components with manufacturing operations is the most critical game for 
automakers. 
Automakers worldwide are moving away from the assembly function; and focusing instead 
on car-design and styling. That TELCO's eyes are trained on the world is clear from the 
briefs to its vendors. AH vendors have been asked to benchmark only against truly 
international standards. It was against this backdrop TELCO had to take its primary make-or-
buy decisions for the key inputs: design, engine and transmission. Applying the price-control 
strategy, TELCO went to the Italian company IDEA, for the product design. It bought the 
engine from Institute Francais du Petrol of France, and applied its skills to suit its 
requirements. For the transmission, TELCO relied on its in-house option at its Engineering 
Research Centre (ERC), Pune. We will take a close look at the resource gaps and how the 
group integrated its entire system to deliver a world-class car. 
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Activity 
1) Designing 
2) Manufacturing 
3) Marketing 
4) Finance 
5) Gestation 
What TELCO possessed 
a) 'Cliasis' based designs for LCV's and 
HCV's. 
b) Diesel engines for LCV's and HCV's. 
c) Carburettor based injection systems. 
d) Low frequency of new models. 
e) Exterior designing. 
a) Large engine manufacturing 
facilities. 
b) Not Integrated. 
c) Not available. 
d) Not available. 
a) Partial knowledge from marketing 
earlier cars. 
b) None. 
c) 'Truck culture' at dealerships. 
d) None. 
a)Rs. nOOcrore. 
a) 30 - 36 months 
What was required 
a) 'Monocoque' body designs for 
cars. 
b) Diesel and petrol engines for cars. 
c) MPFI 
d) High frequency of new models. 
e) Interior designing. 
a) Small engine manufacturing 
facilities. 
b) Assembly line to cater to large 
volumes. 
c) Machine tool for small cars. 
d) Vendor network. 
a) Knowledge of customer tastes and 
preferences. 
b) Showrooms. 
c) 'Passenger culture' at dealerships. 
d) Servicing and spare parts network. 
e) Over Rs. 4000 crore. 
b) Over 48 months. 
A close look how TELCO closed in on the resource gaps: 
By stretching existing resources -
Source: Teaching Notes, IIMC. 
• The engine manufacturing facilities and skills were utilised to manufacture 
engine for small cars as well. 
• The paint shop for Mercedes was used to paint Indica as well. 
• The ability to work in teams that had been applied to designing and 
manufacturing commercial vehicles was utilised in the course of the Indica 
project. 
" An organisational culture that permitted experimentation was of use in the 
Indica project as well. The design team first experimented with developing its 
own models of the Indica before approaching IDEA. This helped them 
identify the specific area where they needed the inputs. 
• TELCO possessed the basic capability built over time to develop new 
products in a short space of time. This was used to develop Indica too. 
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By using existing resources to acquire or build new resources -
• Machine tool division resources applied to modify second hand plants. 
• Robots shipped in basic form and then programmed and fitted in-house. 
• Mercedes relationship utilised to acquire second hand presses from them. 
• Later machine toll facilities were used to modify these machines. 
• One new press two second-hand presses modified to suit requirements. 
• Dies and fixtures were manufactured reducing costs. 
By concentrating existing resources -
• The skills of designers, costing experts and manufacturing personnel were 
made to converge, resulting in low procurement costs and effective value-
chain configuration. 
• Throughout the duration of the project, the resource leverage effort was 
focused on meeting the specific attributes laid down by Ratan Tata himself 
By complementing resources -
• The design skills of TELCO personnel were complemented with the specific 
inputs from IDEA. 
• Knowledge in diesel engines upgraded with specific inputs from La Modeme 
Moteur. 
TELCO went to all its collaborators with a clear idea of what it wanted. This would not have 
been perhaps possible without the involvement and commitment of Ratan Tata himself, who 
spearheaded the "Indica Project" right from the scratch to rollout. The basic focus was not on 
adding value through assembly, but on coordinating activities on the value-chain. He firstly, 
set an ambitious task rather than focusing attention on the 'details of improvement', the task 
of becoming a world-class car manufacturer. He set a clear and precise task, the task was 
concretised with a focus on the next capability to be developed, the capability to build a 
small car. The value to be brought to the customer was defined in precise terms with clear 
benchmarks. 
Ratan Tata remained committed all throughout; he did not allow TELCO's resource gaps to 
act as a detenent. He was personally involved at every stage of the project and helped in 
achieving convergence and focus. He allowed his team of engineers and designers the 
freedom to experiment, helping them build expertise through self- learning. This is in 
consonance with the Tata culture, which allows its top executives an allowance for his 
idiosyncrasies in order to draw out the best in a person. After the technological collaboration 
with Daimler-Benz expired in 1969, TELCO had not renewed it further, preferring instead to 
develop technologies in-house. After a gestation of twelve years TELCO had set up in its 
Pune complex, the pride of place in the complex had gone to the "Engineering Research 
Centre" (ERC). By 1994 ERC had grown to be one of the biggest and by far the most 
advanced establishments in India. The ERC employed over 800 professionals who undertake 
design and development of vehicles, but also tools, dies, fixtures, and other capital 
equipments as well. 
The prime mover behind these efforts was Mr. Sumant Moolgaokar, who had been the 
chairman of TELCO from 1970 to 1988. However, it was Ratan Tata who conceived, 
initiated and implemented the "car projecf since he took over as the chairman of TELCO. 
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Insofar as its manufacturing activities were concerned TELCO had all along preferred to 
perform most of its activities in-house. This long drawn culture has gone in way contributing 
towards the success of the car project. By 1990 it had installed facilities to manufacture 
engines, gearboxes and transmission mechanisms, body panels and important sub-assemblies. 
It had even been manufacturing its requirement of capital equipment such as machine tools, 
dies and fixtures, and the castings and forgings required in its vehicles in-house in its 
machine tools division. The machine tools division also built for the first time in the country, 
four basic robots for spot and arc welding. It had also developed a Computerised 
Numerically Controlled (CNC) machines for its manufacturing operations. 
However, designing a car was qualitatively different from the designing of commercial 
vehicles that had been manufactured by TELCO so far. Small cars were of the steel paneled 
monocoque design, in which the body of the car also acted as the chassis. The commercial 
and utility vehicles built so far had a separate frame, or chassis on which the body was built. 
Another aspect in which a small car differed lay in the fact that, the design of the car had to 
done in such a way that the car would be amenable to manufacture in large volumes. 
Therefore, the average time taken for a car to roll out of the assembly has to be kept low to 
achieve the desired volume. Work on the design of the car project started at the ERC since 
mid 1994. The team studied the designs of many internationally acclaimed small cars, and 
ran simulations of these cars under test conditions on Indian roads using its CAD facilities. 
By mid 1995 the team had come up with two rudimentary three-dimensional models, which 
were shown to Ratan Tata for his approval. 
Ratan Tata decided to enlist the help of renowned car designer IDEA to seek specific inputs 
to fine-txme the in-house efforts. A team of engineers and designers from TELCO interacted 
with an IDEA team for the entire duration of the project. The designing of the car could not 
be carried out in isolation and the manufacturing implications had to be foreseen in advance 
and modifications carried out in the design if required. Thus while the design and 
development of the prototype was proceeding at IDEA, the Indian counterparts at ERC were 
busy setting up the assembly line. Because of substantial "hands on work" experience of 
TELCO engineers, they came up with many suggestions. For instance, the IDEA team came 
up with a proposal to fix the coefficient of drag (a parameter which determines the air friction 
around the car) at 0.33. TELCO's engineers reasoned that such a low coefficient of drag, 
while suitable for high-speed long distance cruising, was not required for Indian conditions. 
The collaborators agreed with TELCO and increased the coefficient of drag, leading to a 
sizeable reduction in development costs. After extensive joint inter-action the exterior design 
of the car was frozen in April, 1996. 
At the conceptual stage of the project, the design team at TELCO had decided that it would 
develop two versions of the small car, one a diesel version and the other a petrol one. After a 
thorough study of several international small car models, the team decided to have a 54HP 
engine for its diesel version and a 60HP engine with carburetor for its petrol version. At the 
time the company could foresee that by the turn of the century, when the car would be 
launched it needed to incorporate multi-point fuel injection technology for its petrol version 
to keep up with the then expected emission norms. TELCO decided to take inputs from La 
Moteur Modeme of France to fine-tune its petrol engines. The design of the transmission was 
done entirely in-house at TELCO's ERC. The small car required a 5-speed transmission 
system, which was not designed by TELCO before. 
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The collaborator suggested various design improvements, and with its own in-house 
expertise TELCO was successfiil in developing a petrol version o f Indica', which conformed 
to Euro II emission norms. The design of the engine and transmission was completed by 
April 1997. The design of the interior proceeded in tandem with the external body styling. At 
the first phase the team undertook an exercise of working out the cost of the numerous 
components that went into the assembling the interior. The mandate from Ratan Tata was 
clear; deliver a car that would be much more spacious than the Maruti 800 (which happens to 
be the industry benchmark for entry level cars in India) while matching the Maruti 800 in 
terms of costs, without sacrificing on quality. The team would design a component, calculate 
the cost involved and in the case of a cost overrun, changed the design or manufacturing 
technique. 
For its small car TELCO decided to perform the following activities in-house: engine and 
transmission except pistons, body panels and assembly. All other components were to be out-
sourced. "Since the company is driven by market demand, its out-sourcing structure must be 
aligned to market dynamics, agrees Pavan Vohra, Principal Consultant, A.T. Kearney 
(Business Today, February, 1999)." Therefore, supply-chain configuration was an important 
task ahead for TELCO. Especially since about 80% of the value of Indica had to be out-
sourced translating into 1200 of its 1500-plus parts, from 200 and-odd vendors which when 
compared to other TELCO commercial vehicles was less than 20%. To keep its transactions 
costs low TELCO has configured its supply-chain on 'JIT' basis. Eventually, the Indica 
assembly facility will operate an integrated kanban-card-signalling system to link the pull of 
its shop floor to that of its vendors. The main target was to monitor the cost, quality and 
targets of its numerous chaimel partners. 
Supplier Quality Improvement Teams were then set up led by Mr. E.J. Agnew, Worldwide 
Director (Supplier Quality), Cummins Engineering Company, USA whose services were 
retained on an honorary basis. A 13-step quality improvement programme beginning with 
supplier evaluation and stretching through design validation to audit of supplier quality was 
then set up. In selecting its suppliers for Indica TELCO initially turned to its tried and trusted 
partners. But since this project was substantially different in terms of its earlier projects; in 
addition it identified several others on their ability to supply components of the required 
quality and target cost given to them. The vendors were grouped into two tiers: tier 1 and tier 
2. The tier 2 vendors were to supply to tier 1 vendors, who were to put together the sub-
assembly and supply the same to TELCO. 
In 1997, TELCO made investments in Tata AutoComp Systems (TACO) to encourage the 
entry of internationally acclaimed auto-component manufacturers in India. Subsequently 
TACO formed several joint ventures, which became suppliers for the Indica project. In 
keeping with the objective TACO and ERC engineers collaborated extensively with the 
vendors to meet its quality and cost targets. Adds M.S. Kumar, CEO, Rane TRW Steering 
Systems, which supplies steering systems for Indica: "TELCO has been extremely 
supportive, making available its entire R&D resources to our engineers (Business Today, 
February, 1999)." For instance, SBL, which supplies clutch-facings and rear-drum brake 
linings for Indica; remarks DGM (Research), SBL: "TELCO is a very transparent company. 
It allowed us to use all their facilities as long as it helps develop a better product. (Business 
Today, February, 1999)." 
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The Auto Projects Division of TELCO was entrusted with the job of purchasing, erecting and 
commissioning the assembly Hne for the proposed Indica plant. It had to resort to several cost 
cutting measures to keep its project costs within the desired limits. In 1995 TELCO 
purchased the Australian plant of the auto firm Nissan that had been producing the Nissan 
Blue Bird in Australia and had subsequently closed down. The plant was purchased at $ 25 
million, which is a fraction of the cost that TELCO would have incurred had it gone for 
importing a new assembly line. The Nissan plant together with 21 robots was shipped to 
T^LCO's machine tools division to be revamped and installed. Three presses for forming the 
body panels were commissioned. Of these only one was new: Erfurt GmbH from Germany; 
and the other two presses bought second hand from Mercedes-Benz and modified at 
TELCO's machine tools division to suit the Indica project. 
TELCO had already established a large network of sales, service and spare parts centres for 
commercial vehicles in India. This network had over 90 dealers spread over 290 authorised 
service stations and a large number of spare parts dealers located throughout the country. 
However for its car project TELCO decided to establish separate distribution and retailing 
network the sale of its passenger cars. TELCO's Annual Report for 1994-95 stated: 
"Marketing and support for cars would need an entirely fresh approach from that of 
commercial vehicles. Recognising this, a separate distribution and retailing network for cars 
had been set up and about 40 dealers has been selected who are in the process of setting up 
facilities in accordance with approved TELCO standards." To help benchmark itself against 
international standards in sales and service of cars, TELCO entered into a joint venture with 
Jardine Matheson Group of Hong Kong and established Concorde Motors Limited (CML) in 
1997. 
The mandate for CML was to establish show case dealerships for TELCO's cars. The 
structure of CML has kept lean with only three hierarchy levels, instead of the industry norm 
of five levels, to create a responsive network with the primary objective being to meet 
customer requirements as quickly as possible. CML was to introduce several customer 
services for the first time in India such as: overnight vehicle servicing; trade-ins of old cars 
against purchase of new cars; fleet management for companies; courtesy cars for customers. 
TELCO also introduced auto-finance schemes through its group company Tata Finance. 
Concorde will also employ market research to help forecast demand through trend analysis of 
a complex web of factors. To ensure that information flows quickly along the value-chain, 
TELCO has electrically linked through VSAT's its demand forecasts to production and 
backwards to its suppliers. In fact, all its dealers are linked to the plant, to relay demand 
patterns on-line. "International car-retailing is moving towards digital dealerships. Telco is 
three steps ahead of everyone else in India. Being on-line will save a minimum of 4 days 
from the order-to-despatch lead-time, says Vasant Cavale, Principal Consultant, KPMG 
(Business Today, February, 1999)." 
Indica was launched at a time when three international car manufacturers had introduced 
their models. This had unleashed what journalists termed as 'car wars'. Hyundai Motors set 
up in 1996 had launched its small car 'Santro' in October 1998. Daewoo Motors set up in 
1995 had launched its small car 'Matiz' and Fiat India set up in 1997 had launched 'Uno' at 
around the same time. According to motor columnists, while Indica compared well with 
these cars in terms of space, pick-up, driveability and fuel efficiency; there was substantial 
scope for improvement in the fit and finish area. Further in a segment where TELCO is 
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currently operating, "Its capacity will be tested by how many new models it can come up 
with, and how soon. Four years ago I would have said no. Today, I am not going to under-
estimate their capacity. They have demonstrated it, says D.C. Anand, CEO, Anand Group 
(Business Today, February, 1999)". 
The logic is irresistible: leveraging the low-cost supply chain that it has built, TELCO had 
already launched a series of other cars - priced in other segments as well, straddling the 
entire spectrum - each of which will be progressively easier to integrate. There is also after 
all a distinct opportunity well within the domain of TELCO for designing a smaller, cheaper 
car, positioned as an entry-level product for the first-time buyer - the slot that Maruti 800 
occupies today. Therefore, the Indica car project is not merely an indigenously developed car 
or a paean to cost management or a challenge to Maruti Udyog's monopoly. It is a 
diversification that reflects the way of thinking and perceptions of the top management of the 
Tata Group. 
The ability to integrate and leverage a project of international size, scale and complexity was 
something the Tata Group did not possess a decade ago; but today it is a distinct reality. In an 
interview, Ratan Tata when being questioned why the Tatas despite identifying growth 
opportunities in a range of new areas, could not fully capitalise on all those opportunities? To 
this he replied, "I don't think there was a real belief that these were the areas we should go 
into. We, therefore, did not embark on those new ventures with the real might the Tatas could 
have brought to the table (Business World, September, 1999)." He once reminisced, "I am a 
moderate risk taker but I am not risk averse, nor am I a gambler. If I believe in something, I 
would pursue it vigorously (Hindustan Times, September, 5, 2004)." 
When the telecom sector was opened up for the private sector sometime in 1995, separate 
licences for separate circles were issued to players wanting to operate in basic, cellular, wire-
less, Internet and value-added services. At that point of time the Tata Group was prepared to 
invest up to Rs. 6000 crore over the next six years. However, with industry moving toward a 
unified licence regime, the players can now compete in a given circle in any area they feel 
comfortable; which was hitherto restricted in the earlier regime. As Kishore Chaukar, MD, 
Tata industries, which spearheads the groups telecom venture sums up: "The telecom market 
is constantly changing, but the moment availability comes in, the demand booms, and when 
prices go down, a new set of customers come in (Business Today, March, 2002)." 
With the rules of the game changing the Tatas are now contemplating investing Rs. 20000 
crore in this sector. Global research and advisory firm Gartner Inc forecasted a convergence 
in call tariffs of Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA) in 2004, even as it predicts pre-paid services to gamer 68% of the 
present market-share in India. Gartner's Principal Analyst, Mr. Foong King Yew comments: 
"Presently, GSM prices are higher than that of CDMA services, but with the implementation 
of Interconnect User Charges regime, the prices are slated to fall (The Statesman, February, 
16, 2004)." A call from a GSM network is levied at over Rs. 2 per minute (depending on the 
service provider), while that from a CDMA network is as low as 40 paise. 
In early 2004, when the domestic diversifications had more or less fallen in place, Ratan Tata 
remarked, "Tata should become an entity of the world (Business Today, February, 2004)." In 
a step in that direction TELCO has already signed an MOU to acquire Daewoo Heavy 
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Commercial for Rs. 465 crore, has tied up with Rover to export Indica's, besides investing in 
an assembly line in South Africa for commercial vehicles. In fact TISCO is also looking at 
opportunities in Korea, China, Thailand and Ukraine, The groups' most recent global 
initiative is in its decision to invest $2 billion in Bangladesh to produce steel, power and 
fertiliser. In the words of Ratan Tata, "A company does not become global by simply 
participating in geographical markets around the world. The objective of globalization is to 
become globally competitive, leverage global opportunities and have the required global 
capabilities. It implies an organization, which employs talented people without reference to 
nationality. We are in the process of acquiring such competitive position and global 
capabilities (Hindustan Times, September 5, 2004)." 
The evaluation of performance the Tata Group during the period (1991-2003) can be best 
summed up in the words of Deepakh Parekh, chairman, HDFC, "Ratan has more than lived 
up to JRD's vision and expectations (India Today, February, 2003)." However, the other side 
of the truth is that Tata scrip's are no longer the deemed gilt it was a decade ago. Much will 
have to be done to bring a smile on the face of its two million shareholders. However, on the 
overall there is reason for the Tatas to celebrate. TCS crossed the billion-dollar revenue 
mark; TELCO put a "Made in India" car on the European roads; TISCO once written off by 
most analysts, turned an exemplary performance and turned EVA positive; Tata Tea's 
takeover of Tetley paid off; Indian Hotels acquired a global face. More or less the growth of 
the Tata Group in the last decade and a half has been compounding in nature, which had been 
simple annualised imder all previous leaderships. This nearly eight fold increase in groups' 
size had yielded enormous market power, thus giving the Tata Group a significant edge to 
overtake and neutralise competitive advantage of entry of smaller groups in relatively newer 
areas like telecom, InfoTech and retailing. 
On the performance side a steady 20% share for its car project, which was created from the 
scratch speaks volumes. TELCO was the country's largest, and the world's sixth largest 
manufacturer commercial vehicles. TISCO was the largest private sector steel manufacturer 
in India, while Tata Tea was the largest integrated tea company in the world. The group's 
breadth and depth have been a source of formidable strength for attracting capital and human 
resources, and taking risks that smaller groups carmot even dream of Not only do the 
economies scale erect redoubtable double entry, it also gives cost leadership to key Tata 
firms. The cost of producing one tonne of hot metal at TISCO is $150, against the global 
average of $(180-200). Says J.J. Irani, M.D., Tata Steel: "The challenge to Tata Steel will not 
only come from imported steel, but also from local players. The way to combat that is to 
become a low-cost manufacturer of high quality products (Business Today, January, 1998)." 
The Tata Group today, in the 135'*' year of its existence is clearly the first citizen amongst 
Indian business groups. While the group had a presence in as many as 25 industry segments 
comprising 95 independently traded firms, the groups' business portfolio is heavily tilted 
towards manufacturing: automobiles, textiles, steel, energy and chemicals. The group also 
had a presence in agri-products, white goods and hotels and was actively moving into new 
areas like InfoTech, retailing, insurance and telecom. The group was the undoubted leader in 
commercial vehicles with a 72% market share of the heavy and medium commercial vehicles 
(HCV), and a 62% market share of the light commercial vehicles (LCV) market. But the 
most critical diversification by far was cash cow TELCO's Rs.l700 crore small car project. 
Says R. Seshasayee, deputy managing director of Ashok Leyland: "They (TELCO) have built 
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a great secondary support structure over the years in terms of after-sales service and spare 
parts availability (Business Today, January, 1998)." But passenger cars is a different strategy 
altogether. It's about reliable technology, aesthetics and competitive prices. 
Led by TISCO, which held a 15% market share in the steel industry, the groups' steel and 
associated metals business would also qualify as cash cow. So would the groups' interest in 
chemicals through Tata Chemicals. While its soda ash business was steady and secure, its 
urea project is clearly a question mark. And if Tata Tea was another cash cow, its coffee 
business was a clear star. The days of Titan Industries as a star seem to be slowly getting 
over; emerging as another cash cow instead. In the service segments, Indian Hotels would 
also qualify for that position. Perhaps the brightest star in the Tata Group was its interest in 
IT, particularly software. TCS (till recently a division of Tata Sons) contributed a health) 
proportion to the groups' bottom-line. Its engineering business would also qualify as a 
potential star. Another prospective star is its retailing wing (Trent). The other star, which is 
slowly loosing its shine, was its power business. It holds an exclusive license of supplying 
power in Mumbai; one of the fastest growing regions in the country, imtil 2014. Finally, the 
group has plenty of dogs as well; white goods giant (Voltas), consumer durables (Eureka 
Forbes) and office automation (Bradma). While its foray into telecom, was still a large 
question mark. 
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Annexure II: Case Study - Reliance Group 
A son of a village school teacher, Dhirajlal Hirachand Ambani (popularly known as 
Dhirubhai) had journeyed, at the tender age of seventeen, to the West Asian port of Aden, in 
South Yemen, then a British colony, to earn his livelihood. After working as a clerk for eight 
years with A. Beese & Co, a French firm that acted as agents for Shell Oil, he returned to 
India in 1959 after a change in the government there. He then set up Reliance Commercial 
Corporation with a total capital of Rs. 15000. He exported ginger, cardamom, turmeric and 
other spices to the West Asian markets where he had established links during his earlier stint. 
He branched out to trading in fabrics and yam, following a heavy demand for rayon fabrics 
in India. The group used its "Export Replenishment License" to import rayon into India and 
sell them at a premium in the local market. Later, when nylon started getting popular in 
India, the group began exporting rayon fabrics from India and imported nylon in exchange. 
The healthy margins, ranging between (100-300)% from that of import of nylon provided 
more than compensated for the loss made on the export of rayon fabrics. Finding good 
quality fabrics for export, however, was proving to be increasingly difficult. As a measure of 
backward integration, the he started manufacturing rayon fabrics at Naroda, Ahmedabad, 500 
km north of Mumbai at a total outlay of Rs. 2.7 million in 1966. During the late 1960's 
nylon, like rayon earlier, was losing ground to another man made fibre - polyester. In 1971, 
to bring in polyester into the country the GOI aimounced a revised scheme under which 
import of polyester was permitted against export of nylon. Already in a similar trade, the 
group took advantage of the scheme and at one stage accounted for 60% of the nylon fabrics 
exported from India. 
The sustained growth in export turnover resulted in Reliance group expanding its 
manufacturing facilities. While it continued to import polyester yam for captive consumption 
and local sales, it also used the import entitlements that were permitted against exports, to 
import state-of-the-art technology for value-addition to its existing products. Even in 1975, a 
technical team from the World Bank had inspected had inspected a number of textile mills in 
India, and its report had certified that only Reliance's textile plant could be described as 
excellent by developing country standards. The focus on exports continued till the late 
1970's, when the GOI stopped promoting the scheme any more. The burgeoning demand for 
polyester in the domestic markets in the early 1980's, made the group shift its attention to the 
domestic markets. Reliance used the experience gained from manufacturing high quality 
fabrics for the exports market to attain leadership for its 'Vimal' brand in the local markets. 
Bulk of the domestic textile mills who manufactured cotton fabrics, had not upgraded their 
technology by then, which enabled Reliance Group to leverage its market-share. 
Historically, the textile market in India had a three-tier stmcture - Manufacturer -
Wholesaler - Retailer. The market structure was such, that the wholesale trade heavily 
controlled it. Dissatisfied with the distribution structure. Reliance opted to bypass the 
wholesale trade by opening retail showrooms - both its own and franchised - across the 
country. While Reliance's competitor Bombay Dyeing had innovated this practice, Reliance 
pursued this strategy on a grand scale. By 1980, Reliance fabrics were available all over 
India through 20 company owned outlets, over a 1000-franchised outlets and around 20000 
regular retail outlets. Not only did Reliance outspend its competition, its advertising budget 
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was among the highest for all products promoted in India. A practice it has maintained since 
then. 
During the same time its turnover jumped to Rs. 2.1 billion and the company was facing 
capacity constraints. The textile industry, like most other industries was subject to licensing. 
Therefore, because of the restrictions the group could not install additional looms, as the GOI 
policy favoured the expansion of SSI. To by-pass this constraint, the group started sourcing 
grey fabrics from the power looms from nearby SSI's, processed them at its textile facility at 
Naroda, and sold them under its brand name. It also acquired a sick textile mill, by exchange 
of shares, to enhance its capacity. Reliance quickly emerged as the largest producer of fabrics 
in India, a position it has maintained since then. 
In 1981, Reliance Group sought to further backward integrate its operations. Following rapid 
growth in the demand for polyester fabrics, domestic demand for PFY had outstripped 
domestic supply, the shortfall being met by imports. It immediately secured a license for 
manufacturing 10000 mtpa of PFY and technology from DuPont for setting up the facility. 
Beyond the straightforward opportunity for import substitution, the group for the first time 
saw the move as a way to improve its competitive position. Dhirubhai later explained: 
"I was a buyer of this product all over the world and I was observing what was 
going on - not only with the producers in India, but also abroad. I went to 
major company in the West and saw how inefficient they were. The bosses 
were not committed, people were not working, were having long lunch hours 
and the cost of all these inefficiencies were loaded on to the product and was 
passed on to me. I knew we could manage the business lot better, make more 
money than them, and yet supply better and cheaper products to our mills 
(EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
At the time Reliance set up its PFY plant, this sector was reserved by the GOI for the use by 
the small-scale weavers in the "art-silk" industry; large textile manufacturers could only use 
cotton. This was the key barrier to consumption. 
"Power looms were often one-two man operations. They typically sourced the 
yam from outside and carried out only the weaving operation. They sold the 
woven grey (unfinished) fabric to process houses, which then completed the 
rest of the operations (processing and printing) and sold the finished product -
often unbranded - to the wholesale trade (which invariably financed the whole 
operation). In contrast Reliance's composite textile mills had fully integrated 
operations, which carried the entire set of activities in-house - from spiiming 
the yam to producing the finished fabric (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
When the Reliance group set up its first backward integration plant for its 10000 mtpa PFY 
project at Patalganga, Maharashtra over a 300 acre plot, the total area was over 20 times 
larger than what was required for a project of similar size. This approach represented a major 
departure from the 'normal' business practice of the time. Instead of creating a "safe" 
capacity based on reasonable projection of demand; the group applied "world scale" capacity 
that would meet the cost and quality standards on a global basis. According to H.T. Parekh, 
the then head of ICICI, who had sanctioned the groups first institutional loan commented: 
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"Dhirubhai always spoke of international standards and sizes. Initially, I admit that I had 
some doubts whether he would really be able to carry it through. But he has disproved me b\' 
his resourcefulness (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." This commitment of creating world scale 
capacity, in turn, was based on Dhirubhai's ambition to do extraordinary things, but also on a 
specific logic. As further illustrated by S.P. Sapra, President, PSF Business: 
"The fundamental difference between Reliance's approach and that of other 
companies was that Dhirubhai saw things that were hidden to other 
companies. The user industry was held back by non-availability of supplies. 
Other companies would typically do a market survey that would show the 
current usage at, say, 2000 mtpa. They would project the usage into the future 
and arrive at a demand of say, 5000 mtpa. They would then set up a 3000 
mtpa facility, depending on their projections of market share. Dhirubhai threw 
that incrementalist mind-set away. He created capacity ahead of actual of 
actual demand and on the basis of the latent demand. Then he would go about 
systematically removing the barriers that were holding the demand (EFMD 
Case Study, 1994)." 
The Reliance Group would not only enter a business with a large, world scale plant far higher 
capacity than its domestic rivals, it would also continuously modernise and increase capacity 
to mop up all the incremental market growth to build a position of absolute industry 
leadership. For managers used to the most staid approach of large MNC's, Mr. K. 
Ramamurthy who joined Reliance Group as Vice President from COO in Chemplast 
explains: "Initially I would go to him (Dhirubhai) with proposals that reflected my 
conservative market-share objectives. And he would say think what a true world-class 
operation must look like. And my investment objectives would quadruple (EFMD Case 
Study, 1994)." Clearly, the Reliance Group hopes rest on the fact the domestic per-capita 
consumption of polyester in India is 2kg compared to 6kg in China and 7kg world-wide. 
Similarly, in polymers, consumption per-capita is 3kg in the country, compared to 10kg in 
China and 15kg worldwide. 
Since the growth rate in the domestic polyester and polymer industry is only around (10-15) 
% increasing capacities at such an alarming rate does not seem feasible. Clearly, the facts rest 
on the uncarmy abilities of the Reliance Group to recreate new markets. Thus once they have 
built up the capacities, they systematically remove the impediments that block the way for 
increases in demand; mostly by radically breaking the price barrier. The groups' confidence 
in the future stems from its high degree of integration (vertical as well as horizontal), leading 
to low costs - a formidable entry barrier. Of course, integration also helps the group in 
balancing cyclical pressures in its product groups. There are other benefits too: at every stage 
of manufacture, the group saves (2-3) % in terms of re-melting costs, inventory management, 
indirect taxes, freight and marketing and distribution costs. 
To stimulate demand for its product PFY, Reliance launched a "buy-back" scheme whereby 
it sold its "Recron" brand yam to the small power looms who then sold back the grey cloth 
back to the company for finishing and eventual sale under the "Vimal" brand-name. Once the 
positive loop of supply-led demand creation process became fully operational, the group 
would revert to its tight asset management strategy. The group gave the weavers a fantastic 
amount of financial support to the small-scale weavers and credit to create demand. In terms 
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of their sales, majority 90% is on cash basis today. Whatever the group ship's today, payment 
is received by 2:00 pm the next day. In 1984, Reliance Group sought to further expand its 
polyester portfolio. It obtained the license for manufacturing 45000 mtpa of PSF. At that time 
domestic capacity of 37000 mtpa was not adequate, so to meet the additional demand an 
additional 10000 mtpa of PSF was being imported. Both PFY and PSF were used for 
manufacturing fabrics and are largely substitutable. 
"PFY imparted a better sheen (shine) and an apparent silky feel to the fabric 
and did not wrinkle as much as the PSF fabric did. PSF fabrics on the other 
hand, provided greater comfort in wear to the consvmier (breathability), 
especially in a tropical climate. They, however, were relatively more 
expensive to care for (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
In addition to expanding its polyester portfolio, it also sought to further backward integrate 
its operations. It obtained licenses for manufacturing fibre-intermediates such as - PTA and 
MEG. Reliance also sought to diversify its product portfolio. It obtained the license to 
manufacture 50000 mtpa of LAB, an intermediate for production of detergents. In keeping 
with its strategy of continuous investment in additional capacity. Reliance expanded its 
capacities in each of its existing businesses. In fact, in a nxunber of cases it expanded the 
capacities even as it was installing the originally sanctioned smaller capacities. Further, in 
each of its existing businesses, Reliance achieved a level of capacity utilisation that was far 
higher than that of most competitors. Adds Sapra, "With low utilisation, high capacity can be 
milestone round your neck (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." For example, the demand for PSF 
remained sluggish throughout the second half of the 1980's. The domestic industry was 
plagued with surplus capacity when, in a period of eighteen months, the overall industry 
capacity went up from 40000 mtpa to 250000 mtpa, due to expansion of facilities by existing 
players, but primarily due to entry of new players like Reliance. 
Realising that the domestic market could not absorb this volimie, Reliance once again turned 
to exports. It not only used its scale to advantage, but it also upgraded its quality to export a 
major part of its output. It marketed the product under its own brand name "Recron" and 
through Du Pont who marketed the product worldwide under its own "Dacron" label. For 
LAB too, the company faced a similar situation of over capacity and responded by exporting 
nearly 25000 mtpa of the product. To support such exports, the group set up Reliance 
Europe, its wholly owned subsidiary in London. The improvement in quality necessary for 
export, together with the experience with international customers, in turn, reinforced the 
company's competitive advantage at home. Beyond exports, the company also pursued an 
aggressive strategy of demand creation at home. It set up "Business Development Groups" to 
create new investment opportunities that would use its own products as feedstock. It provided 
such services to potential investors free of cost and it also use its own network to promote 
those entrepreneurs to secure both funding and distribution. As a result of such demand 
creation activhies Reliance achieved a 100% capacity utilisation in PSF, while most of its 
competitors struggled to achieve 50%. 
A distinctive element of their strategy is to purchase technology firom the best foreign source 
rather than create joint ventures. Adds Mr. S.P. Sapra: "Take Century Enka - everything 
needs Enka's approval. Enka is used to the low growth European enviroimient. So they are 
incrementalist and cautious. They slow down the Birlas. If Dhirubhai created an alliance with 
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Du Pont everyone in India would have said, great he has got Du Pont in India. But it would 
have slowed down everything (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." An essential factor connected 
with this capability is "speed". Says Anil Ambani, M.D. Reliance Industries: "Most 
traditional economic calculations go wrong because they do not take the cost of time into 
account. Long before time based competition became management hype, we did everything 
to compress time in both our projects and our operations. The Reliance Group had already 
buih up a reputation for setting up projects quickly; it had for instance, set up its worsted 
spinning plant within eight months of grant of the license. 
However for the PFY plant it outdid even its collaborators by getting it ready in fourteen 
months - a feat Du Pont, until then, had not managed to achieve anywhere else in the world. 
Instead of adopting the normal practice of linking the various pieces through long arrays of 
pipes (typical for a continuous process plant) after receipt of the equipment. Reliance laid 
scores of kilometers of pipes in readiness for the equipment to arrive and to be installed as 
soon as they landed. At Reliance there was great emphasis on speed. "We do not accept a 
barrier as a barrier. We deal with issues directly. We do not build defenses for non-
performance, adds S.P. Sapra, (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." Perhaps the most dramatic 
illustration of Reliance's speed came when its huge Patalganga complex was flooded on the 
night of July 24, 1989 by flash floods from a nearby river. Technical experts were flown in 
from Du Pont estimated a minimimi period of (90-100) days before the complex could be 
operational again. Local newspaper reports, based on the opinion of India's best experts, 
were even less optimistic, predicting that some of the units would not be operational for at 
least five months. Reliance had the entire complex fully functional in 21 days. K.K. 
Malhotra, Chief of Operations, Reliance Industries provides a vivid illustration: 
"Understanding the scale of havoc, after the water receded, we had to remove 
50000 tormes of garbage - silt, animal carcass, floating junk - before we 
could get to the actual recovery work. All our sophisticated electronic and 
electrical equipment were damaged being under water for hours. We set up a 
control room to connect the site with the outside world. Then we took time to 
carefully survey the damage and quantify the work. Based on that 
quantification, we set up objectives, for each plant, when it will be on track. 
Each day at 11 a.m., I would have a meeting for an hour to review. On the 
third day I asked the Du Pont people, "What do you think? We had plarmed to 
get our two huge compressors ready in 14 days. They said, "Out of two, if you 
can get one ready in a month, you will be lucky." I phoned Mukesh that 
evening and said, "I want these guys out of here. If they say this it will 
percolate, and it will break the will. We had the compressors ready one day 
ahead of schedule, and the whole plant going a week ahead of plan (EFMD 
Case Study, 1994)." 
The real secret, according to Malhotra, lay in two things: "Careful plaiming to quantification 
of tasks and then saturating the tasks with resources. We put in all our resources that the task 
can absorb, without people tripping over each other. If I had all the time in world, I would 
optimise. But given my opportunity cost of lost production, it almost does not matter how 
much it costs because, if I can get the production going earlier, I always come out ahead. 
Only when you put the value of time in the equation do you get sound economics and then 
saturation almost always makes sense (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
255 
As a departure from the prevailing practice pursued by most Indian business groups, Reliance 
approached the investing public directly to fund its growth plans. Most groups sought to fund 
their projects by mobilising fimds - typically debt instruments - from state owned financial 
institutions. High interest rates choked business groups and halted growth. The group kept 
upping dividends year after year, regardless of a dip in profits. After an IPO in 1977, it again 
approached the investing public in 1979; this time with an offer of partially convertible 
debenture. The issue was over-subscribed six times. In 1979 in addition to a 25% dividend, it 
issued bonus shares in the ratio of 3:5. Its share prices appreciated 450%. 
To thousands of well wishers, Dhirubhai uttered, "Hold the papers, one day you will realise 
there worth (India Today, July, 2002)." Dhrubhai's fear of debt once made him repay a 50-
year loan of $150 million in just three years. Reliance preferred to mobilise the funds directly 
from the public as the funds mobilised from financial institutions often had a rider attached to 
them; an option to convert the debt into equity at a later date. The distinctive capability of the 
Reliance Group in this regard was to recreate the capital market through innovative financial 
instruments by understanding the psyche of the average Indian investor. The appeal of this 
instrument to the small investor at that time lay in the fact that: 
"The instrument yielded interest on the entire amovmt in the initial period 
(often linked to the gestation period of the project for which the fiinds were 
being mobilised) and thereafter on the non-convertible portion. Despite a 
boom in the stock markets, following a forced dilution of equity of MNC's by 
the GOI under FERA, equity offerings had not still gained widespread public 
participation. The typical 'small investor' continued to prefer investing in safe 
return instruments. In such a scenario, an instrument, which offered both 
interest and an opportunity to gain capital appreciation, attracted support. The 
conversion imder the capital issue norms operational then was carried out at a 
price which was far below the price of the equity quoted in the stock 
exchange, resulting in substantial capital appreciation on the investment 
(EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
The 1979 issue was quickly followed with issues of partially convertible debentures in 1980 
(for modernising its textile facilities), in 1981 (to finance its foray into the manufacture of 
PFY) and a record (then) Rs. 500 million in 1982 to further modernise its textile facilities. 
"Two months prior to the offering. Reliance's stock was subject to a severe 
bear hammering (short selling) and its stock price had nose-dived. On a single 
trading day the company's stock price fell by as much as 10% of its value. 
Following this a few NRI investment companies registered in the Isle of Man 
moved into the stock market, reportedly on behalf of Dhirubhai - and started 
buying up all the shares that were being sold and demanded delivery. Since 
there was a scarcity in circulation of shares, the resultant panic buying by the 
bears lead to an over 40% rise in the price of Reliance's equity. Dhirubhai 
became the small investor's stock market deity (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
The image of the Reliance Group got further reinforced when in 1983, the group in an 
unprecedented move, offered to convert the non-convertible portion of the debentures issued 
between 1979 and 1982 into equity. It offered to exchange every Rs. 100 of debt for 1.2 
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equity shares of Rs. 10 face value. The offer met with an overwhelming response as the 
Reliance share was being quoted at Rs. 115 in the stock market, while the market value of 
every Rs. 100 debt was hovering around Rs. 84. In a single stroke the group had not only 
eliminated the debt burden, it had also increased its future fund raising capacity significantly. 
Within a year of the extinguishment of the debt. Reliance once again mobilised Rs. 3.5 
billion of fresh funds from the markets. The latter established yet another record. Not only 
was it, at that time, the largest ever issue in the Indian capital market history, it met with an 
over-subscription despite being a non-convertible offer. The group once again demonstrated 
its capital raising legerdemain. 
Yet another facet of Reliance's growth history has been its tax planning. While its profits 
continued to grow, it had not paid a single rupee to the exchequer as corporate income tax. 
The groups' continuous investment in expansion and modernisation of its facilities enabled it 
to set off the profits from operations against tax credits it was allowed on the investments 
made (investment allowance reserves). In a bid to make companies like Reliance, which had 
come to be known as zero tax companies, the GOI amended the existing laws which required 
the companies to pay corporate income tax on at least 30% of their profits after depreciation, 
but before seeking investment allowance credit and other tax benefits. Reliance, however, 
still continued to be a zero-tax company. It changed its accounting practice. As against the 
earlier practice of capitalising interest on long term debt obtained for procuring fixed assets 
till the date of commissioning of the asset, it capitalised interest for the entire contracted 
period of such debt on the assumption that interest accrues at the time of availment of the 
loan till the date of repayment of the said loan, and all loans shall be repaid on due dates 
(Company Annual Report, 1981-82, p 23).' The groups' strong cash flows are perhaps an 
extended arm of its astute financial engineering. 
In 1983, the Bhopal gas disaster had crippled the operations of Union Carbide in India. At 
this stage the group had successfully bid and acquired a license for producing PE and PVC. 
During 1987, the group transferred the license to a newly formed subsidiary - Reliance 
Petrochemicals. The plant was to be set up at a new location in Hazira, in Gujarat, 230 km 
north of Mumbai. In 1988 Reliance Petrochemicals issued fully convertible debentures for 
these projects and mobilised a record breaking Rs. 5.9 billion from the capital market. Its 
shareholder base reached a peak of 2.3 million investors, yet another milestone in the history 
of Indian capital markets. Soon thereafter, the GOI announced a new policy, which allowed 
lower licensed capacities granted earlier, to be scaled to new "minimum economic 
capacities". 
Reliance Petrochemicals opted to upgrade the capacities of the plants. This led to 
modification in the implementation schedules. Importantly, it also led to an upward revision 
in the projected investment outlays. The increased fund requirement was met by mobilising 
debt funds from state owned financial institutions. This required Reliance Petrochemicals to 
pre-pone the conversion of part B of the convertible debenture issued in 1991. Reliance 
Petrochemicals opted to convert even part C of the debenture at the same time. Both the 
conversions were done at par, though at the time of issue, it had planned to do so at a 
premium. As a result of this exercise, the equity base of Reliance Petrochemicals ballooned 
to over Rs. 7 billion. Further, the delay in the commissioning of the plants with enhanced 
capacities had resulted in the project costs shooting up to over Rs. 15 billion, from the Rs. 7 
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billion estimated earlier. It had to not only service this huge equity base, but was also saddled 
with a debt of over Rs. 8 billion. 
In February 1986, Dhirubhai suffered a paralytic stroke. As result his two sons Mukesh 
Ambani and Anil Ambani then in their late twenties, were catapulted into managing the 
affairs, while their father recuperated. It was trial by fire for them. Dhirubhai himself did not 
put in as many hours in the office any more, having moved away from the day-to-day 
operations to being the visionary and strategist for the group. Nevertheless he continued to be 
passionately involved, with a single-minded commitment to the institution he built. He 
commented: "I do not give and have never given attention to anything else except Reliance. I 
have never been a director in any other company. I am not actively involved in any 
association or in anything else. My whole thinking - hundred percent of my time from 
morning till evening - is about how to do better and better at Reliance. Business is my 
hobby. It is not a burden to me. I enjoy it enormously (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
Despite Dhirubhai not being around, his sons (Mukesh and Anil) more or less carried the 
same legacy through. Since it carried on with the same organisation structure, it had not 
faced much resistance internally. They stuck to their mindset of integration and growth 
automatically followed. The Reliance Group had all along had a much-focused mind-set. 
This in a way stopped them from diversifying in unrelated areas. Yet the group often swerved 
to opportunity - media, power, infi'astructure, ports and terminals and financial services. 
However, since these diversifications did not match with their way of thinking, it witnessed 
lack of commitment and financial clout the group could have brought into these projects. 
However, telecom was one area where the group could leverage its skills in exploding the 
market, a capability that it had demonstrated earlier. However, when the group formed 
Reliance Telecom in 1996, the telecom market was overregulated. TRAI regulations pre-
exempted players fi"om competing in circles other than those allotted. Further as Reliance had 
a basic operator's license, it could only offer fixed line services and not limited mobility. 
However, a restricted business environment was not in tune with the Reliance mindset. This 
bottleneck restricted Reliance fi"om demonstrating its skills to swing industry forces in its 
favour. In earlier situations it had brazenly used its skills to by-pass the regulatory regime by 
swinging licenses in its favour. However, this time liberalisation had come a long way and 
efficiency of the market forces prevented Reliance fi-om leveraging the environment. 
The Supreme Court had asked the TDSAT to review its order that would clear the entry of 
WLL services (an approach Reliance had taken to forward calls via contiguous circles). The 
cellular operators sought for a stay order. However, ultimately, the decision by TDSAT ruled 
in favour of Reliance. Reliance could now legally and technically forward calls nationally, 
since it had a basic operator's license in practically every circle. With the ball set, Reliance 
formed a wholly owned subsidiary. Reliance Infocomm and transferred the license in its 
favour. What followed next is only history. 
All through its history the Reliance group has rarely been far away from controversy. Most 
business groups found it expedient to cut private deals with powerful politicians and 
bureaucrats. Bribes in exchange for licenses, illegal political contributions in return for 
preferential regulation and the generation of unaccounted money for sustaining this corrupt 
nexus became, for some, the recipe for quick success and rapid growth. In other cases, pre-
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empting competitors by taking multiple licenses, and then not proceeding to build facilities, 
became a perfectly legal strategy for using the regulatory regime to profit climate of artificial 
scarcity. As a result efficiency was grievously hurt due to government's pursuit of populist 
poHcies. 
Essentially, excessive government regulations fractured markets and destroyed economies of 
scale, size and scope. Indian business groups therefore became much more diffused. Besides, 
with so many legal constraints many business groups resorted with success to the pursuit of 
the loopholes and the illegal. Also most business groups became accustomed to the strict 
government regulations, which were responsible for limiting competition and thereby 
guaranteeing success in any line of business. The Reliance Group is a glaring example in this 
context. All through its history, the Reliance Group has had close proximity with the 
successive Congress governments, led by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. 
Its critics contended that the ability to get licenses granted; obtain fast approvals for its 
resource mobilisation plans from the capital markets and capital goods imports; and get 
policies formulated which favoured it (or disadvantaged its competitors or both), were a 
consequence of the enormous political clout it wielded. Some major illustrations: 
"In 1982 - Reliance's yam plant goes on stream, using PTA & DMT. GOI 
raises customs duty on polyester chips, used by Orkay; puts anti-dumping 
duty on PFY. In 1987 - Reliance sponsors World Cup; Polyester fibre taken 
off OGL List, GOI reduces import duty on PTA. In 2001 - Reliance bids for 
IPCL; controversy over government's decision to modify telecom policy. 
Reliance Infocom vmveils Rs. 25000 crore-investment plan. However, 
Dhirubhai was quick to cover up his uncanny capabilities, "Entitlements and 
licenses were available for everyone to take advantage of If they were not 
quick enough off the mark, is it my fauh?" Perhaps the Reliance Group was 
the first to bring in the concept of "managing the environment" and also 
practised it to its best advantage. The group brazenly showed how a repressive 
system used to controlling and sheltering monopolies could also be co-opted 
by a rank outsider. He swung licenses, clearances and duty benefits, but it did 
so in a focused way, always thinking about stringent project deadlines, 
economies of scale and international benchmarking (EFMD Case Study, 
1994)." 
Following the assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1986, and the 
subsequent changes in the GOI, the Reliance Group found itself in a storm of controversies. 
The group could no longer exploit and leverage the benefits of market imperfections in its 
favour. In the same, the GOI harmed the conversion of its non-convertible portion of 
debentures into equity, hours before the board of directors of Reliance were to meet and 
recommend conversion. The ban followed allegations in the press that banks and financial 
institutions had funded investment companies belonging to the Reliance Group in violation 
of the prevailing lending norms enabling them to acquire large quantities of the non-
convertible portion of the debentures months before the board meeting. The press also 
alleged that the Reliance Group had set up plants whose capacities were far in excess of its 
licensed capacity by smuggling them into the country. This eventually led to a show cause 
notice from the Customs authorities "alleging import and installation of additional machines 
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unauthorised and also misdeclaration of more than twice the declared capacity, (and) 
claiming alleged differential duty and penalty of Rs 1190 million". 
The group however, denied any wrong doing and contested the claim (source: company 
annual report, 1987-88, p 21 and 1989-90, p 30). During the same year the GOI abolished a 
customs levy (anti-dumping duty) imposed on the import of PFY around the same time when 
Reliance's PFY plant was being commissioned. The government action was triggered by the 
accusation that while publicly justified as protection to domestic producers from low cost 
imports, the duty actually enabled the domestic producers - Reliance Group foremost among 
them - to generate windfall profits. As a result of this action PFY prices dropped in the 
domestic market by 20%. The year ended with Reliance's profit nose-diving from Rs 713 
million the year before to only Rs 141 million. 
The group fought back the only way it knew - by a direct appeal to the investing public. 
Following a ban on the conversion of non-convertible debentures into equity, it approached 
the capital market with a record Rs 5 billion offer of fully convertible debentures. The offer 
was over-subscribed by over 7 times, with an imprecedented number of 1.75 million 
applications. Despite all the allegations and setbacks the group had retained the confidence of 
its millions of shareholders. Another round of changes in the government in 1987 followed a 
series of favourable decisions for the Reliance Group. Imports of PSF was canalised through 
a state agency thus preventing direct import by end-users; a special customs levy of Rs 3 per 
kilogram on PTA (which Reliance was still importing) was abolished; the groups' Patalganga 
complex was granted the status of refinery - thus it became entitled to lower level of excise 
duty for raw materials like naphtha; and it was also permitted to prepone the conversion of 
debentures into equity, which resulted in an estimated savings of about Rs. 330 million in 
interest costs. It reported a hefty profit of Rs. 800 million in the next accounting year. 
In 1988, Reliance acquired a significant stake in L&T through an investment subsidiary. 
Apart from being India's No. 1 construction and process engineering company, L&T had 
significant presence in cement, shipping and electronics. At that time Reliance was L&T's 
largest customer and the two had a long-standing relationship. Reliance acquired the stake 
with a view to exploit this synergy. L&T was a professionally managed company, with the 
state owned financial institutions having a 35% stake. Following the acquisition Reliance 
became the single largest shareholder outside the state owned financial institutions. Within 
six months of the acquisition Dhirubhai was nominated chairman of the board of directors. In 
the interregnum three other Reliance directors were inducted into the L&T board. As a result 
Reliance gained effective control over L&T. 
Soon thereafter, the apparently smooth takeover of L&T ran into rough weather. Its 
subsidiary was accused of having employed surreptitious methods for acquiring this stake. 
The leading financial institutions had sold a part of their stakes in L&T (around 7%) to a 
newly set up subsidiary of a leading nationalised bank, apparently to provide it with a jump-
start. This firm instead sold the stakes to the Reliance subsidiary. It was finally unraveled that 
the entire operation was orchestrated to facilitate Reliance to gain control over L&T. 
Following this revelation, the Reliance subsidiary returned the stakes to the state owned 
financial institutions. The controversy however did not end there. Reliance was accused of 
using L&T to shore up its finances. In 1989, L&T made a record public offering of Rs. 8.2 
billion of convertible debentures. Reliance was accused of having mobilised the money to 
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fund the cost overrun of its petroleum project. The funds, Rs. 6 billion were actuall> 
earmarked as suppliers' credit from L«feT to Reliance. Following these accusations and a 
change of the government in 1990, the state owned financial institutions sought the ouster of 
Dhirubhai from the L&T board. L&T thus reverted back to its original position as an 
independent professionally managed company. 
The Reliance Group had all along thrived on decentralised and informal decision-making 
process, which drove its operational dexterity. After 1986 Dhirubhai Ambani passed on the 
baton of operational management to his two sons, Mukesh and Anil. Rather than putting in 
place a formal succession, he has loosely divided responsibilities between his two sons, 
aiming to foster a team-like approach. So, if Anil normally manages the groups finance, 
marketing and public relations; Mukesh looks after the operational issues. The result of such 
a structure was a high degree of ambiguity but also high level of flexibility. People could be 
brought into the organisation from the outside quite easily; responsibilities could be adjusted 
without openly declaring wiimers and losers; and positions could be created and abolished 
overnight. 
The two sons are clearly and firmly the ultimate decision makers. They are supported by a 
group of senior managers whose relative role and status within the group changed frequently 
within a loose organisational structure that was always in a flux. With the constant flux in 
both the status and role of the top management, it was difficult to draw a formal organisation 
structure nor was it readily available fi'om inside sources. Historically, the group had been 
managed along functional lines. The groups focus on rapidly building and tightly managing 
its assets was supported by the professional excellence of a group of managers who had 
complete responsibility for specific functional areas like finance, operations, marketing 
within a specific business. Therefore, organization structure at the Reliance Group is more 
akin to project groups. 
The Delhi based Institute of Quality Limited (IQL), which had a brush with the groups' non-
conventional, but effective, systems when the group to look at its quality management 
systems called it in. "We found that the organisation had no formal system of customer 
surveys or feedback, and thought we could do some work there. But that idea died when we 
learnt that the top three people in groups marketing department knew the company's 1000 
biggest customers - by name, says Ashish Basu, COO, IQL". With increasing size and 
complexity, this relatively ad hoc but highly effective way of organising and managing the 
group has possibly reached its limits. It had so far managed the break-neck speed of growth 
by continuously bringing talent from outside. There was no time for consolidating the 
management team, for creating a team spirit or for systematic development of people from 
within. 
The informal organisation structure at the helm of Reliance Group is again clearly brought 
out from the comments of Prafulla Gupta, a Harvard MBA, who had joined the Reliance 
Group after working for almost twenty years with Booz, Allen and Hamilton, the 
international strategy consultants: "They (Mukesh and Anil) have, both individually and 
collectively, shown a clear willingness to delegate - once there is satisfaction that an 
executive's judgement and ability to act are consistent with their own perspective and value 
system. We do not have a formal delegation of authority in our group. It varies with role and 
the confidence the person can evoke (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." The management of the 
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Reliance Group comprised of three distinct groups (though not necessarily in order of 
hierarchy). In the first group was a set of eariy business associates of Dhirubhai (including in 
some cases their kith and kin) who had historical links with him, personally, rather than with 
the company. They were his intermediaries in his financial operations, in his relationship 
with government functionaries and in de-bottlenecking his implementation plans. With the 
evolvement of the group, their role had diminished significantly, but they still remained 
involved in a largely consuhing capacity. In the second group were a number of people 
whom the group had attracted away from very senior positions, mostly from India's large 
PSU's. The fact is that the group recognised that, in India, only PSU managers had the kind 
the kind of experience in executing projects of size and complexity that Reliance was 
contemplating. So the group hired the best people from this sector and made the best use of 
their skills and experience. These people today form the senior most rung of the Reliance 
Group - who had been the chief implementers of Dhirubhai's vision in the 1970's and 
1980's. 
In the 1990's however, a new group of professionally qualified managers were being 
inducted to form a distinct third group, who would assist the top management on a regular 
basis. This group had been typically educated in some of the best technical and management 
schools in the US with vast international working experience. The relative role of these three 
categories of managers was always in a flux. As described by V.V. Bhat, a senior HRD 
executive with Reliance, "In Reliance, authority and responsibility have to be taken, they are 
not given. No one has the time to give! We are too busy growing (EFMD Case Study, 
1994)." In this context another Reliance executive, K. Narayan adds: "Trust is not a function 
of being a blood relation of the Ambanis. I am not and most of us in the senior management 
today are not. Trust is a fimction of my capacity to deliver (EFMD Case Study, 1994).'" 
Historically, the group had always avoided joint ventures with foreign companies. PrafuUa 
Gupta, Senior Executive, Reliance Industries provides a fiarther elaboration on this issue: 
"If you were a company with a significant non-Indian shareholding, you 
walked with a chain and ball around your neck. Our business needed speed, so 
we avoided foreign equity. Now the playing field is level, it does not matter 
whether you have domestic or foreign equity. In businesses we got into in the 
past, we had the necessary management capability and there were enough 
technical and operational skills within India that we could recruit. Now we are 
getting into oil field development and production. For these businesses, there 
is lots of technical capability in India, but not enough management capability. 
At the same time these are $ 100 million to $ 1 billion plays, and we must run 
these businesses with absolutely world-class competence. So we have three 
choices. We can identify suitable people abroad and hire them and help them 
get used to working in India as quickly as possible. Alternatively, we can 
license or purchase the technology, as we did it for polyester, and grow our 
competence as we go along. Or, we need to review our strategy with regard to 
alliances and be willing to get into more and more partnerships to quickly 
enter new businesses (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
To further backward integrate its operations; between 1989 and 1992 it had set up facilities to 
manufacture LAB directly from Kerosene with Paraffin as intermediate raw material. It also 
commissioned the facilities for the manufacture of PX (input raw material for PTA) at its 
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Patalganga complex. At its Hazira complex it commenced manufacturing MEG, PE and 
PVC. It also acquired a license for setting up an Ethylene Cracker complex at Hazira to be 
commissioned in 1995. It would provide the ethylene required for the manufacture of PE, 
PVC, and MEG. To fund this complex it mobilised over RS 9 billion from the investing 
public and rolled over and rolled over earlier debentures, which were due for redemption. It 
was also in the process of setting up of facilities for manufacturing ethylene di-chloride, a 
feedstock for manufacturing PVC. It also planned to build a world scale caustic soda -
chlorine facility. While chlorine was expected to be fully used for meeting its own captive 
needs for the manufacture of ethylene di-chloride, caustic soda was plaimed to be sold in the 
open markets. In 1992, it formed Reliance Polypropylene and Reliance Polyethylene as joint 
ventures with C. Itochu, Japan. These companies would manufacture 250000 mtpa of 
polypropylene and 160000 mtpa of polyethylene at its Hazira complex. They together 
mobilised over Rs. 6 billion from the capital market to part finance the projects which were 
expected to go on-stream by end 1994. 
In its bid to emerge as the largest vertically integrated manufacturer. Reliance secured a 
license to set up a 900000-mtpa refinery in 1992. It subsequently promoted a new company, 
Reliance Petroleum, in which it had a 21% stake, for setting up the refinery, which would 
meet hs feed stock requirement of naphtha for the manufacture of PX, Kerosene and LAB. 
The new company successfiilly approached the capital market in 1993, with an offering of 
Rs. 21 billion convertible debentures, to part finance the Rs. 51 billion-refinery project. The 
refinery was expected to on stream by mid 1996. The new company had entered into 
marketing and distribution arrangement with the state owned PSU, Bharat Petroleum 
(BPCL). BPCL was the third largest integrated refinery and marketing oil company in India, 
which would have exclusive rights to market the entire range of products except that - a) 
Reliance could sell petroleum products to large companies through pipeline transfers and b) 
Reliance group companies would have the first option to obtain their requirements of feed 
stocks in bulk through pipelines. 
In addition to vertically integrating its operation. Reliance was also expanding its existing 
businesses, in each of which it had already achieved positions of absolute leadership in the 
domestic markets. It was in the process of setting up of a new polyester complex at Hazira, 
where it intended to manufacture 120000 mtpa of PFY, 100000 mtpa of PSF, 80000 mtpa of 
PET and 350000 mtpa of PTA. "This complex would be bigger than our polyester complex at 
Patalganga. On completion, our total polyester capacity would be over 500000 mtpa and that 
would make us No. 1 integrated manufacturer in the world. Don't you think that would be a 
truly unique achievement for an Indian company? said a jubilant Dhirubhai (EFMD Case 
Study, 1994)." And to complete the vertical integration chain, the Reliance Group 
successfiilly bid for the development of oil fields when this sector was opened up by the GOI 
in 1994. Under the then existing policy. Reliance however could not directly market the oil 
so produced. It was required to sell the entire output to the central agencies (for detailed 
product flow chart see armexure). 
A distinct capability the Reliance Group has built up over time is its unique ability to 
complete projects before time and design imconventional ways of working its plants to the 
maximum capacity. The groups' size and scale is matched by its operational excellence. For 
one, it is able to compress project implementation time substantially. The group by pushing 
ahead the pace at the grass-roots oil refinery at Jamnagar: scheduled to be completed in May, 
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1999, it is likely to shave costs by being ready in December, 1998. The groups' history is 
replete with numerous similar examples. In addition, the group has the distinct ability to 
develop command over top-of-the-line process technologies totally in-house. This is helped 
by the fact that its 20 plants are centred over four locations - Patalganga and Naroda in 
Maharashtra and Hazira and Jamnagar in Gujarat, which enjoys close proximity. In this 
context Anil Ambani puts it, applying "sweat technology" to squeeze out the maximum. And 
historically, its plants have operated at utilisation levels exceeding 100% year after year. "We 
have been taught to think beyond, it comes naturally, says Kamal Nath, Senior Vice-
President, Reliance Group (Polymer Business) (Business Today, January, 1998)." 
By relentlessly pursuing scale, vertical integration and operational economies, the Reliance 
Group today generates enormous respect in the financial capitals of the world. The group 
became the first Asian company to float a $ 100 million bond with a 100-year maturity 
period in the US market. Adds Anil Ambani, MD, Reliance Group, "This kind of global trust 
was not something Reliance had bargained nor worked towards. These are the benefits of 
being a truly global corporation (Business Today, January, 1998)." In addition the giant is 
also milking the global financial markets too; it has already borrowed $1.3 billion during the 
period 1995-97. Also because of its investment in scale integration, project management 
capabilities, and command over manufacturing processes, the group is one of the lowest-cost 
producers of polymers and polyesters in the world today. The continuous capacity growth 
allowed the Reliance Group to emerge as the lowest cost polyester producer in the world. In 
1994, its conversion cost was 18 cents per pound, as against the costs of 34, 29, and 23 cents 
per pound for West European, North American, and Far Eastern manufacturers (data source: 
EFMD Case Study, 1994). Hence the groups cost of polymer production is 9% lower than 
that of North American companies, and 23% lower than those in South Korea. 
Moreover, the groups' capital cost per tonne for the same is around (25-30) % lower than 
producers in the US, Eiu-ope, and South-East Asia (data source: Business Today, January, 
1998). What's more, subsequent lowering of import duties to 40% on PSF and PFY at a time 
when the global industry is going through a glut - prices were $1200 in October, 1997, down 
from $1850 in October, 1995 - have put increased pressure on margins. But Reliance 
continues to march ahead in terms of sheer volumes and marketing skills. Little wonder, 
then, at a time when PSF and PFY prices were at their cut-throat worst, the groups' cost 
leadership manifested itself in net margins of 15% in 1996-97. By contrast, its closest 
competitor, the then Rs. 1185 crore Indo Rama Synthetics, registered a net margin of 0.15% 
for the same period. Its President, Strategic & Corporate Services, Mr. V.K. Singhal, 
analyses: "The captive production of PTA and MEG for producing PSF leads to considerable 
margin enhancement and value-addition in the fibre business (Business Today, January, 
1998)." However as Mr. S.P. Sapra, President, PSF Business comments: "... their real 
success lies in transferring the ownership, and implementation, of this vision to the lowest 
rungs of the company (Business Today, January, 1998)." 
From scale to integration, from operational efficiencies to financial engineering. Reliance 
Group represents the pinnacle of success. As it witnesses dramatic increases in size, the 
groups' sine quo «on-status will only be accentuated. But where does it go fi-om here? The 
group claims that its future lies only at home, it has already reached stage where its pre-
eminence is xmquestionable. On that basis the Reliance Group will have to look outwards to 
compete with international giants like - DuPont, Dow Chemicals, Mitsui and Monsanto. It 
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will also have to constantly re-invent itself to larger scales. Actually, the oversupply in the 
domestic polymer industry from time to time is Reliance's own creation. Moreover, the 
group is adding capacities at an alarming rate. Why is Reliance, then building capacities so 
far ahead of demand? Since its exports in 1996-97 were a meager Rs. 200 crore - 2% of its 
total sales, it is not really looking outwards. 
The plethora of new opportunities, in turn, raised questions about Reliance's unique 
organisation and management style. Historically, the different managers heading the key 
functions came together only at the level of the family members at the apex of the company. 
While this structure worked well, it did so at the cost of a severe overloading at the top. 
Another key constraint of the existing organisation structiu-e was the lack of teamwork and 
cooperation within the senior management group heading the different businesses and 
functions, given the diversity of their backgrounds, each of them had a different style and 
was the product of a different culture. The existing organisation structure provided little 
incentive for them to collaborate horizontally or to build a shared culture within the business 
units they managed. Because of the lack of coherence and integration at the top, sharing of 
learning and best practices within the group suffered. According to S.P. Sapra, President, 
PSF Business, "There are pockets of excellence, but we are not fully able to get the best out 
of every component. It is happening at least to some extent in the production and technical 
side, but less so in the business management side (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
One of the options under consideration was to reshape the group into classic multi-divisional 
form, structured around sectors such as fibres polyester staple fibre (PSF) and polyester 
filament yam (PFY), chemicals such as linear alkyl benzene (LAB) and Caustic Soda, 
polymers such as poly-ethylene (PE), poly propylene (PP), and poly-vinyl chloride (PVC), 
fibre intermediates such as para-xylene (PX), purified tetra-pthalic acid (PTA), and mono 
ethylene glycol (MEG) and textiles, with each business head reporting to a Group Executive 
Committee, which will be reporting to the chairman himself With integrated business 
responsibility, the business heads would be responsible for existing businesses, freeing the 
top management for only strategic and administrative oversight and corporate 
entrepreneurship. Such a restructuring would call for a major readjustment of the roles and 
tasks of existing businesses and functional managers, together with substantial delegation of 
operational responsibility from the family to them. Finally, the group was aware of a need to 
build norms and a better-structured process for management development. However, the 
group still thrives on continuity, and there has little or no transition in the true sense. Today, 
at Reliance, whoever is there at the top management, the speed at which the group moves 
will still be there. 
Significantly, the group has also changed its financing pattern. During the period (1995-97), 
it had eschewed the equity route at home to borrow $1.30 billion through international debt at 
coupon rates ranging between (6.20-10.32) percent. Given how expensive debt has been in 
the post-liberalisation India, it was hardly surprising that Reliance's average interest rate has 
dropped from 14.10% to 9.50% from 1993 to 1997. By replacing costly domestic loans with 
cheap foreign borrowings, the group had also increased its average maturity period of its 
loans from 4.5 years in 1993-94 to 13 years in 1996-97. This benchmarks the group 
favourably with its global peers, none of which has a maturity of less than five years for its 
loans. Of course, any depreciation in the rupee against the US $ will adversely impact the 
group in a complex manner. While its product prices will improve, the cost of raw materials 
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- three-fourths of which are imported - will go up simultaneously. What will actually help is 
that the group has parked $806 million - or approximately 60% of its outstanding foreign 
exchange loans abroad, providing a hedge against rupee depreciation. And since the group 
dependent on import of naphtha till circa 2000, making payments in dollars and not in a 
depreciating rupee will actually boost the groups' performance. 
In 1994, the Indian economy was in the midst of a radical change. Following the 
governments economic reforms programme, petrochemicals was no longer a select preserve 
of a privileged few. Entry was made easy for both domestic and global companies. There was 
a reduction in protective import tariffs and was expected to be reduced even further over the 
next few years. While these tangible changes in policy were having their direct effects on the 
industry, perhaps their more significant influence was on the mind-sets of managers in 
Reliance's Indian and foreign competitors. As S.P. Sapra, President, PSF Business adds: "By 
operating as if the environment was deregulated, we have a head start. But others are 
catching up. In the Indian side, the visibility and success of Reliance has made others 
develop the courage to think big. The Reliance formula will no longer be a secret. Also, they 
will not have the impediments we had. They will be on tested grounds. More importantly, 
they will be able to benchmark themselves against us (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." Overall, 
the easing of entry barriers did not worry Reliance too much. As argued by Anil Ambani, 
MD, Reliance Industries, "It would cost Shell $8 billion to replicate our position in India. 
Given their world-wide resource needs, they cannot commit that amount of money to one 
market (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
The reduction in tariffs, however, had already led to increasing competitive pressures. The 
world is in a recession and the fear is that India may be exposing itself to recessionary 
competition and large scale dumping. At our stage of development, we cannot afford to do 
that, said Dhirubhai Ambani, Chairman, Reliance Industries (EFMD Case Study, 1994)." 
Itself subject to an anti-dumping suit launched in 1993 by a European chemical company in 
Brussels, the group laimched its own anti-dumping suit in India against Brazilian, Mexican 
and South American companies exporting petrochemicals to the Indian market. While 
unleashing fiercer competition, the economic reform's programme had also opened up new 
opportunities not only in the refining and oil exploration - which the Reliance Group had 
already taken actions to exploit - but also in a host of other areas. Prafulla Gupta, Senior 
Executive, Reliance Industries describes the power sector as an example: 
"We have a terrifying deficit of the order of 50000 MW. Recognising the need 
for massive investments to improve both the size and the quality of the power 
sector, the GOI has offered a very exciting scheme for attracting private 
companies. It will provide exchange rate protection; guarantee a 16% return 
on equity, all calculated at a plant load factor significantly below what we 
believe to be achievable. We have the experience of running our own 100 
MW captive power plants at Patalganga and Hazira. They are among the most 
sophisticated and best run power plants in the country. We routinely operate 
them at 95%+ capacity. We can mobilise large amounts of capital and have 
demonstrated competence in managing mega projects. At one level this is no 
brainier; we will get returns higher than our cost of capital and create a huge 
new growth opportunity. In fact, we have already bid for one facility each in 
Delhi and Maharashtra, for a total of 750 MW. But we also have to think of 
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the opportunity cost, of the risk of oil price rise and so on (EFMD Case Study, 
1994)." 
With this philosophy in mind the group promoted Reliance Energy in the early 90's, by 
taking over BSES. Despite the business being unrelated in terms of industry, for the Reliance 
Group it was basically a horizontal integration. The breath taking growth rate of the Reliance 
Group in the past, however, would appear positively lethargic if the company achieved its 
plans in the future. In the words of Dhirubhai Ambani: "Growth has no limit in Reliance 
(EFMD, Case Study, 1994)." According to him, "I keep revising my vision. A vision has to 
be within reach, not in the air. It has to be achievable". The same vision continues even after 
the passing away of Dhirubhai Ambani. "The first thing that drives our choice of business is 
growth, and the second thing that drives it is competitiveness, adds Mukesh Ambani 
(Business World, August, 2003)." Competitiveness here means outperforming others in 
virtually all parameters of success. Dhirubhai once noted, "I believe we can be a $10 billion 
company by the end of the century (EFMD, Case Study, 1994)." To achieve this ambition of 
another eight-fold growth in six years the Reliance had plans to invest over Rs. 100 billion 
between 1994 and 1998. 40% of this investment was earmarked for expanding the polyester 
fibre and fibre intermediates business that would help the group emerge as the world's largest 
integrated producer of polyester. 
A bulk of the remaining 60% was earmarked for setting up one of India's largest oil 
refineries - a logical step in the group's drive for vertical integration. Not included in the Rs. 
100 billion-investment plan was the bid it had made for production of oil and gas in the 
offshore fields in India. By 1994 the bid had been successful, raising the group's growth 
prospects enormously, but also its investment requirements by another Rs. 13 billion. This is 
more or less in consistent with the groups' mind-set to build on a step by step process of 
backward integration from textiles to fibres to fibre-intermediates and feed stocks and finally 
to oil refining and exploration (for details see annexure). The radical changes in the Indian 
business environment in the 1990's, posed a strategic gap before the top management of the 
Reliance Group. With fast paced deregulation, a number of one-time opportunity windows 
were opening up in potentially giant sectors. Should the group use its proven skills and 
competencies in mobilising large amounts of capital, in creating new markets and in 
managing mega-projects to diversify in these relatively unrelated businesses? 
Besides power, similar one-time opportunities were also available in telecommunications, 
insurance, electronics and many other areas. In most cases, entry would become far more 
difficult at a later stage. Therefore, a key decision within the top management focused on 
whether the group should go beyond the fabric to crude oil vertical chain that it had 
historically focused on and which still offered almost unlimited opportunities for further 
growth. The benefit of focus was obvious, yet to a group in hurry and a management team 
accustomed achieving the impossible, the new opportunities were almost too attractive to 
resist. Should the group then use it's proven capabilities in mobilising large amounts of 
capital, in creating large new markets, and in managing mega-projects to jump into these 
relatively unrelated businesses? 
Reliance follows a very simple capital allocation model. Every business has the first 
opportunity to re-invest in the existing business provided they deliver 20%. If one cannot 
find opportunities in existing business, one has to search elsewhere. During the entire 80's 
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and 90's there was enough backlog to re-invest in existing business. However, with the 
petroleum refinery at Jamnagar going on-stream in the late 90's the entire link in value-chain 
was completed. So it was necessary for the first time in Reliance history to think beyond its 
existing businesses of vertical integration. Having already sunk in about Rs. 10000 crore in 
under two years and with plans to pump in another Rs. 15000 crore in the next three years, 
Reliance Infocomm is by far the most complex project Reliance has ever pursued. 
In this regard international telecom equipment vendor Nortel, which had supplied critical 
equipment to the project, says that this is perhaps the biggest integrated telecom project in the 
world yet. Nortel India, Chairman, Joseph Samuel notes, "Now, Indian telecom will draw 
international attention (Business World, December, 2002)." It has not been easy for the 
Reliance Group. It had to rework its convergence plans a number of times since the project 
was initiated in early - 1999. The final Infocomm strategy was based on the new generation 
CDMA technology that would offer not only cellular services, but also would be coupled 
with high-speed optical fibre networks underground. The basic idea: offer cellular services at 
the cost of a basic service. It was not until early - 2002 that all the elements of the final 
business plan were put in place. An illustration on how the project was initiated: 
"Rewinding to the last quarter of 1999, when Reliance Group had just 
commissioned its Jamnagar refinery. On that occasion Dhirubhai was to 
address a conference of 100 young CEO's from India and abroad. At that time 
the then Andhra Pradesh chief minister Chandrababu Naidu enquired what 
Reliance was going to do in the new knowledge economy. On that night after 
the conference, Mukesh met Dhirubhai after dinner and had a three - minute 
conversation on the potentials of the emerging telecom industry. Then 
Dhirubhai asked Mukesh: "Do you imderstand all this?" Mukesh replied: "By 
and large, I did." The next two questions from Dhirubhai were: "Is this the 
ftiture?" and "Do we have the strength in us to do all this?" Dhirubhai ended 
by saying: "Yes, if we can do it we should be in it full fledged." There was 
also this old Reliance maxim drilled into us - If you do more of the same, then 
you are likely to land in trouble. At Reliance, the top management stays 
involved in a project till it becomes sustainable. Once that happens, it gets out 
of the way, and hands over the business to the operations team. In another 
month or two, we should be done with Jamnagar. So it was clear that we had 
to start the next thing (Business World, December, 2002)." 
While setting up the refinery at Jamnagar, Reliance had used a lot of technology - in 
communication, systems and putting up the infrastructure. The movement happened in bits 
and pieces. Reliance was perhaps among the earliest to install giga-bit Ethernet capacity and 
video conferencing in India, though for its own in-house use. They had also connected the 
entire Jamnagar petrochemical complex with a series of closed-circuit cameras, which was 
wired to centralised control room. Till then they were basically users of technology, they had 
not thought about it as a business. So they started looking at the big picture holistically over a 
10-20 year timeframe. After gruelling brainstorming of ideas among a handftil of key 
executives it was clear that communication technology alone is not going to deliver value, 
but eventually it will be information. Dhirubhai once remarked: "If common people should 
be able to call across the country and say 'Hello, how are you?' for the cost of a. paan, only 
then the services market will be for the masses and the market will explode. The industry 
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needs to break its elitist framework by breaking this price barrier (Business World, 
December, 2002)." He further observed, there is illiteracy in India, but people can surely 
speak. At the end of the day the bottom-line was clear - push hard for capital productivity. 
When the group was working on the numbers, people were talking about billions, something 
around $(18-20) billions of dollars of investment for its proposed scale of operation. Mukesh 
observed: "Someone quoted $ 2 billion to set up our back-office systems for our network. 
That simply won't work. We had to bring down costs drastically - with the kind of pricing 
we wanted to do for our calls - we targeted costs that were one-sixth or even one-eighth of 
the quoted market costs (Business World, December, 2002)." At this point of time they drew 
on their earlier experiences to build up it's on own capabilities of - integration. Mukesh 
recollects, "Some ten years ago, when I was putting up a polyester plant, I showed my father 
a reactor we wanted for the plant and how we were going to get it. One look and he 
(Dhirubhai) poured cold water over the plan. He took the weight of the reactor and said that I 
was paying Rs. 300 per kilo of steel in the reactor when the market price was only Rs. 30 in 
India and Rs. 15 globally. He made me build the reactor on my own (Business World, 
December, 2002)." 
Based on such critical experiences, Reliance Infocomm built its back-office software in-
house at an estimated cost of only $ 350 million. This was the backbone for the killer pricing. 
When Reliance started their planning per subscriber (sub) cost in GSM was $(400-600). The 
group had however budgeted for $ 90 a sub. Applying its skills in negotiating it asked its 
vendors to choose between making $ 50 on 5 million hubs or $ 5 on 100 million hubs. The 
environment also favoured them. The tech market started collapsing by the end of 2000 and 
international vendors were more than willing to talk, allowing Reliance to enter the market at 
a trough. The primary assumption was that the market would grow exponentially from 
current 10 million to aroimd 100 million in the first five years of operation. So, it was a 
combination of events and capabilities that got the project off the ground. 
The tariff plan forms the crux of Reliance's strategy. The group had already submitted all 
relevant documents to TRAI - on investments, operating expenses, pricing structure, which 
also includes its profits. TRAI has broadly outlined how companies should price their 
services. It says, pricing should not be predatory (should not be below operating costs), (or) 
discriminatory or there should be no cross-subsidy from other businesses. At a projected 20 
paise per minute call, its tariff will be roughly 15% of the lowest plan of its leading 
competitors. Also, most call costs are calculated on per half-minute basis. That is, if you 
speak for 15 seconds, you will still be charged for 30. Reliance will charge calls for every 15 
seconds talk. Of course, Mukesh and his team sweated over eight months to get the pricing 
right. 
Firstly, a specialised European telecom research company did a market survey to develop 
insights into market segmentation. Then, an internal team took three months to develop a 
sophisticated pricing model to independently plot the average mobile time used per month 
with peak and off-peak time network usage. Finally, the market survey results were 
superimposed on the pricing model to arrive at an appropriate price. The bottom-line: even 
though an average Indian spends only 150 minutes of mobile time now, the usage is highly 
price-elastic. Simply put, lower the prices, the higher is the usage. Diamond Cluster, a 
Barcelona based telecom Consultancy Company, played a key role in this exercise. "The 
269 
pricing model was one of the most complex exercises we have ever come across, says partner 
Nevid Nikravan (Business World, December, 2002)." 
In early 2000 when the top management of the Reliance Group was working on the 
preliminary project costs, the total bill worked out between $(18-20) billion. However, if the 
pricing structure was to be kept consistent with the philosophy of its founder, the project cost 
had to be contained within $5 billion. Says Mukesh Ambani: "At that time nobody took us 
seriously. The cost was unheard of (Business World, December, 2002)." The project network 
involved Geographical Information Systems (GIS) - mapping of 104 cities metre by metre, 
with an estimate to cover 600 cities within two years of operationalisation. At this stage 
Reliance made some crucial make-or-buy decisions. Instead of buying the back-office 
software for $ 2 billion for its network operations, it decided to develop it in-house, which 
cost no more $ 350 million. That was the foundation for the killer pricing. 
When Reliance set up its 27-mtpa grassroots refinery in Jamnagar, the fundamental 
assumption was that it would gamer 30% market share. This time too, the Ambanis wanted 
30% of the entire mobile subscribers or a whopping 2.5 million to 3 million subscribers. That 
way the group expects to break-even in its first year of operation. Though the industry has 
been in operation for nearly twelve years in a row, only a couple of cellular operators have 
actually broken even so far. The dice is heavily loaded against them, given the fact that it 
took seven years for the Indian mobile market to grow to 8 million users. In the long run the 
group expects voice services will eventually contribute only 20% of the revenue. 
The bigger play is in wiring up enterprise customers. "Our driving principle is that Infocomm 
is now no longer a support fiinctions for business. It is now the core of any business model, 
says Prakash Bajpai, President (Enterprise), Reliance Infocomm (Business World, December, 
2002)." As he adds, many Indian companies are already moving ahead to implement the 
concept of an extended enterprise. They are, in effect, building an elaborate electronic web. 
which interconnects its dealers, customers, distributors and employees. But by all reckoning, 
the enterprise is yet to take off in India. The groups' assumption is that lack of sufficient 
bandwidth is drastically cramping growth. Today for cormectivity solutions, the best that any 
business enterprise can get is to settle for leased lines, which has a carrying capacity of just a 
mere 100 kbps. 
Reliance plans to skip the megabit generation, and directly offer gigabit speeds at current 
prices. To do that, it plans to take the fibre right inside a company. Then, to spur usage, it 
hosts a series of business applications, including ERP on its servers. Reliance knows 
applications will make all the difference. Which is why, in the Knowledge City in Pune, 
where the Reliance Infocomm headquarters are located, about 500 odd programmers are busy 
creating new applications that will be crammed into the phone "Our pricing for enterprises 
will be below the inflexion point of affordability, says Bajpai, (Business World, December, 
2002)." The advantage of the Reliance Group at this stage is that none of its private 
competitors can hope to match just yet. 
In October 2002, Reliance Infocomm moved its headquarters from Ballard Estate to 
Dhirubhai Ambani Knowledge Centre (DAKC) in Pune. The top management descended on 
the National Network Operation Centre (NNOC) and tried switching on the network. Snags 
hit the system; the links between the cities had to be cajoled to blink. Mukesh Ambani was 
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perturbed, but grew cautious. Even as the deadline drew close, there were indications that all 
the technical hitches had not been sorted out. Reliance had decided to set up 250-300 
proprietary stores all over India, however, till August only one such store was set up in 
Mumbai. In May 2002, Reliance placed Amit Bose, an ex HLL, to head its marketing. But its 
competitive strategies, based on FMCG perceptions, failed to incite the top management. 
The entire marketing strategy had to be reworked all over again right from the scratch. Even 
by mid November, a month before the launch, a lot of things were not falling into place. 
There were indications that all the technical hitches had been sorted out. Much of the fibre 
optic pipelines had been laid, but some bits still needed work. The pricing of the services 
were yet to be finalised. In this scramble, Mukesh Ambani began to depend more and more 
on his old associates for critical advice. Professionals who had been hired for this project to 
head various departments were increasingly left out in the cold. Even so, the Reliance core 
team decided to press ahead with the laimch. While Mukesh concentrated on the technical 
snags, he left the entire marketing to his old loyalists. This in a way implied the trust and 
commitment of the top management. 
Reliance had initially targeted a Rs. 150 crore promotional budget to cover the two months 
after the launch, when the subscription plan would be open. Amit Bose and his team were 
ready with the launch but they wanted a higher budget. However, existing Reliance 
marketing professionals thought even the existing budget to be excessive. The team led by 
Anand Jain and Manoj Modi by-passed the media companies and went directly to the 
publishers and broadcasters. By bargaining hard, they managed to buy media space and time 
worth Rs. 325 crore for Rs. 80 crore. Some media houses even offered discount up to 80%, 
unheard of in media advertising. Bose and his team lost face, and slowly they were left out of 
major marketing decisions. 
Reliance had to finally rely on its old channel partners to form the Reliance Infocomm dealer 
network. The last ditch for the initial marketing team was the pricing strategy, which was 
finalised by the core advisers of Mukesh Ambani. The initial marketing team led by Bose 
was to follow the usual selling tactics that was followed by other operators. But the targets 
Reliance had set needed a radically different approach. The pricing strategy that was finalised 
by Jain and his team was built around the strategy of capital recovery. The calculation: for 
every subscription the group would get a minimum of Rs. 22000 (including local call 
deposit). For the three million-target sets. Reliance Infocomm would have Rs. 6600 crore in 
its kitty. Till March 2003, Reliance had invested Rs. 9000 crore in this project (equity - Rs. 
5250 crore and internal debt - Rs. 3750 crore) and the "Pioneer" scheme would make the 
project cash surplus and achieve the targeted break-even in the first year itself 
Since its high profile launch on December 28, 2002, the Infocomm project has been plagued 
by unprecedented problems. On the pricing side. Reliance offered low call charges, but kept 
entry costs high. This pricing strategy was built around the concept of capital recovery. The 
price plan aimed at locking in subscribers could not bring in the expected numbers. On the 
technology front, the ad said Kabhi Mobile Kabhi Computer. But the latest LG handsets left 
much to be desired. They also heated up on using Internet services. Regarding competition, 
almost all private cellular companies and BSNL denied Reliance complete access to their 
networks. As a result it failed to tie-up interconnect agreements with other operators as 
quickly as it hoped so. The court cases have held up the plans for roaming services. On 
271 
channel strategy, the much-touted Dhirubhai Ambani Entrepreneur Scheme flopped. 
Incompetent dealers have thrown a spanner in their marketing plans. On the regulatory side, 
the cellular operators fought back with a ferocity Reliance had not expected. This forced 
TRAI to look into Reliance's pricing structure. 
The GSM operators lobbied to remove the interconnect charge differences between cellular 
and basic players. Once TRAI re-examined its pricing structure, the advantage Reliance had 
started out with was considerably weakened. SMS was no longer free. The new regime also 
allowed the GSM operators to drop their own prices close to what was being offered by 
Reliance. At one stroke, they almost neutralised the price advantage of the Ambanis. And 
finally, although Reliance had the license to offer only limited mobility, it was offering 
customers full roaming anywhere in India. (It planned to do so by forwarding calls via 
contiguous circles, since it had taken licenses for practically every telecom circle in the 
country. Therefore, in practical terms it offered full mobility). This handicap however was 
removed with the Reliance Group being successful in lobbying for a unified license regime, 
which was later adopted by TRAI. 
Four months after the roll out. Reliance officials admit that they have not been able to meet 
subscriber targets. Meanwhile the GSM operators (including BSNL) started going slow in 
inking intercormect agreements with Reliance Infocomm in different circles. As a result, the 
group had to postpone its rollout twice. And even after final commercialisation in April 2003, 
it could only cover 60 cities against a target of 120 cities. Only a third of the expected market 
share has been cornered (i.e. approximately 1 million customers within three months of its 
laimch). However, contrary to public opinion the Infocomm project cannot be said to be 
facing a crisis. The current problems cannot even be considered a major setback for the 
project or the group. They are far more in the nature of teething troubles. It was not any one 
big mistake; rather the rollout chaos was the culmination of a series of small missteps. 
However yet, the kind of troubles that Reliance had got into with its Infocomm project is 
significant for one reason. Over past two decades. Reliance had built up an image of a group 
that could manage any project of any complexity or size without a single misstep. The 
Ambanis had built up an aura of invincibility. And that is an aura that got shattered. As a 
senior Airtel executive put is: "Reliance has never faced failure publicly (Business World, 
December, 2002)." 
In fact the Infocomm projects troubles are expected to have maximum impact on the groups' 
image, not its financials or long term strategy. The primary problem was that even when the 
strategy was finalised, the top management did not spend much time on the marketing end. 
Reliance loved controlling every step on the marketing chain - therefore, it had not built up 
much expertise on the retailing side, especially consumer sector. This is the area the top 
management had ignored and failed; the most critical factor for the culmination of the major 
bottlenecks. By very rough estimates the group today commands a rough 50% market share 
of the 9 million subscribers for mobile telecom. The business also earned a Rs. 88 crore 
profit in 2002-03. 
However, the story is not over yet. This was just phase one. Already, the stage is set for 
Reliance Infocomm's next offensive - in the market for wiring up business enterprises. It has 
already identified 200000 units where it will take the optic fibre right inside the business 
premises. Companies can use a host of business applications at much higher speeds. 
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Infocomm's third phase, when it comes, will be the real path-breaker, though. The idea is to 
provide broadband services directly to homes using a popular technology called Ethernet that 
allows data to flow in gigabits or a 100 times the copper cable speeds. "Infocomm is an 
annuity business; we expect it to be an important cash-cow in the coming years, says Prakash 
Bajpai, President (Enterprise), Reliance Infocomm (Business World, August, 2003)." 
Another important facet of the Reliance Group is their enormous appetite for information. 
"They (Mukesh and Anil) are enormously bold and their actions are influenced by their 
unmatched access to information. They would know what is happening in every single 
corridor of the government ministries. They know about their customers. They know more 
about their competitors - even about their day-to-day operations - than the top managers of 
those companies. They would know where money would flow, and it is not just about their 
immediate business. They suck up knowledge about everything, constantly. Their magic is 
not just ambition, but ambition with information, adds Ramamurthy, (EFMD Case Study, 
1994). This by and large is a legacy handed over to them by their father Dhirubhai. In 1985 
he quizzed a visitor: "The two largest businesses are oil and tourism. Guess what would be 
the largest business 15 years from now? And then with the characteristic twinkle in his eyes, 
he said, "Information" (India Today, July, 2002)". Dhirubhai had an uncanny ability to 
visualize futxare trends. It was the forecast from a man who had barely passed his 
matriculation. Little did he know that by the turn of the century 'Information' would be a 
major business for the group? The group has already sunk in Rs. 25000 crore on this project, 
by frivolously building a telecom network in 115 cities covering a distance of over 60000 
kms. 
In the near future the group expects to see its presence in the following emerging areas: oil 
retailing, gas pipelines, telecom broadband and power networks. It also plans use its interface 
with customers in oil, power and telecom to create a mega retail business on the lines of Wal-
Mart. While the details are not in place, the group is already forging ahead with major 
alliances. The group will be into networking like never before. On the power side as well 
there is an expected supply gap to the extent of 100000 MW in the next five years. But 
instead of jumping into generation, it is eyeing distribution first, since that gives better 
control over cash flows. When the group was almost through with the refining in the late 
90's, it was clear that services would be the new emerging economy. 
As Dhirubhai Ambani reported at the AGM in 2000, "We see services growing, they are 
going to form a large part of the global GDP and whatever the opportunity we get, we will 
create competencies and invest in service businesses with our goal as 2005 (Business World, 
August, 2003)." Given the groups healthy cash flows, the group had to visualise areas for 
leveraging its philosophy in contemplating projects of international size and complexity, 
domestic and international financing, and ability to develop cutting-edge technologies in-
house to deliver unimaginable value to an average Indian consumer at affordable costs, by 
breaking the price barrier and thereby restructuring the market altogether in terms of size, 
scale and scope. 
The group also needs to work upon is its ability to manage people through a formal 
organisation structure. The group was earlier managing (50000-60000) people at a few 
locations in the country. It now needs to manage (180000-200000) people around the 
country. If the group is successful on this front, it will give them a platform to move at 
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geographical locations beyond the boundaries of this country. The group has already placed 
more than 150 people in its polyester and refining business in 20 countries across the world. 
As Mukesh Ambani adds, " give us two to three years, and we will be a good, strong 
consumer-facing organisation (Business World, August, 2003)." 
The capability that Reliance has now to build upon is - understanding consumer preferences 
and delivering consumer value. For this the group plans to bypass the usual market network -
agent - wholesaler - retailer; like in the earlier Vimal instance; to ensure the customer can 
directly see, feel and touch Reliance services directly. Another fascinating aspect of Reliance 
is its capital allocation. Reliance has always been a low debt group. However, if you look at 
Reliance Infocomm the other way, it has zero external debt. It is really like Reliance's own 
debt, Reliance as group. That is the strength of Reliance now. 
As result of his abilities built over years in backward integration of technologies, Reliance 
Infocomm successfully demonstrated in building the back-office software systems totally in-
house for an estimated $ 350 million; as against the backdrop of an international estimate of 
around $ 2 billion. Despite not having a long drawn history in retailing Reliance had almost 
built a network of 10000 web stores in a record time. Despite a fraction of the projected 
services being available at launch; it was successful in cramming all its freebies as proposed. 
Says Reliance Entertainment, Chairman, Amit Khanna: "All this has happened almost 
overnight without any break in services. That should explain our capabilities (Business 
World, May, 2003)." And while all the other telecom operators (GSM and WLL) were busy 
moving into different circles with joint ventures which combines best of technologies from 
the developed countries; Reliance was basking in glory having delivered a project of 
international size and complexity all alone, without any joint-venture or technological tie-up. 
Having already delivered it. Reliance is now concentrating on delivering capabilities in 
newer areas. 
Delivering gas to homes through pipelines at half the cost of an LPG; generating and selling 
power at Rs. 2.50 a unit; converting gas to diesel at half the present international cost; 
providing music and video on demand at affordable prices at millions of homes through 
information highways. This symbolises the attempt of India's largest business group to move 
into the next orbit. It also symbolises the attempt to transform an industrial behemoth into a 
consumer-facing organisation. It would be foolhardy to expect the journey to be smooth; but 
anybody who has watched Reliance grow over the years would know, it would be even 
foolhardy not to take it seriously. This is based on the Reliance dictum, "Once you have a 
goal, you should be focused on it and not on the obstacles. The day you start focusing on the 
obstacles, you'll miss the goal (Business World, August, 2003)." 
The group has already built up a plan on capital savings by combining the networks for 
power, gas and communications. This will lead to a lot of synergy. However, the group is yet 
to build a similar synergy in operating costs. At present the group is targeting a market of 200 
million households, with an annual disposable income of $ 600. Similar services in the US by 
AT&T costs around $ 180, but with that kind of costs the market size in India would shrink 
to below 5 million customers. However, this is not the market size Reliance is contemplating. 
So all Reliance has to do is to radically break the price barrier to achieve this. And at the end 
of the road the potentials are enormous. Consider this: There are 6 billion people living on 
this planet. Take out 1.5 billion people who are in the developed world that leaves 4.5 billion 
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people who have got such low purchasing power that the Western world does not even think 
they are worth chasing. For this the group has to build upon a series of capabilities, not just 
one or two. Only the cumulative synergy of all such capabilities can bring in the desired 
effect. 
Reliance has already located gas at major parts of this country. All it needs to do is source it 
at a low cost, convert it and put it for multiple uses like power, petrochemicals, domestic 
consumption etc. It also plans to use it for innovative purposes like refrigeration, converting 
it to diesel, ventilation etc. And with this the possibilities are enormous. The group is already 
working on issues like capital costs, catalytic costs and conversion efficiency. But the real 
challenge is to get the right kind of catalyst and to get the economics right. Despite having a 
half chance, few global players possess the ability to replicate such an envious position. 
Taking into consideration the low per-capita consumption of energy in India, there is the 
potential for enormous growth in the next 20 years. This was quite similar to the capital-
productivity-execution problem faced by Reliance for its Infocomm project. "It is a full 
business model, a unique business model that we are trying to develop ourselves, adds 
Mukesh Ambani, (Business World, August 2003)." The groups' key emphasis will be on fast 
turnaround of capital. Perhaps Reliance Infocomm was the fastest in the world in terms of 
capital recovery. 
Having already emerged as the largest business group in India, there was a need to create a 
more organised process for nurturing and developing the groups' human resources. And this 
might require a far more radical change in the groups' style of functioning than any change in 
its formal structure. However, as it becomes a truly world-class, professionally managed 
powerhouse, the Reliance Group will have to affect another crucial change: its image. 
Constantly under attack from its business rivals and politicians throughout the 1980's and a 
major part of the 1990's, the group has had more than its share of controversy. Since the 
after-taste still lingers, the group needs to present a more transparent face. However, the 
biggest challenge before the group yet is a battle of inheritance between the two brothers 
(Mukesh and Anil) over issues of corporate governance and sharing of power in the groups' 
ambitious telecom foray and power ventures. 
Just when the battle between Reliance siblings Mukesh and Anil seemed to be spiralling out 
of control, the family matriarch Kokilaben stepped in. She asked an old family friend, ICICI 
Bank CEO, K.V. Kamath to work out an amicable solution in his personal capacity. Her brief 
to him was simple: come up with a valuation, which offers an equitable solution to a 
problem, which was threatening to engulf the group apart. In order to unravel the 
complicated web of assets and family holdings, Kamath in turn engaged leading investment 
banker Nimesh Kampani (of J.M. Morgan Stanley) to work out the unravel the fortune 
estimated at around Rs. 80000 crore (Hindustan Times, March 13, 2005). This could lead to 
the opening of a pandora's box with major tax implications and unfolding of a complex web 
of cross-holdings in which the management control and ownership of various group 
companies is currently enmeshed. According to the industry grapevine, a settlement is around 
the comer. The three likely possible options: 
In the first scenario, Mukesh gets Reliance Industries (minus refinery and marketing), IPCL 
and Reliance Infocomm. Anil gets Reliance Industries (Refinery and Marketing), Reliance 
Energy, and Reliance Capital including insurance and brokerage and hard cash. Roadblock: 
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The division of Reliance Industries would have been possible through the de-merger of 
Reliance Petroleum, which was merged into Reliance Industries a couple of years ago. This 
has been ruled out as this would rob the company of its cash flows and create dissonance in 
the structure of the behemoth. In the second scenario, Mukesh gets Reliance Industries 
(minus oil and gas), IPCL and Reliance Infocomm. Anil gets Reliance Industries (oil and 
gas). Reliance Energy, and Reliance Capital including insurance and brokerage and hard 
cash. Tagging oil and gas with Reliance Energy would help it in its aspiration to become a 
global energy conglomerate. Roadblock: Breaking up Reliance Industries is just too much 
trouble. In the third scenario, Mukesh gets Reliance Industries and IPCL without disturbing 
Reliance Industries structure, Reliance Power and Utilities and Reliance Power and 
Terminals. Anil gets Reliance Infocomm, Reliance Telecom, Reliance Energy and Reliance 
Capital including insurance and brokerage. Roadblock: Mukesh Ambani will have to give up 
Reliance Infocomm, something that is very dear to him. 
From an initial investment of Rs. 15000 (less than $2000) in 1958 to start a trading house, 
followed by the setting up of his first tiny manufacturing facility in 1966, Dhirubhai Ambani 
has managed to set up a synthetic yam, textiles and petrochemicals empire that with a market 
capitalisation in excess of Rs. 80 billion (about $2.7 billion) in 1994, was the only entrant in 
Business Week's listing of the 50 largest companies headquartered in developing countries. 
In India, Reliance was the foremost non-government company by almost every measure 
including revenues, profits, net worth and asset base. Its earnings growth is, however, more 
re-assuring, averaging around (21-22) % during the same period. Even as its margins have 
got squeezed in line with the global glut in polyester, Jardine Fleming estimates that the 
tripling of its volumes will ensure a three year CAGR of EPS of 26 % (Business Today, 
January, 1998). 
Its historical peak of 15.55% in 1996 is perhaps a sort of record, when compared to its closest 
competitor Indo Rama Synthetics in the same year at 0.15%. This has been primarily possible 
because of its focus on vertical integration, which had manifested in this enormous cost 
leadership. However, with the Reliance Infocomm (a wholly owned subsidiary of Reliance 
Industries) holding enormous market power, the future is only ripe with opportunities. The 
steady rise in the groups' market capitalisation despite market volatility makes one thing is 
very clear - Reliance is averse to market risk. A look at the RIL and RPL merger will reveal 
a different picture. Because what one is doing is merging capital employed in a Rs. 25000 
crore asset, which is one year old with another Rs. 25000 crore asset, which is perhaps 10 
years old. However, if we adjust the capital employed in terms of their age factor, then we 
can get a different picture altogether. Comparisons have to be facilitated between its peers 
(domestic and international) on a continuous basis. Only then one can get a more meaningful 
picture. In the 90's when the group built the refinery, the groups' cash flow was around Rs. 
5000 crore. And on that platform the group decided to invest Rs. 25000 crore on its 
Infocomm project. Once the Infocomm project goes on-stream the groups' cash flow will be 
in the range of Rs. 20000 crore. The real challenge will come when the group will be faced 
with a situation when it needs to invest Rs. lOOOOO crore. Adds Mukesh Ambani: "... those 
kinds of opportunities rarely exist; there is a physical limitation (Business World, August, 
2003)." But if Reliance gets its networking right, it may not seem to be distant reality. 
Today the Reliance Group promoted by Dhirubhai Ambani is elephantine in size, but it also 
floats like a butterfly. Ever since the textile major integrated backward into the manufacture 
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of PFY, in 1982, it has built-up huge capacities in every product-line in the value-chain. 
Circa 1998, the group is the sixth largest producer of PFY (capacity 2.1 million tpa), fifth 
largest producer of PSF (capacity 2.7 million tpa), tenth largest producer of PE (capacity 3.5 
million tpa). And with the completion Hazira Phase II expansion project, the group had the 
largest grass-roots cracker in the world (capacity 7.5 million tpa). By vertically integrating 
the value-chain from polymers, chemicals, fibres, fibre-intermediates, textiles, and 
ultimately, branded ready-made's, the group is perhaps possess the only global operation that 
is vertically integrated from textiles at one end to oil and gas exploration at the other. 
Reliance's businesses primarily comprises of seven independent divisions: polyester fibres 
(contribution to business: market-share - 14% and 40%), fibre intermediates (22% and 55%), 
polymers (25% and 45%), polymer intermediates (25% and 55%), chemicals (13% and 
38%), textiles (5% and 60%), and oil and gas (1%) source (Business Today, January, 1998). 
Barring oil and gas, which are still a question mark the group leads the market by miles in 
other constituents. They are therefore, all shining stars. It the mid 90's it had invested Rs. 
9700 crore in a 15 million tpa grassroots oil refinery at Jamnagar. And in a final act of 
integration, it had invested Rs. 1800 crore to develop the Panna, Mukta and Tapti oil fields in 
the Western parts of the country. The group had by far built up scale through vertical 
integration and focus. As for the groups foray into power it has already implemented three 
power projects with a combined capacity of 1300 MW at Patalganga (Maharashtra), Bawana 
(Delhi), and Jamnagar (Gujarat). It has also moved into financial services to manage the 
groups overall financial linkages. Though the power and finance diversifications seem 
unrelated in-terms of industry coimt, they are horizontal integration moves, because the 
linkages between them are crucial for overall performance of the group. On the overall the 
mindset of the Reliance Group had been to build up scale with focus, coupled with 
diversification exposures primarily along vertical and horizontal lines. 
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Annexure III: Case Study - Aditya Birla Group 
The history of the B.K.Birla - Kumar Mangalam Birla group (recently christened as Aditya 
Birla Group dates back to 1912; currently led by 36 year old Kumar Mangalam Birla since 
1995, son of late Aditya Birla and grand son of B.K. Birla. From trading in cotton, silver, 
sugar and jute the group the group forged ahead in key industries such as textiles, fertilisers, 
chemicals, sponge iron, cement, refineries, carbon black, aluminiiim, financial services and 
software. For Kumar Mangalam Birla, the ascension coincided with an economic downturn, 
and hence steering a behemoth that has presence in diverse industries and a conservative 
organisational structure that is nearly 100 years old is no doubt a difficult task. However, the 
groups current vision is to put a predominantly commodity manufacturing group into an orbit 
of global infrastructure industries, which its late chairman Aditya Birla had left unfinished. 
The roots of the Aditya Birla group dates back to the 19th century in the picturesque town of 
Pilani set amidst the Rajasthan desert. It was here that Seth Shiv Narayan Birla started 
trading in cotton, laying the foundation for the House of Birlas. Through India's arduous 
times of the 1850s, the Birla business (consolidated) expanded rapidly. In the early part of the 
20th century, our Group's founding father, Ghanshyamdas Birla, set up industries in critical 
sectors such as textiles and fibre, aluminium, cement and chemicals. As a close confidante of 
Mahatma Gandhi, he played an active role in the Indian freedom struggle. He represented 
India at the first and second round-table conference in London, along with Gandhiji. It was at 
"Birla House" in Delhi that the luminaries of the Indian freedom struggle often met to plot 
the downfall of the British Raj. Ghanshyamdas Birla foxmd no contradiction in pursuing 
business goals with the dedication of a saint, emerging as one of the foremost industrialists of 
pre-independence India. The groups' legendary leaders' grandson, Aditya Vikram Birla, 
soaked up the principles by which he lived. 
A formidable force in Indian industry, Mr. Aditya Birla dared to dream of setting up a global 
business empire at the age of twenty-four. He was the first to put Indian business on the 
world map, as far back as 1969, long before globalisation became a buzzword in India. In the 
then vibrant and fi'ee market South East Asian coimtries, he ventured to set up world-class 
production bases. He had foreseen the winds of change and staked the future of his business 
on a competitive, free market driven economy order. He put Indian business on the globe, 
twenty-two years before the former Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao and the former 
Union Finance Minister, Dr. Maimiohan Singh, formally introduced economic liberalisation. 
He set up 19 companies outside India, in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Egypt. Interestingly, for Mr. Aditya Birla, globalisation meant more than just geographic 
reach. He believed that a business could be global even whilst being based in India. 
Therefore, back in his home-territory, he drove single-mindedly to put together the building 
blocks to make their Indian business a force to be reckoned with in the boimdaries of the 
international marketplace. 
Under his stewardship, his companies rose to be the world's largest producer of VSF, the 
largest refiner of palm oil, the third largest producer of insulators and the sixth largest 
producer of carbon black. In India, they attained the status of the largest single producer of 
viscose filament yam, apart from being a producer of cement, grey cement and rayon grade 
pulp. The Group is also the largest producer of aluminium in the private sector, the lowest 
first cost producers in the world and the only producer of linen in the textile industry in India. 
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At the time of his untimely demise, the Group's revenues crossed Rs. 15000 crore globally, 
with assets of over Rs. 16000 crore, comprising of 55 benchmark quality plants, employee 
strength of 75,000 and a shareholder community of 600,000. Most importantly, his 
companies earned respect and admiration of the people, as one of India's finest business 
houses, and the first Indian International Group globally. Through this outstanding record of 
enterprise, he helped create enormous wealth for the nation, and respect for Indian 
entrepreneurship in South East Asia. In his time, his success was unmatched by any other 
industrialist in India. 
That India attains respectable rank among the developed nations' was a dream he forever 
cherished. He was proud of India and took equal pride in being an Indian. Under the 
leadership of its present Chairman, Mr. Kumar Mangalam Birla, the group has sustained and 
established a leadership position in its key businesses through continuous value-creation. 
Spearheaded by Grasim, Hindalco, Indian Rayon, Indo Gulf Fertilisers and companies in 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Egypt, the Aditya Birla group is a leader 
in a swathe of products — viscose staple fibre, aluminium, cement, copper, carbon black, 
palm oil, insulators, and garments. And with successful forays into financial services, 
telecom, software and BPO, the Group is today one of Asia's most diversified business 
groups. 
Way back in 1974, Aditya Birla set up the group's first overseas venture in Thailand. A year 
later, he set up the group's first textile mill in the Philippines, which exports to US, South 
Korea, Australia and China. Given a legacy of such thinking, Kumar Mangalam Birla may 
have to prove himself, but his job lies in slashing, rather than entering new businesses. 
Indeed, his strategic decision to shelve the group's non-core projects has not only clarified 
the tack the group will take in the future, but also his ability to take decisions quickly. In tune 
with such policy he has already divested Indo Gulf Fertiliser's Rs. 1350 paper and pulp 
project in Uttar Pradesh, and Indian Rayon's Rs. 105 crore fibreglass projects in Rajasthan. 
The rationale: the estimated returns would not have been commensurate with the investments 
made since the utilisation capacities were in excess of market's size. "Our approach towards 
investments in new industries has become strategic rather than opportunistic, says B.N. 
Puranmalka, Managing Director, Indo Gulf Fertiliser, (Business Today, January, 1998)." 
In building a conglomerate, the late Aditya Birla also created India's first quasi-transnational. 
For the visionary scion, change was not just a consequence; it was the bedrock on which the 
group was built. The cornerstones of the philosophy of the Aditya Birla Group had been 
traditionally woven around: establish world scale plants; keep the cost of ftmds low; ensure 
high rates of capacity utilisation; and control costs. Under the industrial licence raj, this 
worked wonders, but now Kumar Managalam needs to retune them to maintain its 
competitiveness. Since a young CEO heads it, the group's long-term stability is almost 
assured. But what could be critical to the group - which will surely include B.K. Birla 
companies in future - is the people factor. Managing a diversified conglomerate will need 
managers who are professional and focussed - something the group yet lacks. 
At the moment, sexagenarian and septuagenarian loyalists, who believe in unconditional 
loyalty to the CEO, run the group. While this may well have its advantages in the short run, 
in the long run it could be suicidal. A global empire has come to Kumar Mangalam on a 
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platter. An empire those three generations of Birlas built with foresight and intricate 
planning. Political connectivity, a controlled economy, and surplus cash spawned a 
conglomerate whose tentacles were just beginning to extend overseas when Aditya Birla 
died. "The group have some inherent strength. They must now be married to an amended 
direction to make progress, adds Walter Viera, a consultant to the group, (Business Today, 
January, 1998)." The current group chairman is pushing hard with the globalisation of the 
empire, by expanding manufacturing bases in Asia, where the business downturn in the 
1990's makes the timing for this push perfect. 
Integration is the primary factor that had propelled the Aditya Birla Group. For instance the 
Rs. 1150 crore Hindalco is the largest integrated producer of aluminium in the country, with 
its own bauxite reserves and downstream production facilities. By controlling the biggest 
cost factors in the manufacturing of aluminium - power and alumina - through its own 500 
MW power plant and captive mines, Hindalco had emerged as the lowest cost producer of 
aluminium in the world. Even though India accounts for only 3% of the global output of 
aluminium; Hindalco's conversion cost is only $1033 per toime as against Alcan's $1250. 
Century Textiles is one of largest composite cotton mills in the country, producing over 110 
million metres of cotton cloth per annum. It is also one of the leading cement producers in 
the country. And while Indian Rayon is the third largest player in rayon yam, the group is the 
third largest and sixth largest producers of carbon black (insulators), respectively, in the 
world. It is also the largest private sector producer of rayon grade pulp. Right away, the 
Aditya Birla Group has the two key ingredients that go into the making of a global cost 
leader: scales and integration. 
After the untimely death of Aditya Birla in 1995, the group initiated a series of meetings and 
presentations with institutional investors, banks and analysts to project the only heir to the 
Aditya Birla empire, Kumar Mangalam Birla as the leader to an empire comprising a 
turnover of Rs. 7200 crore, a fixed asset base of Rs. 13000 crore and a human resource base 
of 0.4 lac employees. The reason: to stem and dispel doubts about the group's future 
prospects and upcoming projects. In the past one year, the entire group closed in around the 
new and untried chairman. No communication, official or otherwise came out of the group 
headquarters. Industry House, Mumbai - as Kiomar Mangalam settled into his job - except 
for the occasional rumours about disgruntled senior managers. The fact is that Kumar 
Mangalam is at least three decades younger than most of his managers make things even 
more difficult. 
The young Birla clarifies, "I had no time to talk to the media - there was so much work to do. 
My priority was to ensure that everything goes on smoothly (The Economic Times, March 
13, 1997)". But as major group companies - Grasim, Hindalco and Indo Gulf Fertiliser -
came up with comparatively lower profitability in their half-yearly results and the status of 
projects in telecom, copper, paper and power stayed fuzzy, investor confidence looked 
doubtfiil. Could Kumar Mangalam keep the flag flying? More importantly, consider the size 
of the task ahead: diversifications into telecom, power, a refinery, wood pulp and copper 
smelting. New projects worth Rs. 8300 crore, ongoing capacity expansions worth Rs. 5369 
crore are at the helm of group's majors. And one 29 year old at the helm without much 
formal grooming in the group's activities, the doubts began to seem natural. 
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Kumar Mangalam's balancing act was not easy. On one hand he had to ensure that the 
group's precedent oriented senior management, drawn selectively by his father from the 
Marwari community and collaborators and lenders perceive no upveals in the Group Empire 
and systems created by Aditya Birla. On the other hand, he has to make his own tracks to 
establish his identity as capable of leading the multi-national and multi-dimensional group 
into the next century. Says Harsh Goenka, Vice-Chairman, RPG Group, "He is very sincere 
and hard working, and academically well qualified. It is just that expectations from him are 
quite high - I am confident of him, but it will take at least two years for him to leave his 
imprint on the group (The Economic Times, March 13, 1997)." 
Kumar Mangalam, who was always content to follow in his father's footsteps, is now 
carefully working out his ovra blueprint for the future. Characteristically cautious, there is no 
dramatic departure from the past. As he himself commented, "I don't believe in making 
changes for the sake of making changes (The Economic Times, March 13, 1997)." The man 
who had spent the past one year concentrating on ensuring that the loss of the leader did not 
hamper the group's working or progress in ongoing projects, was ready to prove that he was 
up to it. For the year 1996-97, though the year-end results will not be dramatic given the 
market conditions in its different businesses. "Profitability in Indian Rayon will be better 
than last years; at Grasim it will be about the same; and at Hindalco only slightly lower. Only 
at Indo-Gulf, we will be imable to make up for the performance of the first six months, says 
M.C. Bagrodia, Senior Group President, (The Economic Times, March 13, 1997)." 
Kumar Mangalam Birla on the direction the Group has taken in the last four years: 
"I would like to take this opportunity to retrace the direction of our group over 
the past four years. If one were to encapsulate it in a single word - the 
dominant strategic theme over the past four years has been consolidation. This 
is in line with our vision of being a premium conglomerate, with a clear 
business focus at each business level, relentlessly pursuing value creation. The 
logic underpirming consolidation is the push for market leadership, economies 
of scale, productivity gains and operational efficiencies". 
First, I believe our overseas units have exemplified the process of consolidation. The 
financial shock that hit the South East Asian countries in 1997 took until last year to fully 
wear off. Whilst several erstwhile corporate titans in the region have crumbled, our units, 
without exception, have not only emerged unscathed but stronger, and have continued to 
grow and excel. Let me remind you that our units overseas operate in a far more liberalised 
environment than we have in India, and duties on finished products are from nil to a 
maximum of five per cent. I believe that we can be truly proud of their achievements. In 
many ways, they hold a mirror to what the future economic scenario will be like in India, 
when duty differentials reduce to global levels. The acquisition of a 74.6 per cent equity 
stake in Indal from Alcan, at an investment of a little over Rs.lOOO crore, has been a 
milestone. Bringing Indal into the Group's fold has helped us position ourselves along every 
link in the value-addition chain of the business, from metal to downstream products, where 
the Hindalco - Indal combine accounts for an over 70 per cent market share. 
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Moving on to the other metal in the Group's stable, it is commendable that Birla Copper has 
attained a leadership status ~ commanding a market share of over 45 per cent -- within a 
short span of three years from its first commissioning. The de-bottlenecking of the copper 
smelter at Dahej last year has resulted in cost efficiently enhancing the smelter capacity by 
50 per cent to 150,000 tpa last year, and the ramp-up achieved has truly set a new global 
benchmark. The acquisition of the Nifty mines in Australia from Straits (Nifty) Pty Ltd has 
elevated Birla Copper to an integrated copper producer. Yet another landmark restructuring 
move has been the decision to consolidate Indo-Gulf s copper business with Hindalco. All 
these moves take us ahead on the road towards unifying the Group's non-ferrous metals 
businesses, and transforming Hindalco into a globally competitive non-ferrous metals 
powerhouse. Post-restructuring, Indo-Gulf will emerge ftilly focused on fertilizers, with a 
brand that commands a huge equity, strong cash flows and a leadership position in the 
fertilizer industry. It is well positioned to take advantage of the opportunities that arise from 
the disinvestment program of the government. 
The decision to de-merge the Insulator Division - one of the Group's best performing 
businesses - and transfer it to a separate 50:50 joint venture with NGK of Japan, the leading 
global player in the business, is a crucial step to take the insulator business to new heights. 
The partnership with NGK will help to build upon and strengthen the leadership position we 
already enjoy in the domestic market; because of the access we will have to the latest in 
product and manufacturing technology. In addition, there will be opportunities for getting 
plugged into a global marketing network. Through this route we will take the insulator 
business to new heights. A slew of initiatives have also been taken to consolidate the 
operations of Grasim -among them, the closure of the pulp and fibre plants at Mavoor and the 
sale of the loss-making fabric operations at Gwalior. Over the past three years, Grasim has 
become much leaner and stronger — with the debt/equity ratio improving from 0.93 to 0.58, 
interest charges falling from Rs. 292 crore to Rs. 168 crore, operating profit rising from Rs. 
678 crore to Rs.ll42 crore, and workforce rationalization taking the manpower strength from 
24,400 to 16,600. In the Telecom business, we joined hands with the Tata Group. Beginning 
in two states, we have expanded to seven states - after having bid successfully for Delhi and 
Madhya Pradesh and acquiring the Chattisgarh circle. Our subscriber base has reached 1.1 
million. Our footprint covers 40 per cent of the cellular market in India, with a 47 per cent 
market share in the circles where we operate and an 11 per cent market share nationally. 
They have also divested the Group's stake in MRPL to ONGC. Although the sale of the 
group companies' equity stakes in MRPL will have a one-time impact on their profits, the 
exit from MRPL indicates our firm resolves to rationalize the Group's portfolio of businesses 
with a view on the fiiture, and also bears testimony of our commitment to a key group of 
stakeholders: our lenders. The Birla Sun Life joint venture, which started off three years ago, 
has developed a major presence in the insurance and mutual funds' sectors. Birla Sun Life is 
perceived as a leading quality market player recognized for its superior service levels, and we 
consider this as a core business with immense growth potential in the years ahead. From all 
of this, a clear trend emerges. The group's strategy dictates that it get out of businesses where 
they are bit players and strengthen the businesses where they have clear competencies, so 
that it get to the top of the league or consolidate its position there, as the case may be. This 
leads to a sharper and tighter business portfolio with its firepower being better targeted. 
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Though Kumar Mangalam has made sufficient headway in the second stage of the groups' 
growth cycle, much is yet to be done. Given the short time he has taken over at the helm of 
the group, Kumar Mangalam has already proved himself to be a successful change agent. 
Luckily for him, a doting grand father - Basant Kumar Birla has thrown all his weight behind 
his grandson. He commented, "Kumar is clear in his thoughts, and imless he is convinced, he 
will not agree to anything (Business Today, January, 1998)." The focus for the future: to stay 
in the core sector, and continuously upgrade and improve costs and quality in existing 
businesses. New businesses, for the time being, are restricted to the ones already in the 
making - telecom, power and refineries. Adds Kumar Mangalam: "We are now in the phase 
of consolidation. The idea is to build backward and forward linkages in existing businesses to 
gain control over critical inputs (The Economic Times, March 13,1997)." 
Available resources within the group therefore, would be ploughed back as investments in the 
group's core businesses. Hence, the Rs. 600 crore rayon grade wood pulp at project at Grasim 
is a priority - as rayon production, where imported wood pulp is a major cost factor. So are a 
variety of captive power generation projects to augment power supplies for its cement plants 
will ease chronic power shortages. Again, for its cement business, the group has invested in 
the "own-your-ovm wagon scheme" to ease logistic problems. On the other hand, the bagasse 
based paper project and a fibreglass project have been dropped. The reason: neither 
diversification plans showed clear competitive nor leadership edge. "We will only operate in 
businesses where we can be clearly be dominant players, says Kumar Mangalam himself, 
(The Economic Times, March 13, 1997)." Businesses, which carmot provide this, are low 
priority. 
A focus on world-scale capacities, constant attention to operational efficiencies and prudent 
financial management - the common strands binding the wide range of business areas of the 
group are responsible for the impressive achievements of the group. The Aditya Birla Group 
is the first Indian multi-national, which made direct foreign investments overseas. Today the 
group has a manufacturing presence in the vibrant economies of South-East Asia - in 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Egypt. Further it has marketing offices in 
Singapore, Dubai, UK, US, Russia, South Africa, Tanzania, Vietnam, China and Myanmar. 
The group had pushed ahead aggressively in the power sector through a joint venture with 
Power Gen, UK's largest utility company. 
It also had a pre-dominant presence in frontier technologies through Birla AT&T 
Communications, a joint-venture with America's AT&T, undoubtedly the world's best known 
name in communications. It has a leading position in the financial services sector, with an 
established reputation as one of India's leading managers of mutual funds, a business for 
which there is a tie-up with Capital International of the US, one of the largest and most 
respected names in this field, worldwide. Nearly 90% of its group companies have ISO 
certification. The group also had the distinction of being: the worlds largest producer of VSF, 
the worlds largest refiner of palm oil at a single location, worlds third largest single location 
producer of electrical insulators, worlds sixth producer of carbon black and India's largest 
private sector producer of caustic soda, Portland cement, rayon grade pulp and rayon. 
The rapid strides made by the group have been possible due to the strong underlying 
principles, which have been the cornerstone of the groups' corporate philosophy. For the 
Aditya Birla Group, the world is indeed its oyster. Whether, through direct investments 
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abroad; tie-up with international leaders to manufacture products and provide services for the 
Indian market; its modem management practices or its product profile, a global approach has 
been observed in all spheres of its activities. Through a constant up-gradation of technology 
and unflagging vigil over quality, international standards are maintained for the diverse range 
of group companies. Within the organisation, innovation is a habit. Every time something is 
done, an attempt is made to do it differently and better than the previous time. Management 
through consultation and consensus via management committees, shop floor committees and 
quality circles are basic principles of the organisation. Delegation and decentralisation call 
for the participation of each individual. The group's commitment to enviromnent and social 
welfare is evident from its range of activities in these fields. Its projects bring progress to 
remote and backward areas and its plants are the nucleus of thriving community 
development. 
The move in commodities is towards value added products: previously at Hindalco, 50% of 
the total production was in the form of base metals, while the rest is in value-added products. 
By the end of the century 75% of its sales will come from value-added products. Marketing 
was being geared up towards brands than can command a premium. "Indo-Gulf's Shaktiman 
brand commands a premium in the urea market - we provide a total customer package, adds 
Kumar Mangalam, (The Economic Times, March 13, 1997)." However, it is not that the 
Aditya Birla Group will no longer grow or diversify. In fact a dozen of different proposals 
were being examined. But there has been a subtle change on the strategy side. Kumar 
Mangalam has crafted a clear-cut criterion for new investment decisions. The factors: it 
should be a differentiated value-added product, with substantial presence in the value-chain. 
It should have strategic linkages with the group's existing businesses, indicating clear 
sustainable competitive advantage. And critically, project investments needs to be evaluated 
over a sustained period - not just the initial investment. 
In the past one year the group had commissioned phase I, a capacity of 3 mtpa at MRPL, 
India's first refinery after the sector was opened up to the private sector - and as group 
officials are quick to point out, three months ahead of actual schedule, in March 1996, and 
now functioning at 120%) capacity utilisation. It had also received all clearances and tied up 
funds for its Rs. 3690 crore phase II expansion to 9 mtpa, which is expected to be complete 
by August 1999. It had also started operations in one circle in its telecom venture through 
Birla AT&T, and is scheduled to commission two other circles very soon. Working on the Rs. 
2710 crore Bina power project, through its joint venture Birla Powergen, was at an advanced 
stage. The Rs. 1850 crore copper smelter projects at Indo-Gulf, which had generated some 
criticism, are due to be completed by 1997. 
Says Pradip Shah, Chairman, Ind-Ocean Venture Advisors, "I am optimistic about his 
capability. He is trained under his father for five years, and he has a very level head over his 
shoulders (The Economic Times, March 13, 1997)." "One can appreciate that there is 
apprehension in the market. But Kumar Mangalam has worked with his father so long that 
within the group we see no appreciable difference, admits M.C. Bagrodia, Senior Group 
President, (The Economic Times, March 13, 1997)." That is the crux of his strategy: to make 
a difference, without seeming to make it obvious. Traditionally, the group has grown through 
green-field projects, though in future the group will be also relying on acquisitions and joint 
ventures. However, the group plans to go by a minimum 50% stake to ensure management 
control. Historically, the firms of the Aditya Birla Group had operated independently, 
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controlled only from the headquarters, with very nominal investments and resource transfer 
among the member firms. However, with post liberalisation resource transfer among member 
firms of other groups of similar size had increased drastically, the Aditya Birla Group was 
slow to respond to the same. 
Diverse as its activities are, the group companies are dominant players in each of the business 
segments they operate in. Grasim is in the forefront in developing new-generation speciality, 
high performance fibres. It has developed a solvent spiiming process for producing cellulose 
fibre. The company is also working on producing cellulosic thermoplastic polymer, which 
can be converted into fibre/filament by melt spinning techniques. It has developed new 
processes to produce rayon grade pulp from beimboo, eucalyptus and mixed hard woods. It is 
a leading supplier of technology and machinery related to the production of man-made fibres. 
It possesses some strong premium brands and has received prestigious awards in the areas of 
productivity and TPM. Hindaico is among the world's most efficient producers of 
aluminium. It has received several national awards for exports and energy consumption. To 
keep ahead of the market, Hindaico is moving ahead towards higher value-added products. It 
has implemented a modernisation and expansion programme, with technology sourced from 
Reynolds International Inc, US. The company's Renusagar power plant has consistently 
achieved a plant load factor of over 95%. 
Indian Rayon is a branded leader in white cement category. Its hi-tech carbon plant was the 
first unit in India to introduce high temperature technology for manufacturing carbon black. 
It also pioneered the recovery of waste heat and the use of waste gases to generate power. 
The sea-water magnesia plant at Visakhapatnam produces refractory grade magnesia from 
sea water. Indo-Gulf's Jagdishpur plant is one of the most energy efficient ammonia/urea 
plants in the coimtry. It was also the first to introduce gas-based fertiliser plant in the private 
sector. Its urea brand "Shaktiman" had become the market leader. It is also getting up a 
copper smelter complex at Dahej in Gujarat. The smelter with a capacity of 1.5 lacs tpa is 
perhaps the only plant in India to have the flexibility to use a wide range of copper 
concentrates. 
Managalore Refineries and Petrochemicals (MRPL) plant incorporated the latest hydro-
cracker technology to convert heavy fractions to high value distillates. MRPL has sourced 
process technologies from three leading companies: Universal Oil Processes, US; Kinetic 
Technology, US; Shell, Netherlands. Its capacity had been recently enhanced from 3 mtpa to 
9 mtpa. It is also the first joint sector refinery in India. The newly formed joint venture Birla 
AT&T is all set revolutionise the communication scenario in the country. Birla Global 
Finance has already made a foray in a wide range of financial services. It had tied up with 
Capital Group, US to launch to distinctive mutual fimds in the Indian market. It had also tied 
up with Marlin Partners, UK for dealing in investment banking activities globally. 
One factor, which is a mixed blessing, is the support of the top management. "I have worked 
with G.D. Birla, Aditya Birla and now with Kumar Mangalam. We are professional 
managers; our loyalty is with the job, says B.N. Puranmal, MD, Indo-Gulf Fertilisers, (The 
Economic Times, March 13, 1997)." The Birla Group is very dependent on the personal 
touch. It will take Kumar Mangalam some time to build his own equations with his senior 
managers. As a supportive function his mother Rajashree Birla had also started taking a more 
active role, and her unequivocal presence helps to ease the transition. On the other side 
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having a global mind-set, including definite strengths in project identification, in 
implementing projects with estimated costs and schedules and in continuously improving 
quality and bringing down costs will guide future performances. In the past diversifications 
were undertaken various group companies, because at that time it was a question of who got 
the license. However, in its future investments the group needs to be convinced - what is the 
right thing to do - that will enhance shareholder value. Since this would be an irreversible 
decision, it needs to be thought out very clearly. 
By relentlessly pursuing scale, size and efficiency, it has emerged today as the biggest player 
in most its businesses today. The groups' turnover spans Rs. 27000 crore with a geographical 
presence in 18 countries and an employee base of 0.72 lacs. It is the largest producer of 
cement in India; it controls 45% of the aluminium and 40% of the copper markets; it is the 
market leader in insulators, VSF, yams and carbon black. After ten years of succession, it was 
clear to Kumar Mangalam that the strength of the Aditya Birla Group lay in being a 
conglomerate. He did not therefore split his companies into entities focused on one or two 
businesses. He did jettison some projects. 
The group publicly announced a paper and chemicals project, closed down some plants (a sea 
water magnesium unit in Vishakapatnam) and sell his stake in others (MRPL, a 
petrochemicals joint-venture with government owned HPCL) and all this to build on his core 
businesses. In cement, Kumar snapped up companies and factories, increasing his production 
capacity from 5 mtpa 1998 to 31 mtpa in 2003. Likewise in non-ferrous metals, it acquired 
Indal from Alcan to add to his group's already substantial interest in aluminium through 
flagship Hindalco. In copper, three years after commissioning the first smelter, it also took 
over two copper mines in Australia. "Despite the pressures he faced at the time of his taking 
over, he had the vision to take his key businesses to a higher level", says Amit Chandra of 
DSP Merrill Lynch (Business Today, December, 2003). 
Although most of Birla's companies are sitting on piles of cash, the promoter's stake in many 
of them is low to moderate. In Grasim it is less than 21%; in Indian Rayon 27% and in 
Hindalco under 25%. That could be one reason why the group has not tapped the capital 
market even once, financing every diversification from internal accruals and huge cash flows 
from its operations. Perhaps Kumar did not want to dilute the groups' shareholding levels any 
fiirther. In the last eight years cash from operations at just the three big companies - Grasim, 
Hindalco and Indian Rayon aggregated to more than Rs. 35000 crore ($ 7.65 billion). Though 
the late Aditya Birla relied more on organic growth to grow his businesses through green-
field expansion, the young Kumar took advantage of the group's consolidation in cement and 
metals to grow by mergers and acquisitions. "Our goal is to make all our businesses globally 
competitive, says Debu Bhattacharya, CEO, Hindalco (Business Today, December, 2003)". 
Therefore the group made its foray into relatively freer markets like Egypt, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. 
Kumar Mangalam had spent the first five years of his career trying to untangle his existing 
jumble of businesses and drive operational efficiency. As a result of its strong resource 
position built up, the group is in the process of finalising a massive investment plan in line 
with young Birla's new growth strategy. It plans to invest a fiirther Rs. 20000 crore across his 
businesses - primarily in aluminium, copper, cement and fertiliser. For a comparison, in 
aluminium alone, the group will investment more than it has done in the last two decades. 
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Clearly, the Birla has now chosen to shift gears. The next few years will mark an inflexion 
point within the group. For the first time, the group is beginning to think big, really big. In 
the past, Birla was simply focussed on extracting value rather than betting big on growth. He 
typically chose to add capacity in small chunks or acquire healthy, but rQlatively small 
businesses. Consider a couple of his big bets - in 2000, he bought the Rs. 1750 crore Indal, 
which added a third to his existing aluminium capacity. After that, it took him an agonising 
36 months to clinch a deal in early 2004 to buy L&T's cement business worth Rs. 2500 crore. 
Of the total investment of Rs. 20000 crore, insiders say, Birla is close to allocating around 
Rs. 16000 crore over the next four years for his aluminium business. The plans were drawn 
up by Hindalco's, MD, Debu Bhatiacharya, includes the setting up of two new plants. So far 
the board had not yet seen the final blueprints. But after it is ratified by the board, it will 
increase the aluminium capacity of the Aditya Birla Group three times over, all at one shot, 
and pitchfork him into the global top ten manufacturers list. Will Hindalco's plan suck out 
much of the outlay, it will also force the group to take on some debt, and something the group 
has shied away for a long time. If things go according to plan, the rewards will be big too. 
When the two new plants become operational in a little over four years, the Rs. 6800 crore 
Hindalco will be almost as big as the group is today. And in nearly half the time the young 
Birla took to increase the group's empire from Rs. 7200 crore to around Rs. 28000 crore after 
he took over the helm. "Our plan for aluminium is unlike anything we have done before, it 
will take us into a different league, says Debu Bhattacharya, (Business World, September, 
2004)". The stock markets too seem to have noticed. "Conglomerates are all about size and 
scale. Birla was talking of value creation when his peers were thinking big. The market was 
not convinced", adds a leading mutual fund manager (Business World, September, 2004). 
A little before a decade the Aditya Birla Group was the second largest conglomerate, ahead 
of the Reliance Group, and only behind the Tata Group. Since then the Reliance Group has 
zoomed past both the Tatas and the Birlas. Its turnover had shot upto Rs. 99000 crore on the 
back of its aggressive backward integration plans and foray into telecom. The Tata Groups 
turnover had grown to Rs. 65000 crore, led by the expansion and diversification plans by its 
two flagship companies, TELCO and TISCO. The Aditya Birla Groups turnover now is just 
Rs. 27000 crore. The new growth plan should, however, address some of that concern. In the 
last eight years the young Birla has consciously shifted focus from predominantly fibre based 
business to one that is driven by non-ferrous metals and cement. The share of the textile 
business had since dropped from around 25% of the groups' turnover, to below 5% now. In 
contrast the share of the metals and cement business has increased to over 60%. So the group 
had literally put all its eggs in one basket - aluminium. The intent is to become globally 
competitive. The route is again through cost leadership. 
So why is the group so aggressive on aluminium? And will it give him a tenable place in the 
global metal business? This is much in line with its global strategy devised with help of 
strategy consultants - Boston Consulting Group. The confluence of four issues had prompted 
Birla to pin his hopes on aluminium. In the last few years, the leading aluminium players in 
the world, Alcan (capacity - 3.5 mtpa) and Alcoa (capacity - 4.1 mtpa), have begun a ftirious 
consolidation spree. They have acquired nimierous small players across Europe and the US. 
This enabled the top ten players in the industry to control more than 50% of the market. In 
the process, greater scale has helped bring down the unit cost of production. Now, the price 
movements in the aluminium business are indicated by the LME, leaving very little scope for 
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manipulation by individual players. So far, Hindalco has been able to keep its costs down, 
releasing nearly Rs. 1500 crore of free cash flows. 
For any commodity, and aluminium is no exception, long-term viability hinges on its ability 
to produce it cheaply through the ups and downs of the commodity cycle. Currently, 
Hindalco's cost of production fares among the top quartile of the world's most efficient 
producers. But with a capacity of just around 0.4 mtpa, it had remained to be an insignificant 
player. Even the tenth largest player produces 50% more than that of Hindalco. As other 
companies start expanding, Hindalco's lack of scale was soon become a major handicap. It 
would also have a bearing on its ability to keep costs low "Staying in the business with the 
same capacity is like running on the treadmill, you just stay Where you are, says Debu 
Bhattacharya (Business World, September, 2004)". Fortunately for Hindalco, despite its late-
mover status, it still had a window of opportunity to scale up and enter the global league. The 
30-mtpa global aluminium market is growing at 4.5% every year. What is more important, 
Asia is where the hub of action is. Despite China, Middle East and South-East Asia already 
soaking up capacities, a shortage of aroimd 2 mtpa is in the oflfing. 
But once demand tapers off - and that won't happen in a hurry, since the upturn in the 
aluminium cycle is just starting. Therefore, the issue just boils down to global 
competitiveness to sustain long-term performance. That is one where Hindalco enjoyed a 
clear advantage. India had good quality of bauxite ore, the fifth largest in the world. Having 
smelters near the mine pithead will save substantial costs, which will have a direct impact on 
margins, especially in a downturn. Currently, majors in China namely - Guandong Fenglu 
Aluminium Company and Aluminium Corporation of China are just of Hindalco's size. Its 
Chinese counterparts, on the other hand, had to import the ore and thus bear an additional 
transportation cost, denting their competitiveness. 
However, the technology used by the Chinese producers is around 30% cheaper than the 
commonly used Pechiney's technology by Hindalco. Also reserves of bauxite is getting 
exhausted at many of its locations forcing the group to source elsewhere, thereby incurring 
higher transportation costs. It may be able to ward off competition from the Chinese, but on 
the domestic front it had to contend with formidable competition fi-om Sterlite Group, 
promoted by Anil Agarwal. The group's investment started more or less at the same time of 
that of the Birla that neutralising any footage for late entry. Thus while Sterlite lost over its 
bid for Alcan, it outsmarted the Birlas in their bid for getting control over state owned Rs. 
900 crore Balcan. Therefore Hindalco's resource bundle would have to be sharpened to 
ensure its competitiveness in the long run. 
The Rs. 16000 crore investment plan for aluminium will flow into two projects - the Utah 
Alumina Project and the Aditya Aluminium Project, both based in Orissa. The eastern state of 
India had by far the biggest quality of bauxhe reserves comparable to the best in the world. 
(This also explains why the global mining giants like the $ 15 billion BOP had chosen Orissa 
as a safe destination). The two projects are somewhat different from each other. A two-stage 
process makes aluminium from bauxite. First, an intermediate alumina is extracted from the 
bauxite ore. Bauxite is generally found mixed with red mud, around (3-4) metres below the 
land surface. On an average around three tonnes of bauxite is required to extract one tonne of 
alumina. Thereafter, alumina is reduced to aluminium metal by an electrolytic process in a 
smelter. At this stage the location of the smeher from the reserves site help maintains cost to 
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a large extent. "We can reduce costs only to an extent, beyond that, there is a crying need to 
increase scale, adds Debu Bhattacharya, (Business World, September, 2004)". The second 
stage requires a lot of power - which can account for around 40% of the total costs. So 
companies, choose to further process alumina into aluminium depending on the cost of 
power. As things stand, there exists a robust market for both alumina and aluminium. 
In the Utkal project, where the Birlas have a 55% stake along with Alcan, the plan is to have 
a 1.5 mtpa alumina plant. This project has been on the anvil for the past six years, but never 
took of because the government could not rehabilitate the people living near the mines. Now 
the problem seems to have been sorted out, and the Birlas should be awarded the mining 
lease shortly. The Aditya project is a wholly owned subsidiary of Hindalco with a capacity of 
1 mtpa of alumina, and 3.5 mtpa of aluminium. This will catapult Hindalco into the top 10 
aluminium makers in the world. Today, the effective import duty on aluminium is pegged at 
10%. But to ensure that the new projects remain competitive even if duties fall further, the 
plans had to clear stiff internal hurdles for a host of financial parameters like return on capital 
employed, return on equity, interest cover, and that too, assuming a zero import duty on the 
primary metal. 
Even as Birla cranks up his aluminium business, considerable focus is also on copper. But 
unlike aluminium, where size and scale is the key factor, the story is different in the case of 
copper. Here expansion has more to do with being cost competitive, rather than growing the 
business in terms of size. When the Birlas first ventured into copper in the mid 1990's, they 
started the business more as a domestic play. The differential between import duty on the 
metal and its raw material was high (nearly 30%). This allowed the domestic players earn a 
very good margin as just mere converters. There was also growing demand for copper for use 
in jelly-filled telecom cables. So in 1997, the group, through their fertiliser company Indo-
Gulf, put up a copper smelter along the port area in Dahej in Gujarat. This was to ensure that 
they could import the metal easily. Of course they had to contend with the same infra-
structural headaches that are common with most projects. There was no infrastructure then 
available in Dahej to import large quantities of solid cargo. Birla then spent a considerable 
time and money in setting up a new port. No power was available on the site, so the group 
had lay railway lines to transport coal for a new power plant. There were no housing 
facilities. So the group had to develop a township for its employees. None of this quite 
mattered then, since profitability was assured due to the import duty cushion and the 
reasonably strong intemafional copper prices. 
But by around 2000, import duties started coming down (the present differential duty is 
10%). That exposed the vulnerability in the group's strategy. There are typically two 
categories of copper smelters: ones attached to the captive mines, and the standalone 
smelters, which buy ore from the market. However, when copper prices move upwards; the 
standalone smelters end up paying a substantial premium for the ore. This disturbs the cost 
equation and leaves the players scrapping for bottoms. There are two obvious routes out of 
this situation. First, the group had to find out a way shore up its supply of ore. Secondly, it 
has to mitigate the additional investments made on infrastructure. Luckily, the port in Dahej 
is the only bulk solid handling port in the region. So the group had allowed commercial 
access for handling vessel to third parties. Next to bring some cash to the business, the 
company began to convert sulphuric acid, a by-product of copper, into phosphate fertiliser 
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and sell it. It also started recovering gold and silver from the smelter - all to extract a bit 
more value. Yet all this is not enough. 
A few months ago, copper conversion charges fell to almost pence per pound. That really 
shook the group. If the groups business were to remain profitable, its efficiency in terms of 
cost would have to be in the top quartile amongst the worlds leading producers. Just like in 
aluminium. That means the group has to increase capacity and use the additional volumes to 
spread its fixed costs. That's exactly what the group is doing at an investment of Rs. 1800 
crore. When the copper expansion goes on-stream end 2005, the group will have the 
advantage of having the largest single location smelter in the world. The group is also in the 
process of acquiring more mines so that it can procure at least 40% of the raw in-house. That 
is when the conversion costs will be just (5-6) pence per pound, and the group will be 
positioned in the top quartile. 
While the Aditya Birla Group laid the foundations for its metal business; it was also building 
up an impregnable position in cement. In July, 2004, the group took over the cement business 
of L&T, giving its capacity a clear market leader, at nearly 31 mtpa much ahead of its closest 
competitor Gujarat Ambuja - ACC combine at (28 mtpa). The group had paid Rs. 2200 crore 
to buy a 51% stake in the business. Soon thereafter it renamed the much-famed 'L&T 
Cement' with 'Ultra Tech Cement'. Given the sizeable investment, the business would have 
to earn a much higher return. Considering the industry outlook, that may not be very difficult. 
The cement market is growing at around 8%, and it also pre-empts new investments in green-
field capacities because they are not viable at current cost levels. Industry experts are of the 
opinion that in the short-medium term demand will far exceed supplies, considering the 
large-scale investments on infrastructure and housing projects. 
When that happens, the price realisations for cement at around $(40-45) per tonne, they are 
far lower than the international benchmark of $(60-80) will go up. That will have a huge 
impact on the margins of its cement business. Already with a gross margin of 28%, Grasim is 
reckoned to be among the most profitable cement companies in the world. The group had 
already started adding small chunks of capacity to grow market share, however, focus will be 
clearly on consolidation. Despite having made significant investment overseas, the group had 
currently put its brakes on its geographical diversity, by committing major investments in the 
domestic circle. And this is at a time when most Indian business groups are furiously 
expanding overseas. This may seem ironical, especially since, frustrated by the regulatory 
environment, Kumar's father, late Aditya Birla, was among the first Indian industrialists to 
establish global outposts, way back in 1974. 
''Context is another word the young Birla uses often in his conversation about his businesses. 
If his father ran the conglomerate differently from him, it was because of a different context 
in which he built and managed his businesses. By the time he took over the reins of the 
group, he had realised that the context was changing. India was no longer an insular 
economy; tariffs were coming down and you had institutional investors coming in. It became 
clear that we had to place our bets in fewer industries (Business Today, December, 2003)". 
Therefore he concedes a different context needed a radically different approach. The skills 
that were needed to manage and succeed in the post-liberalisation era were very different 
from the earlier decades. Fixing that was his biggest challenge. Birla began the process of 
"contemporisation" by inducting in fresh talent at midlevels, vertically and horizontally. 
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Within the organisation, that is exactly what he is doing: he has begun the process of what he 
calls institutionalising procedures and creating a systems orientation. First came the rising 
sun logo - to impart, as he puts it, a feeling of identity to group companies. Alongside is a 
major thrust on human resource development: The HR function is being treated at the 
corporate level. He instituted a performance appraisal across the group, and a programme for 
tracking and developing high potential managers, which includes developing skills, inter-unit 
transfers and secondments abroad. Kumar Mangalam has also personally visited top 
management institutes to attract entry-level talent. More critical, perhaps, are the three new 
corporate cells, which have already functional for about a year. The first is the corporate 
strategy cell; which examines new investments and projects, and evaluates national and 
international developments that will impact group activities. The second cell is the project-
monitoring cell; this tracks ongoing projects on a regular basis to ensure that projects are 
proceeding on schedule. 
The third is the manufacturing systems cell; which is expected to track and suggest 
improvements in quality and productivity. And for the most important part of it, the group 
has hired people in the age group of 28-30 for industry specific functions. No creating cross 
currents however, in typical Birla style, he is quick to point out that these crack teams are 
meant only for the chairman's office, they are also purely a support fimction for senior 
management across the group. On the structure side the group is heavily networked. All 
member firms freely interact. The top management is highly decentralised; every profit 
centre has total operational fi-eedom within certain broad parameters. The concept of 
knowledge moving around the group is a continuous process. The attitude is of wanting to 
absorb from everything surrounding the business environment, continuously upgrading and 
learning. 
In the past five years, around 325 senior people retired, and at least 400 young talents were 
inducted in. It wasn't a coincidence that one of the first senior-level recruit was a HR 
specialist, Santrupt Misra, who came aboard from HLL. He commented, "The group's HR 
policy has gone in for a complete overhaul, with emphasis now on adoption of globally 
accepted best practices" (Business Today, December, 2003). The new hires - as well as 
exiting people, got more autonomy. While the senior Birla kept tabs personally on daily 
production at every unit, sales and cash flows, his inheritor manages the group by giving the 
senior executives greater autonomy and depending on CVA analyses and MIS. In fact when 
the group took over a second Australian copper mine, it was Hindalco's Debu Bhattacharya 
who led the team and clinched the deal; earlier it would have been a Birla himself However, 
that does not mean the young Birla is a hands-off manager. When Chermai based chartered 
accountant, S. Gurumurthy mediated to settle the L&T deal, it was Kumar himself who saw it 
through from the frontline, not any of his deputies. 
Currently, Kumar Mangalam's A -Team comprises of: Santrupt Misra - an ex HLL joined in 
1996, he heads the HR and corporate InfoTech functions of the group and has put in place the 
groups HR systems and processes; Saurabh Misra - an ex ITC joined in 1999, heads the 
groups cement businesses. He played a key role in the take over of the L&T's cement 
division. He was also responsible for the Birla - AT&T merger with Tata Cellular, to form 
IDEA Cellular; Debu Bhattacharya - another ex HLL joined in 1998, spearheaded the groups 
foray into copper. He now heads the group's non-ferrous metals business, simultaneously 
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being the MD of Hindalco; Shailendra Jain - an old - timer, he began his career in the group 
in 1965, heads the groups VSF and yam businesses, both domestic as well as overseas; 
Sanjeev Aga - ex MD Blow Plast joined in 1997, handles the groups fledgling software 
business as well as TransWorks, the newly BPO outfit; S.K. Mitra -joined the group in 1994 
and is the head of the group's overall financial planning, as well as heading the mutual funds 
and insurance joint-ventures; M.C. Bagrodia - at 66, he is one of the oldest in his core team 
who has worked with four generations of Birla's since 1956, He currently heads the Birla 
Management Centre, the group's apex strategic decision making entity; Bharat K. Singh - As 
director corporate strategy and business development, he heads a team that tracks and 
evaluates new business opportimities and recommends new strategies and plans. 
Back in 1995, it wasn't the stock markets that were sceptical about the young Birla. Ten years 
on, Kumar's recast of the group and consolidation of its businesses through acquisition, 
integration and restructuring seems to have paid back "Grasim has been the fastest growing 
cement company in the last five years, while the VSF business has provided most of the cash, 
says D.D. Rathi, Group Executive President (Business Today, December, 2003)". In 
commodity businesses like cement and aluminium, Birla has managed to guard against 
cyclical vagaries of the marketplace by going up the value-chain. In case of Hindalco, 60% 
of the production is of value-added products. In the highly profitable insulation business, it 
has tied up with NGK of Japan. Says Rakesh Jain, a former GE Plastics Executive, who had 
been appointed CEO of Indo-Gulf Fertilisers; "We are well positioned to weather any 
uncertainty, including decontrol of the sector" (Business Today, December, 2003). 
One of the final outcomes has been the re-rating of stocks of the group's pivotal companies. 
Grasim on the strength of its cement business, trades at a PE of 17.75 (November, 2003), 
compared to 9.7 in 1995; Hindalco at 20.5, compared to 11.2 in 1995. Says Manish 
Chokhani, Director, Enam Securities, "The market has factored in the organisational changes 
and re-rated the group's stocks" (Business Today, December, 2003). True, there are others 
with big ambition in commodity-oriented businesses - like Sterlite Industries (Hindalco's 
primary competitor), but Birla's sheer dominance across a swathe of commodities is difficult 
to match. Thus while commodity businesses are highly cyclical in nature, the groups strong 
exposure in a number of commodities, had reduced its risk on the vagaries of cyclical 
fluctuations. 
But the same carmot be said of his other businesses. Like many other big industrial groups, 
Aditya Birla group has also forayed into new and emerging industries. In sharp contrast to his 
commodities businesses, they are still small and in some instances not very successful. His 
InfoTech venture is too tiny in comparison to the industry heavy weights; his presence in 
telecom in IDEA Cellular is more of a financial stake, rather than strategic; and a slew of 
joint-ventures in financial services like mutual fiinds and insurance are still in their formative 
stages. Although the takeover of Madura Garments in 2000, gave him a head start in the 
apparel market, competition in that segment is ever increasing, with incoming threat from 
local players. He also made tentative entries into entertainment and media (including an 
aborted move for a joint-venture with Star TV). The young Birla defends some of these not-
so-successful ventures as 'testing the waters'; and others like his BPO and IT businesses as 
the ones that could well prove too big in the long haul. He is not quite sure whether his group 
will look different in the next (5-10) years in terms of business portfolio; but he is very sure it 
will be quite different in terms of size. Kumar Mangalam replies, "I am convinced that we 
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(the group) have all that it takes to be in the Fortune 500 by the turn of the decade" (Business 
Today, December, 2003). 
Currently, nearly 80% of the group's turnover comes from its cash cows of textiles (including 
VSF and VFY), cement, carbon black, aluminium and fertiliser. In all these industries the 
group faces little or no threat from local or global competition even as tariff barriers are 
falling. In carbon black, despite the tariff barriers being reduced from 179% in 1991 to 30% 
in 1998, the group had fended off import threats successfully and kept its bottom-lines 
healthy. Beyond the geographical botmdaries, the group's companies in Thailand - Thai 
Carbon Black and Alexandria Carbon Black, together produces 1.2 lakh tpa of carbon black; 
making them the largest producers in South-East Asia. Besides it has plants in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Egypt and its products are exported to US, UK, France, Italy and 
Japan. Indian Rayon is the second largest textile manufacturer in the country today. Grasim 
today accounts for about 9% of the global production of VSF. The share is likely to go up in 
the future because stringent norms discourage new capacities in the developed world. These 
industry specific problems, like envirormiental pollution, makes imports a dwindling threat to 
the group. As such the landed price of VSF and most of its products are far higher than its 
domestic prices. A healthy annual growth in demand at around 8%, fortifies the group's 
market position. 
As for cement, domestic capacity pre-empts imports, however increasing threat is from 
global players like La Farge, which have deep pockets. In aliuniniimi, the prices are linked to 
the LME, but Hindalco's low freight costs make it more attractive to local users. Businesses 
like paper have become dogs with import duties being slashed from 140% in 1991 to 20% in 
1998. And the new businesses the group has jumped into - such as telecom services, qualify 
only as post liberalisation question marks. Therefore restructuring the translational 
conglomerate to face international competition will not be an easy task, nor that the Birlas are 
blind to the need to reconfigure. Far from it, admits B.K. Birla the septuagenarian groups' 
founder whose Rs. 4500 crore group comprising primarily Rs. 1990 crore Century Textiles, 
Rs. 600 crore Century Textiles and Rs. 650 crore Kesoram Industries will eventually come to 
Kumar Managalam: "Restructuring will not be easy task given the groups 93 year old legacy 
and the country's tax structure (Business Today, January, 1998)." As a sort to medium term 
strategy, the group had launched an internal refocusing programme, code-named "Vision -
2002", whose objective is to chart out the groups competitiveness in the next five years. Post 
1992 boom and the accession of Kumar Mangalam as the group's chairman, the stock market 
had heavily discoimted the group's stocks negatively. However, post 2000 when all the 
diversifications had fallen into place, investor's confidence revived, and valuation of group 
companies improved. 
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